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6 Executive Summary 
The Sixth Periodic Report on the social and economic 
situation and development of reQions  in  the EU ar-
rives at an important moment both for the European 
Union as a whole and for Cohesion policies in particu-
lar. The transition to the Euro has already started and 
there is the prospect of enlargement towards Central 
and Eastern European countries. This occurs against 
a backdrop of increasing globalisation and a 'second 
industrial  revolution'  based on  information  technol-
ogy. 
All of these changes have important implications for 
regional economies and labour markets and this re-
port provides background information on social and 
economic trends in the regions. As well as updating 
much of the information contained  in  previous Peri-
odic Reports and in the First Cohesion Report (  1996), 
11  also contains new data and analyses. 
1. The situation In the regions 
In previous Periodic Reports and in the Cohesion Re-
port. the first signs of real convergence of lagging re-
gions were  detected,  but the message was mixed, 
with some indicators showing convergence while oth-
ers were unclear. The evidence is now unambiguous: 
the GOP, or output, per head of poorer regions is con-
verging towards the EU average. Over the  10 years 
1986 to 1996, the following changes are evident: 
•  GOP per head in the  10 regions where this was 
lowest increased from 41% of the EU average to 
50%, in the 25 poorest regions, it rose from 52% to 
59%. 
•  GOP  per  head  in  the four  Cohesion  countries 
went up from 65% of the EU average to 76Yl%, 
and, according to forecasts, to 78% in 1999. 
This Is an unusually rapid pace of convergence, both 
from an historical anti International perspective. It has 
been driven largely by closer European economic in-
tegration. but the Structural Funds have also played 
an Important part. As  an example, exports and  im-
ports between the Cohesion Four and other EU Mem-
ber States have doubled in real terms over the past 
decade and now amount in each case to around 120 
billion ECU. 
However, the above figures also show that significant 
disparities remain; even where catching up is occur-
ring relatively rapidly. the full process can take a gen-
eration or more.  In addition, although most regions 
are experiencing at least some convergence,  their 
performance varies widely. The more favoured lag-
ging regions, particularly capital cities such as Dublin 
or Lisbon, are catching up much more rapidly than 
their rural hinterlands. This underlines the importance 
of reviewing the distribution of aS$istance periodically 
to ensure that limited resources are concentrated in 
the regions that most need it. 
Although regional output is converging, the situation 
regarding unemployment Is less positive. Despite cy-
clical recovery since 1994, unemployment in the EU 
still stood at just under 10% in late 1998, meaning that 
there were 16Yl million people without work who were 
looking for jobs. 
Increasing unemployment over the past 25 years or 
so has affected some regions much more than others 
and some have hardly been affected at all. The 25 re-
gions  with  the  lowest  rates  of  unemployment  are 
rooch the same now as 10 years ago and their rates 
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have remained steady at around 4%.  By  contrast, 
rates in the most affected regions have climbed from 
20% to nearly 24%. 
A particular concern is the scale of long-term unem-
ployment: 49% of the unemployed have been out of 
work for a year or more, 30% for at least two years. A 
closely related problem is the exclusion from the la-
bour market of certain individuals and social groups 
- such as many women and young people. These 
forms  of  unemployment  are  particularly  worrying, 
since they seem largely resistant to general improve-
ments in the economy. The 25 regions with the high-
est unemployment rates are particularly affected by 
such problems. In these regions, the long-term unem-
ployed account for 60% of total unemployment (as 
against 30% in the 25 regions with the lowest unem-
ployment). Moreover, only 30% of women of working 
age have a job and youth unemployment rates aver-
age 47%. 
The resumption of growth alone will not resolve such 
problems. What is needed is an integrated approach 
combining a strengthening of the economic base with 
training  measures aimed at improving  the  skills  of 
those disadvantaged in the labour market and getting 
them into work.  In addition, where so many women 
and young people are excluded from pursuing work-
ing careers and from contributing to the generation of 
economic wealth. mainstreaming of policies aimed at 
them is not an option but a necessity. 
The regions of the  EU  can be roughly divided into 
three types (though some regions do not fit neatly into 
a single category): 
•  Large urban service centres. These regions typi-
cally perform well in terms of both GOP and em-
ployment. The  25 regions most concentrated in 
services have an output per head 27% above the 
EU average. Since the service sector is the main 
source of employment in the EU-jobs in market 
services  in  particular  increasing  by  12  million 
over the past decade-service centres generate 
significant employment opportunities,  often  ex-
tending  well  beyond  the  region  concerned. 
Nevertheless,  there  can still  be serious  unem-
ployment blacks  pots within the cities themselves. 
•  Industrial regions, the economy of which tends to 
be centred on medium-sized cities. which are of-
ten  part of a network. The fortunes of these re-
8 
gions depend strongly on the health of the partic-
ular industries located there. Since much of the 
sector is performing well. manufacturing regions 
are often successful; the 25 regions in which em-
ployment is most concentrated in manufacturing 
have an output per head 8% above the EU aver-
age and unemployment of over 1  Y2  percentage 
points below the average. However, a minority of 
industrial regions particularly affected by restruc-
turing have high rates of unemployment, some-
times (but not always) combined with moderately 
low GOP per head. 
•  Rural regions, with relatively high employment in 
agriculture. These regions generally perform rea-
sonably well in terms of unemployment, although 
problems may show up in other ways, eg in terms 
of high outward migration. However, some agri-
cultural subsectors are low value-added and face 
significant  restructuring  pressures.  The  25  re-
gions with the very highest dependence on agri-
culture  (and  this  can  be  extreme,  covering 
anything up to 40% of the labour force) are partic-
ularly affected and have an average unemploy-
ment  rate  of  14.7%.  This  underlines  the 
importance of facilitating diversification. 
Policy  must.  therefore,  be  tailored  to  the  different 
types of need in different regions. For regions under-
going restructuring, the main problem is  unemploy-
ment, rather than low output and underdevelopment 
Unemployment blackspots are often found  1n  other-
wise successful areas, despite the opportunities sur-
rounding  them.  For  these  regions.  an  integrated 
approach is, therefore, needed, not just increasing lo-
cal economic activity, for example, but equipping the 
people who live there, particularly those who are diS-
advantaged. to play a full part in the economy. 
Demographic trends are likely to affect the EU labour 
market substantially in the long-term, and the report 
examines projections to 2025. Three factors stand out 
in particular: 
•  Low birth rates will mean an ageing of the popula-
tion. with consequences for pensions as well as 
for health care. Over the next 5-10 years, this will 
be particularly  pronounced  in  the  Northern  re-
gions of Italy,  Southern and Eastern Germany, 
Southern France and mainland Greece. By 2025, 
the effects will be most pronounced in Northern It-
aly and central France where the number of over-65s for every 100 people of working age will have 
nearly doubled,  increasing to 40 or more.  The 
number of over-80s, a critical determinant of the 
need for long-term care and the demands on the 
health service, will increase everywhere, but par-
ticularly in Greece, Spain and Italy, with conse-
quent pressure on public budgets. 
•  Similarly,  the  labour force will  continue to  age, 
raising questions about its future adaptability to 
technological change.  The  provision of lifelong 
learning  is,  therefore,  likely to  become a more 
pressing issue in the future. 
•  Labour  supply  is  projected  to  increase  up  to 
2005, due mainly to increasing female participa-
tion rates and, less so, to continued inward migra-
tion.  From  then  on,  declining  population  of 
working age should begin to have an effect and 
the  labour force  is  projected  to  start  shrinking 
from around 2010 onwards.  However, the distri-
bution of the decline between regions means that 
it cannot be relied on to resolve regional dispari-
ties  in  labour market balance.  In  some  regions 
with  relatively  low  unemployment,  notably  in 
Northern Italy, labour supply may even start to de-
cline in  the next few years. possibly creating la-
bour  shortages,  though  it  is  also  possible  that 
growth in demand for labour would give rise to in-
creased  participation.  In  some  high unemploy-
ment regions.  notably  in  the  Southern  parts  of 
Spain and France, labour supply is expected to 
go on rising for some time to come and is unlikely 
to  help  reduce  unemployment  in  the  medium-
term. 
2. Competitiveness 
Competitiveness has  two main  dimensions - pro-
ductivity and employment. The EU is performing rea-
sonably well on the former and badly on  the  latter: 
income and output growth of just over 2% over the last 
decade came  mainly  from  increased  productivity, 
which grew by almost 2% a year, while employment 
rose by less than Y2% a year. This pinpoints the labour 
market in general and the need to increase the em-
ployment-intensity of growth, in particular, as signifi-
cant challenges to competitiveness in the EU. 
Executive Summary 
Lagging regions face the double challenge of catch-
ing up with the present, as well as adapting to the fu-
ture. For some regions, notably in Ireland, Spain and 
Southern Italy, productivity is close to (or in the case 
of Ireland, above) the EU average and the main chal-
lenge is the generation of employment. Conversely, 
Portugal and the  new LAnder  in  Eastern  Germany 
have relatively high employment rates,  but in both, 
productivity would need to increase by 50% to con-
verge to the EU  average. In Greece, significant in-
creases would need to take place in both productivity 
(by 40%) and employment (20%). 
An  unfavourable sectoral structure together with  a 
lack of innovative capacity seems to  be among the 
most important factors underlying lagging competi-
tiveness, suggesting that the key development chal-
lenge  in  the  regions  affected  is  to  improve  the 
productive base and their potential for growth. Poor 
accessibility and low levels of education among the 
work force are often contributing factors to reduced 
competitiveness but, for the most part, regional dis-
parities in these respects are less important than they 
were. 
There is also evidence, however, of the key impor-
tance of less tangible factors which cannot easily be 
quantified, particularly the efficiency-or lack of it -
of public administration, the extent and effectiveness 
of business support services, the availability of social 
facilities. the prevailing business culture and various 
other aspects of the institutional structure. which cre-
ate  a  favourable  environment  for  the  necessary 
changes in the more tangible factors to occur. The 
success of Northern Italy, for example, or the lagging 
development of many parts of the South, cannot be 
explained  simply in  terms  of  the  structure  of  eco-
nomic activity, accessibility and education levels. 
This, therefore, argues strongly for an integrated ap-
proach to regional development which explicitly ac-
knowledges the complexity of the process and takes 
due account of the interaction between factors. intan-
gible as well as tangible. The need, in sum, is for a 
long-term strategy which addresses simultaneously 
the many aspects of the problem of a lack of competi-
tiveness and attempts to build up the social capital of 
a region-its business culture, administrative struc-
ture, institutional relationships and so on - in parallel 
with its physical Infrastructure, the skills of its work 
force and its productive base. 
9 Factors underlying competitiveness 
Although there has bean soma narrowing in recent 
years, the technology gap (measured by such indica-
tors as  patent  applications  and  spending  on  re-
search)  batwaan the  Cohesion  countries  and  the 
other Member States far exceeds the gap in GOP per 
head (except for  Ireland,  which  has  more  or less 
caught up In both respects). The disparities are most 
signifrcant in terms of output indicators, ie in terms of 
the innovations which stem from research and devel-
opment,  underlining  the  need to  improve  the  effi-
ciency of the process  by whiCh research  effort  is 
~latad  Into new products or more efficient ways of 
doing things in lagging regions.  In this respect. it is 
important to bear in mind that companies can inno-
vate  and  bacoma  more  competitive  through  the 
transfer of technology, possibly by means of direct in-
vestment. without necessarily having to do their own 
RTO and applying for patents. 
SMEs play a major rote in employment creation and 
the development of lagging regions. The number of 
SMEs is highest in the Southern Member States. al-
though this is partly due to their different pattern of 
sectoral specialisation. In addition, SMEs tend to be 
concentrated  in  more  favoured  regions  of  these 
countries. particularly capital cities. while in the poor-
est  regions  there  are  comparatively  few.  Tackling 
such imbalances must be part of an integrated ap-
proach to regional development which also takes ac-
count of the  sectoral  distribution of SMEs  and  the 
extant of their presence in the more dynamic sectors. 
Recant research suggests that the potential contribu-
tion of SMEs to development depends on other condi-
tions. such as the availability of support services and 
on their links with large firms and/Or the networks be-
tween them. 
Foreign  direct investment  (FDI)  contributes  to  re-
gional development, not just by increasing the capital 
stock but also by introducing new products and tech-
niques. In order for lagging regions to derive the full 
benefits of FDI, however, it is important that the firms 
making the investment become integrated into the lo-
cal economy.  Over  the  past  10 years,  the  EU  has 
bean the world's major investor abroad, but it has also 
received large inflows of FDI. In relation to GOP, Ire-
land especiaHy  but also  Portugal  and  Spain  have 
benefited from aboYe average inflows of investment 
from countries outside the EU as well as from other 
Member States. 
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Despite progress in recent years. significant dispari-
ties  in  transport infrastructure  remain  between  re-
gions, and the four Cohesion countries still lag behind 
other parts of the Union,  particularly in terms of the 
standard of provision. Even more progress has been 
made in reducing disparities in telecommunications 
infrastructure.  The  Cohesion  countries  still  have 
somewhat less extensive networks, as measured by 
the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants. 
However. with the notable exceptiOn of Greece. the 
gap in the quality of networks, as measured by the ex-
tent of digitalisation, has largely been eliminated. 
The, availabiHty of reliable sources of energy at rea-
sonable cost Is  closely linked to economic growth 
and  development.  Investment in  energy infrastruc-
ture is necessary to close the remaining disparities in 
provision between different regions. In particular, the 
market in natural gas Is sliM very ~mented,  and cer-
tain regions continue to be at a disadvantage in terms 
both of market structure and of infrastructure. 
Disparities in human capital, ie the education levels of 
the work force. are also tending to narrow. though sig-
nificant differences remain in the relative number of 
young people remaining in education and initial voca-
tional  training  beyond  compulsory  schooling.  The 
weight of the past is reflected in the high proportion of 
people of working age with only a basic level of edu-
cation. Three-quarters of those aged 25 to 59 in Portu-
gal  and  two-thirds  in  Spain  have  no qualifications 
beyond basic schooling. These figures are substan-
tially lower, however. for the 25 to 34 age group. re-
flecting the progress baing made to raise levels. 
Institutional factors are increasingly seen as key ele-
ments in competitiveness.  Such factors  include the 
endowment of social capital, in the form of the busi-
ness culture and shared social norms of behaviour 
which facilitate cooperation and enterprise, which is 
of particular  importance for  regional  development. 
Networks between firms are both a product of social 
capital and an element of it. These combine the econ-
omies of scale normally open only to large firms with 
the  dyn~ism and flexibility of  small  units and.  as 
such, are especially important for innovation. 
In fact. social capital (or the lack of it) is a key factor in 
a broad range of elements contributing to regional 
competitiveness and is cited as an important issue 
underlying aspects as diverse as innovation and in-
ner city social problems. A relatively low level of social capital in many lagging regions in the Union is a major 
constraint on their competitiveness. 
The efficiency of public administration is another insti-
tutional factor of importance.  In recent years, there 
have been significant changes in the principles gov-
erning public sector management. a key feature be-
ing  emphasis  on  performance  evaluation.  so  that 
lessons from the past can be systematically fed into 
decision-making to  improve policy  in the  future  (to 
create a 'learning organisation'). Another feature is a 
shift  towards  decentralisation  and  partnership,  en-
abling different levels of government as well as the 
private sector to participate in the policy process and 
to bring their different kinds of expertise and experi-
ence to bear. 
According  to  studies,  the  delivery  system  for  the 
Structural Funds makes two important contributions 
to  the  institutional  endowment  of  lagging  regions, 
through: 
•  programming  and  evaluation.  which  together 
have created a policy-makmg process w1th con-
tinuous  improvement  in  the  measures  imple-
mented  (again  the  'learmng  organ1SSt1on')  and 
which are often described as the ma1n innovatiOn 
to arise from the Funds. Such a process reQuires 
an  accumulation  of  expert1se  w1th1n  public  au-
thorities and. for most Member States. the impe-
tus  to  acQuire  this  came  from  the  Structural 
Funds. In addition. the Commission is developing 
and diffusing best practice techniQues for evalu-
ation; 
•  mobilising private ·and public sector partners at 
the local level. which is not JUSt a benefit in terms 
of increasing the effectiveness of the Funds, but 
is also starting to contribute to the accumulation 
of social capital and to the creat1on of networks in 
lagging regions. The Structural Funds provide the 
incentive and the opportunity for contact between 
many different actors from d1verse areas of the lo-
cal community who might not otherwise work to-
gether  and  can,  therefore.  help  overcome 
obstacles to closer interaction. The contact so es-
tablished  can  generate  benefits  across  a wide 
range of economic  activities in  the  region con-
cerned. 
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3. The role of EU structural actions 
Despite significant progress in recent years, the re-
gional cohesion problem in the EU remains consider-
able. The 25% of the EU population living in Objective 
1 regions have an average GOP per head little more 
than two-thirds of the EU average. GOP per head in 
Objective 1 regions is, however, gradually converg-
ing to the level in the rest of the Union. Between 1989 
and  1996.  those  regions  with  Objective  1  status 
throughout the period went from 63Yl% of the EU av-
erage to 69%. Only 4 of these regions experienced a · 
widening of the gap. 
The gap is the result of both lower productivity and 
lower employment rates than in other parts of the Un-
ion.  The closing of the gap that has occurred since 
1989 is predominantly due to a higher growth of pro-
ductivity in Objective 1 regions than elsewhere rather 
than  higher  employment.  Objective  1 regions  are, 
therefore, becoming more competitive, but, except in 
a few cases. this has not yet been translated into job 
creation. Indeed, unemployment is a major problem 
in many such regions, as well as in Objective 6 areas. 
Just over one in 6 of the labour force in Objective 1 re-
gions are unemployed. compared with one  in  10 in 
the EU as whole. 
For Objective 2 areas, the gap in unemployment with 
the rest of the EU, which is the main focus of policy, 
has closed on average since 1989. Experience, how-
ever. varies between Member States.  In Objective 2 
areas in Germany. France and Italy, unemployment 
was higher in  1997 than in 1989, while in Denmark, 
the Netherlands and the UK,  it was markedly lower. 
Objective 2 areas have a high dependence on a very 
limited number of manufacturing sectors which have 
accounted for the major part of job losses. Neverthe-
less. there is evidence of small enterprises growing in 
importance  and  increasing  the  number  of  people 
they employ, offsetting to some degree the jobs lost in 
large firms. 
In Objective Sb areas, except for those in the Nether-
lands and the UK, unemployment has risen steadily 
since  1989, including during the present economic 
recovery. which suggests that the structural element 
may be becoming more Important. On the other hand, 
employment has risen by more than in other parts of 
the Union, w_hich suggests a larger increase in the la-
bour force than elsewhere.  It also suggests slgnifi-
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cant diversification of economic activity away from 
agriculture, which is the main aim of policy, and there 
is evidence of net job creation in manufacturing in-
dustries where SMEs predominate, especially those 
connected to the rural economy, though also in other 
areas. 
Various studies undertaken to assess the impact of 
the Structural Funds on assisted regions indicate that 
they have made a significant contribution to there-
duction in  regional disparities across the  Union.  In 
particular, a central estimate from the four main mac-
roeconomic models used to estimate the effect of the 
Funds, suggests that they have added around Y2 per-
centage point or more to the growth of Objective 1 re-
gions. By 1999 the cumulative effect of the Funds is 
estimated to have increased the GOP of Greece, Ire-
land and Portugal by nearly 10% in each case and 
that of Spain (much of which is not covered by Objec-
tive 1) by  over 4%. These figures suggest that a signif-
icant  proportion  of  the  catching  up  that  these 
countries have experienced over the period 1989-99 
would  not  have  happened  in  the  absence  of  the 
Funds. 
However.  the  models  also  highlight  the  exteM to 
which the effectiveness of the Structural Funds de-
pends on other factors.  such as  sound macroeco-
nomic and other policies at the national level and the 
structure  of  economic  activity  in  the  region  con-
cerned. 
4. Enlargement 
The  situation in  the  Central and  Eastern  European 
(GEE)  countries has evolved rapidly since the  col-
lapse of the previous regime around the turn of the 
decade. After initial sharp falls in income and output. 
most of the GEE countries have experienced growth 
since  1993 or 1994. The  recovery has,  in  general, 
been most marked in the countries which have made 
the most progress in moving towards a market econ-
omy, underlining the gains to be achieved from  re-
form.  On  the  basis  of  the  recovery  and  closer 
economic integration with the EU,  many CEE coun-
tries have made large strides towards preparing for 
EU membership. 
However, much work needs to be done in  terms of 
boosting  output,  reducing  unemployment  and  re-
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gional disparities and improving the quality of infra-
structure. and the Structural Funds will have a signifi-
cant role to play in this. In addition, before the GEE 
countries are ready to participate in EU structural pol-
icy,  major effort will  be necessary to  put in  place 
structures for the administration of the Funds. 
Although output contracted significantly in  the early 
years of transition, economic recovery from 1993 on-
wards has allowed certain CEE countries to narrow 
the gap in output per head with the Union. In 1997, 
GOP per head in the countries, taken together, was 
around  40%  of  the  EU  average.  In  addition,  this 
masks  significant  imbalances,  such  as  Latvia, 
whose GOP per head is only 27% of the EU aver-
age, and Slovenia, for which this figure is closer to 
68%.  Only two  regions,  Prague  and  Bratislava, 
have a GOP per head above 75% of the EU aver-
age. 
Regional imbalances within GEE countries are char-
acterised by the relative prosperity of urban centres 
and certain Western regions bordering the EU, which 
have benef1ted from the expansion of the service sec-
tor. Conversely. employment has plummeted in other 
regions as a result of large-scale job losses in  tradi-
tional industr1cs and reductions 1n agriculture. Never-
theless.  employment  in  agriculture  and  industry 
remains h1gn  1n some regions, reflecting delayed re-
structuring 
Unemployment has risen significantly in most coun-
tries. but w1th considerable variation in rates. ranging 
from 5%  1n  the  Czech Republic to  14% in  Bulgaria. 
Latvia and  Lithuania.  There are  also  significant re-
gional  disparities  with,  again.  large  urban  centres 
and most Western regions having tower  unemploy-
ment. The labour force has declined as the availability 
of jobs has d1m1n1shed  and people have. withdrawn 
from the work force and, in many CEE countnes. par-
ticipation rates are now close to the EU average. Par-
ticipation 1s  regionally differentiated, often with high 
rates in areas where restructuring is still incomplete. 
European-wide economic integration is  reflected in 
growing trade flows.  By 1995, the EU was the main 
trade partner of all GEE countries. and the share of the 
latter in total EU trade is now superior to that of Japan. 
This has given rise to a significant EU trade surplus 
with  the  countries and EU-CEE exchanges are in-
creasingly  dominated  by intra-industry  trade.  The 
GEE countries as a group are also experiencing a sig--13-14
nificant  inflow of  foreign  direct  investment,  though 
flows are concentrated in a few countries with well-
advanced reform  programmes.  EU  Member States 
are by far the main source of investment, further con-
firming the increasing degree of economic integra-
tion. 
In  addition  to  the  economic  challenges  outlined 
above, the CEE countries still need a lot of investment 
in transport infrastructure and environmental protec-
tion. While the level of infrastructure in many areas is 
similar to that in the EU, the quality is, in general, sig-
nificantly lower. 
Despite major structural problems, most CEE coun-
tries have yet to develop regional policies. With transi-
tion.  CEE  governments,  at  differing  speeds, 
dismantled the machinery of state intervention in the 
economy and  accorded priority to macroeconomic 
stabilisation.  However,  as  economies  stabilised, 
most governments began to introduce development 
policies in recognition of the need to address regional 
disparities. This has been facilitated by decentralisa-
tion of government and encouraged by the prospect 
of EU membership. 
Accordingly, in most countries. the legal, institutional 
and budgetary structure for regional policy which will 
be  necessary  to  participate  in  EU  structural  policy 
has begun to be established. In some CEE countries 
(Hungary. Latvia and Romania), a specific legal basis 
for regional policy now exists. At the national level, the 
ministerial  structure  responsible  for  regional  policy 
has  been  improved  and  administrative  procedures 
are being put in place. At the regional level, adminis-
tration has been strengthened by decentralisation. 
However. fully establishing these structures and pro-
cedures is likely to be a long process. CEE regional 
policies are still weak. lacking a comprehensive strat-
egy and a programming approach. Measures tend to 
take  the  form  of  limited  projects.  implemented 
through sectoral policies which are only loosely coor-
dinated. There remains a need to strengthen the Min-
. istries responsible for regional policy and to develop 
their operational capacity, as well as to formulate na-
tional  strategies tor  regional  policy on  the  basis of 
which sectoral policies can be coordinated. Financial 
procedures also need to be improved so as to chan-
nel  the  support  from  the  EU  Structural  Funds  effi-
ciently. Much still needs to be done, therefore, before 
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the CEE countries will be ready to participate -in  EU 
structural policy. 
The economy of Cyprus is  in many ways well  pre-
pared for acceaslon. Although harmonised PPS fig-
ures do not exist yet, the GOP per head of Cyprus in 
these terms may be  close to or even above 75% of the 
EU average, with potential implications for eligibility 
for Objective 1 at accession.  Unemployment is low 
and  employment  high,  although  correspondingly 
productivity Is also low. 
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15 1.1 The economy 
Since the spread of the industrial revolution last cen-
tury, Western European economies have grown on 
average by 2-2Y.l% a year, though with marked varia-
tions around this trend during particular periods. One 
of these periods occurred after the war in the 1950s 
and 1960s, sometimes referred to as the 'long boom', 
when growth in Europe averaged almost 5% a year. 
High growth during these years was associated with 
expanding trade and investment, a stable institutional 
and  policy  framework  (including  stable  exchange 
rates) and the import of US technology1
• 
The  boom ended  with  the  oil  crises  of  the  1970s. 
Since 1973, growth in the EU  has once again aver-
aged  2-2Y2%.  This  is  slightly  less  than  in  the  US. 
whereas previously it had been substantially above. It 
implies a doubling of output-and real income-ev-
ery 30 years or so. In the 10 years 1986 to 1996, GOP 
in  the EU  grew. on average. by just over 2% a year 
(Table 1). though much more in the first half.  1986 to 
1991,  when  growth,  buoyed  by  expansion  of  the 
global economy and closer European integration. av-
eraged over 3% a year. In the second half,  1991  to 
1996, as a result partly of the downturn in the world 
economy, growth in the EU averaged just 1  Y2% a year 
and GOP fell by Y.l% in 1993 for the first time since the 
oil crisis in 1975. 
Recovery in 1994 was followed by some faltering in 
1995 and 1996 when growth averaged only just over 
2% a year, due in part to exchange rate uncertainty 
and a rise in real interest rates. Both problems were 
exacerbated by doubts about the credibility of na-
tional budgetary policies and the consequent pros-
pects for the  introduction of the  single currency in 
1999. As it has become clear that policy makers are 
committed to both EMU and budgets which can be 
sustained in the long-term, credibility has improved 
and despite the worsening of the global economic sit-
uation, growth over the period 1996 to  1999 is pro-
jected at over 2112% - slightly above the long-term 
trend. 
Regional patterns 
There  are  striking  disparities  in  economic  perfor-
mance between different parts of Europe, particularly 
between the central and peripheral regions (Map 1  )2. 
GOP  per head  (measured  in  terms  of  purchasing 
power standards, PPS. to take account of differences 
in price levels) is typically half to two-thirds of the EU 
average in  the  Southern  periphery. stretching from 
Greece through Southern Italy to Southern and West-
ern Spain and Portugal, and around 60% of the EU av-
erage in most of Eastern Germany. In all of the EU's 
outermost regions (as defined in the Treaty), except 
the Canary Islands, GOP per head is around half or 
less of the average. There are also clusters of poorer 
regions  in  the  Northern  periphery,  particularly  in 
Northern and Eastern Finland and the North and West 
of the UK. By contrast. GOP per head is well above 
average in the more central area extending from the 
North of Italy through Southern Germany to Austria as 
well as in the BENELUX countries and Northern Ger-
many. 
The rest of this section is concerned with the scale of 
regional disparities across the Union, the variation in 
performance between different types of region and 
the specific problems in  particular countries, which 
go beyond the simple core/periphery distinction. 
The focus. in the first place, is on disparities between 
rich and poor regions and the way that these have 
changed over recent years. The fact that a region is 
relatively poor does not mean that it need be at a per-
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Measuring regional economies 
The standard measure of the size and performance 
of a regional economy is Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP), usually divided by the number of inhabitants 
to give GOP per head. GOP is designed to measure 
total output in a particular area, including services. 
However, it is also a measure of income. the main 
components being wages and salaries. profits and 
rent, though it excludes transfers of 1ncome. from in-
dividuals and companies (which might transfer part 
of their profits elsewhere) as well  as from  govern-
ment. in the form, for example, of social benefits. 
This leads to a problem concerning the use of GOP 
as a measure of income in some regions,  such as 
some city-regions, where commuting by people res-
ident in other regions adds to the local work force 
and GOP.  Income per head of the people living in 
the city is, therefore, overstated while that of neigh-
bouring regions is understated. This. however. is not 
a major problem for  most  regions.  especially the 
poorer regions which are the main focus of this re-
port. 
manent disadvantage in  terms of its capac1ty to ex-
pand economic activity. Closer integration 1n  the EU. 
combined with  lower  costs  1n  poorer  regions.  has 
tended to favour some convergence in GOP over the 
period  1986 to  1996  This.  however.  was  concen-
trated in the first half of the period and at the very end. 
while,  in  between. the  recess1on  of the early 1990s 
weakened the forces favouring poorer regions and 
reduced investment in their productive base. in part. 
because of smaller inflows of capital from the more 
prosperous areas. Recovery since 1994 has been ac-
companied by renewed convergence. though, in this 
period and before. the extent varies between regions. 
reflecting their supply-side characteristics. 
Secondly,  different  kinds  of  region  perform  differ-
ently. An obvious feature is the sectoral mix. regions 
where  growing  sectors  are  strongly  represented 
tending to do better than those with sectors undergo-
ing restructuring. The ability to attain critical mass is 
also  important.  Regions  which  are  rural,  sparsely 
populated and/or less accessible are likely to find it 
difficult to accumulate an adequate level of demand 
or provide a sufficient range of services to compete at 
the European level, whereas urban areas are likely to 
find it easier. Capital cities. in  particular. are consis-
tently among the richest areas in  a country and the 
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When regions converge 
The stylised fact, that convergence occurs at a more 
rapid rate during periods of economic growth and 
closer integration, is a simple yet powerful observa-
tion.  It stems from the nature of the various forces 
which affect relative growth in different regions: 
•  the  attraction  of  investment  to  regions  where 
costs are lower and labour and other resources 
more plentiful; 
•  the transfer of technology and best practice from 
leading to lagging regions; 
•  the migration of workers from regions with low pay 
and low job opportunities to those with higher pay 
and  more opportunities, which  may  not  lead  to 
convergence in output or income but may equa-
lise wages between regions. 
All  three of these forces are boosted by economic 
Integration, while the first two are also boosted by 
economic growth when business opportunities are 
expand1ng. (The effect on migration is less predict-
able smce  h1gher  demand for  labour in upturns in 
more  prosperous reg1ons  may stimulate people to 
move  but  the  lower  unemployment  in  lagging re-
9•ons at such t1mes  may encourage them to stay.) 
s.nce the  f~rst two are the ma1n mechanisms for con-
vergence at  the  EU  level. convergence is likely to 
occur more  1n  booms.  Conversely since migration 
h.1s h1stoncally tended to be the mam mechanism in 
tne  US.  convergence  there  has  tended  to  occur 
more dunng recess1ons. 
A f1nal pomt 1s that there 1s noth1ng automatic about 
an 1nd1v1dual reg1on converg1ng. even if this is hap-
penmg generally. It IS not enough tor investment and 
new technology - the two long-run determinants of 
growth- to be potentially available. A region must 
also possess the supply-s1de features to attract both 
and must also have the capac1ty to make effective 
use of them. 
most  prosperous  regions  in  the  EU  are  invariably 
urban. whether they contain a single large city or a dy-
namiC network of smaller towns and cities. Neverthe-
less.  some  urban  areas  can  have  inadequate 
infrastructure and a low-skilled work force and can 
form islands of poverty and social deprivation within a 
prosperous region. Indeed, there is evidence in parts 
of the Union of 'patchwork development', where the 
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performance  of  sub-regions  diverges  significantly 
from surrounding areas. 
Thirdly, there are specific national features which af-
fect regional performance. German unification pro-
vided a stimulus to growth in 1991-92, but the costs of 
transition have helped depress growth rates in Ger-
many to below the average rate in the EU since then, 
even if growth, from a low base, was initially impres-
sive in the East.  In Finland, the decline in trade with 
the  former  Soviet  Union  (and the  consequent col-
lapse in  demand) depressed output sharply in  the 
years 1990 to 1993 and outpaced the capacity of na-
tional and regional labour markets to adapt. In the UK, 
the size and influence of financial markets and the 
closer links to the US led to recession coming earlier 
and being deeper than in most other parts of Europe. 
Indicators of regional disparity 
There are many possible measures of regional dis-
parity. For example, the GOP per head in the 10 poor-
est regions taken as a whole increased from 41% of 
the EU average in 1986 to 50% in 1996. Even adjust-
ing tor the statistical effect of the accession of Eastern 
Germany (see box below), this represents a catching 
up of 7Yz percentage points in 10 years. Relative GOP 
per head 1n  the  10 richest regions has correspond-
Ingly declined over the period from 3. 7 times the level 
in the 10 poorest ones to 3.1  times (Table 2). 
The  list of  the  10 poorest regions has  changed little 
over time. with 8 appearing in both 1986 and 1996. The 
regions concerned are generally remote and in many 
cases ultraperipheral. They include the French over-
seas dominions (OOMs). some Mediterranean islands, 
the  Spanish region of Extremadura and some Portu-
guese regions. GOP per head in all of the bottom 10 in 
1986 converged towards the European average over 
the period. in many, by 10 percentage points or more. 
The list of the 10 richest regions has also changed lit-
tle and, again, 8 were included in both years. These 
consist of four capital cities (Brussels, lie de France 
(Paris). Wien and London) and four regions in West 
Germany. Relative GOP per head in these regions in-
creased further over the period from 153% of the EU 
average to 158% (though this may possibly be due to 
increased commuting - ie more output being pro-
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duced  by non-residents  - rather  than  increased 
output per resident- see Box). 
Extending the number of regions compared, GOP per 
head in the 25 where this was lowest increased from 
52% of the EU average in 1986 to 59% in 1996. GOP 
per head in the 25 richest regions declined from 2. 7 
times the level in the 25 poorest to 2.4 times over the 
10 years. This is all the more impressive, since the list 
of poorest regions in 1996 contains 5 East German re-
gions which were not included -and  for which data 
were not available- in  1986. 
An overall indication of changes in disparities in GOP 
per head can be obtained from statistical measures 
such  as,  in  particular,  the  standard  deviation 
(weighted tor population), a measure of overall differ-
ences from the mean (Graph 1  ),  which summarises 
developments in all regions rather than just the two 
extremes. Excluding the effect of the new Lander be-
coming part of the Union, there was a small decline in 
the measure over the 10 years 1986 to 1996, indicat-
ing a slight reduction in the average disparity. A small 
fall in the measure in the second half of the 1980s was 
followed by a small rise in  the recession of the early 
1990s and subsequently by a reduction to the pre-
recession  level  during the  recovery between  1994 
and 1996. It remains to be seen whether the contin-
ued recovery in the remainder of the 1990s will have 
brought a further narrowing of disparities. 
However, the small reduction in the overall disparity is 
the result of a sharp decline in disparities below aver-
age GOP per head and an increase above the aver-
age. As noted above, the relative prosperity of both 
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Soull:e:E-the richest and the poorest regions increased over 
the period. The summary measure reflects this, dis-
parities being compressed at the bottom end of the 
distribution  and  expanded  at  the  top,  the  typical 
poorer region (ie one with output below average) ex-
periencing an increase in its GOP per head of some 3 
percentage points relative to the EU average. 
At the same time, there has been very little change in 
the ranking of particular regions, and the order in terms 
of GOP per head was much the  same in  1996 as  10 
years earlier (Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
between the two rankings was 0.91 -1  being a perfect 
match). As GOP per head in regions with a relatively 
low level has converged on the average (or diverged 
away from the average in richer regions). it has, there-
tore.  done so at a similar rate in  regions with similar 
GOP per head right across the EU. 
This is reflected in the fact that, increasingly, disparities 
are not between but rather within Member States (Map 
2. Table 3). Catching up in the four Cohesion countries 
often stems more from growth in relatively rich urban 
centres,  particularly  capital  cities.  than  from  that  in 
poorer regions. This corresponds to a well-known de-
velopment  phenomenon.  more  favoured  regions  ini-
tially experiencing faster growth than the less favoured. 
In the  f~rst phase of development, therefore, disparities 
within a country often widen. while in the second phase. 
efforts need to be concentrated in the poorer regions to 
ensure they benefit from national success (from 'trickle 
down').  Narrowing  disparities  in  Portugal  suggest  it 
may be in the second phase, while widening disparities 
in Greece suggest it is still in the first phase. 
The other major cause of growing disparities in Mem-
ber States is the effect of economic restructuring. Al-
though  there  are  overall  gains  to  increasing 
specialisation which enable firms in the same sector to 
benefit from externalities as well as economies of scale, 
regions  relatively  dependent on  declining  industries 
tend to lose, those where growth sectors predominate 
tend to gain.  Increasingly, the regions badly affected 
by this are ones in Northern Member States which were 
previously prosperous. 
Urban, rural and sectoral issues 
Two  key  influences  on  regional  economic  perfor-
mance are the urban-rural mix and the sectoral com-
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position of economic activity. There is a clear link be-
tween the two-for example, there is a close identity 
between rural areas and agricultural ones. The follow-
ing stylised classification of regions can be used for 
analytical purposes: 
•  urban regions distinguished in terms of popula-
tion density and subdivided between: 
•  regions  in  which activity is  concentrated  in 
services 
•  regions  in  which  activity is  concentrated  in 
manufacturing 
•  rural regions distinguished by the sparseness of 
population and often where agriculture is  rela-
tively important. 
This is obviously only a very broad system of classifi-
cation and many regions do not fit neatly into one of 
these categories. Urban areas, for example, may of-
ten have a significant proportion of activity in manu-
facturing  even where  they  are classified  as  being 
predominantly service centres. and vice versa. More-
over. in rural areas, only a minor proportion of activity 
will be directly in agriculture. However. distinguishing 
groups of regions which most closely fit this classifi-
cation may enable general features linked to a partiC-
ular sector to be more clearly identified than in the 
case of more mixed regions. 
The first step is to identify the urban and rural areas of 
the EU. A common approach is to distinguish densely 
populated  areas  (more  than  500  inhabitants  per 
square  km).  intermediate  areas  (500  to  1  00)  and 
thinly populated ones (less  than  100).  For  present 
purposes. the densely populated regions can be de-
fined as 'urban· and the sparsely populated as ·r.ural'3. 
Where possible, the classification is performed at the 
municipality (or commune) level but,  tor  some pur-
poses.  data are  only available for  NUTS-2 regions 
(see Annex for the details of the classification). 
Using  this  definition,  half (49%) of  the  Community 
population lives in urban areas, just under a quarter 
(24%) in rural areas, and a little over a quarter in inter-
mediate areas. These urban areas account for only 
around 3Y2% of the EU's surface area. the rural areas 
for  over 80%.  Urban areas are concentrated in  or 
near the rich central part of the EU, reflecting the as-
sociation of cities with wealth creation (Map 3), and 
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22 an urban ribbon can be distinguished running from 
Belgium and.the Netherlands through Western Ger-
many to Northern Italy. Most of the other major urban 
areas,  such  as  Paris.  Rome.  the  South-East  and 
North-West of England and Copenhagen lie close to 
this. 
Outside the  central  area,  the  settlement  pattern  is 
more polarised with significant urban areas - often 
capital cities and/or coastal conurbations - sepa-
rated by large thinly-populated tracts.  In  many pe-
ripheral parts, notably in Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Ireland. Greece, Sweden and Finland, urban ar-
eas are relatively small and scattered and rural areas 
predominate. 
A  final  point  to  note  is  the  distinction  between 
monocentric and polycentric urban networks. Large 
cities generally dominate the surrounding area and 
are often where services and economic activity, vital 
for the region as a whole, are concentrated. They are 
often important transport hubs. Relatively small. lone 
cities. such as  Dublin or  Helsinki,  perform some of 
these functions for surrounding areas of low popula-
tion. On the other hand. smaller towns or cities often 
form networks. where no one. of them is dominant, and 
tend to be characterised by certain types of activity, 
particularly within manufacturing. This is particularly 
the  case in  parts of Western Germany,  the Nether-
lands. Northern Italy and the Midlands in the UK. 
To  identify the  most typical  service.  manufacturing 
and agricultural regions. the 25 regions with the high-
est concentration of employment in each sector were 
selected (Map 4). Although these regions represent 
extremes, as noted above, this helps to identify com-
mon  developments which can then  be used in the 
analysis of more mixed regions. 
The regions most dependent on services are gener-
ally clustered around Northern capital cities but in-
clude an  area in  the Mediterranean between· Rome 
and  the COte  d'Azur. The  highest concentration of 
employment in  services is around London, where 4 
regions of 13 million people are in the top 25 service 
regions. London is by far the largest financial centre 
in the  EU,  as well as being a centre of government 
and business services and the headquarters of some 
of the world's largest multinationals. It is followed by 
the lie de France (11 million people) which has similar 
characteristics and then by regions around the twin 
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administrative and trading centres of Amsterdam and 
the Hague (7 million people in total). 
In contrast to services, manufacturing is more closely 
associated with  smaller towns  and cities and with 
polycentric urban networks. Most of the top 25 manu-
facturing regions are in or near central and Southern 
Germany and Northern Italy and contain such net-
works.  In fact,  Germany accounts for just over half 
(13) of the 25 regions with the highest share of em-
ployment concentrated  in  manufacturing. The  only 
ones outside Germany and Italy are  based around 
medium-sized cities in Northern Spain. 
The 25 regions with the highest concentration of agri-
culture are, as would be expected, rural, peripheral 
areas in Scandinavia and the Mediterranean. Nine of 
the top 10 are in Greece, In all of  these agriculture ac-
counting for a third of employment as against an aver-
age of 5% for the EU as a whole, and all the Greek 
regions. except Athens and the Aegean Islands, fig-
uring in the top 25. 
Trends in these areas 
Each of these types of region has particular strengths 
and weaknesses. In each group, there are successful 
regions which have managed to capitalise on their 
strengths and others which have succumbed to their 
weaknesses and have suffered declining activity. In 
some cases,  there are marked contrasts in  perfor-
mance within a region. 
As regards urban areas, towns and cities tend to be 
centres of prosperity, creativity, culture and innova-
tion in the EU as well as communication hubs. In addi-
tion,  a  number  of  larger  cities  serve  important 
functions as gateways to,  and key decision-making 
centres in, a rapidly-changing global economy. The 
10 regions with the highest level of wealth creation in 
the EU, except for Luxembourg, contain major cities. 
Regions (NUTS-2) classified as urban have a com-
bined GOP per head of 22% above the EU average 
(Table 4). If this reflects the relative level in municipali-
ties. it implies that areas defined as urban account for 
around 60% of total GOP in the EU. 
At the same time, the main problems facing the EU -
unemployment, poverty,  economic restructuring and 
the destruction of the natural and physical environment 
-are  tor the most part concentrated and accentuated 
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in urban areas. Opportunity and deprivation are often 
created simultaneously and in close proximity. For ex-
ample, the largest financial centre in the EU. the city of 
London. is next to some of the most poverty-stricken 
and deprived areas in the UK. 
Major urban centres are characterised by services. 
often concentrated in the more advanced sectors, as 
well as in communal services, which are mostly non-
market, where growth of employment has been most 
marked (Table  6).  Moreover,  within  these  sectors. 
higher-level functions tend to be performed dispro-
portionately in large urban areas. For example. 14% 
of urban employment is in the financial and business 
service sectors, as compared to around 6% in rural 
areas.  This  does not take  account of the fact that 
higher level financial functions are almost exclusively 
concentrated in  a few urban centres, and financial 
sector employment in rural areas consists almost en-
tirely of local branches of high street banks. Urban ar-
eas are also centres of public administration. again 
the overall figures - 30% in non-market services as 
against 26% in rural areas - do not reflect the fact 
that  more  important functions  tend  to  be  concen-
trated in urban areas. 
Correspondingly.  the  top  25  service  regions  are 
among the  most economically successful in  the  EU. 
w1th comb1ned GOP per head of 27% above the EU av-
erage  (Table  7).  reflecting  the  preponderance  of 
h1gher valued-added services and the high level of out-
put per person employed which they display (Graphs 2 
and 3).  In  some of these regions.  however. activity is 
concentrated in  lower valued-added services.  espe-
cially in the public sector (where the absence of profits 
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reduces  value-added,  output  per  person  employed 
being some 30% below the average level for services 
as a whole). In addition, the absence of a strong private 
sector means that overall employment levels tend to be 
low. In these cases-in Merseyside, Corsica and the 
North of Sweden. for example - GOP per head tends 
to-be below average. 
Manufacturing is more evenly spread across regions 
and is most highly concentrated in  intermediate ar-
eas. where networks of smaller towns and cities pre-
dominate.  Although  all  towns  are  to  some  extent 
service centres, the economy of these towns is typi-
cally based on particular manufacturing sectors. The 
top 25 manufacturing regions  are  relatively  strong 
economically, with a combined GOP per head of 8% 
above the EU average as a whole and most individual 
regions having a level close to or above the average 
(Table 8).  Even those with below average GOP per 
head are among the fastest growing regions in  Eu-
rope. which reflects the fact that although many parts 
of manufacturing are in decline. especially in terms of 
employment, the more advanced parts are perform-
ing well. at least in output terms. 
The influence of restructuring is.  however. probably 
understated by this exercise, since the top 25 manu-
facturing regions tend. by definition. to  be the more 
successful  ones.  Differences  within  manufacturing 
are much wider than between manufacturing and ser-
vices. In addition to the differing fortunes of different 
industries (pharmaceuticals as  opposed to textiles, 
for  example).  rationalisation  and  the  realisation  of 
competitive  advantage mean  that  many industries 
are growing in some regions but declining in others, 
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20 which suggests that concentration may be higher in 
future. It also suggests that the counterpart of good 
performance in  the top 25 manufacturing -or. in-
deed. service - regions. is restructuring and output 
decline in other regions. 
In  rural  areas,  too,  there  is  a  dichotomy  between 
strengths and weaknesses. On the  one  hand, they 
contain a wealth of natural resources.  habitats and 
strong cultural traditions, are desirable places to live 
and are increasingly important tourist locations for the 
pursuit of recreational and leisure activities. On the 
other hand, many rural regions are in marked decline. 
Overdependence on resource-based activities, par-
ticularly agriculture, leaves them vulnerable to the re-
structuring and  rationalisation of such sectors.  The 
inadequate  scale  of  other  industries  often  leaves 
them with few viable development options. The result 
can be depopulation and an  exodus of young and 
highly qualified people especially, leaving an ageing 
and lower skilled population behind. 
Rural areas tend to have low levels of output and in-
come (Table 5).  Together they account for just over 
20% of EU population, but their GOP per head is only 
79% of the EU average. implying that rural areas ac-
count for around a sixth of total EU GOP. It should be 
noted. hOwever. that their low level of income may be 
m1t1gated in some degree by a lower cost of living (the 
PPS measure of GOP allows for national but not re-
gional differences in prices). The poorest rural areas 
are located in the South of the Uhion. in Greece, Por-
tugal. Southern Italy and Spain. 
Agriculture. mining and quarrying account for nearly 
a  SIXth  of  employment  in  rural  areas.  This  means. 
however.  that five-sixths  of  employment  is  in  other 
sectors.  Indeed,  manufacturing  provides  twice  as 
many jobs as agriculture. Even taking account of the 
fact that  much of rural manufacturing and services 
will be linked in some way to agriculture. it indicates 
that  there is much more to  rural areas than agricul-
ture. though there is no denying the link between the 
two. 
Since agriculture is a relatively small sector in value-
added terms (accounting for just 2% of EU GOP) and 
value-added  per person  employed  is  only  around 
42% of the EU average, it is difficult for regions to be-
come  prosperous  through  agriculture  alone.  How-
ever.  for  the  more  remote  and  less  accessible 
regions, it can be difficult to develop other sectors to 
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an  adequate scale. The top 25 agricultural regions 
are all poorer than the EU average, with the exception 
of the Aland Islands in Finland, which are a special 
case. and their combined GOP  per head is over a 
third lower than the average, emphasising the gap in 
development which exists (Table 9). 
At the same time,  the  25  most agricultural regions 
represent an extreme, being drawn largely from the 
most  backward .  regions  in  the  EU.  Although  they 
serve to highlight some of the main features affecting 
agricultural regions. they exaggerate them.  In prac-
tice, there is  no automatic link between rural areas 
and poverty. Not all rural ecooomies are weak and not 
all of them are overdependent on agriculture. Those 
that are more accessible, contain thriving urban ar-
eas and have diversified away from the lower value-
added parts of agriculture. are in  many cases per-
forming better than average. 
A good example is  Emilia-Romagna,  the success of 
which is based on high value-added activities compati-
ble with the rural environment and good links to North-
ern Italian urban centres. Other examples include East 
Anglia and RhOne-Aipes,  both of which contain small 
cit1es specialising in high technology. All three exam-
ples illustrate the  importance of  sectoral  balance for 
economic development and prosperity. 
They also illustrate the importance of the relationship 
between urban and rural areas. Urban areas are vital 
locomotives for the development of neighbouring ru-
ral  areas.  In  an  increasingly  globalised  economy. 
where there is increased potential for links between 
urban areas. it is important that this should not be at 
the expense of links to local rural areas. 
Trade 
The importance of trade in stimulating growth, com-
petitiveness and employment is well attested. both in 
economic theory and history. Foreign trade does not 
simply furnish market opportunities and broaden the 
range  of  goods available  for  consumption.  It  also 
stimulates investment, on the one hand, and innova-
tion  and  technology  transfer,  on  the  other.  Since 
these are the two main factors underlying long-term 
growth, especially in lagging regions, periods of ex-
panding trade have tended to  be  periods of  high 
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growth  and  increasing  convergence  between  re-
gions. 
Trade is a significant part of the EU economy. Total 
exports of goods and services accounted for around 
30% of GOP  in  EU  countries  in  1997.  Most of  this 
trade, some 60%, was between Member States and 
internal to the EU, which suggests that more than one 
in six jobs in the EU is directly dependent on internal 
trade. 
Closer economic integration in the EU has increased 
opportunities for trade between Member States and 
these are likely to increase further with the single cur-
rency.  Between  1987 and 1997,  despite the reces-
sion of the early  1990s,  internal  EU  trade  in  goods 
increased from 14% of GOP to almost 15%. Even in a 
poor economic climate, therefore. internal trade has 
proved a reliable component of the economy. Exter-
nal trade4  has also grown, from 8% of GOP to nearly 
10% over the same period, reflecting the increasing 
globalisation of the EU economy. With sustained eco-
nomic growth and the advent of the single currency, 
internal trade promises to be a significant contributor 
to overall growth, while the continuing trend towards 
globalisation is likely to mean that external trade will 
also  increase  in  importance,  putting  ever  greater 
onus on competitiveness. 
The  scale of  trade of any country is  determined at 
least in part by its size and geography {Graph 4)  For 
obvious reasons, small countries, such as Ireland, or 
ones  neighbouring large economic areas,  such as 
Belgium, will tend to be large exporters 
pean economies have become more integrated, Co-
hesion  Four exports of goods to the  rest of the  EU 
have increased from 11% of their combined GOP to 
over 15% between 1987 and 1997. At the same time, 
exports of services to other Member States rose from 
4Y2%  of their GOP to over 5%%  in the same period 
(these figures exclude Ireland for which no data on 
intra-EU trade in services are available). The rise is all 
the more significant since their GOP increased by one 
third over the  period,  so  in  real  terms  their exports 
nearly doubled. However, all of them, except Ireland, 
still  have relatively low exports of  goods relative to 
GOP given their size, especially Greece, where total 
exports of goods were under 10% of GOP  in  1997. 
While this  is compensated to  some degree by high 
exports of services, exports relative to GOP in all of 
the countries exceeding the EU average, especially 
in Greece (  11% of GOP), it indicates that there is po-
tential for further increases. 
The Cohesion Four, because of their relatively high 
growth,  have also increased in  importance as an 
export market for other Member States (Graph 4) 
Between  1987 and  1997,  their  imports of  goods 
from the rest of the EU increased from 11% of their 
GOP to  16%, doubling in  real terms and reaching 
some  120 billion ECU in  1997.  Although their im-
ports  of  services  from  other  Member  Stat~s are 
much smaller relative to their exports,  largely re-
flecting  their  high  income  from  tourism  and,  in 
Greece, the importance of earnings from shipping, 
they still amounted to around 16 billion ECU in 1997 
{again excluding Ireland). Export opportunities are 
and  importers.  For  every  Member 
State.  however.  irrespective  of  their 
size or position. over half their exports 
of goods are to other parts of the Union, 
the  proportion  ranging  from  around 
55% in Italy, Finland and the UK to over 
70%  in  Belgium. the  Netherlands and 
Spain  and over 80%  in  Portugal.  The 
same is true for services, except for the 
UK,  where only just over a third of ex-
ports go to other Member States. At the 
other extreme, more than 75% of ser-
vice exports from  Spain and  Portugal 
go to the rest of the Union. 
4  Export. of  EU Member States, 1987 and 1997 
For the four Cohesion countries, in par-
ticular, trade within the EU has acted as 
a powerful stimulus to growth. As Euro-
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Source: EUI'OIItat likely  to  increase further,  both  as  the  Cohesion 
countries grow richer and as the European econo-
mies become even more integrated. 
It is also relevant to examine the composition of trade 
(Tables 10,  11  and 12). While the EU as a whole is 
close to balance in many manufacturing sectors, re-
flecting the tendency in most advanced economies to 
export and import the same kind of good, the imbal-
ances which exist indicate that the EU tends to have a 
comparative advantage in  'medium-tech'  products 
rather  than  in  basic  goods  or  'high-tech'  sectors. 
Such  products,  in  general,  have  above  average 
value-added but perhaps are likely to show a lower 
growth in demand in future than high-tech products. 
In  1997, therefore,  the most  ~ignificant net imports 
were of raw materials, including energy, while the EU 
had substantial net exports of engineering products 
and various kinds of machinery, including motor vehi-
cles and space and aviation equipment, as well as of 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  It  was  also,  how-
ever, a net importer of 'high-tech' products, such as 
office machinery and electronic equipment, including 
TVs and audio equipment. 
The Cohesion Four, on the other hand. have a some-
what different composition and,  in  general,  tend to 
specialise in more basic, low value-added products, 
for which the prospects of demand growth are unfa-
vourable. In addition, and perhaps as a consequence 
of the relative concentration of exports on this kind of 
product. Portugal and, more particularly, Greece had 
sizeable deficits on visible trade in .1997 and only Ire-
land of the Cohesion countries had a surplus. 
Three of the Cohesion Four, all except for Ireland, are, 
therefore. net exporters or are close to trade balance 
in clothing and textiles, and seemingly a high propor-
tion of exports are relatively low value-added prod-
ucts,  in  contrast to  Italy which  is  also a  major net 
exporter, while Portugal and Spain are also net ex-
porters of wood products. Although all four countries 
have a high level of employment in agriculture, only 
Greece is a large net exporter. and the export perfor-
mance of Portugal and Spain is poor given the num-
ber employed in the sector. Only Ireland of the four 
specialises in  exporting finished  food  products, so 
adding value domestically to the goods before they 
are shipped abroad. 
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The four countries, except Ireland which is  a major 
net exporter, all have poor trade performance in high-
tech  sectors  and  are  substantial  net  importers  of 
chemicals and  pharmaceuticals,  office  machinery, 
electrical  and  telecommunications  equipment and 
precision instruments. All four countries are net im-
porters of aviation and space equipment and all ex-
cept Spain, net importers of motor vehicles and other 
transport equipment. 
A portrait of the weaker 
regions and Member States 
In 1986, the year of the accession to the EU of Spain 
and Portugal, the four Cohesion countries had a com-
bined GOP per head, in PPS terms, of around 65% of 
the EU average. Over the next 10 years, growth in the 
four was higher than that in the rest of the Union and 
by 1996, their GOP per head had risen to 76Y2% of the 
EU  average, an  increase of around 10 percentage 
points over the  decade, adjusting  for  the  effect of 
German unification (see Box). 
This convergence has been strongly dependent on 
the economic climate. The  Cohesion countries out-
performed the EU average in the boom years of 1986 
to 1990 and at the beginning of the recession of the 
early 1990s. However the recession itself affected the 
Cohesion countries more than other parts of the Un-
ion,  and convergence came to  a halt.  Since  1995, 
however, with recovery, the gap has begun to narrow 
again and forecasts for  1999 suggest that GOP per 
head in the four has risen to 79% of the EU average. 
While  the  experience  since  1986  emphasises  the 
long-term nature of convergence, as the gap in GOP 
per head remains wide despite the progress made, 
the four countries taken together are catching up at a 
rapid rate in relation to both historical experience and 
that in other parts of the world. 
There  have,  however,  been  marked  differences in 
performance between the four countries. Ireland has 
been more successful than any of the others, record-
ing by far the highest rate of growth in the EU over the 
1990s even  during  the  recession  years.  GOP  per 
head, which was only around 61% of the EU average 
in 1986, increased to over 96% a decade later and is 
estimated to have exc.eeded the EU average in 1998. 
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Convergence In ODP per head: 
the effect of German unification 
Comparisons of GOP per head in the four Cohesion 
countries with the EU average are affected by the in-
clusion of the new German Lander in the calculation 
of the average from 1991 on. This had the effect of 
reducing average GOP per head in the Union and, 
accordingly, of increasing the relative  level in the 
Cohesion  countries  and  in  lagging  regions.  Be-
cause no reliable data exist for GOP  in the former 
East German Lander before 1991. it is not possible, 
as it is in the case of other new entrants, to adjust the 
EU  average to  include the  new Lander in  earlier 
years. However, some allowance needs to be made 
in order not to overstate the degree of convergence. 
One method commonly used is to remove Eastern 
Germany from the EU average at the end of the pe-
riod, to make it comparable with the beginning of the 
period.  In  1996,  this raised  the average by some 
1  Y2%,  so Cohesion country average GOP per head 
would  be  75Y2%  of the  revised EU  figure.  as  op-
posed to 76Y2%. Since the Cohesion countnes aver-
aged  65%  of  the  EU  as  a  whole  rn  1986.  the 
adjustment reduces convergence from an apparent 
11 Y2  to  10Y2 percentage points. 
Another method is to  make the .?.dJustment  at  the 
pornt  of  accession.  Between  1986 and  1991.  the 
GOP per head of the four Cohesion countnes rose 
from 65% of the EU average to 71%. excludrng the 
new Lander from the calculation of the EU average 
in both years. Between 1991 and 1996. it rncreased 
from 73% to 76Y2%.  in this case includrng the new 
Lander  in  the  calculation  of  the  average  1n  both 
years.  Convergence is,  therefore.  9'h percentage 
points when measured this way. 
A final point to make is that the narrowrng of the gap 
in GOP per head of the Cohesion countnes w1th the 
rest  of  the  Union  over t1me  does not  only  reflect 
faster growth of their GOP than elsewhere. It 1s also 
affected by changes in relative pnce levels as  re-
flected in the PPS  measure (or by revisions in the 
PPS estimates themselves). These changes reflect 
an increase in prosperity. but not necessarily an in-
crease in productivity. See the methodological an-
nex for more information. 
Much of the growth has been driven by inward invest-
ment  and  the  development  of  multinational  enter-
prises  in  specific sectors,  and there are  concerns 
about the extent of linkages into the local economy 
and spillovers into other sectors. This has given rise to 
doubts about the durability of high growth rates. An-
other sign of potential fragility in the economy is the 
concentration of growth in certain areas, particularly 
in the East of the country. Nevertheless. the record of 
the recent past remains impressive and there is no 
question that real income and employment have risen 
markedly. Moreover. service sectors have also devel-
oped rapidly, especially in Dublin, and these offer fur-
ther potential for growth in the future. 
Portugal,  like  Ireland,  has  also  achieved  growth 
above the EU average since 1986, though at a more 
modest rate.  Like Ireland also. growth has been un-
evenly distributed across the country. On joining the 
EU. it experienced large inflows of foreign investment 
and a marked increase in exports, both of which stim-
ulated growth.  As  a result of this and as  a conse-
quence  of  the  appreciation  of  the  Escudo  which 
raised real  income levels. GOP per head increased 
from 55% of the EU average in 1986 to 70% a decade 
later 
Despite the growth over the period as a whole, Portu-
gal d1d not escape a slowdown in growth in the early 
1990s and recovery was delayed longer than else-
where.  as  a  result  partly  of  weak  investment  and 
partly  of  over-concentration  in  traditional  sectors 
such  as  clothing  and  textiles.  Although  significant 
progress has been made, some fragility in the econ-
omy remains and there is a particular need to mod-
ernise the Industrial structure. Growth has resumed 
since 1995 and GDP per head for 1999 is estimated at 
72% of the EU average. 
Development has been concentrated in  the coastal 
strip and  the  two urbanised regions of  Lisboa and 
Norte. for which most of the gap in GOP per head rela-
tive to the EU average has been closed. The poorer 
regions and the interior are also catching up - typi-
cally  experiencing  a  rise  of  some  15  percentage 
points in relative GOP per head over the decade 1986 
to  1996 - but significant differences remain.  The 
most dramatic is  between Lisboa,  where GOP per 
head was 88% of the EU average in 1996, and neigh-
bouring Alentejo, where it was just 60%. At the same 
time.  however.  considerable social  problems have 
emerged in Lisboa. Spain  has also  experienced relatively  high growth 
since 1986, GOP per head increasing from 70% of the 
EU  average in  1986 to 79% in  1996. Recession hit 
particularly hard in  1993, GOP being lower in  1994 
than two years earlier, but growth has been above av-
erage since then and GOP per head is projected to in-
crease to 80% of the EU average in  1999. Prospects 
for  continuing  convergence of output per head in 
Spanish regions seem favourable. 
Spain  is  the  second  largest  Member  State  (after 
France) in terms of land area, so it is perhaps to be ex-
pected that the pattern of development should be com-
plex  and  uneven.  Growth  has  been  high  in  the 
prosperous regions of Madrid and Cataluna. which al-
ready had a strong economic base. but also in the very 
poorest regions in the South. where a strengthening of 
the  economy is  evident.  On the other hand,  regions 
with output in between. particularly those on or near the 
Northern coast, are performing less well. Nevertheless, 
GOP per head in only one Spanish region -Murcia-
is failing to converge towards the EU average. 
The strongest growth since 1986 has been in Madrid. 
driven by a strong service sector, and this has spilled 
over into neighbouring regions. GOP  per head in  the 
capital was just above the EU average in 1996. while 1n 
Cataluna, it was only slightly below (99%). like other re-
gions in the North-East. building on a strong ir>dustnal 
base and attracting significant inward investment. 
Regions  in  Southern  Spain have historically had a 
weak economic base and are still some of the poorest 
in  the  EU.  Significant  supply-side  improvements, 
however, are beginning to pay off and GOP per head 
in  all of these regions is now converging rapidly to-
wards the EU  average. Two of the  poorest regions. 
Castilla-la-Mancha (where GOP per head mse from 
54%% of the EU average in 1986 to 66% in 1996) and 
Extremadura (where it rose from 44% to 55%), have 
recorded some of the highest growth rates in Spain. 
On the other hand, GOP per head in  Murcia has re-
mained unchanged at 67% of  the  EU  average and 
Southern regions. in general, remain heavily depend-
ent  on  agriculture.  Although  the  situation  has  im-
proved in the recent past, with the end of the drought 
in  1996  which  helped  increase  production  in  the 
South by 13%, this is largely a short-term factor and 
major diversification and continued supply-side im-
provements are necessary to maintain the impetus to-
wards convergence. 
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At the  same  time,  growth in  most of the  Northern 
coastal regions has been relatively slow.  The poor 
performance in manufacturing continues to limit (but 
not prevent) convergence and restructuring looks set 
to continue. As in the South, howeve~.  one of the poor-
est regions, Galicia, has shown a relatively high rate 
of growth, its GOP per head rising from 55% of the EU 
average in  1986 to 63% in  1996. 
In  Greece, the poorest Member State in the Union. 
gro,wth has been little higher than in the rest of the EU 
since 1986. Macroeconomic reforms. however, have 
started to have some effect in recent years and GOP 
per head in 1996 was just under 68% of the EU aver-
age,  up from  60% in  1986. Growth historically has 
fluctuated widely from year to year: the rate in  1985, 
1988 and 1991  exceeding the EU average at 3% to 
4%, while GOP actually fell  in  1987 and 1990, both 
years of high growth in the rest of the EU. Greece has 
still to take advantage of the export opportunities in 
the  rest  of  Europe  and  to  break  free  from  over-
dependence on domestically generated demand. 
Reg1onal disparities in Greece have historically been 
small. The economy as a whole is still relatively under-
developed and most economic activities are isolated 
to a Slgn,ficant extent from developments in the rest of 
the  EU  However, increasing trade and competition 
have oegun to have a differential effect between re-
g,ons. w1th Athens being favoured, in part because of 
its Detter access to the rest of EU,  most air and sea 
traff1c passing through it.  Its strategic position. more-
over. has been strengthened since the closing of the 
ma1n  road link to  the  rest of the  EU  because of the 
problems m the former Yugoslavia. 
In  consequence.  growth has been concentrated in 
Athens. whiCh is now both the ma1n service and man-
ufacturing centre 1n Greece and disparities are open-
ing up w1th  the  rest of Greece. GOP in  the  Athens 
region 1s forecast to grow by 1 percentage point more 
than the national average, while prospects for other 
areas look poor5. This is particularly true of the rural 
and mountainous interior of the country where agri-
culture accounts for 30--40% of employment, much 
more than anywhere else in the Union. Only the is-
lands, where tourism remains buoyant, seem to have 
a favourable outlook. 
Although GOP  per head in  Italy as a whole is  just 
above the EU average, in regions in the South, it is be-
tween 60% and 80% of the EU average, comparable 
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to the level in Greece and Portugal and the poorer re-
gions in Spain. The lagging regions in Italy have his-
torically been hampered by a lack of infrastructure. 
but while the situation in this regard has improved in 
recent years, tt].ey remain heavily dependent on the 
public sector.  which  is  subject to  increasing  con-
straints on  expenditure. As  a result,  GOP per head 
changed little relative to the  EU  average in  the  10 
years 1986 to 1996. 
The new L~nder in Eastern Germany share many of 
the problems of the other poor regions of the EU, in-
cluding outmoded and inadequate infrastructure and 
uncompetitive firms. At the time of unification in 1991, 
GOP per head was around a third of the EU average 
and the new LMder were the poorest regions in the 
Union. Major investment by the German Government 
served to increase output per head to around two-
thirds  of  the  EU  average  in  1994.  A  slowdown  in 
growth since then has provoked fears that catching-
up  may  now  take  much  longer  than  originally ex-
pected. 
In  both Finland and Sweden. GOP  declined signifi-
cantly m the early  1990s. Changes in  the economic 
enwonment. in  particular the collapse of trade with 
the former Soviet Union in the case of Finland. exerted 
more pressure than  labour market institutions were 
able to bear and the fall in output was amplified by a 
sharp reduction in  employment. Between  1989 and 
1992. the decline in their relative level of income was 
unprecedented in  the modern EU, GOP per head in 
Finland falling from 105% of the EU average to 87% 
and in Sweden. from  109% to 97%. 
Although both countries have made a partial recovery 
-to  just below the EU average in 1998-the effects 
are still being felt in the poorer regions (GOP per head 
in Ita-Suomi in Finland, for example, is still only 75% of 
the EU  average). The Northern part of  Sweden and 
the North and East of Finland are sparsely populated. 
economically  fragile  and  peripheral  (the  distance 
from Kiruna in  the  North of Sweden to Malm6 in  the 
South  being  nearly  twice  that  from  Malm6  to 
Brussels). the harsh climate combining with low pop-
ulation  density to  increase the  cost of  maintaining 
physical and  social  infrastructure.  The  mainstay of 
these regions is the public sector which makes them 
vulnerable  in  the  present  restrictive  budgetary cli-
mate. 
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A final point to note is that a few poor regions are in rel-
atively prosperous parts of the  EU.  The  reason  for 
their low level of output and income lies, in general, in 
extensive restructuring  and  while  modernisation of 
the  industrial  structure is,  by definition.  a common 
phenomenon, some regions are affected much more 
than others.  Restructuring, affecting coal mining in 
particular, is a key factor in the decline of South York-
shire in the UK (GOP per head falling from 86% of the 
EU average in 1986 to 74% in 1996) and Hainaut on 
the French-Belgium border. The effects of restructur-
ing  have  been  exacerbated  by urban  and  social 
problems in Merseyside (its GOP per head down from 
86% of the EU average to 73% over the period), while 
in Burgenland in Austria  (72% of the EU average in 
1996), they have been reinforced by the fact that it 
was cut off for several decades from much of its natu-
ral hinterland by Communist States. 
Conclusions 
There  is  clear  evidence  that  GOP  per  head.  and 
therefore the output and income of poorer regions, is 
converging  towards  the  EU  average.  Over  the  10 
years,  1986 to  1996, the level in regions with  below 
average GOP per head typically increased by around 
3 percentage points relative to the EU average. Con-
vergence. moreover. seems to have been more pro-
nounced i,  the poorest regions, the 25 with the lowest 
GOP per head in 1986 narrowing the gap with the EU 
average by 5Yz percentage points and the 10 lowest 
by 7Y2 percentage points. In the four Cohesion coun-
tries taken together, the gap narrowed by around 10 
percentage points over the period and projections for 
1999 suggest a further  narrowing of 2 percentage 
points. 
This rate of convergence is unusually rapid, both in 
historical and global terms. A marked growth in trade 
as  European  economies  have  become more  inte-
grated has been a major stimulus, exports and im-
ports between the Cohesion Four and the rest of the 
EU  doubling in real  terms between 1986 and  1996 
and now amounting to over 100 billion ECU  in  both 
cases.  Supply-side  improvements  in  many  of  the 
weaker regions. a strengthening of their productive 
potential and a shift into higher value-added sectors, 
with  support from  the  Structural  Funds,  have  also 
been important. Significant disparities remain, however, and conver-
gence remains a long-term process. Nearly 20% of 
people in  the EU  still  live in  regions with output per 
head 25% or more below the EU average. By compar-
ison, just 2% of people in the US are in a similar posi-
tion, and average disparities between States are less 
than half those between equivalent regions in the EU6. 
At the  same time.  the  long-term nature of conver-
gence is underlined by the fact that, even in such a 
long-established economic union as the US, dispari-
ties between regions are still declining, the average 
dispersion in GOP per head between States falling by 
around 20% since the early 1960s7. 
In  addition,  although GOP  per head in  most of the 
poorer regions is  converging towards the  EU  aver-
age. the pace at which this happens varies and differ-
ent types of region have performed very differently. 
Urban areas have generally performed well, despite 
serious  economic  and  social  problems  in  certain 
. parts.  as  have  regions with  high concentrations of 
manufacturing and/or service activity,  though there 
are exceptions,  notably in  those dependent on the 
public sector and those where there has been ration-
alisation of manufacturing. Rural areas. in  particular. 
are vulnerable, especially those with heavy depend-
ence on agriculture. 
New challenges lie ahead. Enlargement in  the  past 
has brought new problems tor the Union. but also new 
opportunities and increased diversity. The prospec-
tive enlargement to the East is no different in these re-
spects. The changing global environment. moreover. 
w1th  the  intensification of competition that it brings, 
underlines the need for continued support for regions 
undergoing  economic  and  social  restructuring,  so 
that they are able to take advantage of the new oppor-
tunitieS and new markets which are opening up and 
wh1ch  are just as much part of global change. 
1  .  1 The economy 
The measurement 
of the quality of life 
GOP, which is the statistical measure of total output 
of an economy and, therefore, of the income which it 
generates, is commonly used as an indicator of eco-
nomic welfare. In recent years, however, there has 
been growing interest in the development of alterna-
tive  indicators that measure the  quality of life in a 
broader sense than simply the amount of goods and 
services which are produced and the income asso-
ciated with this. Specifically, the aim has been to in-
corporate  such  elements  as  life  expectancy,  the 
quality  of  the  environment  and  levels  of  literacy 
which determine the well-being of society as much 
as real income. The concern has also been to take 
account of the depletion of exhaustible resources, 
such as fossil fuels or various ores, and the pollution 
of the environment caused by existing methods of 
production and  patterns of consumption,  the  true 
costs of which are not reflected in the way that GOP 
is measured. In particular, the valuation of output is 
currently based on market prices which tend to un-
derstate, or to exclude altogether, the  costs of re-
plenishing  the  resources  consumed  in  the 
production process (such as  the  Amazonian  rain-
forests).  or  of  developing  alternatives  if  the  re-
sources cannot be replaced, and of cleaning up the 
enwonment in the event of pollution. 
Th1s concern IS closely related to the not1on of sus-
tainable development, which can be defined as the 
pursuit of a growth path which meets the needs and 
aspirations of the present generation Without com-
promising  those  of  future  ones.  The  concept  of 
green accounting has been developed as a means 
of Identifying such a development path by explicitly 
allowing for  the costs of resource depletion, poilu-
. t1on  and other externalities not  reflected  in  market 
pnces and of incorporating these 1nto an extended 
system of national accounts. This, however. raises a 
number of measurement problems. since 1t1nvolves 
the assignment of monetary values to essentially in-
tangible elements, such as environmental degrada-
tion  or  the  use  of  resources  which  cannot  be 
replaced, except perhaps in the very long-term. The 
fact that there is no fully objective way of doing this 
makes it difficult to get general agreement about the 
values to be assigned and even about the precise 
approach to be adopted to calculate them. Accord-
ingly, the adoption of a system of 'green' national ac-
counts by the  EU  and other countries is  still some 
way off. Nevertheless, work is proceeding towards 
this ultimate objective, which is an essential corol-
lary of shifting from the pursuit of growth per seas a 
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major objective of policy to that of sustainable develop-
ment. 
In line with the undertakings given at the Rio Earth Sum-
mit  (Agenda  21)  to  develop  green  accounting  and 
sustainability indicators. the Commission has adopted 
a  multi-dimensional  indicator approach (satellite  ac-
counts), under which indicators and accounts measur-
ing  environmental,  resource  or  energy  effects  are 
produced alongside the conventional national income 
accounts. This involves measuring environmental ex-
penditure. establishing natural resource accounts, ex-
amining  economic  instruments  to  help  protect  the 
environment and  improving techniques of  assessing 
damage and assigning monetary values to this. The aim 
is  to derive indicators of sustainability from  such ac-
counts. 
The Commission has chosen a two-step approach to 
constructing satellite accounts of this kind. In line with 
the themes identified in the 5th Action Programme on 
the Environment, a set of 50-100 physical indicators in 
10 policy areas will be established which will provide a 
relatively complete description of the pressures on the 
environment from human activities. The number of indi-
cators selected is a compromise between the precision 
of measurement. which would require an even larger 
number. and the manageability of the system. which is 
facilitated if the number is smaller. The relevant indica-
tors and the weights attached to them to construct a set 
of indices will be chosen on the basis of recommenda-
tions by a scientific advisory group. 
These indices will be incorporated into a European sys-
tem of integrated economic and environmental indices 
(ESI). modelled after the existing Dutch NAMEA system. 
aimed at measuring the contribution of the various eco-
nomic sectors to the different kinds of pressure on the 
environment. 
Two pilot programmes will address the key issue of as-
signing monetary values to environmental damage. The 
EXTERNE programme is concerned with measuring the 
externalities involved in the use of energy and attempts 
to quantify the impact on  health  and ecosystems of 
emissions from various kinds of fuel and production pro-
cesses. in terms of the willingness to pay for their avoid-
ance.  The  second  programme  is  concerned  with 
environmental and climate changes. examining indica-
tors of the cost of damage and avoidance and ways of 
putting monetary values on such aspects as the loss of 
life and bio-diversity. 
Environmental considerations are a key aspect of  re-
gional policy, which needs to ensure that the develop-
ment path pursued is sustainable.  In  line with  OECD 
recommendations,  the  plans  formulated  and  the 
programmes implemented should be subject to envi-
ronmental assessment, indicators of sustainable devel-
opment need to be established at  regional level and 
data on natural resources collected for each region. 
Lack of data at regional level is a major problem in this 
regard. Moreover. there is often a mismatch between 
the areas affected by environmental problems and the 
administrative areas which form the basis of the NUTS 
classification  and  data  collection.  Aggregation.  or 
disaggregation. to the appropriate level cannot. there-
fore.  always be performed. To  improve the  situation. 
data would have to be collected for smaller areas. such 
as NUTS-3 regions. and then aggregated. where nec-
essary. to the areas appropriate for environmental as-
sessment. In Germany, for example. a number of local 
studies have been undertaken to measure water qual-
ity,  land  use and other aspects,  and  similar  studies 
would need to be carried out right across the Union in 
order to establish a regional system of green accounts. 
(  1]  For an overv1ew and analys1s of long-term growth trends, see for example N. Crafts and G. Toniolo. Economic growth in Europe smce 
1~5  ° 
(2]  Except where otherwise stated, 'regions· refers to the 206 NUTS-2 regions. For further information, see the Annex on methodology. 
(3]  The OECD uses a definition for rural areas of 150 inhabitants per square km or less. This leads to broadly similar results. eg around 
25% of the EU population live 1n reg1ons fitting this description. 
(4]  ie the average of imports and exports. The two are in practice similar since the EU was roughly in trade balance with the rest of the 
world over the period concerned. 
(5)  Cambridge Econometrics (1998), European regional prospects. 
(6)  DGXVI calculations. based on  1996 Gross State Product data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
(7)  Harvey Armstrong (  1995). Trends and disparities in Reg1onal GOP per capita in the European Union, United States and Australis, 
unpublished study carried out for DGXVI. 
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1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
The main economic problem facing the EU  remains 
the persistence of high unemployment. This is a long-
standing problem. Between  1973 and 1985, unem-
ployment in the 15 Member States taken together in-
creased every year,  from an  average of only 2% to 
over 10%%1 (Graph 5). Economic recovery in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s temporarily reversed the trend 
but failed to reduce the rate to below 7%%. The level 
of unemployment in 1985 was higher than at any time 
since the  great depression of the 1930s. but worse 
was  to  come.  as  the  recession of the  early  :1990s 
pushed up unemployment to  11.2% in  1994.  Some 
18\12 million people were affected. around 1 in 9 of the 
work force. Recovery since then has reduced unem-
ployment to just under 10% in late 1998. but this still 
represents  some  16\12  million  people without work. 
Unemployment does not only affect the  individuals 
concerned: it also means loss of potential production 
and income for the Union as a whole. 
There are several noteworthy features of labour mar-
ket developments in the Union: 
•  unemployment has risen rapidly during cyclical 
downturns in the economy but has fallen slowly 
during upturns, reflecting a failure to sustain em-
ployment growth for long enough during recovery 
periods. The result has been a 'ratcheting-up' of 
unemployment levels, the peak rate in 1994 being 
higher than in  1985, the low point in  1991  being 
higher than in 1980 (at the end of the upturn in the 
late 1970s). This compares unfavourably with the 
US,  where  falls  during  upturns  have  compen-
sated for rises during downturns; 
•  the rise in unemployment has occurred in a con-
text of increasing employment. Over the  period 
1987 to 1997, employment in the EU increased by 
5 million, but this was not enough to keep pace 
with ?Y2 million new entrants into the labour mar-
ket; 
•  the increase in unemployment has been accom-
panied by widening disparities between regions. 
The less favoured regions have been hit dispro-
portionately by the rise. Whereas unemployment 
in the 25 least-affected regions in  the EU  aver-
ages only ~%.  only slightly higher than in the 
early  1970s,  in  the 25 most-affected regions,  it 
now stands at between 20% and 35%, substan-
tially higher than 25 years ago: 
•  high rates of unemployment have been associ-
ated, both over time and between regions, with 
high  levels  of  long-term  unemployment  and  a 
marginalisation-or social exclusion-of the un-
employed  (Graph  6).  In  1997.  just  under  half 
(49%) of the unemployed in the EU had been out 
of work for one year or more, representing 5.2% of 
the work force (in contrast to under 1  o/o in the US): 
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•  interregional differences in employment opportu-
nities are concentrated, in particular, on women 
and young people. Employment rates of women 
are over 60% in  the 25 regions with the  lowest 
overall rate of unemployment, but less than half 
this rate in the 25 regions with the highest unem-
ployment (Graph 7).  Youth unemployment in the 
latter regions averages 47%, more than double 
the rate for those of 25 and over (20%). 
Labour market dynamics 
Unemployment arises from a mismatch between la-
bour  demand  and  labour  supply  (exacerbated  in 
some cases by the way that wages are set). In partic-
ular, marked regional variations in the demand for la-
bour  mean  that,  while  in  some  regions  demand 
matches labour supply and keeps pace with changes 
in it, in others it falls far short. Among the unemployed, 
however. there  is  a subset whose skills are inade-
quate or are no longer demanded and who. therefore. 
face marginalisation and exclusion ,rom the  labour 
market.  These form what is  called structural unem-
ployment. 
The demand for labour in any reg1on depends on the 
strength of its economic base and on the JOb content 
of growth. Employment represents a s1mple measure 
of  labour  demand.  In  the  EU  ag  a  whole.  th1s  in-
creased by 5 million over the 10 years 1987 to  1997. 
There is a clear link between net job creat1on and eco-
nomic growth (Graph 8):  employment increased by 
7Y2 million between 1987 and 1991. but fell by almost 
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5  million  from  1991  to  1994.  Although  it  has risen 
since then-by almost 2% million between 1994 and 
1997 - the average increase over the 10 years as a 
whole was under 0.5% a year. 
While employment has increased, the  rise  has not 
been enough to keep pace with the growth in popula-
tion  of working age and the  growing proportion of 
those who want to work. 
The rise in labour supply, however, is not the cause of 
high  unemployment  in  any  meaningful  sense.  In-
deed, causality can run in the opposite direction, with 
high unemployment discouraging the participation of 
women and young people in the labour market and so 
driving down the supply of labour. The Nordic coun-
tries,  Portugal and the UK have the highest rates of 
participation, or activity, in the EU, at 70-80% of work-
ing-age population. Yet in Denmark, Portugal and the 
UK,  unemployment is  among the  lowest in the  EU, 
with rates of 5-7%. Moreover, both Sweden and Fin-
land had exceptionally low rates of unemployment, 
2--4%, before the recent crisis. This is in line with the 
experience in  the US,  where unemployment is only 
around  5%  and  the  rate  of  participation  is  almost 
80%.  Moreover. working-age population, as well as 
participation. has risen by substantially more in  the 
US than in the EU over the past 10 years. 
Low activity rates can be seen as an  indicator of an 
unused  pool  of  labour,  particularly  in  the  case  of 
women.  Indeed, one of the most striking features of 
labour markets in the EU is the low rate of activity in 
many regions. especially in  those where unemploy-
ment is high. In regions in Spain, Southern Italy and 
7  Participation and employment ratea in 
region• with loweat and hieheat 
unemployment, 1997 
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0 Greece, activity rates ot women are little more than 
40% of working-age population. 
As noted above, a significant part of unemployment is 
due, not just to insufficient labour demand compared to 
labour supply,  but also to a  structural mismatch be-
tween the two.  A  simple definition  of what is  called 
'structural unemployment' is that excess supply in one 
section of the labour market can coexist with excess 
demand in another. Workers can be unemployed at the 
same time as there are unfilled vacancies, simply be-
cause they do  not possess the skills, or are in some way 
unsuitable, for the jobs on offer. The result is that some 
people have only limited access to the labour market 
and are unlikely to find work even if there were an in-
crease in the demand for labour. 
The level of taxes and social charges levied on labour 
is a potential contributor to this mismatch. especially 
as  regards  the  employment of  low-paid  and  low-
skilled workers. High charges can represent an im-
portant deterrent to the creation of such jobs. while 
providing at the same time a possible incentive to em-
ployers and employees alike to avoid payment by ar-
ranging for the work to be done in  the  1nformal.  or 
black economy, rather than the formal one 
Another cause of structural unemployment is  lack of 
skills. The low-skilled. in general. are much more likely 
to be unemployed than those With higher skills. unem-
ployrvent of those aged 25 to 59 w1th only bas1c school-
ing  averaging  12Y2%  across  the  Un1on  in  1997  as 
against just under 6% for those with university-leveled-
ucation.  In  addition.  skills can become obsolete be-
cause of a change in the pattern of demand or in  the 
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1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
Definitions of labour market concepts 
A number of summary statistics, such as 'participa-
tion  rates'  or  'employment  rates',  are  used to de-
scribe  different  features  of  the  labour  market. 
However, it is not always obvious exactly what these 
concepts mean and what the relationship is between 
them. The conventions used in this report are set out 
below. 
There are around 248 million people aged 15-64 in 
the EU and 246 million of these are included in the 
Union  Labour  Force  Survey,  which  is  household 
based and, therefore, excludes those living in com-
munal  households,  such  as  those  in  the  armed 
forces. In  1997, these were divided broadly as fol-
lows: 
•  124  million  people  in  full-time  employment  (in-
cluding 22 million self-employed): 
•  25 million people in part-time employment: 
•  18  million unemployed.  in  the  sense  of  actively 
seek1ng  work  and  being  available  to  work  (of 
wh1ch 9 mill1on for more than one year): 
•  79 m1llion economically 1nactive (of which nearly 
11  million  would  hke  a job.  but  are  not  actively 
100k1ng or are not immediately avalable). 
Ap;Jrt  from  some  rounding  errors.  other  relevant 
concepts are defined and calculated as follows: 
•  the econom1cally active or the labour force is the 
sum of those employed and those unemployed, ie 
124+25+18=167  million  people.  The  activity or 
partiCIPatiOn rate  1s  th1s f1gure relative to the total 
population aged 15-64. 1e  167/246=68%: 
•  the employment rate  IS the sum of those working 
part·t1me as well as full-t1me relat1ve again to total 
population aged 15:...S4. ie(124+ 25)/246=60.5%; 
•  the unemployment rate is the total number unem-
ployed relat1ve to the total number of those eco-
nomically active, ie 18/(124+25+18)=11%: 
•  long-term  unemployment  can  be  expressed  in 
two ways: the number of people out of work for a 
year or more as a proportion of the total number 
unemployed, ie 9/18=49%, or the number of long-
term unemployed relative to the total labour force, 
ie  9/(124+25+ 18)=5%, which is the long-term un-
employment rate. 
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processes of production.  As  economic development 
occurs, one kind of job disappears and another kind of 
job. needing different skills, takes its place. 
Skills, moreover, do not only consist of formal educa-
tional qualifications but also of aptitude and the ability 
to work effectively in the working environment. Those 
out of work for long periods -such as the long-term 
unemployed and women returning to the labour mar-
ket after caring for children - often lose these skills 
and need time in work to reacquire them. which can 
make employers reluctant to recruit such people. 
There  are  various  ways  of estimating  the  extent to 
which unemployment is structural. in the sense that it 
is likely to be unaffected by an increase in labour de-
mand. or. at least, thatit will take some time for it to be 
affected. A simple estimate is provided by long-term 
unemployment. This serves as an approximate indi-
cator of those who have limited access to the job mar-
ket. including those whose skills are declining due to 
lack of contact with the world of work. This implies that 
structural unemployment is about half of total unem-
ployment in the EU. which is similar to estimates pro-
duced by econometric analysis. 2 
It also 1mplies that structural unemployment tends  to 
be proportionately higher in high unemployment re-
g1ons·  1n  the  10 regions with the highest rates of un-
employment. the long-term unemployed account for 
56% of the total, while in the  10 with the lowest rate, 
the f1gure  IS only 34%. 
The  non-structural  part of  unemployment could  be 
relatively quickly reduced by higher growth of output 
and  1ncreased  investment or  by an  increase  in  the 
employment-content of growth. Structural unemploy-
ment; however,  tends to  be more persistent.  In  this 
case. macroeconomic policies to expand output and 
employment  may  need  to  be combined  with  mea-
sures to increase skills and improve access to jobs. 
equalising opportunities for those marginalised in the 
labour market. 
The regional pattern 
of unemployment 
Unemployment rates differ strikingly between regions 
(Map 5). In parts of the South, ie Spain, Southern Italy 
and in the Mediterranean regions of France,  unem-
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ployment rates of 20-30% are prevalent. higher than 
anywhere else in the Union, along with French OOMs. 
These high rates,  however, are not linked uniformly 
with  low levels of regional output. The two Member 
States where GOP is  lowest,  Greece and  Portugal, 
have  relatively  low  rates of unemployment (though 
there are signs that this may be changing in Greece) 
(Table  16).  There  are  also  some  unemployment 
blacks pots in Northern Europe in regions undergoing 
economic restructuring, in particular, in Finland, East-
ern Germany and the  North-Eastern part of France, 
where rates are typically 15-20%. Moreover, in some 
urban blackspots, rates are even higher than this, de-
spite low unemployment in the region as a whole. 
Despite the fact that the overall unemployment rate in 
the EU in 1997 was very similar to that in 1987, the ex-
perience in different parts varied widely (Map 6).  In 
Sweden,  Finland  and  Sollthern  Italy,  there  was  a 
dramatic increase in  unemployment.  In  the  UK,  the 
Netherlands and Ireland,  on  the other hand,  unem-
ployment fell  by 4-5 percentage points in  many re-
gions. Unemployment declined in much of Belgium 
and  in  some  Northern  and  North-Eastern  parts  of 
Spain, although in the latter case this was more than 
balanced by a rise in unemployment elsewhere in the 
country.  Worryingly,  the  central  and  North-Western 
regions of Spain, which already had some of the high-
est rates in the Union, recorded significant increases. 
although in the South, there was little further rise in the 
very high rates which had already been attained.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that,  in  Greece,  restructuring 
has started to cause unemployment to rise. 
The proportion of the unemployed who have been out 
of work for a year or more gives an approximate guide 
to the extent of structural unemployment (Map 7). The 
highest figures are in the South of Italy, where typically 
two-thirds or more of total unemployment is long-term, 
rising to 80% in Campania. Figures of 60-70% are also 
common in the centre and East of Greece, the North-
West coast of Spain and regions undergoing restruc-
turing  in  Belgium and  the  Netherlands.  On  the other 
hand, in most regions in the UK and Sweden, the pro-
portion is only 30-40% and in many parts of Denmark, 
Finland and Austria, it is even lower, at 20-30%. 
In  addition,  young  people under 25  are  nearly 2% 
times more likely to be unemployed than older work-
ers (Map 8). Except in Germany-where, in part due 
to the apprenticeship system, the rate for young peo-
ple is  similar to the overall rate - youth unemploy-Map 5  Unemployment rates by region, 1997 
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Map 6  Change in unemployment rates by region, 1987-97 
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0-.....1o;o00 ____  ;:;!500 lcm ment is significantly higher than the average across 
all countries and regions. The problem is particularly 
serious in regions where the average itself is high. In 
Spain, youth unemployment averages 40% and rises 
to  50-60%  in  regions  with  high  overall  unemploy-
ment. and in Finland and Northern Sweden. it is also 
high in areas where the overall rate is high. 
The problem. however. can be equally serious in re-
gions with lower unemployment. In the South of Italy, 
youth unemployment is. at 50-60%, as high as in the 
worst affected parts of Spain.  Unlike in Spain, how-
ever. this represents four times the overall rate.  re-
flecting the particular difficulty of finding a first job in 
the  Mezzogiorno.  This  is  also  the  case  in  Greece, 
while in Belgium and France, where youth unemploy-
ment is  around 25%,  much higher than  the  overall 
rate. it is concentrated on a relatively small number of 
young people, many of  whom join the  labour force 
with inadequate qualifications. 
Comparisons of regions at opposite extremes serve to 
emphasise the scale of the disparities (Table 13). In the 
10 worst affected regions. average unemployment was 
28.1% in  1997 or nearly 8 times higher than  in the  10 
least  affected  regions,  where  the  average  was  just 
3.6%. While unemployment in the EU in  1997 was only 
slightly higher than in 1987, in the 10 worst affected re-
gions it was up by more than 4 percentage points 
The composition of the  10 worst affected reg1ons has 
changed more than for GOP per head.  In  1987.  they 
were entirely composed of regions in  Spain,  Ceuta y 
Mellila, Andalucia and Extremadura being notable ex-
amples.  While these were still  in  the  top  ten  1n  1997, 
they  were  joined  by  the  French  overseas  territones 
(DOMs).  most  notably  Reunion.  and  regions  in  the 
South of Italy. 
The structural element of unemployment 1s particularly 
evident in  these  10 regions.  the number unemployed 
for a year or more amount1ng  to  56% of  the  total  as 
against 34% in the ten least affected regions. The for-
mer figure represents nearly 16% of the labour force in 
the 10 worst affected regions. significantly higher than 
the overall unemployment rate  in  most regions of the 
EU. 
In addition, while unemployment rates for women in 
the 10 least affected regions were similar to rates for 
men, in the 10 worst affected regions, they were sig-
nificantly higher- 37% as  against 28% (Tables  14 
1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
and 15). The figures for young people in the latter are 
also extreme; with average unemployment as high as 
56% as against 23% for those of 25 and over, imply-
ing that under 45% of the young people in the labour 
market succeed in finding jobs in these  region~. 
Broadening the analysis, in the 25 worst affected re-
gions, unemployment averaged 23.7% in 1997, more 
than five times the average of 4.2% in the 25 least af-
fected regions. As for the 10 regions with the highest 
unemployment, the  rate in  the former increased by 
nearly 4 percentage points between 1987 and 1997, 
while that in the latter remained virtually unchanged. 
Moreover, the structural element in unemployment re-
mains significant as does the disproportionate effect 
on women and young people. 
While the same Spanish regions account for a large 
number of the 25 worst affected regions in both 1987 
and  1997,  the  other  regions  included changed al-
most completely. The 6 regions in the UK undergoing 
restructuring  which  were  included  in  1987  experi-
enced a marked fall  in  unemployment and were re-
placed  by  the  French  overseas  territories  (DOMs) 
(whtch  were  not covered  in  1987).  a number of re-
gions :n the South of Italy and reg1ons undergoing re-
stru:t:.mng  in  Finland  and  the  Eastern  part  of 
Germany. as well as Corsica 
A Strlktng feature to emerge is that while in some re-
gtons  unemployment  has  changed  relatively  little 
smce the early 1970s. in others it has doubled or even 
trebled  The  tendency for  disparities  in  unemploy-
ment  to  w1den  over  time  is  confirmed by summary 
measures of dispersion. in particular by the standard 
devtatton (we1ghted for populatton). This shows that 
the long-term trend towards a w1den1ng of disparities 
was halted temporarily dunng the years of high em-
ployment growth 1n the late 1980s. but continued from 
1992 onwards (Graph 5). 
While there is a fair amount of similarity in the relative 
level of  unemployment across regions in  1987 and 
1997.  1n  the  sense  that  the  ordering  of  regions  in 
terms of  unemployment was not dramatically differ-
ent. there was, nevertheless, a far greater movement 
up and down the order than in  the case of GDP per 
head  (the  Spearman's  rank  correlation  coefficient 
was 0.58 as opposed to 0.91 ). 
The  disparity  in  unemployment  between  regions 
across the Union is paralleled by a similarly wide differ-
43 1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
ence in most Member States (Graph 9). Moreover, as 
at the EU  level, the difference has widened over time 
(Table 13). Regional differences are greatest in France 
(if the DOMs are included), Italy and Spain. In 1997, un-
employment  in  the  worst-affected  region  in  France 
(Reunion) was nearly 37%, while in the least-affected 
(Aisace), it  was 29 percentage points lower. In Italy, the 
gap between Campania in the South and Trentino-Aito 
Adige in the North was over 22 percentage points. In 
Spain, the rate in Andalucia was over 32% (the highest 
in mainland Western Europe) and, at the other extreme, 
in Navarra (the only region in Spain with unemployment 
below the EU average), it was around 10%. 
On the other hand, unemployment in all the regions in 
the Netherlands, Austria and Portugal is below the EU 
average, as it is in Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, 
where there are no regional data because of the size of 
the country. Similarly, in the UK. only Merseyside has a 
rate above the EU average, the mirror image of Spain in 
this respect. 
Urban, rural and sectoral issues 
Some Interesting patterns emerge in terms of labour 
market characteristics between urban and rural ar-
eas. def1ned 1n the same way as in Section 1.1  above 
(Table 6). The most significant feature is that, despite 
their relatively high GOP per head, unemployment in 
urban areas is  higher on average than  elsewhere. 
This, however, is not uniformly the case. While some 
areas  are  undergoing  restructuring  and/or  experi-
ence a high level of social exclusion, in others, unem-
ployment is relatively low. 
Moreover, unemployment is almost as high in rural ar-
eas  (averaging  11.3%  in  1997)  as  in  urban  ones 
(11.5%), whereas in  intermediate areas,  it is  signifi-
cantly lower than  in  both (9.1 %).  This pattern is  re-
flected in youth, female and long-term unemployment 
rates, though with slight differences. Unemployment 
of women is highest in rural areas (13.8%), while long-
term unemployment is at its most serious in urban ar-
eas (6% of the labour force). suggesting that struc-
tural problems are partic..;larly acute in such places. 
The problem in particular urban areas is even more 
serious than the average figures suggest, since it is 
composed of areas which are among the most pros-
perous in the Union with very low unemployment and 
others where one-third  to half of the work force are 
unemployed. Long-term unemployment is a particu-
lar  problem  in  these  areas.  often  accounting for  a 
large majority of the unemployed. 
9  Unemployment rates by Member State and resional extremes, 1997 
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44 In terms of sectors, employment declined in both ag-
riculture and manufacturing between 1987 and 1997 
but increased significantly in services, which accord-
ingly accounted for much more than all of the rise of 5 
million in the total number employed over the period 
(see Table  17).  This  differential  pattern of sectoral 
change  is  reflected  in  the  experience  of  regions 
which have concentrations of employment in the dif-
ferent sectors (Tables 7, 8 and 9). 
Expansion  was  particularly  marked  in  high  value-
added parts of the service sector (business services, 
especially), as well as in communal services (health 
and education). Nevertheless, employment in  these 
services,  and in  the service sector as  a whole,  re-
mains substantially below the level in  the US (espe-
cially when related to working-age popul3tion - in 
the US, employment in services amounted to just over 
54% of population aged 15 to 64, whereas in the EU, 
the figure was only just under 40%). 
Despite  these  trends,  unemployment  rates  in  the 
most service-intensive regions are only slightly below 
average  (9.6%  in  1997).  While  manufacturing  has 
tended to  expand most in  areas where it  is  already 
best represented - ie regional concentration has in-
creased - the highest rates  of  growth  in  services 
seem  to  have occurred outside  the  reg1ons  where 
they already account for a high proportion of jobs. 
Some 4 million jobs were lost  in  manufacturing be-
tween 1987 and 1997 and while these were concen-
trated  in  declining  industries,  even  the  more 
technologically  advanced  and  dynamic  sectors. 
wh1ch expanded in terms of output, experienced little 
if any growth in employment because of the long-term 
tendency lor the capital intensity of production to in-
crease and for fewer people to be employed per unit 
of output. 
Despite this, the top 25 manufacturing regions have 
the  lowest  unemployment  of  any  of  the  sectoral 
groupings (9.0% in  1997). Except in the three Span-
ish  regions  and one  East  German  region  included 
among these, all have unemployment below the EU 
average, some substantially below. This is even more 
marked for the top 10 regions, where unemployment 
averaged only 6.2% in  1997. As  in  the case of their 
GOP per head, this in part reflects the fact that there-
gions with the highest concentration of employment 
in manufacturing are,  almost by definition, the most 
successful ones.  It  also  reflects the  importance of 
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success in manufacturing as a means of supporting 
job creation in other sectors, especially business ser-
vices. Continuing concentration of manufacturing in 
these regions, many of which are located in Southern 
Germany and the North of Italy, implies that they are 
likely to benefit further in the future as other regions, 
where manufacturing is less important. lose out. 
If the experience of the top 25 service and manufac-
turing regions is compared with the experience of ur-
ban areas in  terms of unemployment, the low rates 
shown by regions which are still doing well in manu-
facturing,  despite the  substantial job losses in  the 
sector as a whole, suggest that the high rates in other 
regions are linked to industrial restructuring. This is 
borne out by the high level of long-term unemploy-
ment in most of the areas concerned. 
Agriculture has experienced the greatest decline in 
employment of all sectors. Although in absolute terms 
the reduction was only slightly less than in manufac-
turing (just under 4 million jobs lost), in relative terms. 
it meant that a third of the jobs which existed in  1987 
had disappeared by 1997. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
the 25 regions with the highest concentration of em-
ployment in  agriculture had an  average unemploy-
ment  rate  of  14.7%  in  1997,  4  percentage  points 
above the EU  average. There is a real risk that the1r 
position will  deteriorate further  given their  high  de-
pendence on the sector, which accounts for nearly a 
quarter of all jobs in the areas concerned. In particu-
lar,  in many of the Greek regions, where unemploy-
ment  is  below  average  at  present.  3~0% of 
employment  is  in  agriculture,  indicating  that  eco-
nomic restructuring has a long way to go. 
If  the experience in  these regions is compared with 
that in rural areas as a whole, where unemployment is 
just below the EU average, it is evident that such ar-
eas include many with very low rates of  unemploy-
ment. These, however, are those which are not solely 
dependent on agriculture, such as East Anglia in the 
UK with  unemployment of 5.6% in  1997, which is a 
centre of high technology and Emilia-Romagna with a 
rate  of 6. 7%,  where agriculture is  concentrated  in 
high value-added sectors and where there are close 
links with the industrial part of Northern Italy. 
Although unemployment is  below average in  many 
rural areas, underemployment is common. For exam-
ple, while part-time working is more prevalent in ur-
ban areas, a greater proportion of those working part-
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time in rural areas (42%) would prefer a full-time job, 
representing a form of hidden unemployment. 
Other features of the rural labour market are increas-
ing diversification of employment towards activities 
such as tourism and a high number of self-employed 
and family workers, many working in small holdings, 
which, at 18% of the total employed, is double that in 
urban areas. 
In addition, rural areas on average lag behind cities in 
terms of the skills of the work force. The proportion of 
the population in urban areas with an above average 
education level (54%) is higher than in intermediate 
areas  (50%)  and much  higher than  in  rural  ones 
(41 %). This is reflected in the relative number working 
in the more skilled occupations, as managers. techni-
cians or professionals, which is 39% of all those em-
ployed in  urban areas as against only 26% in  rural 
ones. Nevertheless. a number of areas within urban 
regions have a relatively low-skilled work force and a 
significant skills gap exists in such areas. 
The age structure of the population also seems to work 
against rural  areas.  Whereas  the  number of  people 
aged 65 and over amounts to 22% of those of working 
age (  15 to 64) in urban areas. in rural ones. the figure is 
27%, over 1 in 4. This reflects in part the tendency for 
people to move into rural  areas when  they  retire.  or 
even just before. but it also reflects an exodus of young 
people  to  urban  areas  where  job  opportunities  are 
greater, so reducing the available work force. 
In sum, although urban areas tend to have a stronger 
economic base than  other regions.  they also have 
higher levels of unemployment on average.  In  rural 
areas, the problem is as much of job quality and low 
wages. In both groups, however, there is a significant 
minority of regions and areas within these with very 
high rates of  unemployment where economic restruc-
turing is underway. 
Employment of women in the regions 
Despite progress in recent years. women are in many 
respects still at a disadvantage in the European labour 
market. Although the net additional jobs created over 
the past 10 years and more have virtually all gone to 
women, this job growth has failed to keep pace with the 
increasing number of women who want to work. As a 
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result,  unemployment among women is much higher 
than  for  men  in  most parts of the  Union.  averaging 
121ho/o as against 91ho/o in 1997. Despite the fact that 
women form just over 40% of Europe's labour force, 
they account for nearly half of the  unemployed and 
slightly over half of the long-term unemployed. Employ-
ment rates for women remain significantly lower than 
for men, at only 50% over the Union as a whole as op-
posed to 70%. Moreover, many of these work part-time 
(32Y2o/o as against 6% of men). 
The greatest challenge to equalising opportunities for 
women and men in the labour market lies in the need 
to enable both to reconcile work and family responsi-
bilities in a better way than at present. Although rec-
onciling  the  two  is  as  difficult for  men  as  it  is  for 
women, it remains the case that vastly more women 
than men are forced to make a choice in favour of their 
family and have to suspend their working careers. As 
a  result,  firms  which  are willing  to  be flexible  and 
make themselves more family-friendly,  allowing,  for 
example, people to work part-time or flexible hours, 
are likely to be at an advantage in attracting and re-
taining women employees. This is  perhaps a major 
reason for the concentration of women in the service 
sector. 
There are other obstacles to be overcome. such as 
perceptions of women,  including women's percep-
tions of themselves. if women are to be less concen-
trated in a few traditional activities and in relatively low 
positions  within  the  company or  organisation  they 
work for. There are, however, positive trends: 
•  the difference between men and women in terms 
of the opportunity to work diminishes with rising 
educational  levels and for university graduates 
the difference is relatively small. In  1997, for ex-
ample, 80% of women graduates aged 25 to 64 
were in employment, only slightly less than the fig-
ure for men (90%). On the other hand, only 44% of 
women with only basic schooling were in work as 
against 76% of men. Moreover. women's educa-
tional qualifications are rising laster than for men, 
those aged 25 to 29 having higher qualifications, 
on average, than men of the same age; 
•  the  combination  of  increasing  educ.ation  and 
changing attitudes means that employment rates 
of women are converging on those of men - be-
tween  1987 and  1997,  they rose  from  46%  of 
working-age population to 50%, whereas those for men declined from 7  4% to 68%. Nevertheless, 
although the difference is diminishing, it remains 
large; 
•  women are concentrated in the growing service 
sector and are,  therefore,  less  at risk  of losing 
their job than men, who are employed dispropor-
tionately in agriculture and manufacturing where 
restructuring is taking place. 
The regional pattern reflects this pattern of change. In 
some countries and regions, much progress has been 
made in  opening up opportunities for  women,  while 
others still have a long way to go. For example, in Den-
mark,  Sweden and Finland.  employment and unem-
ployment rates  of women  are  generally much more 
similar to  those of men than  elsewhere in  the  Union 
(Map 10, Graph 10). This reflects a long tradition of in-
clusion,  gender equality and  child-care provision  in 
these countries. The position is similar in the UK, proba-
bly reflecting  the  high proportion of service employ-
ment,  and unemployment among women is  actually 
less than among men, although employment rates for 
women with young children are relatively low. 
At the other extreme. in the Mediterranean countries 
of Spain,  Italy and Greece, less than half of women 
participate in the labour market. despite an increas-
ing activity rate. particularly in Spain. Moreover. those 
who do join the labour market generally experience 
high unemployment and, as a result, not much more 
than a third of women of working age- in these coun-
tries have a job. while the opportunities for part-time 
work are much less than elsewhere (see. for example, 
Graph 11 ). 
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1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
In lagging regions. in general, women are much more 
likely to be unemployed than men when they partici-
pate in the labour market. In the four Cohesion coun-
tries, unemployment among women is double that in 
the EU as a whole (22% as against 12Y2%). Women, 
therefore,  tend to suffer disproportionately from  in-
creasing unemployment (Map 9).  In  1997, rates for 
women were particularly high in Spain (ranging from 
15% in Navarra to 42% in Andalucia), Southern Italy 
(34% in  Calabria and Campania) and Eastern Ger-
many (20-25%) as well as parts of Greece and Fin-
land,  and  these  regions  showed  the  greatest 
increases over the period 1987 to 1997. 
Much of the difference in employment rates of women 
between regions is attributable to part-time working, 
which is considerably more important in the higher 
employment areas. The number of women with full-
time jobs in lagging regions. therefore. is not so much 
lower than in the rest of the EU relative to people of 
working age. The average rate in Spain and Italy is 
around 30%, only slightly lower than the EU average, 
and not so far behind the rate in the Nordic countries 
of 40-50%. 
Only around 1 in 20 women of working-age. however, 
has a part-time job in Spain and Italy and only 1 in 30 
in Greece, as opposed to around 1 in 6 in the EU as a 
whole and over 1 in 4 in Sweden and the UK. The op-
portunity for  women to work part-time is,  therefore, 
substantially smaller in  regions  in  the  former  three 
countries. as well as in Portugal, than in most North-
ern parts of the Union (Map 11 ).  Moreover, in there-
gions with the highest rates, part-time employment is 
not exclusive to women and a relatively high proper-
11  Male and female employment and 
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tion of men also work part-time ( 10% or more of men in 
employment in some cases). 
The chance of working part-time makes an important 
contribution to the ability of women to pursue working 
careers. Although it is sometimes portrayed as a 'sec-
ond-class'  form  of employment.  the  Labour  Force 
Survey found that over 80% of women employed in 
part-time jobs in  1997 worked in them by choice and 
did not want to work full-time. 
The situation in the 
worst affected regions 
Unemployment in Spain is the highest in the Union, af-
fecting nearly 1 in 5 of the labour force - almost 3% 
million people- in 1997. There are huge disparities 
across the country, the rate in the Northern regions of 
Navarra, La Rioja and Arag6n, ranging between 10% 
and 15%, comparable to many regions elsewhere in 
the  EU,  while  in  the  Southern regions of Andalucia 
and Extremadura, it was around 30%. In addition, low 
act1v1ty  rates among wornen ·(around 40%) suggest 
significant  hidden  unemployment  and  a  large 
underused pool of labour. 
Changes in  unemployment in  Spain,  as  elsewhere. 
have generally mirrored economic performance. with 
marked reductions in  the  second half of  the  1  980s 
(When  employment grew by 3W¥o  a year) and large 
rises 1n the early 1990s (when employment fell by 1% 
a year). Recent recovery has again served to reduce 
rates.  though this has tended to favour regions with 
unemployment below the national average. Over the 
period 1987 to  1997, rates fell from 15.1% to 10% in 
Navarra  and  from  23.2%  to  18.8%  in  Pais  Vasco, 
while  they  actually  increased  in  Andalucia  (from 
31.1%  to  32.0%) and  Extremadura (from  25.9%  to 
29.5%) 
Part of the reason for this lies in extensive restructur-
ing  as  modernisation of  the  economy takes  place. 
Levels of  productivity have converged towards the 
EU average, but the new industrial base still needs to 
be broadened. However, although long-term unem-
ployment rates are high, the proportion of the jobless 
who are long-term unemployed (just over half) is only 
slightly above the EU average. Moreover, unemploy-
ment has come down rapidly since the present recov-
ery began and the employment-content of growth has 
1.2  Unemployment and the labour market 
increased markedly, suggesting that it is one country 
in which unemployment might be reduced substan-
tially by economic growth alone. 
Regional  unemployment in  Portugal  contrasts  with 
that in Spain. Despite similar geographical and his  tor-
ical circumstances,  unemployment performance in 
the two countries has been very different since the 
beginning of the  1980s. While rates  in  Spain have 
generally risen over this period, in Portugal, they have 
remained relatively low. fluctuating between 4% and 
8%.  Recent restructuring of the textile industry has 
been absorbed comparatively well given the scale of 
job losses. and even in Alentejo, the worst-affected 
region, unemployment was only 10% in  1997. 
Explanations for Portugal's performance relative  to 
Spain's include a higher and better balance of em-
ployment - activity rates of women are high and un-
employment low, so there is little slack to be taken up 
-and  less rigidity of wages and contracts of employ-
ment.  In  addition,  high  levels  of  support from  the 
Structural Funds have smoothed the necessary mod-
ernisation of the structure of production. On the other 
hand, a large proportion of employment in agriculture 
and evidence of underemployment suggest that Por-
tugal has still to face significant restructuring in the fu-
ture.  Part  of  the  difference  relative  to  Spain  may, 
therefore,  simply reflect the  fact that  economic re-
structuring is less advanced. Although Portugal starts 
from a relatively good position, continued advance-
ment is likely to depend on the labour market remain-
ing  flexible  and  ongoing  Community  support  for 
restructuring. 
Unemployment in  Greece  is  low  but  gradually  in-
creasing and, as in Portugal, there are features which 
give cause for concern. Restructuring is continuing in 
agriculture and in many industrial sectors as well as in 
the public sector, traditionally a large employer. but 
still  has some way to go. The  industrial base,  how-
ever.  is  weaker than in  Portugal.  On the one hand, 
economic growth is  lower. On the other,  there  is  a 
large reserve  of unused labour. with activity rates, 
particularly among women, being among the lowest 
in the EU. 
The lack of jobs for women is reflected in the fact that 
the unemployment rate of women is more than double 
that of men, while youth unemployment, more than 4 
times that for those of 25 and over. reflects an inade-
quate rate of new job creation. Unemployment rose 
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from 7.4% to9.6% between 1987 and 1997 and in the 
poorer, largely mountainous and rural interior. which 
is most vulnerable to shocks, it increased by more (by 
around  8  percentage  points  to  14%  in  Dytiki 
Makedonia). 
In Ireland, the decline of employment in agriculture 
has been more than offset by growth in other sectors: 
Ireland  is  one of the  few countries  in  the  Western 
world where  manufacturing employment is  still  ex-
panding. Although in the past economic growth failed 
to translate into increased employment. there is clear 
evidence of change in more recent years. partly as a 
result of macroeconomic stabilisation-helped from 
1987 onwards by a series of national wage agree-
ments.  Employment has expanded markedly since 
1991 (by over 3% a year), which is important, as par-
ticipation among women. which has historically been 
very low, is increasing rapidly (the labour force grew 
by almost 2%% a year between 1991  and 1997). 
There is some concern. however. about the structural 
element in unemployment. since employment growth 
has  been concentrated largely in  the  East  and  the 
long-term unemployed, though declining. still amount 
to 56% of the total jobless. Considerable innovation in 
active  labour  market  policy  in  recent  years.  sup-
ported by the Structural Funds, shows signs of help-
ing  the  long-term  unemployed get back into work, 
though  it  remains to  be seen whether employment 
growth will spread across the country. 
Regions in the South of Italy are undergoing restruc-
turing, as many of the large firms. as well as the public 
sector. reorganise and rationalise. Small firms are. at 
present, the main source of job creation. Unemploy-
ment increased substantially over the period 1987 to 
1997,  in  Calabria,  the  rate  rising  by  7 percentage 
points to 24.9% and in Sicilia, by 8 percentage points 
to  24.0%,  while  elsewhere in the  Mezzogiorno, the 
rate went up by at least 4-5 percentage points. 
This. however. is probably as much a result of labour 
market problems as pressure from rationalisation. In-
dicators of structural unemployment suggest that this 
is the highest in the EU. Exclusion is particularly high, 
unemployment of women  is  double that of men  in 
many cases and activity rates of women are  lower 
than  anywhere else in  the  Union.  Youth  unemploy-
ment is nearly four times the rate for those of 25 and 
over and the long-term unemployed represent two-
52 
thirds of the total jobless. higher than anywhere else 
in the Union. 
Around 1 in 6 of the work force in the new Lander in 
Eastern Germany is unemployed, with as many again 
on  short-term working. This  is  a result of major re-
structuring and, especially, rationalisation of industry. 
Given the scale of the initial problem, the labour mar-
ket seems to have coped relatively well and there are 
some positive signs. Youth unemployment is slightly 
less than the overall rate and although unemployment 
of  women  is  higher  than  of  men,  participation  of 
women, if much lower than in 1991. is still among the 
highest in the EU (69% of working-age population). 
Hidden reserves of labour are,  therefore,  relatively 
small. 
Regions in Finland have historically had low rates of 
unemployment.  However.  the  severe  shock of  the 
early 1990s drove the complex collective bargaining 
system to virtual collapse. Employment fell by almost 
20%  between  1990  and  1994  and  unemployment 
soared from 3%'Yo to 18%%. The shock fell particularly 
heavily on the sparsely populated Northern and East-
ern regions and unemployment rose to almost a quar-
ter of the  labour force  in  Lapland and  parts of  Ita-
Suomi. 
Since then. however. the situation has improved. Un-
employment has declined. though the fall  has been 
concentrated in the stronger regions; between 1995 
and  1997,  rates  in  Uusimaa  in  the  South  fell  from 
14%% to  12%, while rates in  the East remained un-
changed at  around 20%.  Structural unemployment. 
on the other hand, seems to be low so unemployment 
is likely to come down significantly as  the economy 
recovers. Partly because of the long tradition of active 
labour market measures in Finland. less than a quar-
ter of the unemployed have been out of work for a year 
or more. even in the worst affected regions. Women. 
moreover, are well integrated into the  labour market. 
with  unemployment  and  activity  rates  only  slightly 
lower than those of men. The main worry is that youth 
unemployment is high, at around 38%. 
Regions in  Sweden have experienced similar prob-
lems, though on a smaller scale. Average unemploy-
ment rose  from  2%  in  1987  to  9%'Yo  in  1994  and 
subsequently rose further to 10% in  1997. As in Fin-
land,  the  increase fell  particularly on  the  sparsely 
populated Northern regions, where rates are around 
13%. Structural unemployment, however, seems low, with the long-term unemployed accounting for only 
around a third of the jobless, in part reflecting a long 
history of active labour market policy, and there is lit-
tle evidence of exclusion of women and young peo-
ple. The prospects for a significant future reduction, 
however, remain uncertain, not least because of the 
greater reliance than elsewhere in the Union on pub-
lic sector employment. 
Conclusions 
High unemployment is the major economic problem 
in the Union. At the end of 1998. just under one in ten 
of the labour force- 16\12 million people-was with-
out a job. In addition, low rates of labour force partici-
pation,  particularly among  women,  indicate a vast 
pool of human resources which is lying idle. 
Unemployment disproportionately affects particular 
regions and social groups and high rates of long-term 
unemployment mean social exclusion for significant 
numbers of  people and serious difficulty in  getting 
them back into work. Unemployment in the 25 worst 
affected regions averages 28%. while the 25 least af-
fected regions have largely escaped the increases of 
the past 25 years, with rates of under 5%.  Youth un-
employment rates in the former average nearly 50% 
and less  than  1 in  3 women of working-age are  in 
work. 
This  suggests that,  although sustained growth pro-
vides a favourable background for reducing unem-
ployment, the market alone will not solve the problem. 
Structural problems require structural solutions: 
•  in particular, regional imbalances in the demand 
for labour mean that it is high in some regions but 
too low in others. Different solutions are required 
for different types of region. Less developed re-
gions need help in  boosting investment and im-
proving  their  economic  base.  Regions 
undergoing restructuring,  where unemployment 
is often highest, need help in smoothing the shift 
of employment to growing sectors. In all regions, 
flexibility is needed in the labour market to ensure 
that investment feeds  through  into job creation 
(1]  Figures for the  1980s exclude the new Lander and East Berlin. 
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and not just higher productivity. The job-content 
of growth, in other words, needs to be increased: 
•  around half of unemployment seems to be struc-
tural, linked to problems on the supply side, such 
as  a  lack of appropriate skills,  which  leads to 
marginalisation or the effective exclusion of cer-
tain people from the labour market. While mea-
sures to create jobs are necessary, they need to 
be combined with measures to promote access 
to  these  jobs,  equalising  the  opportunities  for 
those marginalised. Such measures include in-
creased  training  or  retraining  to  help workers 
adapt to structural change and assistance to help 
people find a job, especially the most disadvan-
taged, such as the long-term unemployed, young 
people lacking sufficient skills and women seek-
ing to return to work after caring for children. 
Member States have the principal role to play, by en-
couraging flexibility and ensuring that disadvantaged 
groups and those affected by restructuring receive 
support.  The  Structural Funds can also contribute, 
particularly by boosting economic development and 
hence job opportunities in  weaker regions, but also 
by  assisting  the  retraining  of  workers  affected  by 
structural  change and  by  supporting  measures  to 
help the long-term unemployed and other disadvan-
taged groups into work. 
(2]  For example. "The Composition of Unemployment from an Economic Perspective", Annual Economic Report for  1995, European 
Commission. 
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As forecast in the 5th Periodic Report, 1 the population 
in  the Union has continued to grow at a higher rate 
than at the end of the 1980s. Although there has been 
a natural increase in population, with births exceed-
ing  deaths.  inward  migration  into  the  Union  has 
gained in  importance. In  1995, it contributed nearly 
80% of the total growth in  population, though it de-
clined somewhat in  1996 and 1997. 
Demographic 
developments, 1985-95 
•  Total population of the Un1on (includ1ng the new 
German Lander) increased by 0.36% a year be-
tween 1985 and 1995, from 358Y2 million to 371 Y2 
million. The rise was greater in the second half of 
the period than the first, averaging 0.4% between 
1989 and 1995 as opposed to 0.2% over the pre-
vious four years. 
•  Population aged over the period. While the pro-
portion of young people under 15 declined from 
19.7% to 17.6%,  the share of those aged 65 and 
over increased from  13.5% to 15.4%. 
•  The  Union labour force expanded by some  8Y2 
million to 165Y2 million in 1995, a growth of 0.6%, 
mainly due to increasing participation of women 
and inward migration. 
•  Active population under 25, as well as in the 25 to 
29 age group, declined partly because of demo-
graphic trends and partly because of increased 
participation in  education  and  training.  Among 
older people aged 50 to 64, the number of men in 
the labour force fell because of earlier retirement 
(ie  reduced  participation)  which  offset 
demographic trends, while the number of women 
increased as higher participation reinforced pop-
ulation growth. In the age group in between, par-
ticipation of men declined while participation of 
women increased markedly.  2 
Population projections to 2025 
Demographic change depends on three factors: iertil-
lty.  mortal1ty (and so changes in life expectancy) and 
m1grat1on  Because  of  the  uncertainty  surrounding 
popu1at1on forecasts, which increases with the length 
of the proJection period, a frequent approach is to con-
struct alternative scenarios, based on different, though 
reasonable.  assumptions for  these  three factors. The 
latest Eurostat projections cons1st  of a baseline sce-
nano wn1ch essentially assumes a continuation of re-
cent trends.  a high growth scenario,  which assumes 
higher fertility, lower mortality and higher net inward mi-
gration and a low growth scenano. wh1ch assumes the 
oppos1te  In  some  sense,  these  represent expected 
upper  and  lower  limits  for  population  growth  up  to 
2025 J 
Key features of the baseline scenario 
The  baseline scenario, which is similar to the latest 
population forecasts made by national statistical in-
stitutes in the different Member States, assumes: 
•  a slow recovery in  the fertility rate from an  esti-
mated 1.44 in  1996 to  1  .55 in  2000 and 1.65 in 
2025;4 
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•  a further increase in life expectancy, which has 
risen by more than 10 years since 1945, by almost 
4 years for men and more than 3 years for women 
by 2025: 
•  slowly declining levels  of  net inward  migration 
from around 760 thousand in  1995 to less than 
600 thousand a year from 2010 onwards. 
On these assumptions, Union population would con-
tinue to grow but at a rate of 0.3% a year until2005, as 
against 0.4% between 1990 and 1995, and 0.1% a 
year from then until2025 (Tables 18 and 19). From a 
Union population of 372 million in  1995 the baseline 
scenario predicts an  !ncrease to 377 million in 2000 
and 388 million in  2025.  Population will already be 
showing a natural decline by around 2010, but for a 
time this will be offset by net immigration. With birth 
rates remaining far below replacement level (ie the 
rate required to replace the parent generation, given 
death rates), the number of young people under 15 is 
set to decline in all Member States in the longer term, 
their share falling from 17% in 2000 to below 15% in 
2025  Given this and the  increasing share of older 
people. crude mortality rates, and so the rate of natu-
ral population decline. will accelerate. On this projec-
tton.  Un1on  population would start to fall  from 2023 
onwards 
At  a  regtonal  level,  the  differences  in  population 
trends are more pronounced and the change from 
growth to decline is more evident. While population is 
likely to grow in most regions over the period 2000 to 
2005. it is already set to decline in Eastern Germany 
and the  North-West of  Spain and Italy,  largely be-
cause of a natural fall in  population, net outward mi-
gration  being  a  factor  only  in  Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern and the Basque Country (Map 12). Emi-
gratton is also forecast to contribute to the decline in 
population in other regions, such as South-West Scot-. 
land. Lorraine. Alentejo. Calabria and Basilicata. The 
major cities in  England as well as Bremen, Brussels 
and Vienna are also likely to experience a fall in popu-
lation. partly as a result of an outward movement to 
neighbouring areas. 
High growth rates, on the other hand, are expected in 
some regions in Southern Spain (mainly because of 
natural  population  growth),  the  South  of  France 
(mainly due to immigration) and Greece (be'cause of 
both factors) as well as in a number of regions in the 
UK, Belgium and the Netherlands (Map 13). The high-
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Low and high growth scenarios 
These two scenarios describe more extreme but still 
plausible  population projections. They  differ from 
the baseline projection in terms of each of the three 
factors which determine growth. 
•  Low growth scenario: fertility rates fall further to 
1.40 in 2000 and only recover slightly to  1.44 in 
2025. Life expectancy is projected to increase by 
two years for both men and women  and  net in-
ward  migration  to  fall  to  around  400  thousand 
from 2000 onwards. 
•  High  growth  scenario:  fertility  rates  recover  to 
1.75 by the year 2000 and to 1.94 in 2025 (similar 
to the rate in the mid-1970s). Life expectancy in-
creases  by  8  years  for  men  and  6  years  for 
women. Net immigration rises until 2000 to more 
than 1  million a year ar1  then falls to slightly below 
800 thousand from 2010 on. 
Under the  low growth scenario,  there  would  be a 
natural decline in population over almost all of the 
projection period, while there would be a net natural 
increase of between 500 thousand and  1 million a 
year in the high growth scenario. While over the near 
future, the difference in the three projections is rela-
tively small, over the longer penod. it is substantial. 
By  2025,  population  in  the  Union  under the  high 
growth  scenario  would  have  risen  to  423  million, 
while under the low growth scenario it would have 
fallen to 358 million. 
With  fertility rates  close to replacement levels.  the 
share of young people in total population would re-
main around 17% until 2025 in the high growth sce-
nario,  while  in  the  low  growth one  it  would  fall  to 
below 13.5%. 
Recent data for the period 199~  give some indica-
tions of which scenario -low, high or baseline-is 
closest  to  the  initial  outturn.  For  example,  fertility 
rates are proving lower than predicted in the base-
line scenario,  so observed increases in the young 
population are around the average of the baseline 
and  low  scenarios.  On  the  other  hand,  mortality 
rates as well as net migration were somewhat over-
estimated in the baseline scenario. Thus the aging 
of the population and the growth of the number of 
old  people  are  both  close  to  the  average of  the 
baseline and high scenarios. It seems therefore, at 
least on initial readings, that the baseline scenario is 
proving a good central estimate, although the other 
two scenarios need to be taken into consideration. est growth of population continues to be in Flevoland 
in the Netherlands (a region reclaimed from the sea). 
though growth is also forecast to be high in Luxem-
bourg and several West German regions, where both 
fertility rates and net inward migration are assumed to 
be relatively high. 
By the period 2020 to 2025, many more regions are 
likely to have declining population (Map 14). These 
include all those in Italy and in Northern Spain as well 
as some in Greece, (Western) Germany and France 
because of fertility  rates  remaining  below replace-
ment level for an extended period-so causing natu-
ral  population  to  fall  (Map  15)  - combined,  in 
Germany, with reduced inward migration. Only in the 
UK  and  Sweden  are  fertility rates  projected  to  be 
closer to replacement levels, so that in sol"'le regions 
which  experienced  a  decline  between  2000  and 
2005, population could rise between 2020 and 2025 
(in Greater London, Greater Manchester, the North of 
· England,  Norra Mellansverige,  Mellersta Norrland). 
At the same time, in the South of France. major inflows 
of  migrants (largely  people  retiring)  from  other  re-
gions of France as well as from countries outside the 
Union. such as in North Africa, are likely to continue. 
Once again. Flevoland is projected to be the highest 
growth reg1on (population rising by 0. 7% a year). 
The ageing of the population 
While  the  different  scenarios  show  very  different 
trends for the share of young people in total popula-
tion. this IS not the case for the share of older people. 
Since all those who will reach the age of 65 or over by 
the end of the period have already been bam. the only 
uncerta1n  factors are the change in  life expectancy 
and net migration. In all three scenanos. the number 
in th1s age group is projected to increase. just as it has 
since 1950. At present. it is rising by around 0.8 mil-
lion, or 1%. a year, over twice the growth in total popu-
lation.  Under the  baseline projection, growth would 
continue at this rate until 2005, after which it is fore-
cast to  increase to  1. 1 million a year as  the  baby-
boom  generation  reaches  retirement  age.  This 
growth in the number of people of 65 and over is com-
mon to all Member States. In this scenario. the share 
of the  population of 65 and over will  increase from 
16% in the year 2000 to 22% in 2025.5 
The significant increase in the share of older people 
(even under the high growth scenario) will have pro-
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found  consequences for  systems of social  protec-
tion, particularly for pensions, which for the most part 
are funded by contributions of employees and em-
ployers. The  increase will mean that a significantly 
higher number of people above retirement age will 
need to be supported by those in work and paying 
contributions. While there were about 4.3 people of 
working age for every pensioner in  1995,  by 2025. 
there will be fewer than 3 (Map 16). 
The prospective problem, however, varies markedly 
between different parts of the Union. In the countries 
with a  relatively young  population.  Ireland,  Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands, the old-age dependency 
rate for the most part was 20% or below in 1995. This 
was also the case in some regions in the North-East of 
France, the South of Spain and Italy, the West of Aus-
tria and the South-West and North-East of Germany. 
In several regions in the South of France. the North of 
Spain  and  Northern-Central  Sweden.  however.  the 
ratio has already reached 30% or so.  In the Swedish 
regions.  this  is  a  result of  emigration of people of 
working age, which is also the case in some parts of 
Northern  Spain  and  the  South  of  France.  In 
Languedoc-Roussillon  and  Provence-Alpes-COte 
d'Azur. on the other hand, significant immigration of 
people of pensionable age has the same effect on the 
rate. 
While no significant ageing effect is likely to be visible 
by 2005 in the UK, Sweden and Ireland. the old-age 
dependency rate is set to increase in  Northern and 
central Italy as well as in Southern and Eastern Ger-
many, the South of France and mainland Greece. The 
dramatic changes in the age structure of Union popu-
lation will  become apparent in 2025 (Map  16).  In  a 
number  of  regions  in  Northern  Italy  and  central 
France. the old-age dependency rate is projected to 
rise to well above 40%, as a result of low birth rates 
over a long period of time, which has the effect of de-
pressing working-age population, and. in France. of 
relatively low net immigration. Apart from in the South 
of Spain and Northern Portugal, only in lie de France 
(Paris) and urban conurbations in England would the 
rate remain relatively low (around 25%), whereas in 
the  Netherlands,  where  population was  previously 
relatively young. the number of people of 65 and over 
relative to  population of working age is  likely to in-
crease markedly to around the EU average. 
Among those aged 65 and over, the share of the very 
old, those aged 80 and over, is expected- after a 
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Map 14  Population growth by region, 2020-lS 
60 
Annual average% change (baseline scenaroo1 
- <.()35 
•  .()35-0 
D  o-o.35 
D  o.35-o~7 
-20.7 
D  Nodata 
EUR15=  01 
Source  Eurostat  0-:....,:1:,::00::..,.. ___  ~!500 km .,. 
' 
....::.  -=  =  - - "":'-... 
Map IS  Population growth and migration, 2020-25 
(baseline scenario) 






1  .3  Population and the labour force 
D  eon.... IE)  ..  =>\:?  ..t)d  0 
..........  - ~  a 
(F)  (F) 
61 1.3  Population and the labour force 
temporary fall up to the year 2000-to increase con-
tinuously to over 27% in 2020 in the baseline projec-
tion. The increase is likely to be most pronounced in 
Greece. Spain and Italy, a development which would 
necessitate major efforts to extend systems of long-
term care for the elderly, in the form of home help as 
well as nursing homes. 
Dependency rates 
The overall dependency rate is the  total number of 
people above and below working age ( 15 to 64) rela-
tive to those of working age. As such. it summarises 
the consequences of changes in the fertility rate. life 
expectancy and migration for the age structure of the 
population. 
The rate for the Union as a whole has. in practice. de-
clined over the past 20 years from around 55% to just 
under 50%, signifying that there are slightly less than 
50  potential  dependants  for  every  1  00  people  of 
working age. The decline reflects the fall in births and 
so in lhe number of children under 15 which has more 
than offset the increase in the number of people of 65 
and over.  This.  however, will  no longer be the  case 
from the year 2000 on, and, according to the baseline 
proJeCtion.  the rate will rise steadily, so that by 2025 
there w1ll  be 58  potential dependants for  every  100 
people of working age. 
At the reg1onallevel, the lowest dependency rates are 
generally found in capital cities and surrounding re-
gions, though they are also low in most regions in Ger-
many and Austria as well as in the North and centre of 
Italy because of  the  low birth  rates  in  these  areas 
(Map  17).  In  the  more  economically  successful 
places,  the  effect of  low birth  rates  has  been  rein-
forced by inward migration of people of working age 
{Darmstadt, Oberbayern and Lombardia, for  exam-
ple). The highest dependency rates generally occur 
in regions where there is an  above average propor-
tion of children, reflecting relatively high birth rates. 
such as  in  Ireland and various parts of  France and 
Spain, which more than offsets, in some cases, in Ire-
land in particular, relatively small numbers of people 
of retirement age. 
Projections indicate that the increase in  the num-
ber of elderly people will push up the dependency 
rate in Western Germany and the North of Italy by 
2005 (Map 17), and by 2025, across the whole of 
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the  Union, despite the fall  in  relative numbers of 
children. The rate  is likely to be particularly high 
(well over 60%) in France (especially in central re-
gions). Sweden and Finland, except in each case 
in the capital city. 
Although the dependency rate gives an indication of 
the  relative  number of  people needing  to  be sup-
ported by those of working age, and so of the tax im-
plications, it needs to be interpreted with care. On the 
one hand, it implicitly treats changes in the number of 
children and elderly people as  if they were equiva-
lent, whereas, in practice, the costs of pensions and 
long-term care are likely to be greater than those as-
sociated  with  caring  for  and  educating  children. 
Moreover. while the former costs fall to a major extent 
on the public sector. and. therefore, have fiscal impli-
cations, the costs of raising children tend to fall much 
more on the family. On the .,ther hand, it fails to take 
account of the number of people of working age who 
are not in work and need to be equally supported by 
those people who are. The fiscal implications of future 
increases in  the  dependency rate.  therefore.  could 
potentially be offset by increases in the proportion of 
people of working age in employment, through both 
reductions in unemployment and increases in partici-
pation. 
Labour force developments 
The demographic prospects described above also 
have implications for the size and age composition 
of the labour force. These, however. are as much 
influenced by changes in participation as by de-
mographic trends. Such changes are determined, 
in turn. by a range of factors, such as attitudes to-
wards further education. the age of retirement and 
women working, as well as the availability of child-
care facilities. the nature of pension schemes and 
the possibility of early retirement and the structure 
of households. They are also affected by economic 
factors. especially the ease or difficulty of finding a 
job, which has a strong effect on people's motiva-
tion  to  join the labour force.  Participation,  there-
fore. tends to 1ncrease as net job creation rises and 
to decline when  it  falls.  Moreover,  demographic 
trends can potentially influence participation, and 
vice versa. insofar as. for example, a reduction in 
working-age population relative to the demand for 
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Q) Low and high growth labour force projections 
The  two alternative scenarios for the labour force are 
based on the equivalent two projections of population. 
The  low  growth  scenario,  therefore,  combines  low 
growth of population with relatively small increases in 
participation and vice versa for the high growth sce-
nario. The main specific assumptions are as follows. 
•  Low  growth scenario: lower rates of economic growth 
than in the past with little growth in employment, giv-
ing little incentive for more people to enter the labour 
market. For young people, lack of jobs means more of 
them staying longer in education and a continuing de-
cline  in  labour force  participation.  For  women with 
young children, there is minimal move to more flexible 
working arrangements or increase in child-care facili-
ties since employers lack the icentive to recruit more 
of them.  The  trend towards early retirement contin-
ues, especially among men, and those remaining in 
employment work full-time because of fears of losing 
their job altogether if they switch to working part-time. 
As a result, few additional jobs are created for others 
to move into. 
•  High  growth  scenario:  higher  rates  of  economic 
growth than in the past, so giving rise to significant in-
creases in employment. encouraging more people to 
enter the labour market and employers - and gov-
ernments  - to  make  working  arrangements  more 
flexible. As a result part-time jobs increase, making it 
easier for young people to combine continuing edu-
cation with paid employment and for women to recon-
cile  family  responsibilities  with  pursuing  a working 
career.  Participation  of  both,  therefore,  rises,  for 
women in all  Member States towards levels in Swe-
den and Denmark. In addition, those approaching re-
force or growth of economic activity stimulates an 
increase in net inward migration. 
Given the wide range of factors affecting participation 
and the complex nature of the interrelationships be-
tween them, any projections of the labour force in future 
years are considerably more uncertain than those of 
population and are surrounded by a very wide margin 
of error. Nevertheless. they are of some interest since 
they serve to raise a number of potential issues. The 
approach adopted, as above, is to set out three alter-
native scenarios based on specific assumptions about 
future trends. None of these, it must be emphasised, 
should be regarded as forecasts but only as hypotheti-
cal illustrations of possible developments. 
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tirement age can  switch to part-time work,  further 
adding to the stock of jobs. 
These two opposing scenarios lead to markedly differ-
ent outcomes.  In the low growth scenario, the labour 
force declines throughout the projection period, falling 
to only 144 million in 2025, some 23 million less than at 
present. with even the number of women declining after 
2005.  In  the  high  growth  scenario,  the  labour force 
grows up  to 2020, though at a declining rate (by over 1% 
a year up to 2005 and just under Y:!% a year from then 
until 2020). By 2020, the labour force amounts to some 
207 million,  40 million more than at present, and only 
starts to decline slowly from then on. This demonstrates 
forcibly that in the high scenario there is little reason for 
labour supply problems, in terms of the number of peo-
ple entering the labour market at least, to constrain the 
growth of employment.  and of  the  EU  economy,  for 
some time to come. 
Some initial evidence (  eg lower than expected net immi-
gration and fertility) suggests that labour force growth 
could fall between the baseline and the low scenario. 
However, the baseline scenario is still a good central es-
timate of the future development of the labour force. 
In addition, it is important to note that, over the next 5 to 
10 years, the main influence on the growth of the labour 
force will be factors which atfect participation, particu-
larly the availability of jobs. Though demographic trends 
will have some effect, this is relatively minor and it is only 
in the longer-term beyond this period, that changes in 
fertility rates, lite expectancy and net migration have an 
important effect on the outcome. 
Baseline scenario 
In the baseline scenario, recent trends are assumed, 
for the most part, to continue. The main assumptions 
are: 
•  continued growth of the EU economy at just over 
2% a year, distributed between regions much as 
in the past; 
•  modest increases in labour demand and employ-
ment growth as a res!,Jit,  with most of the growth 
going into part-time jobs, as in the recent past, 
and full-time jobs increasing only slightly; 
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•  a small increase in  labour force participation of 
young people under 25. in contrast to past trends. 
but centred on part-time work; 
•  increased participation of women in all Member 
States, except Sweden, especially in those where 
the rate is still low which are assumed to converge 
towards the rate in Sweden and Denmark; 
•  a limited rise in participation of women with young 
children. most of these working part-time. reflect-
ing a modest move towards more flexible work-
ing-time arrangements and increased child-care 
facilitie-s; 
•  a rise in the participation of women aged 50 to 64 
in the short-term and. in the longer term. of men in 
the  same  age group as  early retirement  dimin-
ishes. 
While the labour force in the Union grew by over 1% 
a year between 1985 and 1990. partlv as a result of 
a high rate of net job creation. with the recession of 
the early 1990s. growth slowed down markedly to 
well under Y2% a year between 1990 and 1995 (Ta-
bles 18 and 19). In the future. growth 1s pro1ected to 
be  slightly more  than  this  over  the  pHIOd  up  to 
2005,  at  around  Y2''/o  a  year.  There:after.  growth 
would  slow  down  significantly,  the  labour  force 
reaching its peak size in 2011  (at around  181  mil-
lion  some  14  million more than at  present).  After 
2011. the labour force is projected to decline at an 
accelerating rate (exceeding W'lo  a year between 
2020  and  2025)  so  that  by  2025.  11  would  only 
amount to  some  172 million.  Th1s  decline.  more-
over. is expected to affect all Member States after 
2020. 
A feature of the projection is that. whereas.  in  the 
past.  population  growth  has  contnbuted  signifi-
cantly to the increase in the labour force- particu-
larly as the baby-boom generation jo1ned the work 
force and as the numbers leaving 1tto move mto re-
tirement were  relatively small  because of  the  ef-
fects of the war  - in the future. this will no longer 
be the case. Declining numbers of  young people 
will  enter  the  labour  force.  while  the  numbers 
reaching retirement age will increase. Despite in-
ward migration, the  demographic contribution to 
labour force growth will. therefore. decline sharply 
and will already be negative from 2005 on. 
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This,  however. will  be more than offset by an  in-
crease in participation. at least up to 2011. Though 
participation of men is projected to rise slightly, in-
stead  of  falling  significantly,  as  it  has  done  for 
some  years.  the  increase  comes  predominantly 
from growing numbers of women joining the labour 
force, their average activity rate rising from just un-
der 58% at present to 64% by 2020, equivalent to 
an additional 12 million women in the labour mar-
ket. In most Member States, except, in particular. in 
the Nordic countries, activity rates of women are 
projected  to  rise  rapidly  up  to  2005  and  more 
slowly from then on. For men. rates are projected to 
fall in most Member States after 2005, largely be-
cause of the ageing of those of working age and a 
rise in the relative numbers in the older age groups 
for whom participation tends to be lower. 
The overall rise in participation is important not only 
for its effect on the labour force in the Union and on 
the individuals concerned. but also because of its 
fiscal  implications,  especially  in  respect  of  the 
fund1ng  of social protection systems.  likely to  be 
put under increasing pressure as the number of el-
derly people grows. This is only the case, however. 
if higher participation is reflected in  more people 
actually in work, which will depend on  the rate of 
job creation across the Union. 
Regional analysis 
Changes at the regional level largely reflect the overall 
trends.  though  there  are  a number of  divergent fea-
tures. 
•  While the labour force declined across the whole 
of  the  UK.  Sweden.  Denmark.  Finland  and Italy 
(except Trentino-Aito Adige) between  1990 and 
1995. largely because of falling participation,  in 
Germany,  there  were  marked  differences  be-
tween the Eastern and Western parts (Map 18). In 
the new Lander, as a result of both declining par-
ticipation. as jobs became scarce (activity rates 
of  both men  and women falling by some 5 per-
centage points),  and significant outward migra-
tion  to  the  old  Lander,  the  labour  force  was 
reduced substantially.  In the old Lander. on the 
other hand, the inward migration from the East off-
set  the  fall  in  participation.  Immigration  also 
served  to  increase  the  labour  force  in  the 
Thessaloniki  region  of  Greece  (Kentriki ~ 
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EUR15" 28.5 Makedonia) as well as in Valencia.  Madrid and 
Cataluna in Spain, offsetting the effect of low birth 
rates and adding to the effect of rising participa-
tion. 
•  On the baseline projection for the period 2000 to 
2005, the labour force increases in nearly all re-
gions across the Union (Map 18). This, as noted 
above,  is  largely  because  of  a  continuing  in-
crease  in  participation,  especially  among 
women,  the only regions where this is not pro-
jected to occur, or to occur at a lower rate than 
elsewhere, being those in the three Nordic coun-
tries. Even in the new German LAnder. the recent 
fall in participation of women is expected to be re-
versed and rates  are projected to  rise  back to 
their pre-1991  levels. 
•  The only regions where the labour force is pro-
jected to decline up to 2005 are in Northern Italy, 
where it also fell between  1990 and 1995 (Map 
18). This fall is projected to continue in the years 
after 2005 when a drastic reduction in the labour 
force is also projected in the Eastern part of Aus-
tria, most of Flanders and parts of Western Ger-
many. Given that unemployment is already low in 
many of  these  areas.  it  is  possible that  labour 
shortages will  emerge in  the  future.  This,  how-
ever.  depends, on  the pace of future economic 
growth and the  demand for  labour in  these re-
gions. On the other hand, if economic growth and 
rates  of  net job creation  were  to  be  high,  this 
might well encourage more people to join the la-
bour force, so staving off the possibility of labour 
shortages materialising. This is  especially so in 
the many regions where rates of participation, es-
pecially among women, are well below the Union 
average (in Italy, rates for men and women taken 
together are lower than anyovyhere else in the EU). 
•  By contrast. in some of the regions with high un-
employment  at  present.  such  as  the  Southern 
parts of Spain, France and Italy as well as areas in 
the North of France. the labour force is projected 
to grow up to 2005 as a result of an increase in 
both population and participation, despite some 
outward  migration  from  the  South  of  Italy and 
Nord-Pas de Calais in France. Changes in labour 
supply,  therefore,  are unlikely to help solve the 
unemployment problem over this period. 
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•  Participation of women is projected to increase 
virtually everywhere, except Sweden. and that of 
men to rise in the four Cohesion countries as well 
as in the South of Italy (Maps 19 and 20). Rates of 
participation, however, tend not to vary markedly 
between  regions  in  the  same  country,  though 
there is some tendency for rates to be higher in ur-
ban areas than rural ones. Participation of women 
is,  therefore,  projected to remain  below the EU 
average in all regions in Belgium, Spain and Italy 
and above average throughout the UK, Sweden 
and Fmland. Accordingly, even in urban areas in 
the first group of countries, rates will continue to 
be less than in rural areas in the second group. In 
consequence, measures to increase labour force 
participation need to be implemented predomi-
nantly at the national rather than regional level. 
The ageing of the labour force 
With the general ageing of the population in the EU. 
the decline in the number of young people entering 
the labour market and an increase in participation 
of those between 50 and 64. especially women, 
the average age of the labour force Is projected to 
rise from around 38 at present to over 41  in 2025 in 
the baseline scenario. At the same time, the num-
ber of those aged 50 to 64 is projected to increase 
from  just under 20% of the  total  to  almost 30%. 
While  the  extent of  the  change  differs between 
Member States, it is likely to be similar in different 
regions of a country. In the Nordic countr-ies. where 
participation is not expected to change much, the 
ageing effect is relatively small. In Italy and Spain, 
on .the other hand, where birth rates are low and 
participation rates of women are projected to in-
crease significantly, it is pronounced, especially in 
the Southern regions of both countries (Map 21 ). 
The prospective ageing of the work force and the 
increased number .of  older workers raises ques-
tions  about the  effect on  the  ability to adapt to 
changes in technology and new ways of working. 
In the past, the steady stream of young, freshly ed-
ucated people joining the labour market provided 
employers. in some degree, with up-to-date tech-
nical knowledge and recently acquired skills at a 
relatively low wage. The decline in this stream and 
the changing circumstances mean that there will 
be more need to develop other ways to ensure that 
the skills of the work force are renewed and that 
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firms can respond to advances in technology and 
new  working  methods.  This  implies  according 
more importance to life-long learning, to retraining 
existing members of the work force and to updating 
the skills of women returning to work after a period 
of absence for family reasons. 
(  1]  European Commission (  1994  ). CompetitiVeness and Cohesion: trends in the rBQions. 
(2)  European Commission, DetnoQraphic Reporr  1997. COM(97) 361. 
(3]  Eurostat (1gg&), National and Reg1ona1 Populat1on Trends  1975-2025. forthcoming. 
(4]  The total fertility rate is defined as the average number of children born alive to a woman over her IHetime assuming she had the same 
fertility rate as women in specific age groups dunng ner childbeanng years. 
(5)  In a scenario with high life expectancy comb1ned w1th low fertility and low inward migration (the so-called "old scenario"). this share 
would rise to almost a quarter, whereas under a scenano with the opposite assumptions ("young scenario"), it rises to only 19'11.. 
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Defining competitiveness 
Competitiveness is often viewed as a key i!'ldicator of 
the success or failure of policy. The concept of com-
petitiveness, however, while relatively clear when ap-
plied to  enterprises,  is  more difficult to define and 
measure when applied to regions or countries. An in-
dustrial region, for example, is not directly competing 
against a predominantly agricultural region or a finan-
cial centre. so the measurement of its relative com-
petitiveness is problematic. Moreover. the term itself 
tends to convey the impression of a win/lose situation, 
in wh1ch regions can improve their position only at the 
expense of  others,  whereas.  in  practice.  there  are 
mutual gains to be achieved from individual regions 
becoming more competitive. 
The challenge is to develop a concept of competitive-
ness which avoids these problems. At the same time. it 
needs to capture the notion that. despite the fact that 
there are strongly competitive and uncompetitive firms 
in every region, there are common features within a re-
gion which affect the competitiveness of  all  firms  lo-
cated there. These features include physical and social 
infrastructure. the skills of the work force and the effi-
ciency of public institutions. In an  increasingly global 
economy, such factors can contribute strongly to busi-
ness success and need to  be at least of  a minimum 
standard in order to avoid putting firms at a significant 
disadvantage as compared with  those  located else-
where. Moreover. business success will tend in itself to 
add to a region's competitiveness insofar as the exter-
nalities to which it gives rise facilitate the development 
of other firms in the sector, or sectors, in question and 
attract new investment into the area. 
Many of the indicators for measuring competitiveness 
which have been suggested reflect the underlying 
causes. These are factors such as the level of basic 
infrastructure, innovative capacity, the pool of skilled 
labour or the concentration in  growing or declining 
sectors. It is difficult. however, to develop a unified 
measure on this basis, so this report adopts the well-
established convention of defining competitiveness 
in terms of the outcome r~ther than the causes. 
Competitiveness  is.  therefore.  defined here as  the 
'ability to  produce goods and services which meet 
the  test of international markets. while at  the same 
time maintaining high and sustainable levels of  in-
come· or.  more generally, 'the ability of companies. 
industries.  regions.  nations  and  supra-national  re-
gions to  generate. while being exposed to  mterna-
tional  competition.  relatively  high  income  and 
employment levels". 1 
In line with this, GOP per head in any economy can be 
decomposed. for analytical purposes. into the follow-
ing elements: 
Work1ng-
GOP  GOP  Empl.  age pop. 
=  X  X 
Pop.  Em pl.  Working- Total pop. 
age pop. 
The last element, the proportion of population of work-
ing age. contributes relatively little to the variation in 
GOP per head between regions and. in any case. is 
not a variable which can easily be affected by policy. 
It is. therefore. excluded from the following analysis. 
Accordingly, competitiveness is measured in terms of 
GOP  per head and is  divided into two  components 
which  together determine its  level:  GOP  per person 
employed, which is approximately equivalent to labour 
productivity (though it does not take into account the 
average number of hours worked, which can vary), and 
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the total number of people employed relative to work-
ing-age population, ie the employment rate.2 For are-
gion to be competitive, it should have both a relatively 
high level of productivity - or of job quality since the 
two will tend to go together - and a large number of 
people in work - or a satisfactory quantity of jobs. It 
should also be noted that the growth of GOP per head 
in any region is closely approximated by the sum  of 
productivity growth and employment growth. 
The  relationship  between  productivity  and  employ-
ment is rich and complex with many underlying influ-
ences.  Growth  of  productivity,  for  example,  is 
sometimes seen as being incompatible with increased 
employment, but whereas this may be true in simplistic 
terms in the short-term-eg for regions undergoing re-
structuring-in the long-term, the two are more likely to 
be  complementary,  regions  with  high  productivity 
growth tending to grow by more, to create and attract 
higher  investment  and,  accordingly,  to have  higher 
rates of net job creation. In addition, the underlying fac-
tors may affect one component much more than  the 
other, such as technological advance which will mainly 
boost productivity, or may affect both in different ways. 
such as  training to  improve labour force skills, which 
may not only raise productivity, but also increase the 
ability of people to find employmenP 
Trends in components 
of competitiveness 
Growth in the EU, certainly since the war, has largely 
been achieved by raising the average output of each 
12  Contribution of  productivity and employment 
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person employed rather than by increasing the num-
ber of people in work. Of the growth in GOP of 2.2% a 
year over the 1  0 years 1986 to 1996, growth in output 
per person employed contributed 1.8% a year and 
growth in  the number employed only 0.4% {Graph 
12).  The  low employment-content  of  growth  com-
pares unfavourably with the US where, over the same 
period, the greater part of the growth in GOP of 2.5% a 
year stemmed from an  increase  in  employment of 
1.5% a year, output per person only rising by 1% a 
year. 
In terms of levels, the gap in GOP per head between 
the EU and the US is accounted for equally by the two 
components, both productivity and employment be-
ing around 20% higher in the US than in the EU. The 
gap in productivity, therefore, closed over the period, 
while the employment gap widened.4 
As  noted  in  previous sections,  both  the  level  and 
growth of GOP per head vary significantly between 
regions in the EU. The relative contribution of the two 
components, productivity and employment. also var-
ies significantly, even for regions with similar levels of 
GOP per head. 
For  example,  while  the  regions  in  Portugal  have  a 
level of GOP per head which is similar to that in Span-
ish  regions {apart from  the  North-East),  the  level of 
productivity is much lower {typically only around 60% 
of the EU average as compared with around 90% of 
the  average  in  Spain).  Conversely,  employment  is 
some  68%  of  working-age  population  in  Portugal, 
whereas in Spain, it is only around 45%, and only 40% 
in  Andalucia. among the lowest rates in  the EU and 
well below the EU average of just over 60% {Map 22). 
Therefore, while the level of productivity in Spain has 
largely converged on  the  EU  average,  the  relative 
number in  work  is  still  substantially  below and  in-
creasing  employment  is  the  main  economic  chal-
lenge. In Portugal, on the other hand, where the level 
of employment is  well  above the  EU  average,  the 
greater need ·is to raise productivity {giving room for 
real wage levels to rise). 
There  is  evidence that  progress is  being  made  in 
achieving  these  different  objectives.  Productivity 
growth in Portugal, at over 3% a year, was the second 
highest in  the  EU  (after Ireland) between 1986 and 
1996,  and employment growth in  Spain,  at  almost 
1  Y2% a year was also among the highest in the EU. In-......  ...... 
Map 22  GDP per head, productivity and employment, 1996 
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Ill deed, in some Eastern regions and in the capital, Ma-
drid,  growth  was  2-2!12%  a  year  (Map  23). 
Nevertheless, given the scale of the gap which exists 
in both cases, convergence towards the EU average 
is inevitably a long-term process. 
For regions in Greece, the picture is less favourable. 
Both productivity and employment levels are low and 
there is little evidence of catching up to the EU aver-
age in either case. The level of productivity in the rural 
and mountainous interior is typically only around 60% 
of the EU average - the lowest in the EU along with 
some regions in  Portugal.  Unlike  in  Portugal,  how-
ever, productivity growth has also been low- 1% a 
year between 1986 and 1996, almost half the EU av-
erage rate, and so the gap has widened rather than 
closed. 
The number employed, moreover, is not much more 
than half of working-age population in many regions 
(the figure for the country as a whole is only around 
57%). Employment growth, however, at around 0. 7% 
a year, was slightly above the EU  average between 
1986 and 1996. So although there was some conver-
gence towards the EU  level over this period. a high 
. proportion of jobs remain in weaker sectors. and this 
plus the low growth of productivity could 1eopard1se 
future job growth. 
In Ireland, both components of  GOP per head have 
performed strongly. High growth in productivity (over 
4% a year between 1986 and 1996, by far the highest 
rate in the EU,  except in a few Portuguese regions). 
along with even higher growth in output, has begun to 
be translated into significant rates of net JOb creation 
(which averaged 2% a year over the per~od and 3% a 
year over the last 5 years). As a result. GOP per per-
son employed in Ireland has increased to above the 
EU  average and the gap in the employment rate is 
narrowing rapidly (in 1997, employment was 58% of 
working-age population. only slightly less than the EU 
average). 
Southern Italy is similar to Spain, in the sense that low 
GOP per head is mainly attributable to a low level of 
employment. GOP per person employed is typically 
around 90% of the EU average (although in Calabria, 
it is exceptionally low at just over 80%) while employ-
ment is  generally only around 40% of working-age 
population, lower than anywhere else in the Union. 
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Unlike in Spain, there is no sign of this problem being 
corrected. While productivity growth has been rela-
tively high, ranging from just under  2% (Sicilia) to over 
3% (Basilicata) over the period 1986 to 1996, employ-
ment actually fell in all regions of Southern Italy, by 
around 1% a year in most cases. Employment also 
declined in  Italy as a whole, whereas the growth of 
productivity was slightly above the EU  average, so 
that while levels of productivity and employment are 
much lower in the South than in the rest of the country, 
the pattern of change has not been so different. 
The low level of GOP per head in the new German 
L~nder is entirely due to low productivity. While em-
ployment rates (partly because of high female partici-
pation rates, as noted above) are a little above the EU 
average in most regions (typically around 62-63%), 
output per person employed is in  most cases only 
some 60% or less of the EU average. Although there 
are no data for the period 1986 to 1996 as a whole, the 
recent trend seems to be for the initially strong pro-
ductivity growth after unification to weaken and tor 
employment rates to stabilise. 
Employment rates in regions in the North and East of 
Finland  have  traditionally been  high.  However.  the 
slump 1n  the early 1990s largely fell on employment, 
leav1ng productivity growth unaffected or even a little 
h1gner as Industry restructured. In the worst.affected 
reg1on. Ita-Suomi, productivity growth-at 2% a year 
over tne penod 1986 to  1996 - has been similar to 
the EU average, but employment has fallen by 2% a 
year  It IS now only around 55% of working-age popu-
latiOn. less than the EU average and more typical of a 
Mediterranean than a Nordic region. 
The  next  sect1on  examines  the  factors  underlying 
these  d1flerences  in  the  components  of  GOP  per 
he  a  a 
Explaining competitiveness: 
common features of 
successful regions 
In recent years, the issue of competitiveness has at-
tracted a lot of attention and has been the subject of 
many studies. These, however, have tended to con-
centrate on countries rather than regions, and many 
of  the  indicators  used  are  not  statistically  robust. 
Moreover, in many cases, the link between these indi-
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caters  and  competitiveness  is  either  assumed  or, 
where it is analysed, so many indicators are included, 
often of a non-quantifiable kind, that the underlying 
relationship is not transparent. 
A study performed for the Commission5 and further 
work undertaken within  the  Commission  represent 
first steps towards filling this gap. The aim has been to 
reduce the issue to the most basic but important ele-
ments, by constructing a simple model of the relation-
ship between GOP per head by region and the most 
significant features contributing to this. The approach 
followed was, first, to identify the main factors in the lit-
erature thought to explain variations in GOP per head 
between regions: secondly, to construct for each of 
these a simple,  but statistically robust and observ-
able, indicator to represent it; and, thirdly, to correlate 
variations between these indicators across regions 
with variations in GOP per head as well as GOP per 
person employed. 
Four factors emerged as being closely linked with re-
gional differences in the GOP measures: 
•  the structure of economic activity, which for this 
purpose was simply represented as the division 
of employment between agriculture, manufactur-
ing.  construction,  market  services  and  non-
market services, the regions with the highest lev-
els of GOP per head tending to have a relatively 
high concentration of employment in market ser-
vices and/or manufacturing: 
•  the extent of innovative activity, which was mea-
sured by the number of patent applications, the 
best performing regions tending to be the source 




regional accessibility, which was measured by a 
new index of  peripherality produced for OGXVI, 
which implicitly includes  the effects of variations 
in  transport  infrastructure,6  the  regions  where 
GOP per head is above average tending to have 
better accessibility; 
the skills of the work force, which were measured 
by the relative numbers of people aged 25 to 59 
with high (university level or equivalent), medium 
(upper  secondary  level  qualifications)  and  low 
(basic  schooling  only)  levels  of education,  the 
best  performing  regions  tending  to  have  an 
above  average  proportion  of  relatively  highly 
qualified workers. 
These four indicators, in a statistical sense, 'explain' 
almost two-thirds of the variation in GOP per head be-
tween regions in the EU, in the sense that on average 
around 65% of this variation is associated with differ-
ences  in  the  factors  represented  (this  being  esti-
mated using a simple linear regression equation). 
This result, however, needs to be interpreted with a 
good deal of caution. In the first place, the association 
is only an average one and there are many regions 
which diverge from the average in, for example, hav-
ing a relatively high level of GOP per head whilst hav-
ing  relatively  low  values  for  one  or  more  of  the 
indicators. 
This, in part, reflects the relatively simple nature of the 
indicators themselves.  In particular.  regional  differ-
ences in  the  composition of market services or of 
manufacturing - the extent to which activity is con-
centrated in advanced, high value-added sectors as 
opposed to more basic, low value-added sectors -
may be at least as important as differences in the divi-
sion of employment between broad sectors. Similarly, 
the innovative capacity of a region is only indirectly 
measured  by  the  number  of  patents  applied  for, 
which may bear little relationship  to  the  number of 
new products developed or the improvements made 
to the production process and which, in any event, is 
likely to be biased towards manufacturing and under-
state innovation in services. Moreover, education at-
tainment levels measure the formal qualifications of 
the work force and may not reflect the skills acquired 
through less formal means, such as through learning 
by doing. 
Secondly,  the  average  relationship  as  such  says 
nothing about the direction of causation. Increases in 
GOP per head may themselves give rise to changes 
in the structure of economic activity, as, for instance, 
the demand for market services expands with higher 
income,  or  to  greater  demand  for  education,  as 
· young people have more opportunity to study for lon-
ger. Equally, improvements in transport systems. and 
therefore in accessibility, may be a consequence of 
higher levels of GOP per head as well as a contribut-
ing factor, while increased innovative capacity may 
similarly result indirectly from the improved higher ed-
ucation system associated with real income growth. Thirdly, the factors themselves are not only interre-
lated but may not have the same effect in isolation of 
each other. An improvement in the transport system 
and a resulting increase in accessibility, for example, 
may do little to accelerate regional development if it is 
not accompanied by improvements in other features. 
Indeed, as is evident from experience, it may well be 
that these and other features have to co-exist, or op-
erate in combination, for the effect on regional devel-
opment  to  be  significant  and  long-lasting.  In 
particular, it is difficult to envisage a high level of inno-
vation in a region without a highly qualified work force 
or shifts in the structure of economic activity towards 
high value-added market services without the requi-
site skills existing in the labour force or without a mini-
mum level of accessibility. Similarly, the investment in 
transport systems necessary to improve ar.cess is it-
self likely to require a level of economic activity which 
ensures an adequate return within a reasonable pe-
riod of time. 
Fourthly,  and perhaps most importantly, the factors 
included  in  the  analysis  are  ones  that  lend  them-
selves  to  being measured.  Although  each of them 
would clearly be expected to have an important influ-
ence on regional performance both from a theoretical 
perspective and from detailed case studies that have 
been conducted over the years, there are other, less 
tangible,  factors  which  are  much  less  easily  mea-
sured wh1ch might be equally if not more significant 
These  include,  in  particular.  institutional  features, 
such as the efficiency of the reg1ona1 and local admln-
isrration.  the  business support services which exist 
and the social infrastructure wh1ch is in place. 
The relative importance of these factors. it should be 
emphasised.  is  not only reflected in  the  35% of the 
variat1on in GOP per head between regions which is 
not  statistically explained by the  four  indicators in-
cluded in the analysis. It equally underlies the varia-
tion in these four indicators themselves. The structure 
of economic activity, for example, is  unlikely to shift 
significantly towards market services unless the insti-
tutional structure is in place to support this and to at-
tract new business investment in this area. 
At the same time. although the analysis may give an 
indication of the changes which need to take place in 
particular regions if they are to achieve a higher level 
of GOP per head, it is only one step towards defining 
the most effective policies to implement in  order to 
further regional development. The fact that a shift of 
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employment towards market services tends to be as-
sociated with higher levels of GOP per head does not 
in itself say anything about how such a shift should be 
brought about and whether, indeed, it is possible to 
bring about in the absence of parallel changes in, for 
example, accessibility, the skills of the regional work 
force or the  efficiency of  administrative institutions 
and support services. 
Although  a  successful  regional  development  path 
must almost certainly involve simultaneous changes 
in a wide range of factors, it is informative to examine 
differences across the Union in the four factors identi-
fied above and the extent to which they are associ-
ated  with  high  or  low  levels  of  GOP  per  head  in 
different regions. In what follows, each of these fac-
tors is considered in turn, in terms of the potential con-
tribution to reducing regional disparities in GOP per 
head which might be made by eliminating the differ-
ences in their value which exist between regions. This 
is based, it should be emphasised, on the average re-
lationship referred to above between the indicators 
used to measure the factors and GOP per head. Ac-
cordingly, as should be clear from the discussion of 
the nature of this relationship, the results should be 
regarded as indicative only. 
Scenarios 
The  above  analysis  provides  an  estimate  of  the 
change in regional competitiveness that might be as-
sociated with a given change in one of the underlying 
factors. The following four scenarios indicate in what 
way the regional distribution of GOP per head might 
change if regional disparities in each of the four un-
derlying factors were eliminated, ie if regional values 
of the indicator all converged on the EU average. A 
fifth  scenario outlines what might happen if  all four 
factors were equalised. This is subject to all the cave-
ats outlined above, and so should not be taken as a 
definitive prediction for each region. It is more an ex-
ploration of some of the changes that might need to 
be made to enable lagging regions to converge and 
highlights factors of particular interest for a given re-
gion. 
Variations  in  the  structure of economic activity are 
more closely associated with differences in GOP per 
head between regions than any of the other factors 
identified.  This  reflects  the  importance of  employ-
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ment being concentrated in high value-added sec-
tors for overall productivity and job creation. Market 
services. on average, have twice the level of value-
added per person employed than agriculture and are 
.  expanding in terms of employment rather than con-
tracting. Manufacturing, on the other hand, which is 
also relatively concentrated in regions with above av-
erage GOP per head, is characterised by high and 
rising productivity but declining employment (which 
fell by 10% in the Union between 1986 and 1996). At 
the same time, productivity growth in manufacturing 
may be important in generating increases in real in-
come to support job creation in services. 
The most striking features of eliminating differences 
in the structure of economic activity between regions 
are (Map 24  ): 
•  regional disparities in GOP per head would be re-
duced significantly and the number of people liv-
ing in regions with GOP per head of 75% or less of 
the EU average (the strict definition of those eligi-
ble for Objective 1 support under the Structural 
Funds) would fall by more than half to under 10% 
of the total population of the EU (according to the 
average relationship, GOP per head in any region 
could rise by Y:z-1% for every 1 percentage point 
shift  from  agriculture  to  manufacturing  and  by 
over 1% for a similar shift to market services): 
•  in the new LAnder in Eastern Germany; employ-
ment in  construction and manufacturing is  well 
above the EU average and that in market services 
well below (Map 25), suggesting that a shift in the 
structure of activity to be more similar to that in the 
rest of the EU might increase GOP per head con-
siderably (by 20-25% according to the average 
relationship, more than half the present gap be-
tween these regions and the EU average): 
•  in  Portugal.  Spain and Southern  Italy,  GOP  per 
head could also be raised by a shift in the struc-
ture  of  activity,  though  here,  there  tends to  be 
over-dependence  on  agriculture  (which  ac-
counts for as much as 20% of total employment in 
some regions). as well as a low level of employ-
ment in market services: the main exceptions are 
the  capital  cities,  Catalur"'a  and  Pals  Vasco. 
which, as service and (in some cases) manufac-
turing centres, have higher employment in one or 
other of these sectors than the EU average, and 
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some  tourist  areas.  which  also  have  relatively 
high employment in services; 
•  in Ireland, the position is similar, with low employ-
ment in market services and a high proportion in 
agriculture, though the difference from the EU av-
erage is less pronounced as result of the mod-
ernisation effort of recent years; 
•  in Greece, most regions are highly dependent on 
agriculture (which accounts for over 40% of em-
ployment in some cases), but also have low em-
ployment  in  manufacturing  (10%  or  less)  and 
(according to the average relationship) the poten-
tial gain to GOP per head from shifting to the EU 
average structure of activity is as large as in the 
new German LAnder; this, however, does not ap-
ply to Athens,  which already has high employ-
ment in market services; 
•  the  high employment in  market services  in  the 
Southern parts of the UK, Netherlands and lie de 
France contributes significantly to their relatively 
high GOP per head, as does high employment in 
manufacturing in  many regions in  Western Ger-
many and Northern Italy; 
•  in Finland. a shift in the structure of activity to the 
EU  average is  unlikely to  have  much effect on 
GOP  per head; in  contrast,  in  Sweden,  it could 
have a substantial effect since most regions are 
exceptionally  dependent  on  non-market  ser-
vices. which generally account for 40-45% of em-
ployment,  nearly  twice  the  EU  average; 
conversely  the  share of employment  in  market 
services is well below average (typically 20-25% 
as against an EU average of 45%). 
Innovative capacity is generally recognised as a key 
factor  in  regional  development,  though,  as  noted 
above. the indicator used here of the number of pat-
ent applications is likely only partly to capture varia-
tions in regional capacity. Moreover. it also leaves out 
of account technology transfer, which may be just as 
important (for details, see the section below on RTO). 
Eliminating differences in the  level of innovation, as 
measured here. would have the following effects on 
the  basis of the average relationship with  GOP per 
head (Map 26): ~ 
~ 
Map 24  GDP per bead: the effect of  differences in industrial structure across regions, 1995 
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~  g: •  disparities  between  regions  in  GOP  per  head 
would be reduced markedly and the number of 
people living  in  regions with  GOP  per head of 
75% or less of the EU average woulc;l fall to under 
15%,  somewhat  less  than  in  the  case  of 
equalising the structure of activity; 
•  the effect WOL!Id  be greatest in  Portugal. Spain, 
Greece and  parts of  Southern  Italy,  where  the 
number of patent applications  (and  innovation 
levels) are particularly low (raising GOP per head 
by 8-9%, according to the average relationship); 
•  ·  the  effect  would  be  less  in  the  new  German 
Lander and  Ireland (raising  GOP  per  head  by 
around  5%  according  to  the  average  relation-
ship), indicating that the main problems in these 
regions lie elsewhere; 
•  both Northern Italy and Southern England. which 
have relatively high GOP per head have relatively 
low levels of innovation according to  this mea-
sure. which reflects the deficiencies in the mea-
sure  noted  above  rather  than  genuinely  low 
innovative capacity. 
The  indicator  of  accessibility  1s  a  combination  of 
travel times and market size. It measures the ease of 
transporting the goods and services produced 1n  a 
region to markets and implicitly Incorporates much of 
the effect of the quality of transport Infrastructure. Al-
though accessibility is  unquestionably an  important 
factor  in  regional  development.  the  evidence  sug-
gests  that  more  of  its  effect  on  GOP  per  head  is 
through other factors. especially the structure of eco-
nomic activity. 
The main features of eliminating differences in acces-
sibility,  excluding  the  indirect  and  longer-term  ef-
fects. are (Map 27): 
•  to reduce the population in regions with GOP per 
head of 75% or less of the EU average to just over 
15% of the total in the Un1on.  given the average 
relationship between accessibility and GOP per 
head; 
•  to increase GOP per head in Finland and North-
ern Sweden, reflecting the handicap that regions 
in these parts of the EU face as a result of their re-
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moteness from more populous parts of the Union 
and the relatively small size of their local markets; 
•  to raise GOP per head in  Scotland and Ireland 
significantly,  except in Aberdeen,  where earn-
ings from oil are little affected by its peripheral lo-
cation; 
•  to increase GOP per head in Objective 1 regions 
in the South of the Union, though only to a small 
extent in relation to the gap with the rest of the EU. 
suggesting their main problem is not accessibility 
alone; 
•  to  change GOP  per  head  in  the  new German 
Lander hardly at all,  reflecting the fact that their 
problems have little to do with accessibility. 
The indicator for the skills of the regional work force, 
the  broad level of educational attainment, is closely 
associated with the structure of economic activity -
market services. especially the higher value-added 
sectors. tending to employ relatively highly-educated 
people - and the level of innovation. Accordingly, 
vanat1ons 1n education level seem to contribute com-
paratively  little  to  regional  differences  in  GOP  per 
head. 1naependent1y of these two factors. The results 
of  ehm1natmg  such vanations while assuming other 
factors remain the same are. the•efore (Map 28): 
•  to  reduce  disparities  between  regions  only 
slightly and to change the share of EU population 
1n regions with GOP per head of 75% or less than 
the EU average by very little. though this may re-
flect the relatively simple nature of the indicator 
and 1ts  non-inclusion of  informal knowledge, as 
well as the indirect mechanisms involved; 
•  to  h1ghlight  the  major differences  in  education 
levels  which still  exist  between Germany (East 
and West), the Netherlands. Denmark and Swe-
den. where the work force is highly qualified, and 
Portugal,  Spain  and  Greece  (outside  Athens), 
where labour force qualifications are much lower 
and where, despite the improvements made in re-
cent years. it will take a long time to close the gap; 
•  to illustrate the potential importance of informal 
education as well as formal qualifications since in 
some regions with strong economic performance 
and an evidently high degree of competitiveness, 
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Northern Italy, in particular, the proportion of the 
work force with a university degree or equivalent 
is well below average. 
The combined effect on GOP per head of eliminating 
differences across regions in these four factors, ac-
cording to the simple average relationship (Maps 29 
to 31 ),  is: 
•  to  halve regional disparities in  the  EU  to a level 
similar to those between States in the US and to 
reduce the  population in  regions with GOP  per 
head of 75% or less of the  EU  average to only 
around 3% of the total (again similar to the figure 
in the US), with none in the South of the Union out-
side Greece: 
•  to leave the gap in GOP per head in the Mediterra-
nean regions where this is especially low at typi-
cally 10% of the EU average, even after assuming 
that  the  four factors have the  same value as  in 
other parts of the Union. 
However.  the  experience  of  a  number  of  regions 
whrch are  not disadvantaged at present in  terms of 
these four factors.  but which still have relatively low 
levels of GOP per head, such as Athens, underlines 
that rt cannot necessarily be assumed that all regions 
would gain in the same way from such changes. 
Moreover. as emphasised at the outset. while these 
four factors might be a significant part of the explana-
tion of the lack of competitiveness of lagging regions, 
there are other important elements involved. Not least 
among these are the efficiency of public administra-
tion. the effectiveness of support services and other 
aspects of the institutional structure of a region which 
are likely to have a major influence on its development 
and which create a favourable environment for desir-
able changes in the factors identified to occur. 
The informal networks in Northern Italy, for example, 
may well be an important part of the explanation be-
hind the exceptionally strong performance in the re-
gion, just as poor endowment in  social capital and 
ineffective public administration may be significant 
factors underlying the poor performance in  parts of 
Greece, Southern Spain and the South of Italy. 
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Conclusions 
For each of the two aspects of competitiveness iden-
tified here,  productivity and employment, which to-
gether determine GOP per head, the level in the US is 
around 20% higher than that in the EU. In terms of pro-
ductivity, the level in some regions in Southern Ger-
many, Austria and Northern Italy is similar to that in the 
US, while in terms of employment, the level is as high 
as in the US, or higher, in relation to working-age pop-
ulation in Denmark and parts of Sweden. Neverthe-
less,  there is  scope for  improvement in  one or the 
other (or  in  many cases,  both) of these aspects in 
most regions in the EU. 
In terms of growth, the EU has performed better than 
the US as regards productivity and much worse as re-
gards employment. While 3rowth of GOP  in  the EU 
over the past decade and more has been only slightly 
less than  in  the  US,  employment growth has  been 
substantially lower at only around Y2% a year or less, 
hardly enough to keep pace with new entrants to the 
labour market. This points to a need not only to  in-
crease the long-term growth of GOP  to  generate a 
higher increase in employment but also to ensure that 
growth  is  translated  into  more  jobs,  through  in-
creased flexibility in  the  labour market (to  facilitate 
shifts of employment to growing sectors, notably mar-
ket services), structural polices to reduce long-term 
unemployment and measures to improve the skills of 
the work force so that labour demand finds an outlet. 
The challenge to remain competitive in today's fast-
changing world falls on all parts of the EU, but the lag-
ging regions face the double challenge of catching 
up with the present as well as adapting to the future. 
The nature of the challenge, however, varies across 
regions: 
•  in Ireland and regions in Spain and Southern Italy, 
productivity is close to (or in the case of Ireland, 
above) the  EU  average,  implying that the main 
challenge at present is to raise the level of em-
ployment. This is especially true for Spain, where 
unemployment  is  high,  and  in  Southern  Italy, 
where  employment has fallen  rather  than  risen 
over the past decade; 
•  conversely, Portugal and Eastern Germany have 
relatively  high employment rates  and the  main ~ 
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ity which is substantially below the EU average; 
•  in  Greece,  the  challenge is  the  toughest of all, 
both to raise productivity significantly and to  in-
crease the number in employment. 
Regional competitiveness is closely associated with 
four main factors: the structure of economic activity, 
the level of innovation, the degree of accessibility and 
the  education  attainment  level  of  the  work  force. 
These  factors  are  strongly  interrelated  and,  more-
over,  reflect the  effect of  differences  in  less  easily 
measurable  features.  notably  the  efficiency  of  re-
gional  institutions.  especially  public  administration 
and the  business and other support services avail-
able. Nevertheless, examining differences in the four 
factors across the Union enables a rough diagnosis 
to be made of some of the main proximate causes of 
variations in regional competitiveness. 
For  lagging  regions  in  general.  an  unfavourable 
structure of economic activity seems  to  be  a maJor 
problem. as  does the  low level  of  innovation. wh1ch 
suggests that improving the  econom1c  base  1n  lag-
ging regions should be an  essential element 1n  any 
development strategy. Access1bil1ty  and the educa-
tional qualifications of the work force are also Impor-
tant. though 1n part their 1nfluence on compet1t1veness 
tends to be indirect.  working  through other factors. 
such as the structure of activity or the level of Innova-
tion. There are exceptions. however, where the lack of 
accessibility is significant in its own right. such as the 
more remote parts of Finland and Ireland. 
The association between these four factors and GOP 
per  head  across  the  Union  suggests  that  if  differ-
ences in their value between reg1ons were eliminated. 
regional  disparities  in  output would  be  reduced  to 
around half of their current level  Regions where GOP 
per head was  75% or less of tt1e  EU average would 
cover only 3%  of  the  EU  population  and  would  be 
[ 1)  See. for example. OECO ( 1996). lndustnal Compet1t1veness 
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found in areas of the North of the Union undergoing 
restructuring as well as in less developed parts of the 
South. Nevertheless. on the one hand, significant re-
sidual differences in  competitiveness would remain 
and, on the other, to equalise the level of the four fac-
tors concerned across the Union is likely to require 
major changes in other areas as well. This particularly 
applies to institutional factors. such as the efficiency 
of public administration and the range of support ser-
vices available. 
The following chapters examine some of these under-
lying factors in more depth and consider the contribu-
tion of the Structural Funds.  In the light of the above 
findings, the focus is not just on infrastructure provi-
sion and the skills of the local work force, but also on 
indicators of the health of the economic base- inno-
vative capacity, foreign direct investment and SMEs 
-as  well as on institutional and social factors. 
[2)  For a few regions where commultng ts Slgnll,cant. these two components ao not exactly C1etermme the relat1ve level of GOP per head. 
since the number employed 1n  the f1rst  term.  1e  those work1ng  1n  the reg1on.  daes not correspond to the number employed in the 
second term, wh1ch  1s  those resident 1n  the  reg1on  For  further 1nlormat10n on the two ways of measunng employment, see the 
methodological annex 
(3]  For more on the decomposition of  GOP per head 1nto product1v1ty and employment and on the relat1onsh1p between the two, see 
European CommiSSIOn ( 1997).  The Competitiveness of European Industry. 
[4)  See, for example. European CommiSSion (1998). The Competitiveness of European Industry. 
[5)  Cambridge Econometncs (1998). Reg1ona1 Compe/1/iveness Indicators. unpublished study for the Commission. 
[6)  Andrew Copus. lorthcom1ng. 
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The importance of RTD 
It is generally accepted that the competitiveness of 
bOth business enterprises and public institutions in a 
region is a key factor in its economic development 
and, therefore, for the maintenance of a high level of 
employment. Competitiveness in turn is heavily influ-
enced by the ability of companies to innovate, to intro-
duce  new  products  and- new  techniques  in  the 
production process. Innovation can result either from 
the transfer of technology and know-how from outside 
. the region-or company-or from companies in the 
region  undertaking their own  research and techno-
logical development (RTO). 
In the past. RTO was generally seen as a linear pro-
cess. starting with basic research, leading to applied 
research and technological development and culmi-
nating in  demonstration projects or  prototypes.  Ac-
cordingly,  public  policy often  concentrated on  the 
supply-side, especially on  infrastructure. with large-
scale investment in major research centres for under-
taking basic research~  Today the effectiveness of this 
approach, particularly for the development of less fa-
voured regions, is open to doubt. Policies to support 
and  improve  research,  innovation,  education  and 
training, and so promote an innovation culture, are in-
creasingly centred on  the  creation  of  networks.  or 
clusters. to stimulate innovation in SMEs  and to en-
sure the wide dissemination of research results. The 
aim is to maximise the spillovers from scientific and 
technological advances and to  encourage their  in-
corporation in the production process .. 
Empirical analysis suggests that growth of RTO out-
put by region (measured by the increase in  patents 
per  head  of  population)  is  closely  correlated  with 
growth of GOP,  once extreme cases  (regions with 
very low patent intensity or very high growth rates) are 
excluded.  1 It suggests. in addition, that there is also a 
positive association between growth and the propor-
tion of SMEs in a region which are innovative. when 
account is taken of regional differences in the level of 
technology.2  Although  such  relationships  do  not 
prove that the direction of causality runs from innova-
tion to growth, it provides some support for a policy of 
encouraging  RTO  as  a  means of  stimulating  eco-
nomic development. At the same time, not all regions 
need to be leaders in  RTO,  or  even  in  technology-
intensive industries, to attain high levels of GOP per 
head.  The  Balearic  Islands  in  Spain,  for  example . 
have the  lowest ratio of gross expenditure on  RTO 
(GERO) to GOP of all Spanish regions but the highest 
level of GOP per head, thanks to a highly successful 
tourist industry.3 
Indicators of RTD activity 
As shown above, despite the fact that disparities in 
GOP per head across the Union have narrowed sig-
nificantly over the past 10 ten years. the  level in  the 
four  Cohesion  countries,  taken  together.  remains 
substantially lower than in the rest of the EU. The gap 
in GOP per head, however, is much smaller than the 
gap in technology, measured in terms of the ratio of 
gross expenditure on RTO (GERO) to GOP. Whereas 
GERO averaged around 2% of GOP in  the  Union in 
1995, in the four Cohesion countries, it amounted on 
average to under 1% (Table 20). 
At the same time, Ireland needs to be distinguished 
from the other three countries in this respect. While 
GERO  in Greece, Portugal and Spain ranged from 
0.4% of GOP to 0.8%, less than half the EU average, 
in  Ireland, it was  1.4% of GOP,  higher than in  Italy 
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(1.0%).  In  all  four countries.  as well  as  in  Italy,  the 
technology gap narrowed between 1990 and  1995, 
though by more in Ireland than elsewhere (from 46% 
of the EU aver.age to 73%), due to a significant extent 
to direct investment by large multinationals. 
The use of GERD relative to GOP as an indicator, how-
ever, implies the acceptance of a linear model of in-
novation, with expenditure assumed to lead directly, 
and  proportionately,  to  marketable innovations.  in-
cluding, for example, that devoted to basic research 
or government laboratories. This,  of course. can be 
far from the truth, as the experience in the former cen-
trally planned economies in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope demonstrates. Indeed, the essential challenge 
is  precisely to  translate research and development 
into commercial products. A first approach to improv-
ing measurement is to focus on business expenditure 
on RTD (BERD), again in relation to GOP. 
The  technology  gap,  however.  is  even  more  pro-
nounced in terms of BERD. Despite a small narrowing 
of the gap over the preceding 5 years. in  1995. busi-
ness expenditure on RTD in Portugal and Greece rel-
ative  to  GOP  was  still  only around  10%  of  the  EU 
average and. in Spain, it had fallen to under a third of 
the average. Moreover. whereas in the more prosper-
ous Member States. the share of business in total RTD 
expenditure was above 60%. it was less than half 1n 
Spain and only around a quarter in Greece and Portu-
gal. In Ireland. by contrast. partly because of the influ-
ence  of  multinationals.  business  expenditure  was 
much  the  same  proportion  of  the  total  as  in  other 
Northern  Member  States.  An  essential  aim  of  EU 
structural policy has to be to increase the involvement 
13  R&D personnel, 1996 
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2.0 
1.5 
1.0  1.0 
0.5  0.5 
0.0 
'·~  ~  Q*" +"  Q « v*"  q,  ~....,  ,..  <c.  '  <c."  q  ~  "" 
"  <c.v<c,'>t?-
EL.  A, UK:  1993  .sourc.: EuiDSI•t: DGXVI cM:uJ.nons 
96 
of business in RTD in the Member States with low lev-
els of GOP per head. so helping to improve their com-
petitiveness. 
Disparities between Member States  are  much less 
pronounced in terms of RTD  personnel. though the 
data for these include not only scientists and engi-
neers but also administrative and other ancillary staff. 
They  also  include  researchers  in  universities  and 
other higher education establishments, who account 
for a major share of the total in all four Cohesion coun-
tries and one which has increased by more than else-
where  (Graph  13).  Excluding  these  and  others 
employed in the public sector. the differences across 
the Union are similar to those for expenditure. Never-
theless. RTD seems to be more capital-intensive, es-
pecially in  the  public sector. in Member States with 
higher levels of GOP per head than in  the Cohesion 
countries. 
While all three indicators reviewed above measure in-
puts. the main objective is to measure the results of 
RTD,  or the output. A possible indicator of this is the 
number of patent applications per head of population 
(what is  termed the 'innovation coefficient').  In prac-
tice. this indicator differs even more between Mem-
ber States. the values for Portugal, Greece and Spain 
being between just 2% and  14% of the Union aver-
age,  suggesting  that  the  technology  gap  is  even 
wider  in  terms of  RTD  output.  It  also suggests per-
haps that there is a qualitative difference in the RTD 
undertaken  between  the  Cohesion  countnes  and 
other Member States. with spending in the latter be-
ing focused more on original research leading to new 
products and processes. The number of patent appli-
cations in  the Cohesion countries. in other words. is 
much lower than  elsewhere in  relation  to both RTD 
personnel and expenditure. 
Nevertheless.  there are  signs of  improvement.  Be-
tween 1989 and 1995, patent applications increased 
by much more in all four Cohesion countries (by 46% 
in Portugal, 82% in Greece. 100% in Spain and 150% 
in Ireland) than in the Union as a whole (12%). It is im-
portant to note. in this context. the limitations of the in-
dicator being used, which does not, by any means, 
capture all innovative activity, not least because pro-
cess innovation and incremental product innovation 
often do not result in patent applications. In addition, 
it is important to bear in mind that companies can in-
novate and  become more competitive through  the 
transfer of technology, possibly by means of direct in-vestment, without necessarily having to do their own 
RTD and applying for patents. 
It is also worth noting in this regard that the technol-
ogy gap in the US between States, on all the indica-
tors discussed above, is significantly wider than the 
gap in the EU (between NUTS-1 or NUTS-2 regions), 
whereas the gap in GDP per head is much narrower. 
This could well reflect an  easier flow of technology  -
and know-how in the US than in the EU and a freer and 
more rapid dissemination of knowledge, as well as 
larger scale flows of investment between one part of 
the country and another. If this is the case, the impor-
tance for spatially balanced economic development 
of a more even spread of innovative capacity would 
be less in the US than in Europe. 
Regional analysis 
Disparities in  ATD across the Union are even wider 
once account is  taken  of regional variations within 
Member States. These are substantial both in the Co-
hesion  countries  and  elsewhere.  RTD  expenditure 
and employment are very much concentrated in the 
South and South-West of Germany, Flanders in Bel-
gium,  the  Netherlands. South-East England and  lie 
de France as well as,  to a lesser extent. the South-
East of France and the North-West of Italy (Maps 32 
and 33).• These regions represent the  'islands of in-
novation' identified in the Archipelago study and the 
'star regions' identified by the Commission in a multi-
dimensional analysis.5 
Patent  applications  are  similarly  concentrated  in 
comparatively few regions (Map 34). each being ac-
tive  in  different  areas  of  technology.  Indeed,  in  5 
Member States (France. the Netherlands, Austria, the 
UK,  and to a lesser extent, but increasingly, Spain), 
one or two regions are dominant in terms of patent in-
tensity. In Belgium, Germany and Italy, on the other 
hand, there is a larger number of patent-intensive re-
gions, while in Greece and Portugal, there is no signif-
icant  patent  activity  in  any  region.6  While  in  the 
Northern regions,  RTD  is mainly undertaken by pri-
vate  business  and  is  therefore  largely  demand 
driven, in the Southern regions, mainly those .where 
the capital city is located, there is much greater pub-
lic sector involvement. Moreover, there also tends to 
be less transfer of knowledge between the public and 
the private sectors, as well as  between companies 
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within the private sector, and poor linkages to interna-
tional RTD networks. 
ATD  activity, whether measured by expenditure or 
personnel is, therefore, more concentrated than GDP 
and this is true of both the public and private sectors. 
Patent applications are even more concentrated, re-
gions containing 50% of the Union's population being 
responsible for 85% of patent applications. RTD per-
sonnel  in  higher education establishments,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  more  evenly  distributed  across  re-
gions, demonstrating the attempt by governments to 
counteract concentration tendencies. 
Within countries, there is a clear tendency for RTD ex-
penditure, especially by business, to be much higher 
in relation to GDP in capital cities and the surrounding 
areas, as well as in non-Objective 1 regions, than in 
those  with  Objective  1  status  (Table  21 ).  This  is 
equally true  of  patent applications.  In  addition,  in 
Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece,  a  disproportionate 
amount of government expenditure on RTD goes to 
the regions with relatively high GDP per head, includ-
ing especially the capital cities,  so reinforcing con-
centration  tendencies  in  the  business  sector.  By 
contrast. the reverse is the case in Germany, where 
there is a high incidence of government-funded RTD 
in the new Lander as a deliberate part of the develop-
ment strategy for these regions. 
Participation of assisted 
areas in EU RTD policy 
Support for RTD  in  assisted regions from the Struc-
tural Funds, under the Union's regional policy, often 
exceeds the finance they receive from the Framework 
Programmes (FP),  under the  Union's research and 
technology policy. Nevertheless, it is important to ex-
amine how far the two policies are coherent with each 
other. 
Over  time,  coordination  between  RTD  policy  and 
Structural  policies  has  improved  with  the  aim  of 
strengthening the innovative capacity of the  institu-
tions and businesses in less favoured regions so as to 
help narrow the development gap. In the case of both 
the 3'd  and 4111  Framework Programmes, annual ex-
penditure was higher in relation to GDP in the North-
ern parts of the Union than in the South. Nevertheless, 
expenditure  has  also  been  significant  under  both 
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countries. among them Kriti, Dytiki Ellada and Attiki in 
Greece, Madrid and Pals Vasco in Spain and lisboa 
in Portugal as well as in Ireland, all of  which have been 
in the highest bracket of support. In the 4111  FP, Centro 
in Portugal and Kentriki Makedonia in Greece have 
also received support at a similar level. 
The proportion of contracts going to the Objective 1 
regions, taken together (and correcting for the inclu-
sion of the New Lander among them after German 
unification), increased slightly from 11.9% under the 
3'd FP to 12.2% in the 41h FP. This, however, is still sig-
nificantly less than their weight in Union GOP. Their 
share of the total budget, however, was less than this, 
only 8.9% under the 4111  FP,  though this again was 
marginally more than under the 3'd FP (8.8%  ), and just 
6.7% of the budget for enterprises (6.4% under the 
previous programme). Moreover. contracts to partici-
pants in Objective 1 regions have been dispropor-
.  tionately smaller than  in other regions  in all major 
areas of intervention under both the 3'd and 41 h  FPs. 
On the other hand, support has still been greater than 
the  share  of these  regions  in  patent  applications. 
which is only around 2.4  %, so in this sense the budget 
they have received can be argued to strengthen their 
RTD potential. 
Much of the support to RTD in Objective 1 regions un-
der the 4'" FP has gone to the educational sector and 
SMEs. which together account for 60% of total spend-
ing.  which  is in  line with  Structural  Fund  priorities, 
these two categories accounting for only 42% of ex-
penditure in other regions. 
The 5'" FP will concentrate part of its activity on mea-
sures to support cohesion, such as the dissemination 
of research results. the training of workers in RTD and 
support for research on subjects of particular interest 
to less favoured regions. Accordingly, this should en-
sure complementarity with measures financed from 
the Structural Funds, while attempts will be made to 
ensure that the Operational Programmes under the 
latter have points of access to the activities supported 
by the FP. 
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The role of the Structul'lll Funds In RTO 
support 
The Structural Funds support RTD activities in 
the assisted areas under all regional objectives. 
During the period 1989 to 1993, 3.9% of finan-
cial resources for all objectives went to these 
activities. Following evaluation, which criticised 
the overemphasis of intervention on public sec-
tor supply of facilities at the expense of private 
sector participation,  the  insufficient extent  of 
decentralisation  and  the  lack  of  revenue  fi-
nance  to  operate  facilities,  priorities  have 
changed in  the  current programming period. 
More emphasis is now accorded to the build up 
of RTD skills among the work force, to network-
ing (in particular for SMEs), to the promotion of 
innovation and to the stimulation of demand.7 
This can help regions to attain the critical mass 
in  terms of  RTD  potential necessary for  their 
production structure to be modernised and di-
versified. At the same time, the weight of RTD 
support in total funding under Objectives 1 to 6 
has been increased to 5.7%. 
In both periods, the weight of RTD support was 
highest  in  Objective  2  regions  ( 11.5%  and 
16.8%, respectively), reflecting their more de-
velo~d  RTD systems which enable them to ab-
sorb  higher  levels  of  support.  The  relat1ve 
importance of RTD  in Structural Fund support 
varies significantly between Member States. In 
ObJeCtive  1  regions,  it  ranges  from  3. 1%  in 
France to 17.3% in the Netherlands (Fievoland). 
while in Objective 2 regions, only 8.3% of sup-
port  goes  to  RTD  projects  in  Denmark  as 
against  25.3%  in  Finland.  Efforts  have  been 
made by the  Commission to raise  awareness 
and clarify the role of RTD in regional develop-
ment through seminars, conferences and vari-
ous  publications.  Further  support  for  RTD  is 
provided  under the  Community  Initiatives.  in 
particular, through STRIDE (Science and Tech-
nology for  Regional  Innovation  and  Develop-
ment in Europe) in the 1990 to 1993 period and 
SME, ADAPT and the sectoral initiatives in the 
current programming period. 
These interventions have been complemented 
by pilot projects launched by the Commission 
under Article 10 of the ERDF and Article 6 of the 
ESF  (Maps 35 and 36). For example, theRe-
gional Innovation Strategies (RIS) and the Multi-
Regional  Technology Transfer Projects  (RTI) 
programmes have been set up to support tech-
nological innovation with a combined budget of 
15 million ECU.8 The RIS,  around 20 of which 
are currently in operation administered by re-
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gional governments, are aimed at strengthening the  in~ 
novative capacity of enterprises, particularly SMEs. by 
developing partnerships between the  public and  pri-
vate sectors as well as Inter-company cooperation. The 
RIS  works  through  steering  committees,  comprising 
over 300 key representatives of regional government, 
universities,  technology  centres,  entrepreneurs  and 
their associations and so on, which have the task of de-
signing action plans to define the specific projects to 
support innovation in SMEs. In total, 5.000 SMEs have 
been consulted in the process of elaborating the current 
RIS,tncludlng the first 7 Regional Technology Plans. 
The RTis are aimed at encouraging the development of 
cooperation networks for technology transfer from the 
core regions of the Union to less favoured regions, en-
abling firms in the latter to identity, adapt to and absorb 
innovatory processes developed in the former, so help-
ing to reduce disparities between the two areas. So far 7 
RTis involving 30 regions have been established. 
Two types of project have been developed in respect of 
the information society with a total budget of around  ~ 5 
million ECU (Maps 35 and 36): RISI1 is aimed at encour-
aging  partnerships  between  the  key  institutions  and 
businesses  in  a region and the  formulation  of  action 
plans for developing service projects and applications 
in telematics to help regions adapt to the information so-
ciety, so that they can benefit from the opportunities it 
creates and avoid the risks. Its focus is on employment 
and the competitiveness of SMEs, in particular. The pro-
jects. which are undertaken in cooperation with the ESF. 
involve 22  regional  authorities working  in  partnership 
w1th  key  institutions and businesses  in  their region  in 
telecommunications and related areas. The 22 RISI1 re-
gions together with the SIR lSI regions (pre-pilot actions 
RISI1  1995-97) have  formed  a European  association 
(ERISO)  to support interregional cooperation and the 
exchange of best practices through the establishment 
of multi-regional working groups on particular issues, 
including telematic applications for SMEs. 
RISI2 (multi-regional pilot applications in telematics) is 
aimed at implementing telematic solutions to regional 
development problems through  7 projects of interre-
gional cooperation involving around 30 regions. 
For this and the other programme centred on interre-
gional cooperation, at least one-third of the regions par-
ticipating have to be  Objective  1 or 6 areas and the 
same proportion of the financial contribution has to go to 
them. In both cases, there is special emphasis on sup-
port for SMEs.  In practice, they cover many of the re-
gions in the Cohesion countries (Maps 35 and 36). 
A number of other innovative measures have been un-
dertaken in respect of the information society, and sup-
port has also been given to the creation of a European 
network (EBN) ot Business Innovation Centres (BICs) 
for innovative firms. Of the 140 BICs involved,  120 are 
located  in  less  favoured  regions.  The  functioning  of 
these centres is currently under evaluation. 
For the next programming period 2000 to 2006, the draft 
ERDF regulation envisages renewed emphasis on RTD. 
SMEs will be supported to facilitate innovation and tech-
nology transfer, and assistance generally will be given 
to  RTD  to encourage innovation  and  the  use  of  new 
technologies. The aim is to strengthen the R&D potential 
of regions and to encourage the development of the in-
formation society, as set out in the Commission Commu-
nication on 'Reinforcing cohesion and competitiveness 
through research.  technological development and  in-
novation. 9 
( 1  J  European Commission ( 1997). Second European Report on S& T  Indicators.  p. 356. A similar correlation could not be found between 
the number of patents per head of population and GOP growth. tmplying that it is lncru  ...  in RTO activity that boost economtc 
development. Ct.  8. Clarysse and U.  Muldur. Regional Technology and Economic Gaps: A Systemic Approach. working paper 
DG XII·AS-4. 1997. The two studies do not. however. cover the same period of time, the one using the patenting level as an tndtcator 
of innovauon covenng a more recent period when technological differences between regions have become less marked and when 
accordingly the correlation might have weakened. 
(2]  These were defined as SMEs which introduced a new product during the last three years.  See  European Commission (1997). 
Second Europfan Report on S& T Indicators, p. 366. 
(3]  European Commission (1997). Second European Report on S& T Indicators. 
(4]  The highest value of GERO relative to GOP is in Berlin. at 3. 7%, the lowest one. in Dytiki Makedonia at just 0.04%. On the basis of the 
various indicators presented here. however. the technology gap  between European regions is  significantly smaller than between the 
States of the US. See Second European Report on S& T Indicators.  1997. p. 3421. 
(5]  See Competitiveness and Cohesion: trends in the regions,  1994, p. 101 and Second European Report on S& T  Indicators. 1997. pp. 
360-363. 
[6)  See Second European Report on .S& T Indicators,  1997. p. 371. 
[7]'  For specific examples of the measures taken. see Reinforcing Cohesion and Competitiveness through Research,  Technological 
Development and Innovation. Corrmunication from the Commission. COM(1998) 275 fin. 
[8)  In the framework of DG Xlll's innovation programme, support is granted lor a similar programme, the Regional Innovation and 
Technology Transfer Infrastructures and Strategies (RITIS). 
[9]  Reinforcing Cohesion and Competitiveness through Research. Technological Developm6nt and Innovation, Communication from 
the Commission. COM(1998) 275 fin. 
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SMEs in the European economy 
In  1995, there were around 18 million enterprises in 
the Union, excluding agriculture and non-market ser-
vices. Of these, 99.8% were small and medium-sized 
enterprises employing fewer than 250 people.' To-
gether they are estimated to account for two-thirds of 
the jobs in the EU outside the agricultural and non-
market sectors and for some 55% of the turnover. 
SME,  moreover, are of key  importance for  employ-
ment growth. For a number of years. accord1ng to the 
best estimates, they have played a disproportionate 
role  in  net job creation.  while  employment in  large 
firms.  particularly  in  manufacturing,  has  declined 
This reflects the inherent characteristics of SMEs.  in 
particular.  their greater flexibility and their ability to 
adapt better than  larger firms  to  changing market 
conditions.2  In  addition.  they  serve  to  facilitate  the 
shift of resources between sectors and are often a 
major source of innovation. so helping to increase the 
growth potential of the economy. In this respect, they 
are  a  necessary complement to  1arge  companies. 
which the latter are tending increasingly to recogn1se 
by concentrating more on  their  corE  activities and 
outsourcing  other  parts of  their  business  to  SMEs 
through  various  kinds  of  subcontracting  arrange-
ments, including in some cases R&D. 
Through their flexibility and their potential for employ-
ment creation, SMEs can play a major role in regional 
development. At the same time,  however. they are 
also handicapped in various ways when competing 
with larger firms. In most cases, they have more diffi-
culty in raising finance, most crucially when they first 
start up. In addition, the costs of complying with gov-
ernment regulations and the taxation system are likely 
to be higher relative to turnover than for larger enter-
prises.  For  these reasons, measures are generally 
targeted on SMEs to help them compete on a more 
even basis (see Box on EU assistance to SMEs). 
Regional indicators 
Since clearly the presence of businesses. and in par-
ticular of SMEs. is an essential condition for the devel-
opment of a region. the density of enterprises, or of 
SMEs (defined here as the number per 1000 people 
of  work1ng  age),  can  be  used  as  an  indicator  of 
whelt"ler the infrastructure- 1n the sense not only of 
transport systems and so on. but also institutional ar-
rangements and support services - is favourable to 
econom1c development. Equally, it can also be used 
to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  structural  policies. 
However. since SMEs are highly diverse in terms of 
the1r  sector of  activity.  market focus.  technological 
capab1!1ty. the skills of their work force and, generally, 
thelf potent1al for growth. the mere presence of large 
numbers of SMEs is no guarantee of economic suc-
cess  Indeed, in many less developed regions of the 
Un1on.  a h1gh density of SMEs IS sometimes seen as 
evidence of  a  relatively weak and antiquated eco-
nomic structure, lacking the features to attract busi-
ness 1nvestment. 
In practice. the highest density of enterprises occurs 
in the South of the Union. in Portugal, Spain, Italy and 
Greece. which on a simplistic view would suggest 
that these countries have more favourable conditions 
for business development than the Northern Member 
States  (Map  37).  Enterprises  in  all  four  countries, 
however, consist predominantly of small family busi-
nesses and are much smaller than in the rest of the 
Union, in terms of both their average number of em-
ployees and their turnover (Maps 38 and 39).3 This is 
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Source: Eurosta1  0:.....:,;100;;.... __  ....:::500 lcm in large measure due to the different structure of eco-
nomic activity in the South of Europe and the relative 
concentration of enterprises-and employment-in 
less capital-intensive sectors.4 The number of sepa-
rate  enterprises,  therefore,  and  their  relative  size, 
gives a highly misleading impression of the potential 
for growth and job creation of different parts of the Un-
ion,  unless explicit account is  taken of the sectoral 
distribution of enterprises as well as of the nature of 
enterprises themselves. In Northern Member States, 
therefore, SMEs are more concentrated in more dy-
namic sectors, while the proportion of employment in 
medium-sized firms also tends to  be  higher, again 
partly because of the structure of activity. 
The size structure of enterprises appears to be rela-
tively similar across regions in the same country, ex-
cept there seems to be some tendency for the relative 
number employed in  large firms to be higher in the 
capital city and surrounding area. A regional analysis 
of enterprise numbers and size, however, is limited by 
lack of data. Specifically, the only data available in 
most Member States in this regard relate to produc-
tion units, or establishments, rather than enterprises, 
and though these may give a reasonable approxima-
tion of relative numbers of firms of different size, this is 
not necessarily the case because of possible varia-
tions  between  regions  in  the  importance  of  multi-
establishment enterprises. 
In practice, the relative density of small and medium-
sized local units in different parts of the Union is simi-
lar to the relative density of enterprises {Map 40). s The 
density of units, however, is also relatively high in the 
South of France, which may well reflect the same un-
derlying factors as in other Mediterranean countries. 
In Portugal, Italy and Spain, there is a clear tendency 
for local units to be concentrated, relative to popula-
tion, in the regions with relatively high GOP per head, 
including, in particular. in those where the capital city 
is located {in,  for example, Northern Italy, Catalul'\a, 
Madrid, Valencia, Pals Vasco, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo 
and the Algarve) (Map 41 ). Although the relative con-
centration of local units in capital cities is also evident 
in other Member States,  the regional differences in 
these three countries provide a clear illustration of the 
lack of productive facilities in disadvantaged areas. A 
similar  imbalance  is  also evident for  employment. 
While there is  no systematic  difference in  the  size 
structure of enterprises between different regions in 
Spain or Italy, the total number of jobs is much lower in 
the less favoured regions. 
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The role of SMEs 
in employment creation 
Although the data available are limited, those which 
exist (in particular, those on enterprise demography 
compiled by Eurostat) suggest that the creation of en-
terprises, which are predominantly very small, con-
tributes  as  much  to  employment  growth  as  the 
expansion of existing firms.  Indeed, the evidence is 
that substantial numbers of  new firms  are  created 
each year across the  Union to exploit new market 
possibilities, to produce and sell new products and/or 
to use new techniques of production or new ways of 
working.  Although similar numbers of firms,  again 
predominantly very small,  also go out of business 
each year, this process of birth and death is an es-
sential part of economic development, of the adapta-
tion  to  changing  market  circumstances  in  a 
competitive environment and of the  implementation 
of new technology. Moreover, with technological ad-
vance and changing patterns of consumption as real 
incomes  rise,  niche  markets  are  being  created  in 
which SMEs can not only compete on more favour-
able terms  with  larger enterprises  than  before  but 
have a comparative advantage specifically because 
of their size and greater flexibility.6 
In  addition, estimates of the number of people em-
ployed in small businesses based on the Community 
Labour Force Survey suggest that the share of em-
ployment in small firms in services rose slightly be-
tween 1992 and 1997. while the share in industry rose 
more significantly, perhaps reflecting the growth of 
outsourcing or subcontracting.  7 
Any assessment of the contribution of SMEs  to job 
creation in the Union is, however, affected by the cov-
erage and quality of available information. The data 
currently produced by Eurostat are partial and suffer 
from methodological problems. They,  therefore,  do 
not  allow  definitive  conclusions  about  the  role  of 
SMEs  in  employment creation to be drawn. As the 
employment size of firms changes over time and as 
some  small  firms  grow into  larger  ones  and  vice 
versa, the contribution to employment growth of firms 
of different size cannot be measured simply by com-
paring the relative number employed by them at two 
points  in  time.  The  only way  of  measuring  this  is 
through  monitoring  the  development  of  individual 
firms over time so that any change between employ-
ment size classes can be tracked.8 
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Support measures for SMEs 
According to a recent survey of assistance to SMEs 
in rural, underdeveloped regions, the support pro-
vided,  apart from  financial  aid of the  traditional 
kind, took a wide range of forms, Including training 
and Consultancy services to entrepreneurs, assis-
tance for cooperation between SMEs and the cre-
ation  of  networks,  and  the  establishment  of 
business centres or technology parks to encour-
age the diffusion of technology, especially that re-
lated  to  the  inherent  features  and  potential 
comparative advantage of the reg.ion in question.9 
Experience in  Italy and Norway, moreover, shows 
that such broadly-based and long-term assistance 
can  lead to  significant increases in  the  survival 
rates of SMEs. 
Support for SMEs  under the EU  Structural Funds 
has followed this kind of broadly-based approach. 
The available data indicate that for the current pro-
gramming period, about 14% of the total resources 
of the Structural Funds (ie approximately 22 billion 
ECU) is directed at supporting the production facil-
ities and economic environment of SMEs. In Objec-
tive 1 regions, such support is usually i_ncluded in 
the  ·mdustry· operational programmes.  In  Objec-
tive 2 areas. the share of funding going to support 
SMEs IS  usually above average, while in Objective 
6 reg1ons. funds for SMEs amount to a quarter of to-
tal  Community  support.  These  figures,  however, 
only mclude the programmes specifically targeted 
at  SMEs.  wh1ch  also  receive  assistance  under 
programmes directed at all enterprises. Under Ob-
lect•ve Sb, programmes for 'investment in produc-
tion. SMEs, the craft sector and services' account 
for 25% of all appropriations. More indirectly, SMEs 
can also benefit from  public investment in  infra-
structure and training. 
The Commission in its new guidelines for Objective 
1 and 2 areas. issued in 1997, identified the devel-
opment of SMEs as a priority area for support. This 
emphasis  is  reflected  in  the  new  Objective  2 
programmes for 1997-99. 
A special Initiative was introduced in  1994 with a 
budget of 1 billion ECU to help SMEs in all assisted 
areas to adapt to the constraints of the internal mar-
ket and the globalisation of the economy. 80% of 
the budget was earmarked for Objective 1 regions. 
The aim is to increase the competitiveness of SMEs 
by  improving  their  working  environment and  in-
creasing their know-how, special emphasis being 
given  to  RTD  and  innovation  in  information  and 
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communication  technology.  Support is  provided 
for cooperation between SMEs and with research 
centres to  improve their marketing, organisation 
and  management  as  well  as  to  enab1e  them  to 
share skills. 
Another Initiative with a major SME dimension is the 
LEADER  II  programme  focused  on  rural  areas. 
Around 20% of the total Community contribution of 
1755 million ECU goes to measures which directly 
assist SMEs and the craft sector, in the form of sup-
port for business services, innovative investment, 
teleworking  and  the  setting  up  of  enterprises. 
Since eligibility for support requires projects to be 
innovative, the Initiative enables new methods of 
organisation and marketing as well as new prod-
ucts to be tested. SMEs are also supported under 
the ADAPT Initiative, whicl-t is aimed at helping the 
work force adapt to industrial change. 
In addition, the creation of innovative enterprises and 
the development of SMEs is assisted under the A  IS, 
RTT,  and RISI  programmes, described above (see 
Box on RTD support), as well as by the establishment 
of information and advice centres, such as the Euro 
Info Centres and the European Business and Innova-
tion Centres (BICs). Moreover, the RECITE II (internal 
and external  inter-regional cooperation) innovative 
measure  also  covers  SMEs,  while  the 
EUROPARTENARIAT  programme,  introduced  in 
1987, supports the development of regions eligible 
for assistance under Objectives 1, 2. Sb and 6 by en-
couraging the SMEs located there to establish busi-
ness cooperation with companies in other Member 
States or third countries. These events. where enter-
prises can meet potential partners, are co-financed 
by the ERDF and are held twice a year. 
As  well  as assistance from the Structural Funds, 
SMEs  also receive support from the European In-
vestment Bank through global loans. totalling more 
than  11  billion ECU since 1990, 6.4 billion ECU of 
which went to assisted areas. They can, in addition, 
be eligible for interest subsidies from the EIB and 
loan  guarantees  from  the  European  Investment 
Fund  (for which no regional breakdown is  avail-
able). Finally, the Commission has also recently es-
tablished  a  pilot  scheme.  called  'Seed  Capital', 
extending reimbursable advances to independent 
investment funds  providing finance  for  business 
start-ups. Though the programme is not confined to 
assisted areas, 15 of the 23 funds in operation are 
located in such regions. At present such data on enterprise demography are 
only available for 5 Member States (Finland. Sweden. 
Portugal. Spain and France) and for a limited number of 
years.  Although  developments have varied  between 
them. there seems to have been a tendency during the 
first half of the 1990s - which was largely a period of 
recession or slow growth -for  very small firms (below 
20 employees) and  large ones (250 employees and 
more) to suffer disproportionate job losses. while small 
enterprises  (20-49  employees)  and  medium-sized 
ones (50-240 employees) performed better. 1o 
A recent study on the UK concludes that job creation in 
SMEs has been dominated by a small number of enter-
prises  with  very  high  growth  rates.  but  that  this  has 
been accompanied by a high rate of failure among the 
'lower tailofmicrofirms'. 11 The smallest firms (with 1-19 
employees). therefore, had the highest rates of both job 
creation and job destruction, which is consistent with 
the findings to emerge from the Eurostat demographic 
data cited above. 
As noted above. however. analysis of job creation by 
SMEs can be distorted by the variation in the employ-
ment size of companies over time as a result of eco-
nomiC fluctuations. which means that companies move 
between size classes. After adjusting for this distortion. 
the study for the UK still found an inverse association 
between company size and job creation. 
Finally, while it is generally accepted that there is a high 
rate of gross job creation in SMEs, there is still a signifi-
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cant lack of understanding about why some firms sur-
vive and expand and others fail. Studies for the period 
1990 to 1992 suggest that, depending on the sector, 
between one-third and two-thirds of SMEs introduced 
technological  changes  into  the  products  they  pro-
duced and the processes by which they did so and that 
these were the ones most likely to survive and to be in-
volved in collaborative partnerships with other firms or 
research  institutions.  The  'lower  tail  of  micro firms·. 
however. were for the most part involved in very little in-
novative activity. These companies also tended to co-
operate less in R&D than larger enterprises. which may 
partly be due to lack of information about possible part-
ners, and. in general. they provided much less training 
to their employees. 12 This suggests that broadly-based 
long-term assistance (of the kind described in the Box) 
is  important  to  overcome  these  weaknesses  and  to 
strengthen the competitiveness not only of such firms 
but also of the Union economy as a whole. particularly 
that of lagging regions. 
Important  conclusions  to  emerge  from  the  above 
analysis  are.  in  the  first  place.  that  the  potential  of 
SMEs for employment creation differs between sec-
tors as well as different kinds of enterprise; secondly. 
that further work is required to identify the factors de-
termining this potential in order better to target assis-
tance. especially on those SMEs which are capable 
of innovating and which are likely to be a source of 
employment growth in the long-term. 
[ 1]  SMEs are defined as firms with fewer  than 250 employees. hav1ng an annual turnover of not more than 40 million ECU and/or a 
balance sheet valuat1on of not more than 27 million ECU and w1th less than 25% of equity owned by a large enterpnsc. 
(2]  Research has shown that in some Member States. 1nclud1ng 1n Portugal and Greece (where data are Umited to manufactunng). very 
small  companies (1-9 employees) 1n  a number ol cases have h1gher value-added per unit of labour costs than other small  or 
medtum-sized companies and, Jherefore. a higher profitability. See European Commission, Enterprises in Europe,  Fourth Report. 
1996, part 1. 
(3]  In sp1te of the differences in bustness structures between the Member States there is a remarkably strong retattonshlp between 
employment and turnover per enterpnse. Portuguese enterpnses have a below average turnover per employee wh1ch IS explamed 
by spec1ahsat1or 1n 1ndustnes w1th a low value-added. 
(4]  See European Cc.mmiSSIOn. Employment in Europe  1998. Part II. Sect1on  1. 
(5]  A local unit is an enterprise or a part thereof. eg a workshop.  lactory or office. situated in a geographically separate place. Th1s 
deh01t1on allows for a more prec1se regional allocauon of productiOn (and employment) between sites than data for enterpnses, the 
head offices ol the larger ones ol which are located disproportionately 1n large cities. For Denmark and Portugal. however. only data 
on the number ol enterprises are available. The data also exclude units with no employees, ie with only self employed, and so tend to 
understate the true number of units. In addit1on. small and medium-sized units are defined as those with less than 100 employees 
which differs from the definition or SMEs (less than 250 employees). 
[6)  See European CommiSSIOn,  Employment in Europe  1998. Part II, Section  1. 
(7]  Idem. 
(8]  Idem. 
[9]  Idem. 
[10)  A. Hughes. Small Firms and Employment, Employment Policy Institute. 1996 
I  11)  European Commission, Enterprises in Europe, Fourth Report, 1996, p. 72. 
(12)  See ElM Small Business Research and Consultancy. SME Observatory, Filth report,  1997, chapter 6. 
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2.4  Foreign direct investment 
The role of FDI in 
regional development 
Together with trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) is 
an important mechanism for integrating international 
markets. Trade and FDI flows  can be substitutes or 
complements for each other. 
The  economic development of  a region  is  strongly 
linked to its ability to attract and retain productive ac-
tivity. A number of studies have been undertaken on 
the factors which influence the  attractiveness of  re-
gions for  foreign. investors.  The  results  of  one  such 
study were presented in  detail in  the  previous Peri-
odic Report.,  It indicated that  production costs (la-
bour costs. in particular) were only one of a range of 
factors influencing potential investors and that in or-
der to attract inward investment, a region needed to 
have a combination of favourable characteristics. 
FDI contributes to regional development by increas-
ing the capital stock and productive capacity. This is 
most obvious when it takes the form of investment in a 
new 'greenfield' site or in the expansion of an existing 
plant. It is less obvious when FDI consists merely of a 
financial transaction to acquire shares in a domestic 
company or to  purchase an  existing asset.  In prac-
tice, by far the greater part of FDI consists of the latter 
type of transaction. Nevertheless. even  in this case, 
the effect may still be to increase the capital stock as 
the recipients spend the additional funds received or, 
in  the  longer-term,  as  the  new owner invests in  the 
business acquired. More generally, it may lead to a 
strengthening of the competitiveness of the business 
as it becomes part of a larger international concern as 
well as to an increase in competition in the economy 
in question, stimulating local businesses to increase 
efficiency and product quality. 
In all probability, inward investment will increase em-
ployment either directly if it adds to productive ca-
pacity  or  indirectly  over  the  longer-term  if  it 
strengthens competitiveness. It may also provide ac-
cess to new technology and know-how. This is partic-
ularly  important  in  less  developed  regions  which 
often lag behind in this respect and as a result have 
lower levels of productivity. In order to have the maxi-
mum effect on regional development, however, it is 
important for the new facilities created and/or the mul-
tinational company responsible for the investment to 
become integrated into the  local economy.  This in-
volves, at a minimum, the transfer of technology to the 
local unit and, preferably, the diffusion of this technol-
ogy to other companies in  the region.  It also entails 
the sourcing of supplies from local businesses and/or 
the sale of the goods or services produced to local 
corporate customers.  Moreover,  the  higher the  de-
gree of integration of the investing company into the 
local economy, the more likely it is that its presence 
will be permanent and the investment long-term. 
Nevertheless.  there  are  potential  negative  effects of 
FDI. which are likely to be more of a possibility the less 
the  investors  become integrated into the  local econ-
omy. A common fear, in particular, is that the investing 
company will have less attachment to the area and may 
at any time cut back production, and employment, as 
part of its global strategy. This tends to assume, how-
ever. that a domestic company would act differently if it 
owned the plant or business in question and neglects 
the fact that it would be under the same kind of pres-
sure from international competitive forces. If a facility is 
uncompetitive when owned by a multinational, there is 
little reason to suppose that it would perform better if 
owned by a domestic company. 
Another concern, sometimes expressed, is that the 
presence  of  a  foreign  investor  tends  to  drive  up 
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wages.  Instead  of  recruiting  people  and  training 
them,  it is  argued, multinationals tend to entice the 
most  qualified,  and  already  well-trained,  workers 
away from  local companies by offering them  high 
rates of pay. Forced to follow suit, the cost competi-
tiveness of local businesses therefore suffers. There 
is, however, little evidence that multinationals act in 
Difficulties of measurement 
For statistical purposes, FDI is defined as the acqui-
sition by an individual or enterprise resident in one 
country  of  assets  located  in  another.  The  main 
source of difficulty concerns not just the identifica-
tion of such flows and collecting reliable information 
about them,  particularly as many transactions are 
internal to multinational companies, but also defin-
ing the circumstances when an asset is acquired in 
the  case  of financial  transactions,  particularly  in-
volving company equity. In this case, transactions 
are included as part of FDI only if a material interest 
is acquired in a foreign enterprise (usually defined 
as a shareholding of at least  10%, though unfortu-
nately not in all countries). Once this condit1on is sat-
isfied. further capital transactions between the two 
parties concerned also count as FDL  FOI  transac-
tions. accordingly, 1nvolve the acqu1S1t1on of equity 
cap1tal as well as reinvested earn1ngs and ·other di-
rect  investment  capital',  cons1st1ng  of  Inter-
company debt transactions. 
While the definition is relatively clear. measurement 
problems arise because of the use of  different na-
tional sources and methods of collect1on and differ-
ent  ways  of  classifying  transactions.  Although 
Eurostat  attempts  to  harmonise  the  data  com1ng 
from  different Member States,  the  task  •nvolved  is 
formidable, not least because many data are miss-
ing or unavailable and have to be est1mated  from 
secondary sources or even from  relat•onsh1ps ap-
plying elsewhere (ie from models).2 Wh1le outflows 
to country B as recorded by country A should equal 
inflows from country A as recorded by country B.  1n 
practice.  this .  is  rarely  the  case  and  1n  many  in-
stances the difference is substantial For example. 
the difference between estimates of total intra-Un1on 
flows of FDI based. on the one hand, on 1nflow data 
and. on the other, on outflow data. vaned between 
16% and 33% of the total in each of the three years. 
1993 to  1995. The reason for such asymmetry lies, 
partly, in the inaccurate geographical allocation of 
FDI flows on the part of Member States and, partly, 
in differences between the way data are collected 
and defined in the different national systems. 
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this particular way- indeed, since low wages may 
well have been a motivating factor behind the move in 
the first place. they have little incentive to do so. On 
the other hand, there is evidence that multinationals 
typically provide a relatively high level of training and, 
if they are investing in a lagging region, need to do so 
since the stock of highly qualified labour is almost 
certainly limited. 
A further view holds that a significant part of FDI con-
sists of companies relocating their activities primarily 
to benefit from investment aid. If the relocation takes 
place between Member States. then there need be no 
net expansion of the capital stock in the Union as a 
whole. Again, however, there is no evidence that this 
is a prevalent activity and. even if it were. the capital 
stock is likely to be modernised and made more pro-
ductive as a result. Moreover. if the alternative to relo-
cation within the Union is relocation to a third country, 
then on any realistic assessment, there is a net gain to 
the EU's productive potential. 
Trends in FDI 
There are acute problems in measuring flows of FDI, 
wh1ch mean that any analysis of developments is in-
evitably subject to a high degree of uncertainty and 
accord1ngly must be heavily qualified (see Box on 
measurement problems).  Moreover,  since data on 
FDI are usually collected at a national level, analysis 
of the regional incidence of investment is a priori not 
possible. It is, nevertheless. of interest in this context 
to examine FDI flows into the Member States with rela-
tively low levels of GOP per head. Unfortunately, the 
data on FDI for these countries are even less reliable 
than for other Member States and even greater cau-
tion needs to be applied to the interpretation of them. 
This is particularly the case for Ireland and Greece, 
since neither country provides detailed statistics on 
their FDI. Accordingly, the data presented below are 
estimates based on the statistics provided by partner 
countries. 
The major global players 
At the global level, the stock of FDI at the end of 1996 
is  estimated  to have been over $3  trillion  (around 
2, 700 billion ECU-more than the value of total world 
exports  in  the  same year.  of around  2,500 billion ECU). Since 1980, FDI has grown three times faster 
than  domestic investment.  Nevertheless,  it still  ac-
counts for only around 6% of the annual investment of 
industrialised economies. The major economies, the 
US, Japan and the EU, are the major sources of FDI. 
Over the 10years, 1987 to 1996 inclusive, EU compa-
nies invested more than 315 billion ECU outside the 
Union, while the total FDI of Japan amounted to 220 
bil!ion ECU and of the US to 195 billion ECU.  Inward 
investment into these three economies over the same 
period varied by much more (Graph 14  ). The US, due 
inter alia to its large market and relatively high growth 
rates, but perhaps most importantly reflecting its sub-
stantial deficit on current account. attracted foreign 
investment of more than 430 billion ECU, while under 
7 billion ECU were invested in Japan by foreign com-
panies over the same period. The EU was in between 
the two extremes, with inward investment of 247 bil-
lion ECU. While Japan was, therefore, the major net 
foreign  investor over the  period,  reflecting  its  sub-
stantial surplus on current account, the US was the 
major net recipient of FDI. 
It  should be emphasised. however, that these data 
comprise only the acquisition of equity capital and 
'other  direct investment  cap1tal'  and  exclude  rein-
vested earnings, which are likely to  be more impor-
tant the longer a foreign asset has been owned. Since 
US companies started investing abroad earlier than 
Japanese enterprises. the flow data probably under-
state US  investment abroad.  Indeed.  at the  end of 
1996, the stock of US foreign assets amounted to 620 
.billion ECU. of which 269 billion ECU were in the EU. 
and  these  exceeded  total  liabilities  by  146  billion 
ECU. 
Moreover.  there  were  significant  variations  in  the 
scale of flows over the period. Recorded US outflows 
ofFDI were only 56 billion ECU in the five years 1987 
to  1991, but they increased to  139 billion ECU over 
the next five years. On the other hand. inflows fell from 
241  billion ECU to 191  billion ECU between the two 
periods. so that net inward investment declined mark-
edly. In the case of Japan. where inflows have always 
been very small, outflows reached a peak in 1989-90 
when more than 22% of the total went to the EU, possi-
bly because of a desire to be present within the Single 
Market, though also perhaps because of the relatively 
high rate of growth in  the Union during this period. 
Since 1992, Japanese FDI has fallen to less than half 
its peak level and the share going to the EU has gone 
down to 15%. 
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Flows between the EU 
and the rest of the world 
More than half {51%) of EU outflows of FDI over the 
period 1987 to 1996 went to the US,  though the pro-
portion declined from over 60% in the first five years to 
43% in the second (Table 22). Other Western Euro-
pean countries (EFT  A) were the second largest desti-
nation accounting for just over 1  0% of the total over 
the 10 years, while little more than 1% went to Japan. 
Investment in  Central and Eastern European coun-
tries and the former Soviet Union increased markedly 
over the period as the transition process got under-
way. accounting for around 12% of the total, much the 
same as the EFT A countries. in the five years 1992 to 
1996. 
The UK was the main source of outflows over the 10 
years, accounting for over 21% of the total, followed 
closely by Germany (20%),  France (19%) and the 
Netherlands  (14%)  (Table  23).  However,  the  UK 
share fell significantly between the first and second 
halves of the period (from 31% to under 11 %). with the 
result that in the years 1992 to 1996. it was much less 
than tnat of Germany and France (over 20% in each 
case) 
The s::>urce  o·f  inflows shows some similarities to out-
flows  Aga1n. the US and EFT A are the largest sources 
of  mvostment in  the Union. with  shares of 40% and 
26°o  respectively (Table 22).  though EFTA's share 
fell compared with the first half of the period. when it 
was tne largest investor in the EU. reflecting perhaps 
the build-up of the EEA. Over the years 1992 to 1996, 
more than half of all inflows 1nto the Union came from 
14  FDI now• in and out or the EU, US and Japan, 
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the  US,  with  Japan·  accounting for  9%,  though  its 
share fell from  12~%  in the first half of the period to 
5~%  in the second.  . 
As  in the case of outflows,  the UK was the main 
player, receiving 36% of inflows, though, again as for 
outflows, its share fell markedly over the period {from 
43% to 30% between the first and second halves), 
mainly reflecting a sharp decline in the share of US in-
vestment going to the UK (Table 24). The share going 
to other Member States was considerably smaller, 
France accounting for almost 15%, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Belgium/Luxembourg and Sweden account-
ing for between 6% and 10%. However, FOI flows into 
all  these  countries,  except for  Spain,  increased in 
both nominal and relative terms between the first and 
second halves of the period, while flows into the UK 
actually declined in nominal terms. 
Since Member States vary enormously in the size of 
their economies. the figures for shares of inward in-
vestment can be a misleading indicator both of their 
relative attractiveness to outside investors and of the 
potential  importance  of the  inflows  concerned  for 
their economic development. Relating inflows to GOP 
g1ves a much more meaningful picture {Table 25). In 
practice. inward investment in  relation to GOP was 
highest over the period for Ireland. while in both Spain 
and Portugal it was above the Union average, which 
is  encouraging from  the  point of view of their eco-
nomic convergence. It was also above average in the 
UK. Belgium/Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Swe-
den. On the other hand, the share of investment from 
outside the Union going to Greece was substantially 
below average given its level of GOP (only around a 
quarter of the EU average), as it was in Germany and 
Austria. 
Flows between Member States 
Direct investment flows between Member States sig-
nificantly exceeded flows with third countries during 
the 10 years 1987 to 1996 {425 billion ECU as against 
315 billion ECU in terms of outflows). The relative size. 
however, of the two shifted significantly between the 
first and second halves of the  period.  In  the years 
1987 to 1991, in the run-up to the internal market, in-
ternal flows were only slightly greater than flows to 
third  countries,  but in  the  five  years  after,  they in-
creased markedly {to 248 billion ECU as against 157 
billion ECU) while the latter remained much the same 
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in nominal terms. This may  well reflect both the secure 
environment of the Single Market and the investment 
opportunities provided, coupled with the effects of a 
period of relative currency stability. As a result, eco-
nomic integration within the Union increased further. 
Much of this investment stemmed from France and 
Germany, each of which accounted for 22% of the to-
tal. while the Netherlands was responsible for a fur-
ther 14%, more than the UK, which was the source of 
under 10% of total flows {Table 26). The UK share, 
however. rose in the second half of the period, while 
that of France fell and the German share increased 
slightly {to  23%),  reflecting,  in  part.  moves by the 
companies concerned to shift  production to  lower 
cost locations. 
In relation to GOP, which again gives a more mean-
ingful indication of the importance of the investment 
concerned to the Member State in question, the larg-
est source of outflows was the Netherlands together 
with Belgium/Luxembourg and followed by Sweden 
and Ireland. 
Again in relation to GOP, the largest recipients of in-
flows of investment from other Member States over 
the  10  years  1987 to  1996 were  Ireland  and  Bel-
gium/Luxembourg.  with  Portugal,  the  Netherlands 
and Spain being the third, fourth and fifth largest. re-
spectively, but with significantly lower levels (Table 
27). The large inflows into Belgium/Luxembourg con-
sist inter alia of the establishment of bank branches in 
Luxembourg, because of its importance as a financial 
centre, coupled with the fiscal advantages involved. 
They also comprise the establishment of offices of 
multinationals in  Brussels,  attracted by its strategic 
position both geographically and politically. The rela-
tively  large  inflows  into three  of  the  four Cohesion 
countries are again encouraging from the point of a 
view of convergence. This is particularly the case for 
Ireland,  which,  in  addition  to  receiving  the  largest 
amount of inward investment over the  period as  a 
whole, experienced a significant increase in the sec-
ond half as compared with the first. 
Effect of FDI flows on cohesion 
In order better to assess the effect of FOI, it is useful to 
consider net investment flows for individual Member 
States and to standardise them in terms of population 
(Table 25}. So far as intra-EU flows are concerned, all four Cohesion countries were net recipients of invest-
ment from other Member States over the  10 years 
1987 to 1996 and to that extent have been assisted in 
their economic development. 
They have also been net recipients of inflows from 
outside the Union, especially Spain and Portugal, so 
that they have gained doubly  from inward investment. 
Moreover, more recent data suggest that total inflows 
in:o Portugal increased substantially in  1997, to 1% 
times their average value over the preceding 5 years 
(though given the data problems too much impor-
tance should not be attached to one year's figure). 
Relative  to  population,  apart from  Belgium/Luxem-
bourg, the largest inflows were into Ireland, followed 
by Spain and Portugal, while inflows into Greece were 
substantially lower. The UK, which also had a level of 
GOP per head below the Union average, though by 
much less. was a net recipient as well, while Finland, 
.Germany and the Netherlands were the largest net 
exporters of capital. 
FDI flows and the Structural Funds 
Expend1ture  in  the  regions  from  the  EU  Structural 
Funds bears some relationship to inflows of FDI. inso-
far as  it co-finances national schemes to provide in-
vestment aid in assisted regions and so encourages 
companies to locate projects there. In a more indirect 
way. the Funds support improvements in  infrastruc-
ture and training to raise the skills of the work force, so 
making the areas concerned more attractive to for-
eign 1nvestors. 
During the first programming period 1989 to 1993, net 
FDI  inflows exceeded transfers from  the  Structural 
Funds in three of the four Cohesion countries (Graph 
15). the only exception being Greece. Net inflows of 
FDI  to  Ireland amounted to almost 8% of GOP and, 
accordingly,  more  than  3¥2  times  Structural  Fund 
transfers. 
FDI inflows into Spain increased rapidly in the second 
half of the 1980s to reach a peak of almost 10 billion 
ECU in  1990.  While they remained high until 1994, 
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they fell in the subsequent two years and outflows in-
creased. More than two-thirds of inflows in each of the 
years 1992 to 1996 came from other Member States 
and half the flows went into manufacturing, with the 
food, chemical and motor vehicle industries being the 
main areas of investment, while in services they went 
predominantly into banking and business services, 
including computing,  so  helping to  modernise the 
economy and increase its growth potential. 
Direct investment in Portugal followed a similar path 
to that in Spain, rising throughout the 1980s. reaching 
a peak of almost 2 billion ECU in 1990 and declining 
steadily up to 1995. when it was only a quarter of its 
1990 value, though, as noted above, there seems to 
have been a resurgence in  1997. In  1995 and 1996. 
outflows of FDI. mainly to other EU countries. for the 
first  time  exceeded  inflows.  Inflows  of  investment 
throughout the period 1987 to 1996 came predomi-
nantly from other Member States.  and mainly from 
Spain. the UK, France and Germany. Most of the in-
vestment  went  into  services,  particularly  banking, 
property and business services, though in a number 
of years. there were significant flows into electricity, 
gas and water as well as construction. The effect has 
been to improve the infrastructure of the economy, fi-
nancial as well as  physical, and to lay the basis for 
further investment and economic development gen-
erally. 
Unfortunately,  no  recent  data  are  available  for 
Greece and Ireland on the details of investment. 
(1]  European Commission (1994), Competitiveness and cohesion: trends in the regions. 
(2)  See Eurostat (1998), FDI statistics, Part C: Methodology issues. 
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The role of infrastructure and human 
capital in regional development 
Differences in infrastructure are recognised as con-
tributing significantly to variations in regional compet-
itiveness.  However,  competitiveness  depends  not 
only on endowments of physical infrastructure but, to 
an increasing extent, on those of human capital or the 
skills of the work force.  Indeed,  effective education 
and training systems can make as much contribution 
to  economic  development  as  advanced  transport 
and telecommunication networks. The economically 
stronger regions in the EU with high levels of GOP per 
head are generally better endowed with both types of 
capital than lagging regions. 
The importance of infrastructure is reflected in the pri-
ority it is accorded in development-related expendi-
ture in Member States. Government fixed investment. 
which consists mainly of capital expenditure on phys-
ical infrastructure.  accounts  for  between  10%  and 
20% of total gross domestic fixed capital formation in 
Union  countries.  Part of  such  expenditure goes  on 
education and training, on the construction of build-
ings and the purchase of equipment. By far the most 
important part of investment in education and train-
ing, however, the spending on teachers and instruc-
tors  and  the  books  and  other  material  needed  for 
teaching, is classified in the national accounts as cur-
rent expenditure despite the  addition  to  the  capital 
stock, broadly defined, which it gives rise to. This ele-
ment of expenditure amounts to between 4% and 7% 
of GOP across the Union. 
A significant proportion of Union aid to the lagging re-
gions also consists of  investment in  physical  infra-
structure and human capital. Over the  1989 to 1993 
programming period, some 35% of total expenditure 
from the Structural Funds in Objective 1 regions (16 
billion ECU at 1994 prices) went on investment in ba-
sic  infrastructure and a further 22% (over  10 billion 
ECU) on investment in human capital. 
Over the  1994 to  1999 programming  period.  invest-
ment in basic infrastructure in Objective 1 regions from 
the Funds, including from the new Cohesion Fund. in-
creased  to 45 billion ECU or 41% of the  total  spent. 
while expenditure in these regions on the development 
of human resources rose to 29 billion ECU. 26% of total 
spending. In addition, the European Investment Bank 
will have provided some 25 billion ECU in loan finance 
for investment in basic infrastructure in such regions by 
the end of the 10-year period  1989 to 1999. 
Comparison of infrastructure endowment between re-
gions raises a number of conceptual and methodologi-
cal issues which need to be considered, as regards. 
first, the most appropriate indicators for measurement 
to use and, secondly, assessment of the effects of such 
endowment on the regional economy. 
Defining appropriate indicators 
The measurement problem consists, first. of identify-
ing an appropriate-and concise-set of indicators 
of the scale and, perhaps more importantly, the qual-
ity of endowment of the different kinds of infrastruc-
ture  in  individual  regions.  Second,  the  indicators 
need to be sufficiently simple for the exercise to be vi-
able and capable of being aggregated into an overall 
measure of endowment. Thirdly, account needs to be 
taken of links between different kinds of infrastructure 
both within and between regions,  such as the stan-
dard of connections between the regional transport 
network and the national and international systems. 
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The simplest measure of infrastructure is the physical 
scale of provision in relation to potential use, such as 
the length of roads per square kilometre or per head of 
population. Alternatively, tor some kinds of infrastruc-
ture, the proportion of population with access to partic-
ular facilities may be more relevant,  such  as  to  the 
public water supply.  Indicators of quality are slightly 
more tricky to define, tend to be specific to individual 
kinds of infrastructure and usually have to be indirect 
pointers to the standard of provision. For the rail net-
work, for example, the extent of electrification and the 
number of separate tracks, which affect both the speed 
of the service and its carrying capacity, can be used to 
give a reasonable indication of quality. 
However, neither indicators of scale nor of quality can 
convey how far the existing endowment in any region is 
suitable to its development needs. Since the  existing 
infrastructure  in  use  will  have  typically  been  con-
structed over a great many years, it may reflect past re-
quirements and past patterns of development rather 
than  present and  prospective ones.  Although  there 
may be an extensive transport network, for example. it 
may be in the wrong place and lack efficient connec-
tions.  In addition, while it is possible to devise indica-
tors of different types of infrastructure. it is much more 
difficult to compare endowment of one type with that of 
another in a meaningful way and to assess how far. for 
example, deficiency in one aspect is compensated by 
a high standard of provision in another. 
· Indicators of endowment.  therefore.  can only  be a 
starting-point  for  evaluating  regional  disparities  in 
provision and for identifying major needs for  invest-
ment in relation in economic development. In this re-
gard, moreover. it should also be borne in mind that a 
high  standard  of  infrastructure  endowment  is  no 
guarantee of the economic success of a region. Simi-
larly, though major deficiencies may represent a seri-
ou:.. obstacle to development. they may not prevent it 
from occurring. In sum. therefore. while the measure-
ment of infrastructure endowment is important for un-
derstanding differences in regional performance, the 
indicators devised need to be interpreted with cau-
tion from a number of perspectives. 
Economic impact of infrastructure 
Simply identifying the level of physical infrastructure 
in different regions says little. of course. about its rela-
tionship to economic development. Although the as-
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sociation between the two is not in doubt, the nature 
of the causal link is still the subject of debate. Some of 
the more central regions of  the Union, tor example, ar-
guably face constraints on future development, de-
spite  high  levels  of  infrastructure  endowment, 
because of the inability of the structure in  place to 
cope with further growth in usage. Equally, a relatively 
poor endowment in  physical infrastructure has not 
prevented certain peripheral regions. notably in Ire-
land, from achieving high rates of economic growth. 
though growth has usually been accompanied by in-
creased  investment  to  improve  provision  (which 
raises an important question about whether such in-
vestment should precede or follow economic devel-
opment). 
A key issue concerning the effects on the regional 
economy of investment in infrastructure relates to the 
fact that,  while the costs generally fall on the public 
sector, the benefits accrue to the business sector in 
terms of lower production costs-because of. for ex-
ample. improvements in transport and communica-
tions. easier access to markets and suppliers. better 
support services and a more highly qualified work 
force.  In  some degree, this is inevitable because of 
the  'public good' aspect of much of infrastructure 
which makes it difficult, or costly, to restrict its use to 
those who are willing to pay the full costs of provision. 
Nevertheless. partly because of advances in technol-
ogy which  have  increased  the  possibility  and  re-
duced  the  cost  of  imposing  pricing  mechanisms. 
there is a growing interest in achieving a closer rela-
tionship between the financing of infrastructure provi-
sion  and  its  use  once available.  Pricing  road  use, 
through tolls or metering the time spent in congested 
areas.  or imposing taxes or charges related  to  the 
damage caused to the environment - physical as 
well as natural - by particular kinds of activity or be-
haviour are examples. In addition, there are increas-
ing  attempts  to  involve  the  business  sector  in 
financing infrastructure investment and in operating 
the facilities once constructed in a number of Member 
States. 
Regional endowment 
of transport infrastructure 
As demonstrated in the Commission's First Report on 
Economic  and Social Cohesion  in  1996,  transport plays a key role in efforts to reduce regional dispari-
ties in economic performance across the Union. Such 
disparities are closely linked to geographical location 
and accessibility, in the sense that the more periph-
eral the region and the less accessible, the lower its 
GOP per head is  likely to be. While there are many 
other factors involved. it seems to be the case that, 
even in an age of information technology and signifi-
cant advances in telecommunications. transport fa-
cHilies  for  both  passengers  and  freight  are  often 
critical for regional competitiveness and prosperity. 
Investment in transport alone. however, will not lead 
to a narrowing of regional development disparities or. 
indeed,  necessarily  contribute  significantly  to  re-
gional growth. For this to be the case. complementary 
action needs to  be  taken  to  ensure  that  disadvan-
taged regions are in a position to profit from the op-
portunities created by improvements in transport. In 
practice.  the  evidence  suggests  that  carefully-
managed  investment in  transport tends  to  have a 
beneficial  long-term  effect on  business  investment 
and  economic  development  in  regions.  although 
there are wide variations in  the extent to which this 
happens.
1 
Transport. moreover. cannot be considered in isola-
tion  of  regional  needs.  It  is  not  sufficient merely to 
equalise endowment across the Un1on  1n  some Sim-
ple  sense.  More  geographically  remote  and  less 
densely populated regions are likely to need greater 
provision in  terms of  roads or  railways  per head of 
population than  more central,  more  densely popu-
lated ones. In addition. areas on the extreme periph-
ery  of  the  Union.  especially  islands.  will  tend  to 
require  more  port  and  airport  facilities  than  else-
where.  Equally,  in  the  more  congested  central  re-
gions of Europe, the combination of transit and local 
traffic may necessitate a higher than average level of 
provision relative to  both area  and  population.  The 
problem  is  to  determine  the  degree  of  under-
provision of infrastructure in the light of these kinds of 
variation in need. 
A further consideration is that. unlike most other types 
of infrastructure, transport systems can yield signifi-
cant benefits to people and businesses who are not 
resident in  the  region where  they are  located. The 
costs, however, to the environment as well as to the 
national or regional budget, tend to fall on local resi-
dents. This makes for difficulty in deciding the reme-
2.5  Infrastructure and human capital 
dial action to be taken once a problem or deficiency 
in the system has been identified. 
Roads 
Most of both passenger and freight traffic in the Union 
goes by road.  In  1996, nearly 75% of freight move-
ments (measured in terms of tonne-kilometres) and 
more than 85% of passenger movements (measured 
in passenger-kilometres) were made by road. In the 
case of freight, there has been a steady increase in 
the  importance of road transport oyer the years.  In 
1970, for example, less than 50% of total goods trans-
port was by road.  In the case of passengers, roads 
were already the major means of travel in  1970. The 
importance of the motor car, however. has risen ap-
preciably while that of buses has declined-from ac-
counting for  12% of passenger transport in  1970 to 
just 8% now.2 
A good road system is not only beneficial in  itself 
but is also important to ensure the effective use of 
other  forms  of  transport.  particularly air  and sea 
ports 
The less developed and generally peripheral parts of 
the Un1on tend to have a less extensive road network 
than otner parts. In terms of a basic composite indica-
tor wh1Ch g1ves equal weight to surface area and pop-
ulation.  the  road network in  Belg1um is over 3 times 
more extensive than  the  EU  average (according to 
data for  1994), while in France, the Netherlands, Lux-
embourg and Denmark. it is over  1  Y2  times more ex-
tensive (Graph 16). By contrast. the network is much 
less extensive in most of the less developed parts, un-
der 50% of the average in Spain and Greece and only 
around 75% of the average in Portugal. The main ex-
ception to  this  tendency is  Ireland.  where the  road 
network IS twice as extensive as in the EU generally, 
given 1ts  land area and population. which in part re-
flects  the  relatively  scattered  distribution  of  settle-
ments. 
Most of the roads in Ireland, however, are of relatively 
low  standard,  as  is  revealed  by  the  indicator  for 
motorways, which is the most commonly used mea-
sure  of  road  standards  and  carrying  capacity.  In 
terms of length of motorway, again weighted by land 
area and population, only the UK, Sweden and Fin-
land of the Northern Member States have a less ex-
tensive  network than  the  EU  average,  while  in  the 
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Benelux countries it is 2% times more extensive than 
average  (Graph 17). In Greece and Ireland, in stark 
contrast, it is less than 20% of the average and in Por-
tugal, only around 50%. In Spain, on the other hand, 
there are more motorways than the EU average given 
its size and population. 
The overall extent of the road network, relative to area 
and population, does not differ significantly between 
regions within Member States. Motorways, however, 
tend to be concentrated in the more central areas with 
higher levels of economic activity.  In  France,  there 
are significantly fewer kilometres of motorway in the 
West  and  South-West  than  over  the  country  as  a 
whole (some 30-40% less). Similarly, in Sweden and 
Finland, where the overall provision is well below the 
Union average,  it  is  well  above this average in  the 
Stockholm region (172% of average) and in Uusimaa, 
where  Helsinki  is  situated  (122%),  whereas  in  no 
Northern region does the figure exceed 20% of the 
average. 
In the less developed regions, the length of motorway 
in most of the new Lander in Eastern Germany is only 
around 65% of the EU average and well below the fig-
ure for  Germany as  a whole (over  1  Yz  times  higher 
than average). The same is true in the North-West of 
Spam. Southern Italy and Northern Portugal. while in 
Greece. motorways are almost entirely concentrated 
around Athens and there  are none at  all  in  several 
Northern regions. 
There  is  no  harmonised  measure available for  the 
quality of the road network across the Union or the ex-
tent of congestion at peak times. 
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For rail transport, there is less variation in the extent of 
provision than for roads, though the differences be-
tween Member States and regions remain significant. 
Moreover, the spatial pattern of variation is similar to 
that for roads.  The network is  more extensive than 
elsewhere.  relative to land area and population,  in 
Luxembourg,  Germany,  Sweden,  Finland,  Belgium 
and Austria, where it is 1  Y2 times or more the EU aver-
age. As for roads, the network is much less extensive 
than in other parts of the Union in Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, in all of which it is around 60% or less of the 
EU average, while in Ireland, it is only slightly below 
the average (Graph 18). 
Unlike in the case of roads, the length of railway varies 
widely between regions in the same country. In gen-
eral, the network is most qxtensive in large urban ar-
eas, such as the Brussels-Capital region in Belgium 
(where  it  is  8  times  the  EU  average),  Vienna  (4% 
times), Berlin (over 3% times) and lie de France (over 
1  Y2  times). On the other hand,  it  is also extensive in 
many remote and sparsely-populated regions, such 
as in the North of Sweden, where figures range from 
2Y2  times the EU  average in  Norra Mellansverige to 
4Y2 times in Oevre Norrland, or in Finland. 
This is not the case, however, in the Southern,  less-
developed Member States, where in a number of re-
gions. the length of the rail network is significantly less 
than the average for the country as a whole, which. in 
turn, is well below the Union average. In the North of 
Portugal  and  Asturias  in  Spain,  the  figure  is  only 
around 45% of the EU average and, more extremely, 
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E-ll.,._ over half the regions in Greece have no rail network at 
all. 
By contrast. in all the new L~nder in the East of Ger-
many. the extent of the rail network exceeds that in the 
rest of the country and. in each case, is over twice the 
EU average. 
There are two indicators of the quality of the rail net-
work which are available for all  EU  Member States. 
though not tor regions-the proportion of the network 
which is  double track and proportion of lines which 
are electrified. Double track rail lines obviously allow 
more traffic and are likely to reduce journey times as 
well as cut down accidents, while electrification tends 
to increase speed and give a better image of rail as a 
mode of transport. 
In the case of double track. there is considerable vari-
ation between the central parts of the Union and the 
.periphery. though for a number of different reasons. 
In  Belgium.  the  Netherlands and the  UK.  between 
65% and 75% of the network is double track. signifi-
cantly more than anywhere else in the Union. while in 
the four Cohesion countries. it is just over 25% in Ire-
land and Spain. around 15% in Portugal and only 10% 
in Greece (Graph 19). In all four countries. the figures 
are less than in other Member States. with the excep-
tiOn of Sweden and Finland, where only around 10% 
of  rail  lines  are  double track  because  of  the  very 
sparsely populated nature of most of their land areas. 
A broadly similar pattern emerges as regards electri-
fication. though with a few differences. While the pro-
portion  of  rail  lines which  are  electrified  is  high  in 
Belgium {70%) and the Netherlands (72%}, it is well 
below the level in most other Member States in the UK 
(30%) (Graph 20). In the Cohesion countries, only in 
Spa1n  is  the  extent of  electrification. comparable to 
that in most other parts of the Union. while in Portugal. 
under 20% of lines are electrified. in Ireland. virtually 
none and in Greece none at all. 
Energy 
Economic growth and development depend in large 
measure on the availability of reliable sources of en-
ergy at reasonable cost. At the same time. the rela-
tionship  between  growth  and  the  consumption  of 
energy tends to change over time. reflecting changes 
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in the pattern of consumer demand, the structure of 
production  and  the  pressure  for  energy  saving, 
which, in turn, are conditioned by political, social and 
cultural factors as well as by technical progress, the 
fiscal system and the extent of concern for the envi-
ronment. 
In the EU,  the less favoured regions still for the most 
part show the most unfavourable situation as regards 
energy. In general, they have a higher energy inten-
sity  (energy  consumption  per  unit  of  GOP)  and 
greater dependence on imported sources of energy 
than other parts of the Union. This highlights the need 
to develop energy infrastructure, reducing the effects 
of isolation and dependency  on one source or supply. 
Other measures to boost competition also have a part 
to play by reducing energy costs, which are a major 
input to industry and therefore a key determinant of 
price competitiveness. 
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At the same,  because of their relatively low level of 
GOP per head, the less favoured regions tend to con-
sume less energy in absolute terms and contribute 
less to toxic emissions, despite a high dependence of 
electricity generation on fossil fuels. Nevertheless, if 
the aim of policy is to support their convergence to a 
comparable level of GOP per head as in the rest of the 
Union. it also has to try to ensure that their energy in-
tensity is significantly reduced as this occurs. 
Energy consumption  relative  to GOP  in  Greece and 
Portugal, therefore, is over 40% higher than the EU av-
erage (Graph 21 ).  In Spain and Ireland, on the other 
hand, it is below average. Conversely, energy intensity 
is well above average in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Luxembourg. Greece and Portugal are also relatively 
dependent on imports of energy, though this is equally 
true of Spain and Ireland. In each case, around 65% or 
more of total energy consumed is imported and almost 
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Member States, imports account for under 60% of the 
energy consumed and for Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands,. under 40%, while the UK is still a net ex-
porter of energy. For Luxembourg, Italy and Belgium, 
however, 80% or more of the energy used comes from 
abroad. 
The four Cohesion countries also consume less energy 
per nead of population than other Member States, as 
noted above, partly reflecting their relatively low level of 
GOP per head. In Portugal and Greece, consumption 
per inhabitant amounts to only just over 50% of the EU 
average, in Spain, to around 70% and in Ireland, just 
over 80%, in each case, less than in any other Member 
State apart from Italy (Graph 23). By contrast, Sweden 
and Finland, in part because of the harsh climate, con-
sume 1  Y2 times more than the EU average and Luxem-
bourg, well over twice more. 
Lower energy consumption in the Cohesion countries 
is  reflected  in  lower levels of caroon dioxide (C02) 
emissions than elsewhere (Graph 24), though not to 
the extent implied by their relative level of energy use 
because of the high degree of dependence on fossil 
fuels (oil, gas and coal)- or thermal sources- for 
electricity generation. 
Renewable sources of energy can assist in the devel-
opment of the less favoured regions, contributing to a 
sound energy balance and reducing dependence on 
one  source.  The  dispersed  nature  of  renewables 
means that they lend themselves to decentralisation; 
islands and remote areas are among the most obvi-
ous beneficiaries of the use of renewable energy. The 
high employment content of renewable sources is an 
additional benefit in less favoured regions. 
Telecommunications 
Telecommunications are important, both in providing 
direct support  for  regional  economic  development 
and  as  a complement  to  systems  of  transport.  In-
deed, while even the most highly developed transport 
system can alleviate the effect of distance between 
regions only to a limited extent, modern telecommuni-
cation systems are capable of eliminating distance 
altogether as  an obstacle to  the  development of  a 
wide range of economic activities, especially in more 
advanced, and rapidly-growing, services. 
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In  effect,  recent advances  in  informatics and  tele-
communications have led to the introduction of en-
tirely.  new  services,  such  as  on-line  computer 
support, tela-banking and the broad range of com-
mercial  activities  generated  by  the  internet.  Elec-
tronic  commerce  presents  enormous  opportunities 
for business in Europe, particularly SMEs, and a pro-
active  approach  at  the  regional  level  could  boost 
growth  and  employment.  The  Commission  has  re-
cently presented a proposal for a directive on elec-
tronic commerce in the internal market. This proposal 
aims to establish a clear framework, helping consum-
ers and operators to reap the full benefits of the infor-
mation society. 
The  physical location of  the  providers of  such  ser-
vices is dependent principally on the availability of an 
adequate and competitive telecommunications infra-
structure, in combination with the necessary skills in 
the work force, rather than on physical closeness to 
the market. Even in the case of manufacturing, how-
ever, where distance is still an issue, efficient modern 
telephone, fax·and data transmission systems are es-
sential to competitiveness. 
In these circumstances. an effective and competitive 
telecommunication system is a key factor in regional 
economic development. At the same time,  telecom-
munications  cannot  substitute  entirely  for  physical 
contact.  Indeed,  improvements  in  telecommunica-
tion links are likely to stimulate increased demand for 
transport,  both directly and  indirectly, through  their 
boost to  economic development. Accordingly, sys-
tems  of  transport  and  telecommunications  can  be 
expected to develop in parallel rather than as alterna-
tives to each other. 
The basic indicator of infrastructure in relation to tele-
communications  is  the  number  of  telephone  lines 
available, white the proportion of lines connected to 
digital exchanges gives  a reasonable  indication of 
the quality of the service. Indeed, only digital connec-
tions allow access to the advanced networks which 
are an essential element of modern data transmission 
systems.  In  the  1990s,  substantial  advances  have 
been  made  in  modernising  the  telecommunication 
networks across the Union, notably in the extension of 
digital networks, but gaps remain,  especially in the 
less developed regions. 
Despite rapid growth in telephone networks, there are 
still  significant  variations  between  Member  States 
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and regions (Graph 25). In most of the more devel-
oped  Member  States.  there  are  between  50  and 
slightly over 60 main lines per 100 inhabitants, with 
Sweden having the highest network density, with 63 
lines per 100 inhabitants. Belgium and Austria are ex-
ceptions. with just over 45 lines per 100 inhabitants. 
On the other hand, three of the four Cohesion coun-
tries, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, have under 40 lines 
per 100 habitants, while Greece has 52. 
There  is  comparatively  little  variation  between  re-
gions in the number of lines in relation to population 
within Member States. The main exception is the new 
Lander in Eastern Germany where. with the exception 
of Berlin, no region has more than 40 lines per 100 in-
habitants, as compared to a national average of 53 
lines. An interesting feature is that in a number of re-
gions where tourism is important, such as the Algarve 
in Portugal, there is a relatively high number of lines 
relative to resident population, reflecting the lines in-
stalled in hotels and other tourist facilities. The same 
is the case in the Nordic countries. where a relatively 
large number of lines in sparsely populated regions is 
a  reflection  of  the  significant  number  of  holiday 
homes. 
D1gital systems are now the norm across most of the 
EU. reflecting the generally high level of Investment in 
the modernisation of telecommunicatiOn networks m 
recent years.  By  1996. in 6 Member States (France. 
Luxembourg. Netherlands, Finland Sweden and the 
UK),  between  90%  and  100%  of  lines  were  con-
nected to digital exchanges, and in all the other more 
developed  countries,  the  figure  was  over  70%.  In 
contrast to  the  overall  number of  lines.  the  rate  of 
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digitalisation was not much lower in the four Cohesion 
countries, with a figure of 83% in Ireland, 79% in Por-
tugal and 67% in Spain. Only in Greece, where the fig-
ure was only 43%, was the rate substantially less than 
elsewhere in the Union. 
In recent years, with the widespread liberalisation and 
privatisation  ot telephone  networks,  there  has  been 
concern that the less developed and more remote re-
gions might be left behind in terms of access to modern 
telecommunication systems. In general, however, the 
regional data on digitalisation does not seem to sup-
port this fear. In most Member States, the proportion of 
lines  connected  to  digital exchanges does not  vary 
much between regions, suggesting that networks have 
been modernised across countries as a whole without 
making any regional distinction. 
Environmental facilities 
and water supply 
Enwonmental infrastructure - considered  here  in 
terms of the capacity to supply adequate amounts of 
clean water and to dispose of domestic and industrial 
waste - is  both a contributor to economic activity 
and a source of protection against ecological dam-
age as development takes place. It is, therefore, a key 
factor 1n  ensuring the sustainability of growth. 
Problems of environmental damage are widespread 
throughout the  Union.  In  the case of contaminated 
land and  urban  dereliction.  in  particular,  problems 
tend to be greater in developed areas in industrial de-
cline than in less developed regions. 
The physical requirement for new environmental in-
frastructure is difficult to estimate. Continuing change 
in  environmental policy and standards,  uncertainty 
over future economic growth and changes in technol-
ogy complicate the picture, while, at the same time, 
there is a serious lack of data on existing facilities. In 
these  circumstances,  it  is  only possible  to  give  a 
broad indication of the scale of differences in endow-
ment across  the EU,  and generally only at national 
rather than regional level. Water resources 
Water is perhaps the most important natural resource 
for agriculture and households and one of the most im-
portant for many industries. Proper management of the 
environment requires that the process of supplying wa-
ter does not interfere unduly with the ecosystem. The 
availability of water depends on geographical location, 
geology and climate,  while the  adequacy of  a given 
supply can only be assessed in relation to the pattern of 
economic development and the size and spatial distri-
bution of the population. Many poorer regions in South-
ern  Europe  have  a shortage  of  water  and  seasonal 
fluctuations in  both supply and demand as well as  a 
greater  possibility of contamination of  reserves  than 
elsewhere in the Union.  Such 'water stress', however, 
can also occur in Northern parts of the Union where an 
apparently adequate supply can be stretched by high 
population density and/or high industrial and agricul-
tural consumption. 
An  indication of water stress is given by total renew-
able fresh water resources per inhabitant 1n relation to 
the EU  average (Graph 26).  The  situation in  th1s  re-
gard varies  widely across  the  Union.  with  Sweden 
and Finland  having  up to  six  t1mes  as  much water 
available as the EU average. while 7 Member States 
(Belgium,  Denmark.  Germany.  Spain.  France.  Italy 
and the UK) have below average supply 
In the Northern areas. the problem takes the form of 
high population density combined with a high level of 
industrial development. and in the South. of low rain-
fall,  coupled  with  high  evaporation  and  high  con-
sumption  by agriculture (for irrigation).  In  Portugal 
26  Renewable fre1h water reserves 
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and Greece,  however,  water is  relatively abundant 
despite  low  rainfall  because of substantial  inflows 
from rivers which have their source in neighbouring 
countries, which is  also the case in  Austria.  Almost 
half of the water supply in Portugal, for example, co-
mes from rivers originating in Spain. 
Water distribution infrastructure 
The existence of a given amount of water in relation to 
population gives only a first indication of the availabil-
ity of supply. To be effective, it has to  be combined 
with an adequate system of water distribution, some-
thing which, even in the 1990s, does not apply in all 
Member  States.  While  virtually  all  households  are 
connected to the public water supply in Germany and 
Denmark. in Finland and Austria, the proportion falls 
to around 85% and in Ireland to only 72%,  though in 
some Member States. the figure may reflect the exis-
tence of significant private water provision, notably in 
rural areas, rather than the absence of piped supply 
as such. 
Waste water 
There 1s an even greater range of variation in connec-
tion  to  waste  water  treatment  systems.  At  one  ex-
treme  wtually  every  household  is  connected  in 
Denmark and over  85"/o  in  Germany,  Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. At the other ex-
treme.  only 34 "'o  of  households in  Greece have ac-
cess to waste water treatment facilities, while in Spain 
and Ireland. the figure is below 50"/o (Graph 27). 
27  Population connected to waste water 
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Municipal waste 
Since most people in the Union live in urban areas, the 
level of municipal waste generated in relation to popu-
lation is an important indicator of the impact of human 
activity on the environment. In general, this is related to 
levels of income and it is, therefore, to be expected that 
the four Cohesion countries generate lower amounts of 
municipal waste than  countries with higher levels of 
GOP per head. The annual  level of municipal waste 
generated  amounts  to  310  kilograms  per  head  in 
Greece, around 370 kilograms per head in  Portugal 
and Spain and nearly 440 in Ireland. Apart from the lat-
ter, this is lower than in all other Member States. except 
for Germany, the figures ranging from around 400 kilo-
grams per head in Finland to nearly 600 in the Nether-
lands and over 600 in the UK (Graph 28). 
Municipal waste  can be managed by incineration. 
composting, recycling or landfill. Landfill is the most 
common  and  least expensive method of  disposal, 
and is used in most Cohesion countries. the propor-
tion  varying from 85% in  Spain to 100% in  Ireland. 
However. landfill is also a significant method of waste 
management in most other Member States. notably It-
aly (86%). Finland (77%) and the UK (70%) (Graph 
28)  The other principal method of disposal is inciner-
ation. which itself c"n have damaging effects on the 
enwonment.  The  highest proportion  of  waste  dis-
posed of in  this way is  in  Luxembourg (71 %),  Den-
mark (63%) and Belgium (49%) (Graph 28). 
Recycling is preferable to landfill and incineration, yet 
the scale of the former varies considerably between 
Member States. There is therefore a role for regional 
28  Municipal wute 1enerated and means of 
diapoaal 
700  ,.....--------------,~----, 
~~-------~~~~~--~  ,.....r-
~  1------ir- !":;  .. ".  ,--,! 
r- r  :  :··1-tiH.ltl~---,J--~----+-:+t 
200 
100 
0  0 
Q ((,;to  '!)  '  ~  t!t  "'  ,..  ((,  ~"'  ..;:,+- ((,"'  q  ((, ~"'  ~""...;:,~~ 
IRL,  I,  L. A: 11185;  I,  DK.  1!, NL,  fl,  FIN. S: lltc;  ((;  ((; 
0, fl: IIU;I!I.: r•:IJIC: 11110  -:lf_.M 
130 
waste management policies in  promoting recycling 
over the coming years. 
Regional differences in 
human capital endowment 
As noted above, the competitiveness of regions de-
pends not only on physical infrastructure endowment 
but also, to an increasing extent. on the skills of the re-
gional work force. Effective educational and training 
systems  are,  therefore,  important  in  strengthening 
comparative advantage. Despite efforts made over 
recent years, however. disparities are still significant. 
A priority across the EU  is  to adjust educational and 
training systems to the  profound changes which are 
taking place. The need is •') respond to technological 
advances. which are making existing skills redundant. 
and to demographic trends,  which are  reducing the 
number  of young people entering the labour market. 
Disparities in educational participation 
rates 
Basic education is essential to improving the capabil-
ities of the future work force across the Union. It gives 
young people a better chance of finding their first job 
and is essential preparation for further education and 
vocational training. 
In all Member States, all children remain in compulsory 
education up to the age of 15 at least. while the number 
29  Participation in  education of 15-18 year olda, 
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staying on to undertake further education or vocational 
training courses has risen significantly in recent years. 
In 5 of the more developed countries in the Union, over 
90% of 15 to 18 year olds were in education in  1996, 
while in a sixth, it was just under 90%.  In three others 
(the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark), however, it 
was only just over 80%, similar to the proportion in three 
of the four Cohesion countries - Ireland being the ex-
ception with a figure of 88%. In the UK (78%) and Italy 
(79%), the proportion was lower than in any of the Co-
hesion countries (Graph 29). 
There are larger differences in respect of further edu-
cation, though these are not wholly in line with relative 
levels of GDP per head. While in a number of the most 
developed Member States, the proportion of 19 to 22 
year olds in education and training was ar'Jund 60% 
or more in  1996, in Austria, the proportion was only 
40%, in Sweden, 34% and in the UK, 31% (Graph 33). 
In Spain. by contrast, the figure was 55%, in Portugal. 
50% and  in  Greece,  44%,  all  higher than  in  these 
three  countries,  as  it was  in  Ireland (  41%  ).  though 
only slightly so. 
Of those remaining in education beyond compulsory 
schooling. however. a higher proportion tends to un-
dertake vocational courses - which arguably pro-
vide some young people with a more pract1cal and 
skills-based preparation for the current demands of 
the labour market- in the more developed Member 
States than in the Cohesion countries. where a more 
traditional  approach has  been  favoured.  Wh1le  the 
relative number of young people aged 15 to 19 in vo-
cational education and training ranged from just over 
20% in Spain and Greece in  1993-94 to  17% in  Ire-
land and just 12% in Portugal. in all of the other Mem-
ber  States.  except  Denmark  (21%)  and  Finland 
(24%),  the  proportion  was  over  25%  and  40%  or 
above in Germany (40%), Belgium (45%) and Austria 
(55%) (Graph 30). 
Disparities in educational attainment 
The educational attainment of working-age popula-
tion is a key indicator of the availability of skilled la-
bour in any region and significant disparities still exist 
in the average attainment level across the Union.  In 
the least developed Member States,. a large propor-
tion  of  the  population aged 25  to  59  (ie  excluding 
those under 25, many of whom will not yet have com-
pleted their education) have no educational qualifies-
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tions beyond compulsory schooling-three-quarters 
in Portugal, two-thirds in Spain, over half in Greece 
(52%) and just under half in Ireland (48%) (Graph 34). 
This is more in each case than in the rest the Union, 
with the exception of Italy (60%)  and luxembourg 
(53%), though in the UK (47%}, the proportion is only 
marginally lower than  in  Ireland.  In  other Member 
States, the proportion is 40% or less and under 30% in 
the three Nordic countries, Germany and Austria. 
The  disparities,  however,  are  gradually  being  re-
duced. For those aged 25 to 34, who completed their 
education within the past 15 years or so,  the propor-
tion who have not progressed beyond basic school-
ing falls to 66% in Portugal, half in Spain, and only just 
over a third in Greece and just under a third in Ireland, 
in both cases less than in the UK as well as in Italy and 
Luxembourg (Graph 35). At the same time, the pro-
portion of people in this age group with no qualifica-
tions beyond basic schooling is also much lower in 
most other Member States - under 20% in the three 
Nordic  countries.  Nevertheless,  as  young  people 
who are completing their education at the  present 
time join the work force, the gap should narrow fur-
ther. 
Disparities in access 
to continuous training 
The lack of reliable data across the Union on trainmg 
once  people  have  completed  their  education and 
joined the work force makes it impossible to assess 
satisfactorily the difference in provision between dif· 
ferent parts of the EU. Nevertheless. a recent survey 
of enterprises with 10 or more employees (conducted 
in all Member States apart from Austria, Finland and 
Sweden), found that fewer of them provide training to 
their workers in Portugal, Greece and Spain (under 
30% in the last and under 20% in the first two) than in 
other Member States, except for Italy. In  Ireland, on 
the  other  hand,  the  proportion  (almost  80%)  was 
above average (Graph 31 ). There remains, however, 
a question mark over the degree of comparability of 
these findings. 
The same applies, and to even greater extent, to the 
data available on the relative number of people in em-
ployment aged 30 and over who receive training. Ac-
cording to the 1996 Union Labour Force Survey, only 
around 2% or fewer of those surveyed in Greece. Por-
tugal and Spain had undertaken any training during the 
131 2.5  Infrastructure and human capital 
30  Participation in  vocational education and 
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0 preceding four weeks, less than in any other Member 
State apan from France, while in Ireland, the figure was 
over 5%, more than in 5 countries with higher GOP per 
head (Graph 32). While these figures are almost cer-
tainly not directly comparable between countries, pri-
marily because of the  different definitions of training 
adopted (in France and Portugal, they relate only to for-
mal training courses), they suggest that access to con-
tinuous training may well be less than elsewhere in the 
EU in at least three of the Cohesion countries. 
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[ 1]  London School of Economics (  1997), The socio-economic impact of p~ts  financed by the Cohesion Fund. 
[2j  European Commission. OG VII, Transport in Figures. 
133 2.6  Institutions and social capital 
Growth and development depend not just on tangible 
-or  ··hard'-factors such as infrastructure and busi-
ness investment,  but also on  more  intangible - or 
'soft'-factors, especially the underlying institutional 
structure. Factors such as social capital and the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of public administration are 
increasingly recognised as key features contributing 
to  regional  development.  This  section  highlights 
some of the issues surrounding such factors. 
The first half of the section surveys the role of institu-
tions in regional development. focusing. in particular. 
on social capital and public administration. The sec-
ond half draws on the results of evaluations and on a 
study
1 (including interviews with those 1nvolved in six 
selected Member States:  Germany.  Spam.  Ireland. 
Portugal, Finland and the UK) assessing the contribu-
tion which the delivery system for the Structural Funds 
has made to institutional development in the regions. 
The role of institutions 
in regional development 
The institutional structure can broadly be defined as 
'the rules of the game in a society or.  more formally, 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.  In  consequence.  they  structure  incen-
tives in human exchange. whether political, social or 
economic'.2 It, therefore, incorporates both the 'insti-
tutions', such as businesses. trade unions and gov-
ernment, which are the decision-making units within 
an  economy and the 'institutional' framework within 
which they make their decisions. The latter includes 
aspects such as the prevailing culture, historical tra-
dition, social norms of behaviour and the legal and fis-
cal systems which have been established. 
Traditionally, economic analysis tended to neglect the 
role of such institutions, except insofar as they consti-
tuted barriers to effective competition. More recently, 
the focus has been broadened, with the discovery that 
many of the economic tools used to describe the func-
tioning of markets can also be appfied to explaining the 
working  of institutions.  The  rapidlY  growing literature 
highlights the fact that institutions are fundamental to 
the behaviour of economies. that their interaction with 
the market is rich and complex and that there are both 
positive and negative effects. 
Indeed m modern capitalist economies it is impossi-
ble to a'sentangle the  two.  Markets cannot function 
effect1vely without suitable institutions. as exemplified 
by  the  behaviour of the Russian economy since the 
former  regime  came  to  end,  while  the  principles 
wh1ch gUide action in the market (such as pricing and 
compet1t1on) are increasingly being applied to the op-
eratiOn of Institutions. Obvious examples are: 
•  market functioning is virtually impossible without 
secure property rights, backed up by legislation 
and social norms and, in their absence, price in-
centives. which are a fundamental part of market 
forces. are effectively blunted. The establishment 
of  enforceable property rights has been one of 
the greatest challenges in the transition of Central 
and  Eastern  European economies.  In  the  Euro-
pean Union, it is apparent that  ~conomic devel-
opment  is  obstructed where  social  norms  and 
legal sanctions are weak in protecting property, 
such  as  in  severely  deprived  urban  areas  or 
where there is organised crime: 
•  price incentives, and therefore the efficient func-
tioning of the market, are also dependent on a se-
cure  and  stable  currency,  which,  in  turn,  is 
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dependent on  an  appropriate  institutional  and 
policy framework: 
•  within firms, decision-making is increasingly be-
ing  decentralised,  with  local  managers  being 
judged by their performance in the market, while 
at the same time there is growing emphasis on 
cooperation and the formation of links between 
companies,  especially  between  suppliers  and 
customers, in areas where there is a common in-
terest: 
•  in the labour market, as noted earlier in the Re-
port,  the  structure  of  households  and  social 
norms play a key role in determining the partici-
pation of women, while availability of jobs (partic-
ularly part-time and in services) and pay levels, in 
turn.  influence household behaviour and social 
attitudes. 
The efficiency of the institutional structure of a re-
gion is. therefore, increasingly considered to be a 
significant factor in regional development. exercis-
ing an influence at least equal to that of more tradi-
tional, tangible factors such as infrastructure.  3 The 
following  diagram  summarises  the  influence  of 
some key institutions on the regiona: economy: 
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Different institutional  levels are distinguished. First, 
there are the institutional arrangements within firms 
(intra-firm),  which,  combined  with  those  between 
firms,  are  the  main  direct influences on  economic 
growth and the regional economy. In addition, there 
are two indirect influences: the regional institutional 
setting, consisting of the public administration, and 
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'social capital', comprising the habits, customs and 
local culture. and the national and EU institutional and 
policy framework. 
Although the internal characteristics of firms which 
determine whether they are successful or unsuccess-
ful is an interesting theme for analysis, the focus here 
is on the twin aspects of social capital and public ad-
ministration which affect all firms in a region. 
Social capital and networks 
Social capital can be defined as 'features of  social or-
ganisation, such as trust, norms and  networks, that can 
improve  the  efficiency of society by facilitating  co-
ordinated actions. '5  Such  capital  improves  the  func-
tioning of both markets and institutions by reducing the 
effort expended in contract::'lg, monitoring and enforc-
ing the terms of transactions. It creates the possibility of 
deeper economic relationships and a longer-term per-
spective and helps build trust in businesses on the part 
of both customers and trading partners which is  be-
coming a key determinant of competitiveness. Social 
capital can  also foster  cooperation  between  diverse 
economic actors. both public and private. where this 
would otherwise be difficult. 
Social capital arises from the establishment and op-
eration of networks, from social interaction and eco-
nomic relationships. Networks consist. in general, of 
relationships  between  broad  equals  and  often  in-
clude local authorities, trade unions and voluntary as-
sociations as well as businesses. 
Networks between businesses are particularly impor-
tant for  regional development. These can be either 
vertical or horizontal (and may even be both) and the 
relations  between  the  firms  involved  tend  to  ehtail 
both institutional aspects (ie the relationship is usually 
long-term) and market aspects (ie participants can 
opt  out if they wish). Networks potentially combine the 
best of both worlds: economies of scale usually asso-
ciated with large firms and the dynamism and flexibil-
ity  characterising  firms  competing  under  market 
conditions.  They  can  be particularly  important  for 
small  businesses  which  are  not  large  enough  by 
themselves to realise economies of scale. 
A major aspect of networks is that they facilitate the 
diffusion of know-how and innovation. The generation 
and acquisition of knowledge is typically subject to significant economies of scale and networks enable 
firms to tap into the knowledge and know-how accu-
mulated  by all  those  involved.  Equally  importantly, 
networks often generate new knowledge, or innova-
tions. as in Silicon valley in the US, for example, and in 
the so-called 'third Italy'. which small firms would not 
be able to do acting alone. 
The informal nature of networks. however, offers wide 
scope for opportunistic behaviour, especially where 
non-patentable knowledge {often as important as, or 
more important than.  patentable knowledge) is con-
cerned. Networks are, therefore, dependent on high 
standards of business conduct and  high  levels  of 
trust, which are major elements of social capital. ·The 
lack of  social capital helps to explain one of  the EU's 
key problems, namely its poor record of converting 
scientific and technical knowledge into commercially 
successful products and  services. that is the inability 
to  transfer  technology from  laboratory to  industry, 
from one company to another and from region to re-
gion.  At bottom.  this  is  not so  much a  technology 
problem as a networking problem'.6 
A final point to note is that. although these institutions 
t)ave beneficial effects. they can gradually become 
inflexible ('institutional sclerosis'l) and end up as ob-
stacles to change. T  oday's success can become to-
morrow's failure and 'ties that bind become ties that 
blind. '8 ft is therefore imperative periodically to reform 
institutions  and/or  to  expose  them  to  outside  influ-
ence  According to  some commentators.  European 
integration is a key force in this.  since it exposes re-
gions to institutional models and competition from all 
over the Union. 
The efficiency and effectiveness of public 
administration 
There have been substantial changes in  the philoso-
phy of public sector organisation in  many Member 
States in recent years. There are many elements in-
volved, but two key aspects are of particular interest 
in this context. One is performance management, in-
cluding an emphasis on internal efficiency and trans-
parent and accurate measurement of performance, 
and the systematic incorporation of the  results  into 
policy. The other is both the inclusion of wider public 
sector representation and the involvement of the pri-
vate sector in the policy-making process. 
2.6  Institutions and social capital 
The concept of performance management goes be-
yond measurement, which in itself is nothing new tor 
the public sector (indeed, governments of centrally-
planned economies were  particularly keen  on this, 
with less than satisfactory results). In the first place. 
the measurement involved is not just in terms of inputs 
or intermediate outputs, but entails a more sophisti-
cated economic evaluation of the  effects of policy, 
and independent evaluators from the private sector 
are,  increasingly, being brought in to advise on  the 
precise method to be applied and the aspects which 
should be included. 
Secondly,  evaluation  is  combined  with  internal 
decentralisation. A policy cycle is established within 
which the top level of management sets targets and 
then  decentralised  units take  responsibility for  the 
day-to-day management of policy. Finally, the results 
-often from various different managing units - are 
evaluated  and  policy  improved  accordingly.  The 
focus  is  more on  the  results  obtained than  on  the 
measures used to achieve them, allowing individual 
units  flexibility  to  adapt to  specific circumstances 
and. importantly, the freedom to innovate.  In private 
secto1  terms,  this  represents  a  move  away  from 
detailed micro-management and towards  manage-
ment by results. 
This has numerous implications. including the freeing 
of central management to  concentrate on  strategic 
planning,  leaving the  details to decentral1sed units 
which have a better understanding of them and are. 
therefore, best placed to deal with them. It also gives 
rise to the concept of the 'learning organisation' with 
systematic improvement of policy from one cycle to 
the  next.  rather than  a simple repetition of  existing 
programmes.  Governments  which  have  embarked 
on  this  process are achieving significant long-term 
improvements in efficiency. 
The key issue here is one common to many institu-
tions: how far an administration can move beyond a 
simple model of hierarchical control to a more decen-
tralised system without losing the ability to coordinate 
activities. This balance is difficult to achieve, but re-
warding in terms of tapping individual expertise and 
creating the conditions for policy innovation. Related 
challenges include those of establishing 'intelligent' 
organisational routines and of building a culture of 
trust and cooperation where employees work for the 
collective  good  rather  than  pursuing  individual 
goals.9 
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The second major change is towards wider partner-
ship. One facet of this is the emergence of the ·multi-
level governance' model, within which different levels 
of government which are formally autonomous work 
together. However, partnership can also include the 
private and voluntary sectors. Different partners can 
potentially bring different strengths and different per-
spectives. More centralised authorities can,  for ex-
ample,  tap  economies  of  scale,  including  the 
knowledge generated by many different kinds of ex-
perience, while local units tend to be closer and more 
sensitive  to local  conditions.  1o In  addition,  private 
firms, which are often exposed to vigorous competi-
tion, tend accordingly to be a source of best practice, 
while the voluntary sector is often best placed to know 
about certain kinds of social need. 
A key feature of such partnerships is that the different 
parties involved are formally autonomous but share 
responsibilities.  The  relationship  between  them  is, 
therefore, one of cooperation and negotiation rather 
than  being a hierarchical one.  Moreover,  since the 
protagonists have different perspectives, it encour-
ages a full and open discussion of objectives which 
potentially increases both transparency and the qual-
ity of planning. although it is also possible tor the sys-
tem  to  become  unwieldy.  In  addition,  such· a 
horizontal network can be ideal for the transmission of 
tacit knowledge and innovation, and the  accumula-
tion of social capital. 
The contribution of 
the Structural Funds 
The  delivery  system  developed  for  the  Structural 
Funds has had a major influence on the institutional 
structure  in  different  regions.  particularly  the  effi-
ciency of public administration. The system is deter-
mined not just by the  basic parameters set  by the 
Structural Funds  and  national  regulations.  but  has 
evolved from the day-to-day interactions between the 
different organisations involved. It entails a multi-level 
system of governance, within which the relationship 
between the different levels is one of partnership and 
negotiation rather than a hierarchical one. In addition. 
it Incorporates features of the new public manage-
ment model, such as private sector involvement and 
the economic evaluation of results.  , 
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The  system  consists  of  two  main  operational  ele-
ments (programming and implementation) and three 
feedback loops (monitoring, evaluation and financial 
control). 
Structure of  the delivery system 
i 
I 
j  ~----------~ 
For each region. a development programme is pro-
posed by the competent Member State authority -
generally  the  national  government,  sometimes  in 
partnership with regional government There are two 
levels of programming: a strategic one, involving the 
definition of objectives, the main development strat-
egy,  the  distribution of financial resources between 
priorities and so on, and a detailed one. involving the 
implementation of the strategy, the sub-programmes 
to be included. the measures to be used and so on. 
The proposal is then negotiated with the Commission. 
which. inter alia. checks the coherence with the Struc-
tural Fund regulations and guidelines. Once the Com-
mission  has  given  formal  approval,  the  plan  is 
adopted as a 'Community Support Framework', or, in 
a more  simplified  form.  as  a 'Single Programming 
Document'. 
The implementation of the programme is a more dif. 
fuse  process.  with  many  actors  participating  and 
partnership being the key note. The monitoring com-
mittee, for example, usually has a very strong local 
flavour. including, or even being dominated by, rep-
resentatives from local and regional authorities. em-
ployers  and  trade  unions  and  voluntary  groups. 
Management of specific programmes may be dele-
gated to some of these groups, individually or work-
ing together in partnership at the sub-regional level. 
The extent of inclusion of local representatives is flexi-
ble and at the discretion of the Member State con-
cerned. It can, therefore, be tailored to comply with traditional  practice,  although  the  Structural  Funds 
procedure has often led to some change in  certain 
aspects of this  practice. For example,  in  Germany 
and  Spain,  the main parties responsible for  imple-
mentation  are  the  strong  regional  authorities.  In 
smaller Member States. national authorities generally 
take the lead, although there is sometimes significant 
participation by  the private sector (  eg in Ireland) or lo-
cal authorities (eg in Portugal).  In  Sweden and the 
UK, many of those involved are active partners, both 
local actors (public _authorities. private business and 
voluntary sector organisations) and central govern-
ment. 
The Commission is also closely involved in much of 
the  implementation.  While,  formally.  the  Member 
State authorities are responsible and the Commission 
is simply one of many participants in the monitoring 
committees.  in  practice,  the  Commission's  advice 
(eg on interpretation of the regulations or on coher-
ence  with  the  programming  documents)  is  often 
sought on detailed issues. 
In  the current programming period, there are three 
main feedback loops: 
•  monitoring determines whether the programme is 
going  according  to  the  agreed  plan  and  as-
sesses physical output; 
•  evaluation  assesses  the  final  impact  of  the 
programmes in social and economic terms and. 
increasingly, considers the effectiveness of the 
delivery mechanism; 
•  financial  control assesses  compliance with  the 
rules for spending the Funds. 
In  principle.  these  feedback  loops  act as  mecha-
nisms for improvement and facilitate the evolution of 
policy. In the current system, however, there is little 
formal institutional link between the feedback loops 
and implementation. Their main effect is,  therefore, 
on  the  climate  in  which  programmes  are  imple-
mented,  and  their  main  influence  is  through  the 
(mostly voluntary) efforts of the officials involved. 
Indeed, the delivery system can be said to be a mix-
ture of management by results and management by 
regulation. Decentralised implementation with quan-
tified  objectives  and  evaluation  is  consistent  with 
management by results, but this co-exists with, and 
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may to some extent be limited by, regulation-based 
management systems in many Member States and 
by regulations set at the EU level. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that the man-
agement styles of the  different bodies involved -
Commission, Member State and regional authorities, 
employers and trade unions and voluntary organisa-
tions- can be very different. .For  example,  in  the 
case of the public sector, the UK management of the 
Structural Funds is largely by results, according to the 
study on the delivery system, while in Germany, Spain 
and Portugal, programme managers are responsible 
solely for complying with the rules and regulations of 
the programme and public funding. Finland and Ire-
land fall somewhere in between. 
The Structural Funds procedure contributes in vari-
ous ways to improving the institutional structure of re-
gions.  One  is  through  mobilising  the  different 
partners and the strengths they bring in terms of both 
knowledge and other resources. Another is through 
the innovation which results naturally from  different 
forms of partnership between the many different ac-
tors involved and the many different instruments they 
have at their disposal. Observers sometimes refer to 
the Structural Funds machinery as a laboratory and 
there is significant potential for institutional and tech-
nical innovation. According to the interviews with par-
ticipants which formed part of the study, the Funds 
have made three specific contributions: 
•  programming, involving clear planning and long-
term stability, which is a feature of the new public 
management literature and a sine qua non of the 
participation of representatives from different lev-
els of government. the private sector and volun-
tary organisations; 
•  evaluation, which is often described as the main 
innovative spin-off from the Structural Funds pro-
cedures and which,  though  it is still in  its early 
days, is both a device to improve effectiveness 
and a precursor to other innovations; if the Funds 
procedures are  a  laboratory.  evaluation  is  the 
measuring instrument. revealing the success or 
failure of different experiments. In addition, evalu-
ation of best practice is starting to spread beyond 
the Structural Funds into national policies; 
•  mobilising  regional  and  private  sector involve-
ment.  Partnership  has  improved  the  effective-
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ness  of  the  Structural  Funds,  by  bringing  in 
additional resources and knowledge, as well as 
by effectively creating public, private and mixed 
networks, which are themselves important for re-
gional development. 
The goal of the Structural Funds is to strengthen the 
productive capacity of regions and, therefore, boost 
growth and employment in weaker regions. The fea-
tures listed above are directly relevant in this regard 
since they make the operation of the Funds more ef-
fective and the achievement of these objectives more 
likely. However, there are also significant indirect ef-
fects. The Funds have created a need for evaluation, 
coordination and the establishment of networks in the 
regions assisted, but these give rise to economies of 
scope,  in  the sense that they are au  applicable for 
other purposes. As  a  result,  there  are spin-off  im-
provements to public and private institutions in there-
gions and countries concerned. 
Programming 
As noted above, clear and detailed programm1ng 1s a 
key  part of the Structural Funds procedures  Three 
benef1ts of this were frequently cited in the Interviews 
conducted in Member States. 
The  first was  stability and certainty to  facilttate  for-
ward planning, which the study found to be univer-
sally welcomed. Operating programmes over a six-
year period provides the target groups as well as the 
relevant administrative authorities with  a compara-
tively stable financial and regulatory framework. Be-
cause of the additionality condition and the need for 
matching funds, this stability also extends to related 
areas of national spending. 
The second was the stimulation of analysts. The for-
mulation of regional development plans forces those 
involved to analyse both the problems and the strate-
gies and instruments for tackling them. In contrast to 
many national measures. the programmes supported 
by the Structural Funds have to be checked system-
atically for their strategic viability. The programm1ng 
documents are published and must. therefore. be po-
litically and economically defensible. so requiring the 
plans to be clear and consistent. Such beneficial ef-
fects were cited in Germany and Portugal, in particu-
lar. 
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In addition. the discussion process allows the differ-
ent participants involved to pool their expertise. Local 
authorities, for example, have access to local knowl-
edge, while the Commission has access to a great 
deal of experience in various parts of the Union, in re-
gions which have both similar and different features. 
Moreover,  the  publication  of  programming  docu-
ments exposes them to  the  scrutiny of outside ex-
perts. 
The third benefit cited was the encouragement of co-
ordination  between departments and sectors.  This 
was felt to be insufficient in all6  of the Member States 
covered, with individual national Ministries tending to 
work independently of each other. in a traditional way. 
The intersectoral nature of the Structural Funds was. 
therefore, initially a challenge but has subsequently 
stimulated coordination and dialogue between other-
wise  separate  Departments.  These  benefits  were 
cited in Portugal, where improved coordination dates 
from the PEDIP programme. and in Finland, in partic-
ular. 
Evaluation 
Evaluation  is  the  natural  complement  to  program-
ming; while the latter clarifies the strategy, the former 
clanfies the results of the strategy. In addition, innova-
tion in regional policy depends on the ability to com-
pare the effects of different programmes in different 
contexts and to disseminate the results of this com-
parison to others. 
Evaluation is regarded by many, including those in-
tervtewed in the study, to be the most significant inno-
vatton  resulting  from  the  Structural  Funds 
procedures. This is not to say that it never occurred 
before 1988, but the reform of the Structural Funds 
made rt obligatory and put it on a systematic footing. 
Interestingly, evaluation was initially resisted by many 
as being an unnecessary piece of bureaucracy, but it 
is  now generally viewed as giving rise to two major 
benefits: 
•  it is spreading best practice and a culture of eval-
uation to Member States, in most of which there 
was previously little or no experience of this; 
•  there is ongoing improvement in evaluation best 
practice, partly as a result pf the increased num-
bers  undertaking  such  exercises  and  experi-menting  with  different  techniques.  partly as  a 
result of the conscious fostering of innovation by 
the Commission. In addition. evaluation has been 
extended to new areas, such as the structures for 
implementation. 
The spread of a culture of evaluation has two main as-
pects. One relates to monitoring systems and the de-
velopment of performance indicators, the other to ex 
post evaluation, which generally uses  'softer' data, 
such as field surveys, to assess the real and lasting 
effects,  for example, on job creation.  Monitoring is 
usually undertaken in-house, while ex post  evaluation 
tends to be carried out by independent experts. The 
development of a culture of evaluation is,  therefore, 
particularly important in respect of the latter. 
In many Member States, there was little ex post evalu-
ation before the reform of the Structural Funds. The 
main exception was the UK and, to a lesser extent. the 
Nordic countries. the Netherlands and Ireland. Cre-
. ating expertise in this area and the related culture is a 
long-term process, but in all the Member States. ex-
cept the UK, significant improvements in techniques 
and  coverage are  reported.  Moreover.  even  in  the 
UK. the Structural Funds have led to evaluation being 
extended to structures of implementation. 
In all 6 Member States in which interviews were con-
ducted, there have been efforts to improve the moni-
toring system by developing indicators. though from 
widely  differing starting  positions and with varying 
levels of development. Indicator systems. which go 
beyond merely checking financial flows.  have been 
developed furthest in the UK and Finland. stimulated 
by the management-by-results systems operating in 
public administration.  By comparison.  in  Germany 
and Portugal, the development of monitoring systems 
based on physical and impact indicators is still at an 
early stage. 
Improvements in best practice are occurring in sev-
eral ways. One is simply through the spread of a cul-
ture of evaluation.  which,  combined with  the  insis-
tence of Commission officials on the development of 
improved indicators. has created a climate of innova-
tion. Indicators of output, outcome and. to some ex-
tent, impact are being developed in many places. Ire-
land is a notable example, where there are currently 
very ambitious attempts to construct a real-time moni-
toring system using impact indicators with very short 
lead-times. 
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The  MEANS11  programme  is  making  a  significant 
contribution to the evaluation techniques available. 
Through the programme, the Commission is financ-
ing  research  into  such techniques,  helping  to  de-
velop a professional culture and professional bodies, 
encouraging  discussion  between  those  involved 
{both academics and officials), formulating reference 
frameworks and establishing best practice. 
Regional and private sector mobilisation 
Partnership is one of the key aspects of the delivery of 
the Structural Funds. It seeks to build consensus and 
institutionalise  dialogue  between  the  Commission. 
national governments, regional and local authorities, 
private  business and the voluntary sector.  Partner-
ship occurs at different stages of the  delivery pro-
cess. from consultation during the planning phase to 
cooperation in implementation. 
Partnerships are evolving over time. Before 1989. few 
bod1es.  such as the Monitoring Committees, existed 
to  give substance to coordination and  partnership. 
Today. elected regional and local bodies have an in-
regral role in the Structural Funds procedures in many 
Memoer States. particularly the larger ones.  Private 
and  voluntary  sector  involvement  is.  however.  still 
more var1able.  being 'strongest at the  plan-making 
ana  programming  stage  (albeit  often  informally), 
mosr  vaned (some high and some low levels of in-
volvement) at the project funding stage ... and weak-
est m terms of  morytoring and evaluation.' 12 This form 
of mst1tut1on-building often involves a long lead-time 
and partnerships are likely to deepen in future. 
The advantages of partnership mclude: 
•  access to the strengths of the different partners, 
Including  their  local  and  specialist knowledge. 
Decentralisation  ~nd public-private partnership 
are  particularly  emphasised  in  the  new  public 
management  literature.  For  example,  so-called 
·yardstick competition'  between  delivery agen-
cies. whether public or private, can lead to mutu-
ally beneficial exchanges of information, exerting 
a particular influence where public departments 
need to adapt longstanding and sometimes out-
dated methods and procedures. This contributes 
to  the  spread  of  the  new  public  management 
agenda.  particularly  in  regions  and  Member 
States where it has a low profile; 
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•  high levels of cooperation and ownership. The in-
terviews showed that those involved at local level 
have  a very  positive  overall  impression  of the 
Structural Funds and their results, even if there is 
some frustration with procedures: 
•  creation  of  local  networks.  The  importance  of 
these  networks  in  regional  development  was 
stressed above. The need to improve coordina-
tion and communication between the various par-
ties involved in all the Member States was cited in 
the study, but there are two particularly interest-
ing developments: 
1. the  decentralisation of implementation to  the 
very local level, led by the UK and Ireland. The 
Funds  create  a consensus  between  diverse 
actors - local authorities,  private and volun-
tary sector - that would be difficult to sustain 
in their absence. At the local level it is relatively 
easy to  integrate the  different Funds  (ERDF, 
ESF and so on), the instruments used. the de-
velopment targets and the public and private 
sector contributions. Although this "integrated 
approach" can be very rewarding in  terms of 
results. it is more difficult to sustain at a wider 
level; 
2.  Regional  Innovation  Strategies,  led  by  the 
Commission. These could be described as in-
stitutional engineering exercises, aimed at link-
ing  all  those  involved  in  technological 
development at the  local level (from both the 
public, including universities, and private sec-
tors).  so creating the  right institutional condi-
tions for increased innovation in the region. 
It  should,  however,  be  noted  that  there  can  be  a 
trade-off between efficiency and the scale of partici-
pation,  particularly  when  the  number  involved  ex-
ceeds a certain level. In addition, local partners tend 
to  h?ve  less  Structural  Fund-specific expertise,  so 
there is a strong need for Commission and national 
authorities to provide technical assistance. 
In the Member States covered in the interviews, three 
patterns of development in partnership can be distin-
guished: 
•  marginal changes to  strong Federal systems in 
Spain and Germany; 
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•  administrative decentralisation, but little increase 
in private participation in Finland and Portugal: 
•  strong regional, local and private empowerment 
in Ireland and the UK. 
In Germany, the LAnder are the main bodies involved: 
representatives at regional and local levels below this 
have tended to participate only in implementation of 
projects, while the role of the Federal Government is 
diminishing as the Structural Funds become increas-
ingly decoupled from national regional policy, admin-
istered jointly by the  Federal  Government  and  the 
Lander. Under pressure from the Commission, busi-
nesses  and  trade unions have,  in  the  current pro-
gramming period, gained increased representation. 
In Spain, the responsibility for the Structural Funds is 
divided  between  central  government  and  the  re-
gions,  according to  the  responsibility of the  region 
concerned for policies which are purely national. Lo-
cal authorities, private businesses and trade unions 
play a relatively minor role in the Monitoring Commit-
tees and in the implementation of policy. 
In Finland, the implementation of the Structural Funds 
has coincided with a decentralisation of national poli-
cies and an increase in the institutional responsibili-
ties  of  the  newly-created  Regional  Councils.  The 
latter are the main bodies responsible for the Struc-
tural Funds. in concert with the regional offices of na-
tional  ministries.  Interestingly,  there  is  felt  to  have 
been significant mutual gains between implementing 
the Funds and pursuing the separate goal of decen-
tralising national policies. This is a good example of 
economies of scope in the delivery system. 
Regional mobilisation is taking place on two levels in 
Portugal,  where  government has traditionally  been 
highly centralised.  First.  the  Structural  Funds  have 
boosted the  financial resources of local authorities, 
typically  by  an  estimated  1Q-15%.  Secondly,  the 
Comissoes de Coordenac;ao Regional (commissions 
for regional coordination}, created as decentralised 
units of central government. expanded their powers 
with the adaptation of the Structural Funds and have 
become a regional voice in the planning and imple-
mentation of regional programmes. 
Ireland is a small and traditionally centralised State, 
and local authorities have had very limited functions. 
These powers are being significantly boosted as re-sponsibility for the Structural Funds is transferred to 
local  partnerships of  public.  private  and  voluntary 
aector representatives.  On  the Commission's initia-
tive, assistance to local development has increased 
in the present programming period. The  local part-
nerships  now  make  their  own  local  development 
plans and receive a budget from the Structural Funds 
to implement them. The partnerships are supported 
both in terms of planning and technically by a com-
pleteiy new implementation structure. 
In  the  UK,  decentralised Government Offices have. 
over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, been devel-
oping and taking on more responsibilities. These of-
fices are responsible for implementation of the Funds 
and play a key  role  in  the  Monitoring Committees. 
Structures of implementation have been very innova-
tive and one emerging pattern is further decentralisa-
tion to local partnerships. including representatives 
from the private and voluntary sectors. As in Ireland, 
central government provides a strong technical sup-
port structure for local partnerships. 
Conclusions 
Institutions are a key factor in regional development 
and, in the long-term. may well prove to be the most 
significant one. There are many different institutions 
which exert a crucial influence on economic issues-
including efficiency and innovation - by structuring 
the  choices open  to  individuals  and  organisations 
and the incentives they face. Economic success de-
pends not just on private sector institutions such as 
the standard of company management and the  ex-
tent of networking between firms.  but also on  social 
factors such as trust and on the quality of public sec-
tor management. 
Social capital is of particular importance tor regional 
development and  includes networks between firms 
as  well  as  shared  mJitural  traditions  and  attitudes 
which facilitate cooperation. Networks between firms 
can  combine the  economies of  scale  normally  re-
served to large firms. with the dynamism and flexibil-
ity of small firms and are particularly associated with 
innovation. In the statistical analysis in section 2.1, the 
high level of competitiveness of Northern Italy which 
is not 'explained' by the factors examined is almost 
certainly  due,  at  least  in  part.  to  the  innovation 
achieved  by  such  networks.  Conversely,  the  rela-
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tively low level of social capital in  many regions is 
identified in the literature as a significant constraint on 
innovation. 
Public administration  is  also  important for  regional 
development and  measures in  recent years  to im-
prove the quality of this have been associated with 
new principles of public management. A key feature 
is the introduction of sophisticated tools to evaluate 
performance, enabling lessons from the experience 
of past policies to Influence present ones. so creating 
a  'learning  organisation'  which  continuously  im-
proves its strategy. Other features are decentralisa-
tion  and partnership which potentially allow public 
authorities at different levels as well as private sector 
representatives to bring their various strengths to the 
policy process. 
Continuous reform is necessary to keep institutions 
up to date. At present, there is a move. in both the pri-
vate and public sectors, away from simple hierarchi-
cal and  bureaucratic control  towards decentralisa-
tion,  partnership and networks which are generally 
considered more efficient. 
An institutional factor with a particular bearing on re-
gional  development  is  the  delivery  system  of  the 
Structural Funds. This has a direct effect by encour-
aging  the  efficient  and  effective  use  of  Fund  re-
sources.  but  it  also  potentially  has  indirect effects 
through encouraging networking and improvements 
in the structure of public sector management. 
As an institution, the delivery system is characterised 
by multi-level  governance,  ie  the  Commission.  na-
tional governments and regional and local authorities 
are formally autonomous, but there is a high level of 
shared responsibility at each stage of the decision-
making process. The relationship between these is. 
accordingly,  one  of  partnership  and  negotiation 
rather than being a hierarchical one.  It also has ele-
ments of the new principles of public management. 
such as decentralisation and evaluation. 
The delivery system has made an important contribu-
tion to the institutional endowment of lagging regions. 
A particular contribution to the efficiency and the ef-
fectiveness of public administration has been the no-
tion of a continuously improving policy cycle, within 
which evaluation of past policies is used to improve 
the  performance  of  future  ones.  This  process  re-
quires  expertise  within  public  authorities  and,  for 
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most Member  States,  the  impetus  to  acquire  this 
came from the Structural Funds. In addition, the Com-
mission  is  developing  and  disseminating  best-
practice  techniques  of  evaluation  through  the 
MEANS programme. 
The delivery system is also beginning to contribute to 
the accumulation of social capital and the formation 
of networks in lagging regions. There are often obsta-
cles to the latter, and local partnerships create the 
contacts between the many diverse actors from dif-
ferent walks of local life to help overcome these. In ad-
dition, the desire to influence programmes provides 
an incentive for those concerned to resolve the initial 
problems that naturally arise in forming such relation-
ships. The Structural Funds, in other words. encour-
age the creation of local networks, which then benefit 
other areas of economic life in the region. 
The  principles underlying the Structural Funds and 
the delivery system in place enjoy widespread sup-
port. Indeed, the survey undertaken revealed a high 
degree of support for the concept as well as appreci-
ation of the practical results. However. an equally im-
portant theme was the need for  reform and  further 
development of the practice, and it was felt that un-
necessary bureaucracy needs to  be cleared away. 
deeper and broader partnerships fostered and a cul-
ture  of  evaluation  further  developed.  As  one  inter-
viewee  put  it,  'the  problems  lie  in  the  operational 
questions, the advantages in the principles'. 
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3  The situation and trends in assisted regions 
The concern here is to examine developments in the 
regions of the EU that have been assisted under the 
priority Objectives of the Structural Funds in the pe-
riod since their reform in 1989. Specifically, the analy-
sis considers, in  turn.  Objective 1 regions. in which 
GOP per head is generally below 75% of the EU aver-
age, Objective 2 regions. which are suffering from in-
dustrial decline, and Objective 5b regions. which are 
rural areas with problems of structural adjustment., 
The focus is on two key areas of economic welfare: 
•  employment and unemployment 
•  GDP and productivity. 
The Objective 1 regions 
Objective 1 regions currently contain some 25% of 
the total  population of  the  EU.  or around 92 million 
people. They are typically large areas concentrated 
mainly in the peripheral parts of the Union which suf-
fer the handicaps described in Part 2 above - spe-
cifically,  relatively  poor  infrastructure  endowment 
and a work force with comparatively low skill levels as 
well as institutional deficiencies as defined in the pre-
vious section. 
As a group, these regions have by definition the low-
est levels of GDP per head in the Union. equivalent to 
some 68% of the average in 1996 (Table 28). This re-
sults from a combination of their poor performance in 
terms of GOP per person employed (or productivity) 
and their low level of employment in relation to work-
ing-age population (or the employment rate), which 
together largely determine GOP per head.2 
For Objective 1 regions taken together, productivity is 
substantially below the level in the rest of the Union. 
GOP  per  person employed  in  1996 averaged just 
over three-quarters (78%) of the figure for the EU as a 
whole.  Their employment rate  was  also much less 
than elsewhere in the Union, the total number in work 
in  1997 averaging 52% of the population of working 
age ( 15-64) as compared with an EU average of al-
most 61%. 
The low level of employment reflects the much more 
difficult labour market conditions in such regions than 
elsewhere  in  the  Union.  unemployment  averaging 
16 2% of the work force in Object1ve 1 regions in 1997 
as  aga1nst  an  average rate of  10.7% across the Un-
IOn.  In me Objective 6 regions which it is possible to 
dJStJngUJsh  1n the present analy:>is. which are mostly 
in  F1n1and.  unemployment was even higher. averag-
Ing  19 8%. 
The d1ff1cult labour market conditions and the acute 
job shortages associated with them. however, are not 
only reflected in high unemployment but also in low 
part1c1pation  in  the  labour force.  especially among 
women. In other words. lack of available jobs deters 
those not in work from actively seeking employment 
and.  therefore.  means that significant numbers are 
depnved of  being able to pursue working careers. 
Low participation accounts for around 40"/o of the gap 
in the employment rate between Objective 1 regions 
and the rest of the Union. 
The prevailing structure of employment in the Objec-
tive 1 regions. however, is not much different from that 
in the rest of the Union. Employment in the secondary 
sector - industry and construction - accounts for 
around 30% of total employment in both cases. The 
major difference is the persistence of high employ-
ment in agriculture in Objective 1 regions, where it ac-
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counts for around one in 1  0 jobs, twice as many as in 
other parts of the Union. As a reflection of this, Objec-
tive 1 regions also have a lower share of employment 
in services, though, as in the rest of the Union, this is 
still the dominant sector,  accounting for  60% of all 
jobs (Table 33). 
Since 1988, the gap in GOP per head between what 
are now Objective 1 regions and the rest of the Union 
has narrowed appreciably, the level in such regions 
increasing fiom 64% of the  EU  average to 68% in 
1996 (the latest year for which regional data are avail-
able).  These figures,  however,  are  affected  by the 
changing composition of Objective  1 regions  from 
one programming period to the next, as noted below. 
as well as by the inclusion of the new German Lander 
in the EU average from 1991 on (which has the effect 
of reducing it). Nevertheless, taking explicit account 
of these two factors does not greatly change the con-
clusion. 
Over the first programming period, GOP per head. in 
what were then Objective 1 regions, increased from 
around 63Y2% of the EU average in 1988, immediately 
before the period began. to66Y2% in 1993 (excluding 
for this purpose the new German Lander from the EU 
average in  1993 in order to  compare like with like). 
Since 1993, the  gap in  GOP per head for the same 
group of  regions  has  continued  to  narrow and  by 
1996, the relative level had risen to 68% of the EU av-
erage (again excluding the new German Lander from 
the  EU  average- or  from 68% in  1993 to 69% in 
1996, if the new Lander are included) (Table 29). 
A similar convergence of GOP per head towards the 
level in the rest of the Union is also evident over the 
period since 1993 if the group is expanded to include 
the regions accorded Objective 1 status for the first 
time  in  the  present  programming  period.  1994  to 
1999. For all Objective 1 regions taken together, GDP 
per head increased from 66% of the  EU  average in 
1993 to 68% in  1996 (including the new Lander in 
both numerator and denominator). 
The relative increase in GDP per head in Objective 1 
regions between 1988 and 1996 was entirely due to a 
larger increase in productivity than in the rest of the 
Union rather than to more jobs being created and, ac-
cordingly, more people being in employment to con-
tribute to GOP.  Between  1988 and  1993,  GDP per 
person employed in the regions which had Objective 
1 status  during the  first  programming  period  rose 
148 
from 76% of the EU average to 79% (again excluding 
the new Lander from the EU average throughout and 
also excluding the French OOMs, for which employ-
ment data are only available for one year,  from the 
Objective 1 figures), while the number in work in rela-
tion to the population of working age declined slightly 
(Tables 31  and 32). Since 1993, productivity for this 
group of regions has risen further in  relative terms, 
GOP per person employed increasing to 81% of the 
EU average by 1996, whereas the number of people 
in  work relative  to working-age  population  has  re-
mained virtually unchanged, as it has in the rest of the 
Union. 
Much the same is true of the expanded group of Ob-
jective 1 regions over the second programming pe-
riod, GOP per person employed rising from 76% of 
the EU  average in 1993 to 78%% in  1996, while the 
employment rate has again remained much the same 
as compared with that in the Union as a whole. 
The failure of employment to  increase in  relation to 
working-age population in Objective 1 regions, from a 
level which was already low in  comparison with the 
rest of the Union. has led to significantly higher unem-
ployment. As a growing proportion of people of work-
ing  age,  especially women,  have joined the  labour 
force and have attempted to  find  employment.  the 
number of jobs available has proved insufficient and 
many have ended up unemployed. In the regions with 
Objective 1 status in the first programming period, the 
average rate of unemployment went up from 15.6% in 
1988 to  16.3% in  1993 (again excluding the French 
DOMs), less than the increase in the Union as a whole 
(from 9.1% to 1  0.5%, excluding the new Lander) (Ta-
ble 30).  However, although the average rate in  this 
group of regions has fallen slightly since the peak (of 
17.6%) in  1994, it was still over 17% in  1997, above 
the level in 1993 and well above that in 1988, whereas 
in  the Union as a whole,  unemployment had come 
down to the same level as in  1993. 
In the expanded group of Objective 1 regions, aver-
age unemployment in 1997 was also above the rate in 
1993 and, in  this case, it was much the  same as in 
1994.  Objective 1 regions,  therefore,  have  proved 
much less successful at creating jobs and reducing 
unemployment than they have in raising productivity 
and increasing GOP per head. In consequence, it re-
mains the case that while around a quarter of the Un-
ion's population lives in Objective 1 regions, they are 
home to a third of the unemployed. EU structural policies: main features 
The Union has six major financial instruments to imple-
ment its structural policies: the European Regional De-
velopment  Fund  (EADF),  the  European  Social  Fund 
(ESF), the Guidance Section of the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), the Fi-
nancial  Instrument  for  Fisheries  Guidance,  the 
Cohesion  Fund  and  loans  from  the  European  Invest-
ment Bank (EIB). The  Cohesion Fund and the EIB are 
based on a project-financing approach and are  gov-
erned by their own specific rules. The Structural Funds, 
which  encompass the  first  four  instruments,  operate 
within an integrated programming framework accord-
ing to a set of principles set out in the implementing reg-
ulations. 
In the current programming period,  1994 to 1999, the 
Structural Funds address regional problems under four 
Objectives: 
•  Objective  1,  for regions where development is  lag-
ging behind (accounting for almost 68% of total re-
sources); 
•  Objective 2. for restructuring in areas affected by in-
dustrial decline (  11% ); 
•  Objective Sb,  for structural development in rural ar-
eas (4%): 
Differences between Objective 1 regions: 
situation and trends 
These general observations on the situation and de-
velopments in the Objective 1 regions taken together 
conceal considerable differences between them. The 
differences were accentuated when the list of Objec-
tive 1 regions was revised in 1993 to include both the 
new German Uinder and areas  in  otherwise more 
prosperous Member States in the North of the Union 
in which economic and social conditions had deterio-
rated significantly, largely as a result of industrial de-
cline. Whereas in the programming period 1989 to 
1993, the Objective 1 regions were a largely homoge-
neous group of less developed - and, for the most 
part.  less  industrialised - areas  in  the  traditional 
sense of the term, following the 1993 review, eligibility 
was extended to certain areas which had previously 
been highly industrialised in Belgium, France and the 
UK, as well as in the former East Germany which were 
equally industrialised in most cases. 
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•  Objective 6,  for structural development in sparsely-
populated areas (0.5%). 
The  population  covered  by  the  regional  Objectives 
amounts to 51% of the EU total. Some 55% of the total 
resources  goes to  16%  of  the  EU  population in  four 
countries- Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal-mostly 
delivered through Objective 1 programmes. 
Three other Objectives are centred on specific prob-
lems rather than on regions as such: 
•  Objective 3 Is  concerned with  helping  to  alleviate 
long-term and youth unemployment; 
•  Objective 4 assists the adaptation of workers to in-
dustrial change; 
•  Objective Sa promotes structural adjustment in agri-
culture and fisheries. 
There are separate Community Initiative programmes to 
support transnational, cross-border and inter-regional 
actions organised under 13 different themes.  In addi-
tion. a small proportion of total resources.  some 1%. is 
reserved for technical assistance, pilot projects and in-
novative measures. 
The differences between regions is evident in their 
general economic features. For example: 
•  GOP per head in Ireland, the Objective 1 region in 
which this is highest, was almost twice as high as 
in  the  poorest parts of Greece and Portugal in 
1996 and over twice as  high as in  most of the 
French Overseas Departments (Table 29); 
•  unemployment rates in the Objective 1 regions in 
Spain in  1997, averaging 24%,  were more than 
three times those in most regions in Portugal and 
Greece and six times that in Burgenland in Aus-
tria (Table 30). 
The Objective 1 regions with the highest level of GOP  _ 
per head are a relatively diverse group comprising, 
apart from Ireland, Mediterranean regions such as 
the French island of Corse, Cantabria in Spain and 
Attiki, the region in Greece where Athens is situated. 
It also includes Lis boa in Portugal and Mofise in Italy, 
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o  .......  t.oo--. __  __,!100 km as well as the Northern regions of Halnaut In Belgium, 
the Highlands and Islands In Scotland, Northern Ire-
land In the UK and the newly rasurgent East Berlin In 
Germany. All of these regions had GOP per head In 
1996 above 75% of the EU average (the threshold fig-
ure for ellg lblllty for Objective 1 status) and well above 
the average in Objective 1 regions as a whole (68%). 
A second group of regions has GOP par head slightly 
below this level. It Includes the Island regions of Notlo 
Algalo  and  Krltl  in  Greece,  Canarias  in  Spain  and 
Sardegna In  Italy. as well as Burgenland In Austria, 
Puglia  in  Italy,  Flevoland  in  the  Netherlands, 
Merseyside In the UK and Comunidad Valenciana In 
Spain. Ita Suomi in Anland, which Is eligible for aasls-
ranee under Objective S, is also in this group. These 
regions have GOP per head In the range 71% to 75•" 
of the Union average. 
A third group of regions has GOP per head well below 
the Objective 1  threshold, with levels of 70% of the EU 
average or leas,  In  many cases much less. This In-
cludes large areas of continental Greece (as well as 
Voreio Aigaio), all of the new LAnder in Eastern Ger· 
many  except for  Berlin.  large parts  of  central  and 
northern  Spain,  Portugal  (outside  Llsboa)  and  the 
most southerly regions of Italy. The French OOM-
which figure among the very poorest regions of the 
EU  - are  also  included.  together  with  Galicia  In 
North-West Spain. 
There are equally large differences between Objac-
tive  1 regions  in  terms of unemployment.  as noted 
above. The highest rates, of 20°.4 of the labour force or 
more In 1997, occur in most of the Spanish Objective 
1 regions as well as in virtually all of the Southern ltal· 
ian regions, While rates are only slightly lower than this 
In Eastern Germany. On the other hand, unemploy-
ment Is significantly lower In most of the Greek Objec-
tive 1 regions and lower again in much of Porwgal, 
where the average rate in 1997 was below 7%. 
Examination of the two components which together 
derermine GOP per head -the  level of GOP per per· 
son employed and the level of employment In relation 
to  working-age  population - provides further  evi-
dence of the difference In performance between Ob-
jective 1 regions.  In soma regions, GOP per person 
employed (or productivity) Is comparable to levels In 
the rest of the Union, so that the lower level of GOP per 
head is the result of a relatively small number of peo-
ple of working age having a job and earning income. 
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This Is the case In rnost of the Northern Objective 1 re-
giona, notably Halnaut, Ireland, and Flevoland, in all 
of Which the level of productivity was above the EU 
average In 1996, as well as In most of Spain- with 
the exceptiOn of Galicia and Extramadura - South· 
ern Italy except Calabria, Burganland, Sterea Ellada 
in Greece and Corse (in which It was only slightly be· 
low). In all of these regions, low GOP per head Is are-
sult of a lacl<  of  breadth  in  the  regional  economy 
reflected In failure to create sufficient jobs for the pop-
ulation of working age. In many cues, the numbar In 
employment amounts to under 45% of working-age 
population, especially In the Spanish and Italian re-
gions, as compared with an  EU average of 15 per-
centage points higher (Tables 31  and 32). 
In other Objective 1 regions,  lew GOP par head is 
more a reflection of low prodUctiVIty than loW employ-
ment. This Is especially true of the regions in Portugal 
where the employment rate Ia above the EU average 
In most cases, while the level of productivity Is sub· 
srantlal/y leas. A consequence of this Is that unem-
ployment  Ia  well  below  the  EU  average  In  most 
regions except Alentejo-and in Centro, under 4%. 
As  noted  above,  in  Objective  1 regions  taken  to-
gether.  GOP  pcH  hcaad  haa tended to converge to-
wards  the  levels  In  the  rest  of  the  Union.  This 
tendency has been widespread acrosa tha regions 
concerned-and, indeed, in aomca cuaa, in Ireland, 
in partiCI.IIar, haa been much more pronounced than 
the average Increase. Nevertheless, there are a few 
regions, but only a few, in Which GOP per head has 
declined in relative terms rather than risen. Indeed, 
there are only 4 regions, which have had Objective 1 
status slnc:e 1989 where GOP per head wu  lower in 
relation to the EU average In  1996 than In 1988, the 
year  before  the  first  programming  period  began. 
Then are Sterea Ellada In Greece,  though here rhe 
decline was  concentrated In  the  first programming 
period and since 1993, the relative level of GOP per 
head  has fallen  only marginally,  Dytlkf Makedonla, 
also  in  Greece,  Whara  the  relative  level  was  only 
slightly doWn and where It has risen during the sec· 
ond programming period, Campania in Italy, where 
again the relative level in 1996 wu  only sRgtrtty lower 
than In 1988 and Guyana, one of thl  French DOM, for 
which tatlmares of GOP, especially in PPS terms, are 
more uncertain than elsewhere. 
In addition, there are only 4 regions accorded Objec-
tlva  1 statua  In tht present programming  period  In 
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which GOP per head was lower in 1996 in relation to 
the EU average than  in 1993. These are Halnaut in 
Belgium, Burganland In Austria and Marseyside and 
the Highlands and Islands, both in the UK, where In 
each case. apartfromthaflrst, the relative decline be-
tween 1993 and 1996 was comparatively small. 
The Objective 8 areas covered here, like almost all 
the Objective 1 regions, have experienced a relative 
increase in GOP per head since 1993, tl'lough this his 
not been enough to  compensate  for the  steep fall 
which occurred In the Immediately preceding years, 
which partly had Its origins ln the collapse of trade 
with the former Soviet Union. 
Experience in Objective 1 regions with regard to un-
employment has been more varied. Although in this 
case, in most Objective 1 regions, the rate has risen 
since 1988, as for !he  group as  a whole,  there are 
some exceptions. The two moat notable ones are Ire-
land, Where unemployment fell from over 16~  to 10% 
between 1988 and 1997, almost all of the decline ba· 
lng concentrated In the second programming periOd, 
and Northern Ireland, where It fell by even more, from 
17%  to  just  over  10%.  Unemployment  also  came 
down over the second programming period,  if lass 
dramatically, In the two other Objective 1 regions In 
the UK,  Merseyslde and the Highlands and Islands 
(despite In these cases a relative decline In GOP per 
heed). Other regions to experience a reduction In un-
employment were Notio Aigato In Greece and the Por-
tuguese Island of Madeira, though In both cases the 
decline was only very marginal, and, In the second 
programming period, Flevoland In the Netherlands. 
All  three  of these  regions,  It  Is  worth  noting,  have 
among the lowest rates of unemployment In the Union 
(Notlo Algalo has the 15" lowest rat• of all NUTS-2 re-
gions while the rate In the other two Is only around half 
the EU average). 
The divergent tendencies in relative Jevela of GOP per 
head and unemployment In most Objective 1 regions 
can be traced to the similarly divergent changes In 
levels  of productivitY and  employment rates.  There 
are very few regions ln which a virtuous combination 
of above average growth in productivity and a high 
rate of net Job  creation has been established. The 
most notable example, once more, ls Ireland, where 
the  growth of GOP per person  employed has  sub-
stantially outstripped that In the rest of lha Union. the 
level Increasing from  17% below the EU average to 
5% above in Just  B years between 1988 and  1998, 
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and where the number In employment has risen from 
just over 51% ot working-age population to  almost 
58% over the same period. Even so, the employment 
rate remains lower than In other parts of the Union, If 
only slightly so. 
l.eavlng aside Flevoland, there are very few other re-
gions which  experienced a a\gnltlcant rise  In  both 
productivity and employment-Northern Ireland and 
Centro  In  Portugal  being  two of these.  (Fievoland, 
where output per parson employed has risen almost 
as much as In Ireland and where the employment rate 
has risen by more, is a special casein that a high pro-
portion of the population work outside the region and 
ls, therefore, not counted in the productivity figure-
which relates to  those working In tl'le region- but is 
counted in the employment rate - Which relates to 
residents.) 
At the same time, While there are numerous examples 
of regions  In  which  productivity has  Increased  by 
much more than the Union average since 1988, there 
are no cases Where the employment rate has risen 
significantly without an accompanying high growth In 
productivity.  In other words,  the  strong conclusion 
which emerges il that productivity growth seems to 
be a nec;eesary condition for sustained growth In em-
ployment, but It Is not a lufflctent condition. The chal-
lenge facing lagging regions, therefore, Is not only to 
achieve  higher  productivity  in  order to  strengthen 
competitiVeness and eecure long-term development, 
but to translate this Into more jobs. 
lndaed, In  many cases,  In  lha regions where  high 
rates of productivity growth have been attained, this 
appears to have bean accomplished through ration-
alisation, more by labour shake-outa than by invest-
ment In  new jobs.  In  Sterea  Ellada  In  Greece,  for 
example,  Where,  as  noted above,  GOP  per person 
employed Ia above the EU average, productivity in-
creased COil&lderably between 1  ass and 1  996 (from 
9% below the EU average to 1% above) but the em-
ployment rate wen1  down from 59% ot working-age 
population to under 68% and unemployment rose to 
12% of tha work fOtce In 1  997. Similarly, In Basi IIcata 
In Italy, productivity rota from only 73% of the EU av-
erage In  1988 to 86% In 1996, but the employment 
rate went down from 49% to 42% and unemployment 
rose to over 20%. 
In sum, the analysis reveals the Immense difficulty In 
Objective 1 regions of closing the gap on the other parts of the Union not only In terms of productivity and 
GOP par head but also In terms of employment, which 
seems to be a longer term task. 
The Objective 2 and 5b regions 
Objective 2 of the Structural Funds supports the re-
structuring and dlver&lflcalion of areas affected by In-
dustrial  decline,  while  Objective  5b  is  aimed  at 
assisting the development of rural areas hit by prob-
lems of structural adjustment, generally arising from 
the decline of agriculture, especially as a source of 
employment. Regions which have Objective 2 status 
In the present programming period have a population 
of around 61 million, just over 16'% of the Union total, 
and are located mostly In the more urbanised parts of 
the  Union.  Areas  with  Objective  5b  status  have a 
combined population of 32 million. almost 9% of the 
Union total. 
Objective 2 
The areas eligible for Objective 2 assistance are typi-
cally located In Member States, predominantly In the 
North of the Union, with GOP per head around the EU 
average or above.  Low levels of output and real In-
come which come from lagging development are not 
their main problems, as in the Objective 1 regions, but 
rather difficulties of compensating for the decline In 
their traditio1'1al  11'1dustrial  base by expanding other 
activities. 
The problems,  therefore, tend to show up predomi-
nantly in  thra  labour market,  in Inadequate levels of 
employment and net job creation and relatively high 
rates of unemployment. In  1997, just under 1 in 8 of 
the  work  force  was unemployed In  Objective 2 re-
gions taken together, an unemployment rate at 1  1  .9% 
as against an EU average rate of 1  0. 7%. Although the 
rate waa  higher In  1997 than  In  1989 (11%),  it was 
lower than  In  1993 (12.3%)  before  the  start of  the 
present programming period. Moreover, it repre$8nts 
a better performance than  In the Union as a whole, 
where the average rate was the same in  1997 as In 
1993 and markedly higher than In  1989 (8.3%). The 
gap In unemployment rates as compared with the EU 
average has, therefore, come down from 2. 7 percent-
age points to only 1.2 percentage since 1989. 
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The growth In the number employed In Objective 2 re-
gions, however,  has been modest over thia period. 
Between 1989 and 1991, it roea by only 0. 7% overall, 
juat 0. 1  % a  year, largely reflecting the recession In the 
early 1990s when employment declined significantly. 
Nevertheless,  even  this  low  rata  of  employment 
growth was slightly higher than that achieved In the 
Union as a whole, where the cwarall number In work 
was only 0.5% higher in 1997 than 8 years earlier. 
The implication of the very small Increase in employ-
ment In Objective 2 regions coupled with the modest 
rise  In unemployment Ia that participation in the la-
bour force declined over the period. A significant pro-
portion  of  those  losing  their  jobs,  therefore. 
panlc\llarly men In their 50s, withdrew from the labour 
market Into  early retirement,  while lncreaalng num-
bers of young people stayed In educatlon longer and 
postponed looking for their first job. This, in conse-
t:~uence, had the effect cf keeping the unemployment 
rate down and, Indeed, contributed to lhe decline in 
the rata relative to the Union average since 1989. 
As for Objective 1 regions, tnere are marked differ-
ences  In  performance  between  Objective 2 areas. 
There are  many  regions where unemployment was 
lower In 1997 than  In  1989, and more where  II  was 
lower than In 1993, but equally there are many Where 
It was much higher in  1i87 than 8 years  earlier.  In 
moat cases, the changes which have occ:urred reflect 
what has happened in the Member State in which the 
region Is situated. Increases In unemployment, there-
fore,  are particularly evident In Objective 2 areas in 
. three  of the  largest  Member  States  - Germany, 
France and Italy-where ratea rose significantly be-
tween 198Q and 1997, though they are equally appar-
ent in  Belgium and Swaden,  where rates also went 
up. In Belgium, however, there have been falls in un-
employment  in  Objective 2 regions  since  1994 as 
rates have declined generally. This has been mora 
marked In Spain, where there was a substantial rise in 
unemployment in such regions, as in the country as a 
Whole,  between  1989 and  1993,  but where  since 
then,  and In  19i6 and 1997 especially,  rates  have 
come down almost as fast as they Increased previ-
ously. 
Reductions  in  unemployment  between  1989  and 
1997 occurred in Objective 2 areas In Denmark, the 
Netherlands and the UK, again in line with develop-
ments  at  lhe respective national  levels.  In  meet of 
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these regions, rates in  19Q7 were berween 6% and 
9%, some way below the EU average of 10. 7%. 
Recent analysis by the Commission hu shed more 
light on the undertylng structural changes affecting 
manufacturing  In  Objecrlve 2 areas,  and  new data 
sources have been specifically developed as parr of 
the exercise. Ths analysis shows that, at the begin-
ning of the 1  ggoe, Objec:tive2 areas, In general, were 
dependent on a relatively narrow Industrial base. The 
predominant Industries were Iron and steel, textiles 
and clothing,  transport equipment and metal prod-
ucla. Other induetrles, especially relatively advanced 
and higher growth ones, such as electronics or agrl-
foodstuffa,  were  under-represented.  This  depend-
ence  on traditional industries, which was the main 
source o1 the structural problems In the Objective 2 
areas, and the consequences which result 1rom it. are 
illustrated by the facr that. In 1986, iron and steel and 
textiles and clothing accounted for 19% of employ-
ment In manuf•cturing In the areas.  but for 40% of 
jobs lost over the period 1986 to 1992. 
Moreover, In half rhe Objective 2 areas examined, de-
pendence on Iron and steel. laxtiles liVId clothing and 
transport equipment was much more extreme, these 
industries accounting for more than 50% of menu1ac-
turlng employment. and over 80% in some caaas. At 
the aame time, the analysis also revealed encourag-
ing signs of growth In  small enterpriaas (defined as 
those  employing  fewer  than  20  people).  Whereas 
large enterprises In Objective 2 regions are estimated 
to have lost some 270,000 Jobs In net terms between 
1986  and  19i2,  small  enterprises  gained  over 
20,000. 
Objective 5b 
The rural areas eligible for Objective 6b assistance, 
which face problems of generating new job opportu-
nltlas  as employment declines in  agriculture.  have 
slgnlflcantly lower rates of unemployment than other 
parts of the Union. In 1997, these averaged 7.8% as 
against the EU average of ,0.  7%. As In the rest of lha 
Union, however, unemployment was higher in  1997 
than In 198SI, though In contrast to other regions, in-
cluding those wirh ObJective 2 status, the rate rose 
steadily over  the  period,  even  during the  recovery 
years from  1~  on. This possibly suggests that un-
employment, though relatively low on average, is be-
coming  more  structural  in  nature  in  Objective  5b 
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areas and less affecred by uptums In economic acriv-
ity, 
On rna other hand, employment has risen by more in 
ObJective Sb areas than In Obj~tiva  2 regions and by 
even mora than in other parts of the Union. Although 
most of this growth occurred In the first part of the pe-
riod between 1989 and 1993, It Indicates that an im-
portant  part  of  the  reason  tor  Ihe  rise  in 
unemployment lies In an Increase In labout supply. 
As for olhet assiated regions, these average figures 
conceal wide differences in experience beiWean dif-
ferenl pans of the  Union.  Unemployment rates  are 
particularly high in Objective 5b areas in Spain, Fin-
land and Sweden, where they varied trom between 
10'l(. and nearly 16% In 1997, While in those in France 
and Italy, they averaged 9-,0%. In most cases, how-
ever, this  was low;r than  In  the rest of the country. 
Nevertheless,  unemployment  has  tended  to  rise 
steadily in Objective Sb areas In all Member States, 
with the exception of rh& Netherlands and the UK. 
The structural changes affecting ObJective Sb areas 
have also been the subject of a special analysis by 
the Commission, of a similar kind to that de&crlbed 
aboVe for ObJective 2 areas. Again, the anoilllysis was 
focused on changes in manufacturing over tha period 
1989 to 1993. 
According to this study, while the number employed 
in  manufacturing In the Union as  a whole  declined 
over the period, there was an increase, amounting to 
soma 46,000, in the 41 Objective 5b areas covered .. 
Much of this rise occurred In sectors where SMEa pre-
dominated, often  in activities directly connected to 
the rural economy, such as the prodUction of timber, 
the manufacture of wood products and fumiture and 
of agri-toodstuffs. There was also a growth of employ-
ment in industries such as  metal products and the 
processing of plastics rand rubber. A large part of the 
increase, moreover,  took  place in  production units 
employing fewer than 20 people, which are estimated 
to have expanded In number from 20,500 to 22.000 
over the period in the regions covered. 
Concluding remarks 
The above analysis indicates that there has been sig-
nificant progress  11'1  many of the regions assisted by EU structural policies in the comparatively short pe-
riod since 1989. In  the priority Objective 1 regions, 
GOP per head, which is the main focal point of policy, 
has converged towards the Union average in virtually 
every case. There has been less progress. however. 
in respect of unemployment, where the gap with the 
rest of the Union has tended to widen slightly over this 
period. This reflects the fact,  as confirmed by Com-
mission  evaluation  studies,  that  structural  policies 
seem to have had their major effect on productivity, or 
GOP per person employed, which was generally well 
below that in the rest of the Union and was an impor-
tant reason for their lagging development. As a result. 
their competitiveness has improved which should fa-
vour job creation in the long-term by increasing their 
ability to achieve self-sustaining growth. In the short-
term. this has limited the effect on employment. 
There are also signs of progress in Objective 2 and 
Objective Sb areas. Since 1989, the gap in unemploy-
ment rates between Objective 2 areas and the rest of 
the Union. which is a main focus of policy, has nar-
rowed appreciably, and in  1997, the average rate in 
such regions was less than in 1993 whereas in the Un-
ion as a whole it was the same. In Objective Sb areas. 
on the other hand. where unemployment is now lower 
than in the rest of the Union. the rate has risen slightly 
since 1994 and the end of the recession in the Union. 
highlighting the apparent structural element in unem-
ployment. At the same time. however. more detailed 
studies indicate that. in these areas as well as in Ob-
jective 2 regions.  there has been a shift towards a 
more diversified structure of economic activity, which 
is a central objective of policy. 
3  The situation and trends in assisted regions 
The  lm.,.ct  of  Structural  Funds  on  the 
Objective 1 regions:. 
Summary of results from evaluation 8tudlea 
The  performance  of  assisted  regions  can· be  as-
sessed by using macroeconomic models to analyse 
the changes which have occurred since assistance 
has been given. In other words, by comparing devel-
opments in the post-assistance period with those be-
fore and by estimating what would have happened 
had the trends observed in the pre-assistance period 
continued, an impression can be gained of the possi-
ble effect of the assistance. The estimates derived 
from this kind of trend analysis, however, need to be 
treated with caution, since they do not directly ana-
lyse the impact of policy as such but instead, by impli-
cation,  attribute  any  divergence  from  previously 
observed trends to the effect of the measures imple-
mented.  It  is,  therefore,  assumed  that  there  is  no 
change in the behavioural relationships observed in 
the past and that no new factors emerge during the 
post-assistance period, other than the introduction of 
the policy itself, to affect the outcome. Both are very 
strong assumptions to make and,  in reality,  it is not 
possible to know what would have happened in the 
absence of Union support. Nevertheless, such analy-
sis is instructive. 
A variety of macroeconomic models has been used 
to assess the effect of EU transfers on the key magni-
tudes of growth, investment and employment. How-
ever, given the data which exist, the models _can only 
really be applied effectively to analyse developments 
in individual Member States rather than in different re-
gions within countries.  This  means,  in  this context, 
that their use is largely restricted to countries in which 
regions  are  wholly,  or  predominantly,  assisted 
through Union structural policies, which means, in ef-
fect, Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, in which all 
or most regions have Objective 1 status and which, 
since 1994, have also received transfers from the Co-
hesion Fund. 
In essence. the economic effect of EU assistance is 
twofold. In the first place. transfers from the Structural 
Funds add to income  in the recipient regions,  pro-
ducing a so-called Keynesian, or demand, effect on 
output and employment as the additional income is 
spent  on  goods and  services.  Secondly,  they are 
likely to increase productive potential in the region, 
which is the main aim of policy, by improving infra-
structure,  raising  the  skills  of  the  work  force  and 
strengthening local business. This latter type of im-
pact Is much more difficult to assess than the first 
since many of the programmes and measures intro-
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duced are long-term in nature and produce their full ef-
fect on the economy only after a number of years. 
Different models focus more or less on one or other of 
these two effects.  The  results  of using  three  different 
kinds of model are summarised here: a largely Keynesian 
model, incorporating input-output techniques ('Beutel'), 
which focuses on the overall and sectoral effects of the 
stimulus to demand; a pure supply-side model ('Pereira') 
which focuses on the improvements in  economic effi-
ciency; and models which incorporate both demand and 
supply-side effects ('HEAMIN' and 'OUEST'). 
The Beutel model was used to address the following re-
lated questions: how much of the economic growth in 
the Member States covered can be attributed to EU co-
funded programmes (Community Support Frameworks 
or CSFs) and to EU grants? How have the CSFs affected 
macroeconomic development and the structure of ac-
tivity in recipient countries and, as part of this, what pro-
portion  of  EU  transfers  feeds  through  into  domestic 
demand and output? How many jobs depend on struc-
tural policy measures? How large are leakage effects 
through imports from other parts of the EU? 
According to the  model.  EU  transfers during the two 
programming periods 1989 to  1993 and 1994 to  1999 
are estimated to have increased GOP growth by an av-
erage of 0.9 percentage points in the f~rst penod and 1.0 
percentage points in the second tn Greece and Portu-
gal. 0.8 and 0.6 percentage points 1n  Ireland and 0.3 
and 0.5  percentage  points  in  Spa1r1  (Table  34).  This 
compares  with  annual  transfers  from  the  Structural 
Funds equivalent to 3.2% of GOP for Portugal. 3.4% for 
Greece. 2.1% for Ireland and 1.1% for Spain. This im-
plies that. in relation to the transfers rece1ved. the addi-
tional growth achieved was slightly less in Greece and 
Portugal than in the other two countnes. which may re-
flect their greater tendency to import because of  their 
narrower industrial base. 
The addition to economic growth in the four countries 
largely arises from the increase in investment resulting 
directly from Structural Fund interventions. On average, 
such transfers,  together with  the  assoc1ated  national 
contribution, were responsible for f1nanc1ng over 30% of 
total investment in Ireland and Portugal and over 40% in 
Greece. As a result,  an  increasing part of  the capital 
stock in each of the four countries (2-3%) was attribut-
able to Community transfers. 
The impact on employment, on the other hand. appears 
to have been more limited. A major reason for this is that 
capital  grants or subsidies to the  private  sector have 
been used to increase the capital intensity of production 
or to replace existing  plant and  equ1pment  with  more 
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modem machinery, either way tending to raise the pro-
ductivity of labour. Nevertheless, estimates suggest that, 
by 1999, around 800 thousand jobs, or the equivalent of 
3¥2% of total employment, in the four main recipient coun-
tries will depend upon interventions from the Funds. 
At the same time, Structural Fund transfers tend to give 
rise to large leakage effects through increasing imports, 
mostly from other EU Member States. The Beutel model 
estimates that more than a quarter of the total amount of 
EU  transfers to the four countries have effectively re-
turned to the other Member States in this way. 
The Pereira model, which focuses exclusively on sup-
ply-side effects, was used to examine the impact of the 
Funds on Greece, Portugal and Ireland over the period 
1994 to 1999. The results obtained are similar to those of 
the Beutel model, the structural measures implemented 
being estimated to have increased GOP, on average, 
by 0.4-0.6 percentage points a year in Greece and Ire-
land and by 0.6-0.9 percentage points a year in Portu-
gal.  According  to  the  model,  the  main  underlying 
reason for this is the additional investment in the busi-
ness sector, in public sector infrastructure and in hu-
man capital triggered by Union intervention. 
In  the  HEAMIN  model,  which  explicitly  incorporates 
both demand and supply-side effects, the initial impact 
of intervention comes through the stimulus to demand 
since the  effect on  productive potential takes time to 
materialise. According to the model, however, the de-
mand st1mulus  has only a temporary effect in  raising 
GOP growth and dissipates comparatively quickly. The 
lasting effects come from improvements in the condi-
tions of production, which contribute significantly to in-
creasing productivity and competitiveness. 
The effect on GOP growth -which is broadly similar to 
that estimated by the Pereira model - is larger at the 
beginning (because of the  addition to demand) and 
smaller later on. This is a result of the dissipation not only 
of the demand effect, but also of the supply-side one 
(because of  negative labour market reactions).  In the 
case  of  Greece.  the  addition  to  GOP  growth  would 
amount, on average, to 0.6 percentage points a year as-
suming EU assistance were continued at current levels 
up to 2010. but by then the addition would have fallen to 
0.3 percentage points. For Portugal, the supply-side ef-
fects are estimated to be smaller than for the other coun-
tries, partly because a higher proportion of assistance 
goes to agriculture, while for Spain, the impact is also 
estimated to be smaller,  in  this case because of the 
smaller size of EU transfers relative to GOP. 
In the QUEST II model, which also incorporates both de-
mand and supply-side effects, the influence of mone-tary  variables (interest  rates,  inflation  and so on) is 
included  explicitly.  As  compared  with  the  HERMIN 
model,  it  assumes that individuals and private  busi-
nesses are more forward-looking in the decisions they 
take  about  consumption  and  investment,  implying 
faster responses to changes in policy. It also assumes 
that fiscal policy is expansionary, which in the model 
tends to dampen  economic growth through higher inter-
est rates, a consequent appreciation of the exchange 
rate and (partial) crowding-out of private investment. 
Because of the dampening effects on demand, it is per-
haps unsurprising that QUEST II  produces lower esti-
mates of the effect of EU structural policies on economic 
growth than the other models. GOP growth is estimated 
to have been increased by  only 0.3 percentage points in 
Greece in the 1989 to 1993 programming period and by 
only 0.1 percentage points in the period 1994 to 1999, in 
Ireland by  0.3 percentage points in both periods. in Por-
tugal by 0.3 percentage points in the first period and 0.2 
percentage points in the second and in Spain by 0.1  · 
percentage points in both. 
In summary, although too much importance should not 
be attached to the precise magnitude of the estimates. it 
is encouraging that very different models all point in the 
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same direction. The general conclusion appears to be 
that the Structural Funds have had a significant effect in 
reducing disparities in  economic  performance across 
the Union and narrowing the gap in GOP per head be-
tween the four Cohesion countries and the rest of the Un-
ion. This is supported by a large number  of more detailed 
studies. 
If the estimates derived from the models are compared 
with the results of the analysis in the text of differing 
changes in GOP per head in the four countries, it sug-
gests that other factors have had a significant influence 
on relative performance apart from EU  structural poli-
cies, which is not too surprising. This is most notably the 
case for Ireland and Greece, which represent the two 
extremes in terms of GOP growth. Among these factors 
are the macroeconomic and other policies pursued by 
govemment. the scale and nature of inflows of direct in-
vestment, the initial structure of economic activity, the 
enterprise shown by business and the efficiency of pub-
lic administration together with the relative endowment 
of social capital, as defined in Part 2 above. It is through 
the last of these that  EU  structural  policies may also 
have had an indirect. if perhaps no less important, im-
pact on the  development of  lagging regions,  as ex-
plained 1n Part 2. 
[ 1  J  Objective 6 areas. wh1ch are very sparsely populated, are also cons1dered here along with Objective 1 regions. However. Objective 
6 typically does not target whole NUTS 2 or NUTS 3 regions. Regions 1ncluded in the analysis are those where at least 50% of the total 
population lives 1n assisted parts of the region. For Objective 6. thiS means that the analysis is based on data for a restricted number 
of NUTS 3 regions: Jamtlands Jan (S). the regions of Ita Suomi and Lappi (FIN). 
[2]  See the identity set out at the beginning of Part 2. p. 75. 
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4.1  Introduction 
Enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and Cyprus is a great opportunity, both for the 
countries  concerned  and  for  the  EU  as  a  whole. 
Shared geographical, historical, political, social and 
economic factors mean that it makes sense to treat 
the Central and Eastern European countries together. 
Cyprus, however, has a different history and a differ-
ent economic situation and is therefore examined in a 
separate section below. 
Since the turn of the decade, the Central and Eastern 
European countries (GEE countries) have entered a 
period of profound political and economic reform, an 
experience without precedent in Europe this century. 
The  previous  regime  was  based  on  the  centrally 
planned economy which limited the exposure of pro-
ducers to markets and to competition both at home 
and from the outside world. Reform is directed at the 
establishment of markets and the discipline they en-
tail, and at the opening up of the economy to interna-
tional trade. The changes are being introduced in a 
very short period of time.  Consequently, the  impact 
on economy and society in GEE countries has been 
considerable. 
The effects can be seen in  demographic and eco-
nomic changes. Population has not changed much or 
has fallen as a result of outward migration as well as, 
increasingly, of falling fertility rates. The introduction 
of the market mechanism has led to a radical restruc-
turing of economic activity. As a result, economic out-
put has declined significantly, though there are clear 
signs of recovery since 1993 or 1994. This has also 
led to falling employment. a contraction of the labour 
force and a rise in unemployment. 
With  the dismantling of trade barriers,  international 
trade has increased significantly, as has the inflow of 
foreign  investment The  dominant trading  partners 
and the main source of foreign investment have been 
the neighbouring Member States of the EU. This in-
creased economic integration across wider Europe 
as a whole is both a cause and an effect of major polit-
ical developments, notably the fact that CEE coun-
tries count future membership of the European Union 
among their top priorities. The EU,  in  turn,  has initi-
ated a process of preparing for enlargement. This be-
gan formally with the European Council meeting of 
Copenhagen (1993), which set key criteria for mem-
bership, and the European Council meeting in  Lux-
embourg  ( 1997)  decided  to  open  accession 
negotiations with groups of applicant countries. In the 
meantime,  the  Commission's  proposals  for  the 
Union's  future  policy  priorities  and  financing  -
Agenda 2000-make specific provision for enlarge-
ment. 
While enlargement provides, above all, the opportu-
nity for maintaining stability and improving prospects 
for growth in Europe, there is little doubt that it pres-
ents a considerable challenge and will undoubtedly 
increase the heterogeneity of the EU. This was high-
lighted in the Study on the Impact of  Enlargement on 
EU Cohesion Policy(Agenda 2000), which confirmed 
that  the  applicant countries lag  far  behind  the  EU 
Member States in  terms of economic development 
and that their  institutional capacity to  manage the 
Structural Funds needs to be improved. It, therefore, 
concluded that they should be given pre-accession 
assistance and be familiarised with EU structural pol-
icy. 
The concern here is to further develop the analysis of 
the demographic and economic situation in the differ-
ent CEE countries (more specifically, in Bulgaria, the 
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Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland. Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), and in their 
regions as well as to examine the development of re-
gional policy. The analysis indicates the wide differ-
ences  in  experience  between  the  countries.  An 
understanding of these differences is essential as en-
largement approaches. The analysis focuses to a sig-
nificant extent, partly because of data availability, on 
the period 1990 to 1995 following the initial implemen-
tation of reforms, though developments in more re-
cent years are covered insofar as data exist. Because 
of uncertainty about the reliability of some of the data, 
in particular at regional level, certain results should 
be treated with caution and considered as indicative 
only. 
4.2  Demography: 
situation and trends 
Total population in the 10 CEE countries covered here 
amounted to  105 million in  1997, some 28% of the 
present population of the EU.  In the late 1980s. total 
population peaked at over 106 million. so that in over-
all  terms  there  has  been  little  change  during  the 
1990s. This followed a long period of growth, though 
at a slowing rate, with total population increasrng from 
86 million in  1960 to 100 million in the late 1970s (Ta-
bles 36 and 37). 
Two countries, Poland (38Y2 million) and Romania (22Y2 
million), account for almost 60% of the total population 
in the region, and another two, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, each with just over 10 million rnhabitants. for 
another 20% or so. Apart from Bulgana (8Y2 million) and 
Slovakia (5% million), the remaining countries all had a 
population of below 4 million, and below 2 million rn the 
case of Slovenia and Estonia. 
Most of the CEE countries are more sparsely popu-
lated than the EU, population density averagrng 98 in-
habitants per square km as against 116 in the Union. 
The Baltic States are the most thinly populated (Esto-
nia, 32 inhabitants per square km. Latvia. 39  and Lith-
uania~ 57) while the highest population densities are 
to be found in the Visegrad States (  131 per square km 
in the Czech Republic, 123 in Poland. 110 in Hungary 
and 109 in Slovakia). 
The  natural  increase  in  population  (births  minus 
deaths) was equivalent to 0.4% of  total  population 
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over the period 1990 to 1995 as a whole (Table 35). 
This indicates that the main reason for the reduction 
of population during the 1990s has been significant 
net outward  migration,  which  amounted  to  some 
1. 1% over the period. However, the net outflow was 
concentrated in the early years of transition and since 
1993 has come to a virtual halt, and the main reason 
for continued population decline since then has been 
falling  fertility  rates.  From  1990 to  1995,  total  birth 
rates fell from 13.6 births per 1000 inhabitants to 10.4, 
a fall  of over 20%.  Death rates  have,  on  the  other 
hand, remained unchanged at around 11  deaths per 
1000 inhabitants. 
In terms of general demographic developments, the 
CEE countries can be divided into four groups: 
•  countries with declining population due to both 
negative natural growth and outward migration, 
which include Bulgaria, Estonia, and Latvia: 
•  countries  with  declining  population  overall  but 
with different changes in natural growth and mi-
gration, which include Romania, with little or no 
natural  growth  but net outward  migration,  and 
Hungary,  with  negligible net outward migration 
but a natural decline in population: 
•  countries with  stable population. which  include 
those with  little natural change in  population or 
net  outward  migration,  such  as  Slovenia,  the 
Czech  Republic,  and  Lithuania,  where  natural 
growth has offset net emigration: 
•  countries with growing population, in which natu-
ral  growth has more than offset net emigration, 
which is the case in Poland and Slovakia. 
The  sharpest fall  of  population  between  1990 and 
1995 occurred in  Latvia and Estonia (-6%),  in  Bul-
garia (-4%) and Romania (-2%). The Czech Republic, 
Slovenia and Hungary also registered declines. but 
more  modest.  In  Lithuania,  population  was  un-
changed over  the  period as  a whole  but fell  after 
1992. Only in Poland and Slovakia did population in-
crease and according to projections these two coun-
tries alone will experience growing population in the 
medium-term. 
Much the same factors underlie these changes. In the 
early 1990s,  substantial outward migration was the (II) 
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main reason for decline. In Estonia, this amounted to 
4.9% of population  between  1990 and  1995,  only 
slightly more than in Latvia (4.6%), largely reflecting 
the  withdrawal  to  Russia  of  the  Soviet  army.  In 
Slovenia, inflows of refugees from former Yugoslav 
republics  offset  outward  migration,  while  in  other 
countries, outward migration seems to have had a 
more limited effect on population. 
After reaching a peak in 1992 (reducing population 
by 2. 1% in Estonia and 1. 7% in Latvia). outward mi-
gration has declined in all the countries and, as noted 
above, population decline is now due to a natural fall. 
In  Latvia  •.  birth rates have fallen from  14  births per 
1000 inhabitants in 1990 to 7. 7 in 1995 and most other 
countries have experienced a reduction, though by 
somewhat less. The effect of declining fertility rates 
on population, which may be partly a result of transi-
tion and which was initially overshadowed by  outward 
migration, is now fully evident. 
Regional aapecta 
While  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  Romania, 
Slovenia and Lithuania have a relatively balanced re-
gional  distribution  of  population.  in  Hungary, 
Slovakia.  Bulgaria,  Estonia  and  Latvia.  there  is 
greater concentration in and around the capital city 
(Maps 43 and 44). 
In Poland, there are a number of large urban centres 
(Gdansk,  Poznan.  Lodz.  Wroclaw.  Warsaw).  but 
these are geographically dispersed and of a similar 
size  (1-2.5  million),  though  Upper  Silesia,  where 
Katowice  with  3.8  million  inhabitants  accounts  for 
10% of the total population of the country, is an ex-
ception. In the Czech Republic, Prague with its sur-
rounding region (2.3 million) represents some 20% of 
the total population but this is less than Moravia (al-
most 4  million).  In  Slovakia,  the  Western  region  in 
which the capital, Bratislava, is located, accounts for 
around 40% of the country's population with the re-
maining  60%  distributed  between  the  central  and 
Eastern parts. The concentration of Romania's popu-
lation in  the Eastern parts of the country, except ir. 
Bucharest, is relatively weak. Similarly, in Slovenia, 
population is relatively evenly dispersed across the 
country, as it is in Lithuania, where there are a number 
of urban areas of much the same size as well as a 
large rural population. 
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By contrast.  in  Hungary, the population is  concen-
trated in Budapest, the surrounding area and West-
ern regions. In Bulgaria, some 40% live in the South-
Western  region  where  Sofia  is  situated.  More  ex-
tremely,  in  both Estonia and Latvia. almost half the 
population of the country live in the capital. 
As compared with the EU,  the major cities in the re-
gion are generally smaller and medium-sized cities 
are  proportionately more important.· Moreover,  the 
large cities have not tended to grow at the expense of 
the smaller settlements around them.  In all  10 of the 
countries. over half the pop~:-~tation live in urban areas, 
the proportion ranging from only 51% in Slovenia to 
70% in  both Estonia and Latvia. While comparisons 
are difficult, more people live in  rural areas than in 
most EU countries and the rural-urban migration, pre-
dominant in most parts of the region during the 1980s, 
has  either  slowed  down  or  been  reversed  in  the 
1990s. The latter has been the case in Bulgaria, Esto-
nia, and Latvia, where population has shifted in some 
degree from cities to countryside, partly because of 
job shortages and increased rents in the former. Ro-
mania is a special case as the recent increase of rural 
population is largely a response to the lifting of restric-
tions  on  internal  migration.  Poland  constitutes  the 
main exception as the share of urban population is 
still increasing. 
The period since transition has not resulted in a major 
increase in  the  spatial concentration of population. 
Between 1990 and 1995, population in all Czech re-
gions declined though less in Moravia than in Bohe-
mia. Over the same period, population continued to 
grow  in  nearly  all  Polish  regions  ( voivodships), 
though at a somewhat slower pace and with some ex-
ceptions, such as Lodz, Katowice and Warsaw. Pop-
ulation fell in all Romanian regions with the exception 
of  the  North-East.  In  Slovakia,  population  growth 
slowed  down  but  there  was,  nevertheless.  an  in-
crease in most regions. with East Slovakia registering 
the  largest  rise,  largely  because of  higher  natural 
growth (Map 45}. 
All Bulgarian regions experienced significant popula-
tion  decline with  the  sharpest fall  in  Haskovo and 
Northern regions. Even in Sofia, the capital, there was 
an overall fall of over 2% over the period. From 1992 
onwards, regional populations have tended to stabi-
lise. In Hungary, the decline in population has contin-
ued  in  all  regions,  though  at  a  slower  pace.  with 
Central Hungary, which includes Budapest, showing the largest fall (2.5%), largely because of an above 
average reduction in birth rates. 
Labour force 
Age structure of population 
As in the EU, population is ageing in CEE countries. 
The number of people below working age (15) has 
declined from well over 20% of the total in virtually all 
10 countries in 1990 to 19% or below in most coun-
tries  in  1997.  This  ageing applies to  all  candidate 
countries with  only Poland,  Lithuania  and Slovakia 
having a higher proportion of young people (around 
21%),  though one which has fallen  by as much as 
elsewhere. In 1995, Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Czech Re-
public and Hungary had the lowest shares of popula-
tion under working age {18%). 
As a result of increases in Poland and the Czech and 
the Slovak Republics. the total population of working 
age in the region registered a modest increase be-
tween 1991 and 1995. This increase was most signifi-
cant  in  the  Czech  Republic,  where  the  share  of 
population of working  age  grew from  66%  to  over 
69%, and in Slovakia, where it rose from 64% to over 
66%. In the future, however, the decline in population 
under working age will inevitably lead to the contrac-
tion of the potential labour force in many CEE coun-
tries. Poland and the Slovak Republic are exceptions. 
since  their  population  is  younger  and  they  have 
higher birth rates than elsewhere. 
All the countries have experienced a rising share of 
population over working age. The rise was most pro-
nounced in the Baltic States and Bulgaria. In Lithua-
nia. the share increased from  10.4% to almost 13% 
between 1991 and 1995 and in Estonia from 11.6% to 
13.1%. In Poland and the Slovakia, the increase has 
been less than in other countries and the relative im-
portance of this group is lower (at some 10% of the to-
tal). 
The ageing of population. however. is moderated to 
some degree by low life expectancy compared with 
other developed countries. In most CEE countries, life 
expectancy at birth is around 70, and only 68 in Latvia 
and some studies suggest that life expectancy has 
fallen  since  the  transition  began.  Infant  mortality, 
moreover.  is significantly higher throughout the re-
gion than in the EU. While it stood at 5 per 1000 births 
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in 1996 in the latter,lt was 7 per 1000 in Slovenia and 
9 per 1000 in the Czech Republic, the countries with 
the lowest rates in the region. In Romania, infant mor-
tality was almost 25 per 1000 births and in Bulgaria 
and Latvia 16 per 1000. 
As in the EU,  the ageing of the population in the re-
gion is set to increase markedly over the next 10 or 20 
years, with a consequent rise in the old -age depend-
ency ratio - the number of people in retirement who 
have to be supported by those in work.1 Moreover, as 
a result of lower retirement ages,  the share of de-
pendent pensioners is clearly higher than the  age 
structure would suggest.  2 Early retirement was en-
couraged during the first stages of the transition pro-
cess as a means of limiting the rise in unemployment. 
Pensions currently account for 2/3 to 3/. of total social 
security outlays,  in  some cases even  representing 
the  single largest item of public expenditure. Con-
tinued ageing is, therefore. likely to put social security 
systems under further strain. 
Dependency ratH 
CEE dependency rates (poputation above and below 
working age in relation to that of working age) ranged 
in  1996 from 48-50% in Latvia.  Estonia,  the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia to 54-55% in Poland, Roma-
nia. Bulgaria and Lithuania (Graph 36). Variations be-
tween  countries are  marked both for  old-age and 
youth dependency. Slovakia, Poland,  Romania, the 
Czech Republic and Bulgaria have the highest rates 
of youth dependency, while old-age dependency is 
highest in Hungary, Lithuania,  Estonia,  Poland and 
Romania. 
Since the start of transition, the overall dependency 
rate has increased in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria 
while it has not changed much in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia and Lithuania. In Slovakia and Lat-
via. it has fallen (there are no data for Slovenia). 
Regional Aapects 
The share of population under working age tends to 
be relatively high in rural and certain traditional indus-
trial areas, while the converse is true for the major ur-
ban areas.  In the Czech Republic, Prague has the 
lowest proportion of population under working age 
and the highest proportion above it. Similarly. in Hun-
gary. the population of Budapest is older than in  most 
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other  parts  of  the  country,  as  it  is  in  Warsaw, 
Bratislava and Bucharest. 
By  contrast,  the  Western  and  Northern  parts  of 
Hungary as well as Northern Moravia and Bohemia 
in  the  Czech  Republic  have  relatively  higher 
shares of population under working age. This  is 
also  the  case  in  the  North-West  and  Eastern 
voivodships in  Poland,  Eastern Slovakia and the 
Northern and Eastern regions of Romania.  In the 
latter two countries, this is largely caused by higher 
birth  rates  in  rural  areas.  However,  the  share of 
population of working age in these areas is gener-
ally low, suggesting outward migration to urban ar-
eas in search of employment. 
ubour force participation 
Under the  previous  centrally  planned  economic 
system,  the  commitment to full  employment and 
the expectations that all  men  and  women  physi-
cally able to work would  do so.  led  to  very high 
rates  of  labour  force  participation.  especially 
among women. Before the start of reforms. in 1989 
or  so.  participation rates  (employed  plus  unem-
ployed relative to population 15 to 64) ranged from 
70 to 80% with a peak at 83% in the Czech Republic 
and the lowest rate in Bulgaria with 70%. This by far 
exceeded the corresponding EU participation rate 
of some 69% (1989), the difference being in  part 
due to higher female  participation  1n  CEE  coun-
tries. with rates up to 70% except for Poland (63%) 
and Slovakia (65%).3 
With transition to market economies, CEE citizens 
became freer to choose not to engage in economic 
activity. At the same time, employment opportuni-
ties declined. Consequently, labour force partici-
pation  contracted.  Although  comparisons  are 
problematic because of the progressive shift to la-
bour force surveys as the source of data and the 
use of official, registered figures in a few countries, 
it seems clear that sharp reductions in labour force 
participation have taken place in most CEE coun-
tries, with the possible exception of the Slovak Re-
public and Romania. 
By 1993, surveys conducted in some of the coun-
tries (providing the first real possibility of compar-
ing the situation in different countries) suggested 
participation rates ranging from 63% in Hungary to 
some 81 ro in Lithuania. Rates had seemingly fallen 
since the beginning of the reforms in all countries, 
to 67-68% in  Bulgaria,  the  Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia,  70%  in  Poland  and  Latvia and around 
75% in the Czech Republic and Estonia. The only 
exception was Romania with participation broadly 
unchanged at 78% (Graph 37). 
The fall in labour force participation was very much 
concentrated in the early years of transition. From 
1993 to 1995, labour force participation stabilised 
or even increased in  some CEE countries (Latvia, 
Slovakia. Slovenia, Romania) but continued to fall 
m most. By 1995, Bulgaria's participation rate had 
fallen to 63% and that of Hungary to 59%, a decline 
of 17 percentage points since the start of transition. 
Corresponding figures were 72% in 
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However,  labour force  participation 
has  stabilised  since  1995.  With  the 
exception of Lithuania,  which previ-
ously had a high rate,  participation 
rates  were  mostly  unchanged  be-
tween  1995 and  1997.  By  1997, the 
overall  rate  of  participation  was 
around the EU average (68%) in Po-
land, Slovakia, Slovenia and Latvia, 
significantly above in the Czech Re-
public, Romania, Estonia and Lithua-
nia (73-79%) and significantly below 
only in Hungary (57%) and Bulgaria 
(65%).  Compared  to  the  pre-
transition period, Hungary has expe-rienced the  sharpest overall decline in  participa-
tion  followed  by  the  Czech  Republic,  Bulgaria, 
Poland and the Slovak Republic. Romania consti-
tutes  a  notable  exception  since  participation 
seems actually to have increased. 
Trenda In gender and age atructure 
With transition, female activity rates were expected to 
dec!ine by more than those of men, partly as a result 
of companies abandoning many of the social provi-
sions  previously  undertaken.  Although  reliable  fig-
ures are lacking, this does not seem to have been the 
case. During the early phase of transition, male activ-
ity tended to decline faster than female activity. How-
ever, the status of the female labour force shifted, to a 
larger extent than for men, from employment to unem-
ployment. Among men, there was a higher propensity 
to leave the labour force altogether on losing a job. 
For example, in Romania, the female activity rate in-
creased during early transition but female unemploy-
ment rose while employment actually declined.  · 
From  1992 or  1993 onwards.  female  activity  rates 
clearly contracted but. with the exception of Hungary. 
no faster than male rates. The decline of female par-
ticipation was generally assoc1ated with an ongomg 
decline in female employment. In 1995. female partiC-
ipation rates  ranged between 60% and  65%.  apart 
from  Hungary (51%) and  Romania  (74%).  Between 
1995 and  1997.  female participation stabilised and 
even increased in Bulgaria. the Czech Republic. Lat-
via  and  Slovenia.  but continued  to  fall  in  Hungary 
(49%) and Poland (60%) 
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Regional Aapecta 
The  regional impact of contracting labour forces 
varies widely between the CEE countries. In gen-
eral, labour force participation is high in regions for 
which restructuring is  still incomplete and where 
dependence on single industries or agriculture re-
mains high. In a number of rural areas, agriculture 
increasingly constitutes an  employment reserve, 
absorbing workers laid off in other sectors. In some 
regions,  the  previously neglected tertiary sector 
has developed to such an extent as to compensate 
for the reduction in job opportunities elsewhere in 
the economy (eg in Prague). A seeming paradox, 
at least in the short to medium term, is that regions 
with low activity rates are often the ones which have 
succeeded most in restructuring their economies. 
In the Czech Republic and Hungary, labour force 
participation  has  fallen  in  all  regions.  However, 
while Czech regions show only small differences, 
with the lowest rates in  the Moravian regions and 
the highest in Prague, in Hungary, regional dispari-
ties are significant; North Hungary and the North-
ern  Great  Plain  display  the  lowest  rates.  and 
Central-Hungary, the highest. In Hungarian regions 
w1th low activity. industrial and agriculturarrestruc-
tur~ng has reduced employment with an increasing 
proport1on  of  the  population  of  working  age 
ult1mately  leaving  the  labour force.  Regions  like 
Central  Hungary  . and  Central  Trans-Danubia, 
where h1gher  labour force participation has been 
Transition  has  also  affected  the  age 
distribution of labour forces. Participa-
tion  among  young  and  older  age 
groups has fallen by much more than 
for those of prime working age (25  to 
55).  For those under 25 years. partici-
pation has plummeted with economic 
restructuring,  making  initial  entry into 
the  labour market  extremely  difficult. 
However, the decline. at least in some 
countries. has been accompanied by 
rising participation in education. This is 
notably the case in Hungary, though in 
other  countries.  education  participa-
tion tended to rise only slightly if at all 
and failed to match the  decline in  la-
bour force participation. 
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Map 46  Activity rates in Central and Eastern Europe, 1995 
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growth of service sector employment (Map 46). 
In Slovakia, the labour force contracted in all regions 
up to 1993, and stagnated thereafter. The exceptfon 
is Bratislava which, because of substantial commut-
ing from the neighbouring region of Western Slovakia, 
has  artificially  high  participation  rates.  In  Western 
Slovakia, therefore, participation, though clearly un-
derstated, is the lowest in the country. Rates in Middle 
and Eastern Slovakia are only slightly lower than the 
national average. 
In Poland and Romania, by  contrast, labour force par-
ticipation remains high in predominantly rural areas, 
while  many  industrial  regions  have  experienced  a 
significant reduction as large enterprises have con-
tracted or have closed down. In Poland, this has re-
sulted  in  marked  differences in  participation rates 
between the two types of region, while in  Romania, 
participation rates in  Bucharest and the South-East, 
have fallen  to  well  below that  in  other,  more  rural, 
parts of the country where employment in agriculture 
has expanded. 
4.3  Economy 
GOP 
The change in GOP in CEE countries since the transi-
tion began is difficult to assess for two reasons. First, 
there is a lack of reliable figures,  especially for the 
earlier years of the transition, which partly stems from 
the change in accounting conventions from the con-
cept of net material product, which tends to underes-
timate the output of services, to the valuation method 
used in market economies. Secondly, and more im-
portantly, even if reliable estimates of the change in 
the volume of output produced did exist. these would 
be impossible to  interpret meaningfully because of 
the fundamental change in the nature of production, 
from a system where this was determined by central 
planners to one where it is determined largely by con-
sumer demand. Whereas under the previous regime, 
choice of what to buy was restricted to a limited num-
ber of products, the development of a market econ-
omy has seen the range of goods and services on 
sale widen considerably, with a consequent immea-
surable increase in  consumer satisfaction. As a re-
sult, present figures for GOP are not comparable with 
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those before, or even immediately after, the transition 
began. 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the CEE coun-
tries have experienced a significant reduction in eco-
nomic output. Best estimates put the contraction at 
between 20% and 30% in GOP with an even sharper 
decrease in the Baltic States.4 1n 1995, total CEE out-
put was estimated to be equivalent to 11% of total EU 
GOP in terms of purchasing power standards. 
With transition, the national authorities, with varying 
speed, shifted economic policy towards macroeco-
nomic  stabilisation  and  the  introduction  of  market 
mechanisms. Tight monetary and fiscal policies were 
aimed at curbing inflation and creating favourable 
prospects  for  long-term  growth.  Subsidies  were 
gradually reduced and loan facilities for less efficient 
state-run companies diminished to promote industrial 
restructuring  and  to  expose  enterprises  to market 
forces. Moreover, the reforms coincided with the dis-
integration of the former trading system (CMEA) and 
the collapse of trade with the former Soviet Union as 
well as within the region itself, which ceased to be on 
preferential terms supported by subsidised energy 
and other inputs. Demand from Russia and the CIS 
states which had been the main export market de-
clined dramatically, while global recession reduced 
the  beneficial impact of the  re-opening of Western 
markets. 
The scale and timing of the contraction in GOP varies 
between the CEE countries. Between 1990 and 1993, 
nearly all of them experienced a significant fall in pro-
duction. In terms of the volume of goods and services 
produced; estimates put the reduction at around 50% 
in  Lithuania, over 40% in Latvia and around 30% or 
more in Estonia, Bulgaria and Romania. Although the 
fall in production in Poland, the Czech Republic. Hun-
gary,  Slovenia  and  Slovakia  was  less,  it  was  still 
around 20%. 
From 1993 on-and from 1991 , in the case of Poland 
- many economies began the process of recovery. 
This  resulted  in  growth in  1993 in  the  region  as  a 
whole of some 1  %. While GOP continued to fall in Bul-
garia (-1.5%), Hungary (-0.6%) and Slovakia (-3.7%), 
it increased in Poland (3.8%),  Romania (1.5%) and 
Slovenia (2.8%). Although output grew in  Romania, 
this was caused by a rise in domestic consumption 
mainly fuelled by government subsidies to industry. 
By contrast, there was a significant fall in GOP in the 
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Baltic States because of the late start of transition. In 
1993, GOP in  Estonia declined by 9%, in  Latvia by 
15% and in Lithuania by 16% (Graph 38). 
Economic recovery gathered pace in 1994 and 1995, 
with growth overall of almost 4% in the first year and 
around 5%% in  the second. Over these two years, 
GOP increased in all of the countries, apart from Lat-
via, which was severely affected by financial crisis, 
and Lithuania,  where output fell  by almost  10% in 
1994.  The  highest  growth  rates  were  in  Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania,  where output increased by 
some 7% in  1995. 
Since then, most economies have continued to grow. 
In 1996, GOP in the region increased by 4%, though 
growth slowed down in  1997 to 3%%.  Growth was 
highest once again  in  Poland  and the Slovakia,  at 
around 6-7%. By 1997, recovery was established in 
the Baltic States, with GOP increasing by 11% in Esto-
nia and 6% in Latvia and Lithuania. In Hungary and 
Slovenia,  growth  was  lower  at around 4%.  In  the 
Czech Republic, however, economic and political cri-
sis resulted in GOP growth declining to 1% in  1997. 
By contrast,  in  Bulgaria and Romania.  political and 
economic problems remain which could threaten fur-
ther progress. In 1996 and 1997, GOP in Bulgaria fell 
by 10% and 7%, respectively, while in Romania, it de-
clined by over 6% in  1997. 
Notwithstanding recovery in recent years, the level of 
output in most CEE countries remains well below pre-
transition levels. By 1997, only in Poland (12% higher) 
was  GOP  above  its  1989  level,  though  in  both 
Slovenia (only 1% lower) and Slovakia (5% lower), it is 
expected to be so in  1998. The Czech Republic and 
Hungary are unlikely to be far behind. The largest re-
ductions have occurred in Lithuania and Latvia, with 
GOP in  1997 only some 61%,  in  the first case and 
56%, in the second, of the estimated level in 1989. In 
Estonia, GOP had, by 1997, recovered somewhat to 
around 73% of its 1989 level, bUt in  Bulgaria. it was 
down to only 63%.5 
In general, the countries which started to implement 
economic reforms earliest have tended to experience 
less of a reduction in GOP (Poland and the Czech Re-
public). Where economic restructuring was delayed, 
either for internal reasons,  as in  Romania and Bul-
garia, or for external reasons, as in the Baltic States 
(which did not become independent before 1991), 
the fall in GOP has been more severe. 
A catching-up proceu? 
As  a result of the fall in  output, real  income in  CEE 
countries. measured in terms of GOP per head. has 
declined. As reliable GOP per head figures. in terms 
of purchasing power standards (PPS) to take account 
of differences in  price levels between countries, are 
not available prior to 1993, the magnitude of this de-
cline is difficult to assess. In  1995, GOP per head, in 
PPS terms, in the CEE countries was only 38% of the 
EU  average, a major difference not only compared 
with the average of EU Member States but also in rela-
tion to the Cohesion countries (Ireland, 
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As  might  be expected.  variations  in 
GOP per head between countries are 
significant.6  Slovenia had the  highest 
level of GOP per head in 1995, at 65% 
of the EU average, closely followed by 
the Czech Republic at 62%. In Slovakia 
and Hungary, GOP per head was also 
above  the  average  in  the  region  at 
4~5%  of the EU average, while in Po-
land,  it  was  slightly  below  at  36% 
(Graph 39). The lowest levels were in 
Romania and Estonia (32% of the EU 
average), Bulgaria (28%) and the Bal-
tic States, of Estonia (32%) and Lithua-nia (28%), with Latvia having the lowest level of all the 
countries with GOP per head of only 25% of the EU av-
erage. 
The recovery in most GEE countries has seen GOP 
growth exceeding that in the EU in every year since 
1993 and has led to  some narrowing of the gap in 
GOP per head. Between 1995 and 1997, growth aver-
aged just under 4% a year in the 10 countries taken 
together, almost twice the rate in the Union, with the 
result that the gap closed over these two years from 
38% of the EU to 40%. 
The gap has not, however, narrowed in all the coun-
tries and, where it has, the extent has varied. Since 
1995, GOP growth was substantially higher than the 
EU average in Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and the Baltic States and slightly higher in Hungary. 
Between  1995 and 1997,  the catching-up process 
was most marked in Estonia, where GOP per head in-
creased from 32% of the EU average to 37%, in Po-
land, where it rose from 36% to 40% and Slovakia, 
where it rose from 43% to 47%.  In  Slovenia, the in-
crease was from 65% to 68% - to much the same 
level in  1997, therefore, as in Greece. Growth in the 
Czech Republic was a little below that in the EU,  so 
that its relative level of GOP per head has remained 
much the same. while in Romania and Bulgaria, GOP 
fell so that the gap with the EU widened. 
If growth continues at this rate, GOP per head in some 
regions.  especially  in  Slovenia  and  in  the  Czech 
Republic will over the next few years exceed 75% of 
the  EU  average.  These  regions  may  therefore  not 
qualify for Objective 1 of the Structural Funds. In the 
short-term to medium-term. however, this catching-
up process is unlikely to have major implications for 
EU structural policy. 
Shlfta In the sectoral structure of QDP 
The  GEE  countries have  experienced  a  significant 
shift in the sectoral composition of production during 
the transition, with, in general, a decline in industrial 
output and an expansion of services. This reflects. in 
part, the underdeveloped nature of the latter and the 
inability of many enterprises in the industrh:ti sector to 
compete  with  imports  from  market  economies  as 
trade  barriers  were  reduced  and ·subsidies  with-
drawn. The fall in industrial production was markedly 
greater than of GOP as a whole throughout the region, 
particularly in the early years of the transition. How-
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ever, since 1993 or so. output has risen again in most 
countries. but with a significant shift in the composi-
tion from heavy industry to consumer goods. Despite 
the substantial fall in output in the early 1990s, indus-
trial production still accounts for between 30 and 40% 
of GOP in most GEE countries. more than in most Un-
ion Member States.  7 
In contrast to industry, the underdeveloped nature of 
services before the reforms and the pent-up demand 
which transition has released have led to a significant 
rise in  the output of the sector. This has been most 
pronounced in  retailing,  hotels and restaurants.  fi-
nancial services and activities connected with tour-
ism.  By  1995, the share of services in  GOP ranged 
from some 35% in Romania to close to 65% in Estonia 
and Hungary, with the Baltic States, the Czech Re-
public  and  Slovakia  experiencing  the  highest  in-
crease. 
The development of agriculture has been more di-
verse. In most countries, production declined sharply 
in  the early years of transition as  farms were priva-
tised and collectivisation was abandoned, leading to 
an increase in the number of separate units. a reduc-
tion in average size and reduced efficiency. The fall in 
output was reinforced by the withdrawal of subsidies 
and by 1995,  agricultural production accounted for 
less than 10% of GOP in most GEE countries. The de-
cline  was  especially  marked  in  Poland.  the  Baltic 
States and Hungary, in  all of which agriculture had 
been a major source of output. It was also significant 
in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, where 
the sector was less important. By contrast, in Bulgaria 
and Romania, agricultural production has remained 
38  GDP per head in Central and Eutern 
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at much the same level in relation to GOP as before 
the transition began. 
Regional Aspects 
Reliable data for GOP per head by region are not yet 
available for the CEE countries, but preliminary esti-
mates suggest the following (Map 47). In all regions 
apart from Prague and Bratislava, GOP per head was 
below 75% of the EU average in  1995. Regional im-
balances are characterised by the relative prosperity 
of the larger urban centres. The regions of Budapest. 
Warsaw·and the Czech and Slovak capitals are, to-
gether with Slovenia, the only ones in which GOP per 
head  was  over  halt  the  EU  average.  Additionally, 
Western  regions  also tend  to  be more  prosperous 
and these, together with urban regions, typically have 
a better endowment of infrastructure. much greater 
inward flows of foreign investment and a higher rate of 
expansion of services. 
Conversely, most other regions have generally been 
more affected by the decline in industrial and/or agri-
cultural  production  which  has  only  partially  been 
compensated by expanding services. Thts 1s particu-
larly  the  case  tor  Eastern  parts  of  Poland.  North-
Eastern Romania and major parts of Bulgar1a.  Latvia 
and Lithuania where GOP per head was below 30% of 
the EU average in  1995. 
In the Czech Republic. economic act1v1ty  1s  spread 
relatively evenly across the country and reg1onal diS-
.  parities are  small.  Central  Bohemia has  the  lowest 
GOP per head, but this is probably a reflection of ex-
tensive commuting to  the  capital which largely ex-
plains the high GOP per head in Prague. At the same 
time,  Prague has clearly benefited from  the  expan-
sion  of  services and  international contacts.  Thts  is 
also true of Budapest. which is estimated to account 
for close to 60% of total FOI  going to Hungary and 
over 50% of foreign trade. As a result. GOP per head 
in the city of Budapest was over 75% of the EU aver-
age in 1995, though the level was below thiS 1n the re-
gion  as  a  whole.  Regional  disparities  are  more 
pronounced in Hungary, with Eastern parts. notably 
the North-East, particularly affected by dcchn1ng in-
dustrial and agricultural production. 
In Poland, Warsaw and Western regions have tended 
to benefit from larger inflows of foreign investment. a 
more rapid growth of trade and a faster expansion of 
services than other parts of the country. ln these re-
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gions.  GOP  per head was  in  most cases between 
30% and 50% of the EU average. Conversely, many 
regions in the North-East and South-East have been 
disproportionately affected by falling agricultural pro- · 
duction and, in some cases, the collapse of particular 
industries. In these. GOP per head was mostly below 
30% of the EU average. 
In Slovakia, a significant imbalance, accentuated by 
commuting, exists between Bratislava, which has a 
rapidly expanding service sector, and the rest of the 
country. Western areas have benefited from the prox-
imity of the Czech market, the Slovak Republic's main 
trading partner, while the Eastern areas have suffered 
a  substantial  reduction  in  industrial  production. 
though Kosice seems to have maintained a compara-
tively high level of GOP per head. In addition. rural ar-
eas located mainly in the North-Eastern and South-
Central parts of the country, have been depressed by 
the decline in agricultural production. 
Regional  disparities  in  Romania  mainly reflect  the 
spatially-differentiated  impact of  economic  and,  in 
particular. industrial decline. The Eastern regions, es-
pecially  the  North-East,  have the  lowest  GOP  per 
head. while the level is highest in Bucharest, though 
below 50% of the  EU  average in  1995.  In  Bulgaria, 
GOP per head is highest in the capital, Sofia. and the 
surrounding region as well as  in Burgas in the West. 
whereas in  the rest of the country, especially in the 
North. it was under 30% of the EU average in  1995. 
Employment 
The  number in  employment has  declined substan-
tially'" CEE countries over the transition period, partly 
reflecting the large fall in output, partly the process of 
rationalisation and restructuring to reduce overman-
ning. Because of data problems in the early transition 
years - problems which  have  subsequently been 
largely resolved through the  introduction of  house-
hold-based  labour  force  surveys  in  nearly  all  the 
countries- it is difficult to be precise about the con-
traction of employment which occurred in the early 
1990s. However, estimates suggest a fall in the num-
ber employed in  the countries excluding the Baltic 
States of somewhat over 6 million between 1989 and 
1995, a reduction of some 14%.eln the Baltic States, 
employment is  estimated to  have contracted by 1fl 
million. In general, the largest fall occurred in the early 
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employment had stabilised with some countries even 
registering a small rise. 
The extent of the fall in employment varies markedly 
between  countries,  in  part  reflecting  the  pace  at 
which reforms were introduced. Estimates suggest 
that between 1989 and 1992, the number in work fell 
by 25%  in  Bulgaria,  22%  in  Hungary and  13% in 
Slovakia and Poland. In the Czech Republic and Ro-
mania, the reduction of employment was more limited 
amounting to 9% and 5%, respectively. Despite the 
scale of the fall in employment, in a number of coun-
tries  (Bulgaria and  Romania,  in  particular),  it  was 
markedly less than the reduction in output, suggest-
ing that jobs were still being protected against market 
forces during the period and that. accordingly, em-
ployment was  maintained  at a  higher level  than  if 
more far-reaching reforms had been implemented. 
The change in employment in the Baltic States over 
the period is difficult to assess because of the lack of 
reliable data. The reduction in employment, however. 
is generally believed to have been smaller since the 
main reforms were introduced later than in the other 
countries.  Lithuania,  for  example,  had  legal  limita-
tions on lay-offs until the end of 1992, and employers 
re11ed  on unpaid leave and shorter working hours to 
cut labour inputs. 
From  1993 on.  employment in CEE countries stabi-
lised and even tended to increase after 1995. In the 
Czech  Republic.  Hungary,  Estonia  and  Lithuania, 
employment was lower in  1997 than in  1993 (Graph 
40), but the decline was concentrated in the first part 
of the period and, after 1995, the number employed 
rose. Over the four years as a whole, employment in 
Lithuania contracted by 6%, while in  Hungary, it fell 
by SY2% and in Estonia by 9%, in the two Baltic States. 
the fall reflecting the delayed start of the reform pro-
cess. Nevertheless, there was a marked rise over the 
whole period in Slovenia (6.3%) and Slovakia (4.3%). 
Most of the countries have. therefore. experienced a 
significant fall in their employment rates (the total em-
ployed in relation to population 15 to 64  ).  In 1989, the 
employment rate ranged from 70% in Bulgaria to 83% 
in  the Czech Republic.  By  1993,  rates  were below 
70%  in all countries apart from the Czech Republic 
(72%) and Romania (72%). The fall was most marked 
in Hungary and Bulgaria. In the former, employment 
was  only 55% of working-age  population,  a  fall  of 
some 20 percentage points, while it fell  by 17 per-
176 
centage points in Bulgaria and 13 percentage points 
in Slovakia. 
Since 1993, however, employment rates have stabi-
lised.  While  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Estonia  and  the 
Czech Republic have experienced a small additional 
fall, in Bulgaria and Latvia, the rate has increased. In 
Romania, the total employed was still around 74% of· 
working-age population in 1997, higher than in most 
EU  Member States.  In  the  Czech  Republic,  it  was 
some  69%,  and  in  Poland,  Slovakia  and  Latvia. 
around 60%, while in Slovenia, Estonia and Lithuania, 
it was in between the two. 
Employment of women has been more stable than 
that of men. Except for the Czech Republic. employ-
ment rates of women have contracted less than those 
of men, which is not too surprising given the sectoral 
distribution of the fall in empll)yment, which occurred 
primarily in  industry, traditionally a male-dominated 
sector,  while  services,  in  which a  disproportionate 
number of jobs are performed by  women, expanded. 
At  the  same  time,  the  recorded  figures,  including 
those based on labour force surveys, understate the 
true level of employment (just as the GOP figures un-
derstate the actual level of output and income) be-
cause  of  the  significant  numbers  working  in  the 
informal,  or  black  economy.  For  example,  unre-
corded employment is thought to represent 15-20% 
of  active  population  in  Latvia  and  around  25%  in 
Slovenia.  According to national sources. in  Poland, 
unrecorded employment is estimated at around 2.2 
million.  9  However, employment in  the  hidden econ-
omy can be temporary and less secure, supplement-
ing household income alongside the principal source 
of earnings in the formal economy. 
Shifts In the sectoral structure of employment 
Since the  transition began, many large state enter-
prises.  particularly  in  heavy  industry,  have  either 
closed or been reduced in size, while the number of 
private firms,  predominantly very small ones in ser-
vices and light industry, have increased significantly. 
Comparisons with the pre-transition period are even 
more difficult to make for changes in the sectoral dis-
tribution of employment than for changes in the total, 
because of revisions to the system and method of 
classification, which has meant that many jobs previ-
ously allocated to agriculture or industry have been 
reassigned to services. This, therefore. tends to ex-aggerate  the  shifts  between  broad  sectors  which 
have occurred and to overstate the relative growth of 
services. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that such a 
growth has occurred, even though the precise extent 
is uncertain. 
Agricultural employment has fallen in most CEE coun-
tries  but generally remains  well  above the  level  of 
most EU  Member States.  In  1997,  agricultural em-
ployment represented 6% of total employment in the 
Czech Republic, 8% in  Hungary (after a significant 
fall from  16% in  1990), 9% in Slovakia (from 15% in 
1990)  and  10%  in  Slovenia,  Estonia  and  Bulgaria 
(Graph 41 ).  In other CEE countries, the share of pri-
mary sector employment remains high (20% in  Po-
land  and  21%  in  Latvia  and  Lithuania).  though  in 
Poland,  it has fallen  since the transition began and 
has continued to decline in recent years (from 23% in 
1994). In Romania, the figure was as high as 39%. Ag-
ricultural employment, however, has not declined ev-
erywhere. In Romania. in particular. it has increased 
both in absolute and relative terms, largely due to the 
economic reforms. especially the privatisation of land 
but also the decline in industry. In Bulgaria and Lat-
via. the share has risen since 1994, while in Slovenia, 
it was much the same in 1997 as three years earlier. 
The decline of industrial employment has particularly 
affected traditional industries such as electrical and 
mechanical engineering.  steel,  chemicals and  min-
ing. Prior to transition. the share of employment in in-
dustry  was  around  40-50%  in  most  countries.  By 
1997. the share had fallen to between 25% and 33% 
in  Estonia.  Latvia,  Poland.  Hungary 
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have been more pronounced in  countries (such as 
Hungary and the Czech Republic) where service em-
ployment was  already high by CEE  standards.  By 
1997, service sector employment accounted for 59% 
of total  employment in  Hungary,  58%  in  Lithuania, 
57% in Estonia, 53% in Latvia and the Czech Repub-
lic and 52%  in  Slovakia.  In  Romania.  however, the 
share of employment in services was just 31%, well 
below that in any EU  Member State (in Greece and 
Portugal. the countries with the lowest shares, it was 
58% and 56%, respectively). 
Regional A8pecte 
The fall in employment in CEE countries has affected 
some regions much more than others. largely accord-
ing to the  sectoral  pattern of activity.  Regions with 
concentrations of heavy industry have been particu-
larly hard hit. While many rural regions with high em-
ployment  in  agriculture  have  also  suffered  a 
disproportionate loss of jobs. the tendency has been 
less widespread and in Romania.  in particular. rural 
areas have experienced much less of a decline in em-
ployment.  At the  same time.  the growth of employ-
ment in services has been concentrated in the large 
urban areas. especially the capital cities. and this has 
tended to offset the decline in industry. 
In the Czech Republic. employment has declined in 
all regions but North Bohemia and both Moravian re-
gions have been particularly affected. These regions 
have.  because of  their  high degree of  industrialis-
ation.  suffered  from  the  decline of  heavy industry. 
and  Romania.  In  other  countrtes.  the 
share remains significantly higher than 
in  the  EU  at 37% in  Bulgaria.  39%  in 
Slovakia. 42% in  the Czech  Republic 
and 43% in Slovenia. In Lithuania, how-
ever. only some 20Y2% of total employ-
ment was in  industry. less than in any 
EU Member State. 
40  ChanKe iD employment iD Central and Eastern Europe, 
1990-97 
While  the  growth  in  service  employ-
ment has been widespread across the 
region. the share is still well below the 
EU  average  (65Y2%).  The  growth  of 
service sector employment is particu-
larly marked within  areas  such  as  fi-
nance.  retailing.  and  hotels  and 
restaurants. The  increase. while com-
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This is also the case in Northern Hungary, while the 
decline of employment in  South-Transdanubia and 
the Northern Great Plain is largely due to falling num-
bers working in agriculture. The more stable develop-
ment of employment in other Czech regions is due to 
the  growth  of  services  (accounting  in  Prague  for 
some 75% of the total). Similarly, in Western and Cen-
tral Transdanubia, as well as in Budapest, the decline 
of employment has been smaller as service sector 
employment increased. 
In Poland, the fall in employment has been larger in 
voivodships with high shares of employment in indus-
try. Conversely, many voivodshipswith high employ-
ment in agriculture have fared better. However, this is 
not a uniform pattern. In general, Western parts of the 
country have been more affected by declining em-
ployment than  Eastern  regions,  while,  in  Slovakia, 
employment has fallen by more in Eastern parts. The 
only region which is an exception to this in Poland is 
Warsaw where employment rose between 1990 and 
1995. Similarly, employment increased in  Bratislava 
over the same period. while in all other Slovak regions 
it fell. Both capitals have benefited from a significant 
rise in service sector employment. In Romania, there- _ 
duction of  employment  has  been  relatively  evenly 
balanced between regions. All have experienced a 
fall but it has been particularly marked in Bucharest. 
largely due to the fact that in other regions agriculture 
has cushioned the decline. 
Accordingly, employment rates also display marked 
regional  variations.  In  Hungary.  the  rate  is  signifi-
cantly higher in  Budapest than in the North. This is 
also the case in Poland. In Slovakia, the employment 
rate in Bratislava is artificially high as a result of large-
scale commuting, though even adjusting for this, it is 
significantly above rates in the East of the country. 
while in the Czech Republic, there is less of a differ-
ence between regions. In Romania, there is also only 
a relatively small variation in rates between regions 
despite the  disproportionate fall  in  employment in 
and around Bucharest. 
Unemployment 
The large state-run enterprises that characterised the 
period before transition were heavily subsidised in  a 
number of ways, which had the effect of encouraging 
high levels of employment and labour hoarding. This 
masked the relatively unproductive nature of much em-
ployment which, under market conditions. would have 
tended to result in unemployment. Some sources sug-
gest that 'true' unemployment' may have been as high 
as 20 to 30% in the CEE countries in the 1980s. 
With the start of transition, unemployment became a 
reality. In general, unemployment rose sharply during 
the early years of transition and by early 1994, 7.5 mil-
lion  Central  and  Eastern  Europeans  were  unem-
ployed according to official estimates.  10 
GEE unemployment generally peaked in  1993 or so 
but  subsequently  stabilised  and,  especially  from 
1995 on, has tended to fall. This is the 
case in Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Lithu-
41  Employment by Hctor iD Central and Eutern EW'Ope, 
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ania, Slovakia and, to some extent. Bul-
garia.  The  Czech  Republic  was  the 
principal exception to the general rise 
of  unemployment and the  rate  is  still 
lower than elsewhere. After a rise at the 
beginning of the decade, the rate sta-
bilised at 3-4% of the labour force. This 
was the result of more favourable start-
ing conditions. the rapid growth of pri-
vate firms and an active labour market 
policy, but also withdrawals from the la-
bour force into inactivity. Moreover, in 
some  labour-intensive  industries,  re-
structuring has been slow and some la-
bour  hoarding  persists.  In  recent 
years, however, Czech unemployment 
has tended to rise and in 1997 was over 
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In the Baltic States. extensive labour hoarding largely 
restrained the rise of unemployment in the early years 
of transition. However, surveys suggest that real un-
employment was already high by 1993 and by 1995, it 
had risen to 10% or above in all three countries. Simi-
larly, unemployment in Romania was contained in the 
early years  of transition  as  economic restructuring 
was postponed and here it has been kept well below 
10% throughout the transition. 
In 1995, unemployment rates ranged from 4% in the 
Czech Republic to some 17% in Lithuania and 19% in 
Latvia. In relation to the EU average (10.7%), unem-
ployment rates were substantially higher in Lithuania, 
Latvia,  Bulgaria (14%),  Poland (13%) and Slovakia 
(13%).  By contrast.  the  Czech  Republic,  Romania 
(7%) and Slovenia (7%) had unemployment rates well 
below the EU average while they were broadly in line 
with the  EU  average in Hungary (10%) and Estonia 
(10%). 
From 1995 to 1997, unemployment fell in all the coun-
tries except Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Esto-
nia where it  increased. However, even where it has 
fallen, the rate in most cases remains relatively high 
and comparable to levels in the EU.  In  1997, unem-
ployment stood at 14% in  Latvia,  Lithuania and Bul-
garia,  12% in  Slovakia,  10% in  Poland and Estonia. 
9% in Hungary, 7% in Slovenia and just over 5% in Ro-
mania and the Czech 'Republic. 
The emergence and rise in  unemployment has  un-
doubtedly given rise to increased poverty and signifi-
cant social  problems.  Moreover,  with 
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countries,  Hungary and  Estonia,  unemployment of 
women is less than for men, the difference in 1997 be· 
ing almost 2 percentage points, while in Bulgaria, Ro-
mania,  Slovenia  and  Latvia  (there  are  no figures 
available for Lithuania), the average rate for women is 
only slightly above that for men.  In Poland, by con-
trast,  the rate of female unemployment was over 3 
percentage points higher than for men (similar to the 
difference which exists in the Union), in the Czech Re-
public,  over  2"12  percentage  points  higher  and  in 
Slovakia, over 1  Y2  points higher. 
Youth unemployment 
Unemployment  among  young  people  increased 
faster during the initial years of transition than among 
the rest of the work force, reflecting the relatively low 
rate of new job creation. By 1995, 38% of the Bulgar-
ian labour force under 25 was unemployed, the high-
est rate in the region. In Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, 
rates  were  somewhat  lower  at  31-32%.  Only  the 
Czech Republic had a single-digit youth unemploy-
ment rate at some 8%. 
In a number of countries, however, youth unemploy-
ment has come down in recent years as employment 
opportunities in  the private sector have expanded. 
From 1995 to 1997, youth unemployment declined in 
all CEE countries with the exception of the Czech Re-
public and Estonia.  Nevertheless, youth unemploy-
ment has remained clearly higher. in general twice as 
high, than the overall rate in all CEE countries except 
the Baltic States. In 1997, it.was still higher than else-
the passage of time, there has been an 
increase in  the duration of unemploy-
ment, as noted below, and a growing 
threat to social cohesion with more of 
the unemployed exhausting their enti-
tlement  to  benefit.  According  to  a 
study, only 28% of unemployed in Bul-
garia in  1994 were entitled to benefits 
and only 22% of those ceasing to draw 
benefits  in  Hungary  did  so  because 
they had found a job. 
42  Unemployment rate• in Central and Eutern Europe, 
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Female unemployment 
As in the EU, unemployment of women 
is higher than that of men in most CEE 
countries, though the difference tends 
to be  less  than  in  the  Union.  In  two 
25  %ol  Ioree 
25 
n-......................................................................  ~  ..........  ~  ~ 
15 
10  10 
5  5 
0  0 
BG  LV  LT  SK  EE  Pl  HU  Sl  RO  CZ  EUR15 
LV tNU '*·  LT ,...,,  110 CIIM  So~Re:  EunM,_, ~  u,.,.,....,l  + LFS 
179 4  Enlargement 
where in Bulgaria (36%), followed by Lithuania (26%), 
Latvia  (25%),  Poland  (23%)  and  Slovakia  (22%). 
Some studies, however, suggest that economic re-
covery  has  benefited  the  young  more  than  older 
members of the work force. This would imply that fur-
ther growth might serve to reduce youth unemploy-
ment by more than  the overall rate  because of the 
greater capacity of young people to adapt to chang-
ing economic conditions. 
Long-term unemployment 
The increase in unemployment has also given rise to 
more  long-term  unemployment.  Job-shedding, 
specially within industry, particularly affected those 
with largely redundant skills and with low capacity to 
adapt to the new demands.  By  1995, slightly more 
than  half of  the  total  unemployed had  been out of 
work for a year or more in most CEE countries. Only 
the Czech Republic (34%  ), Estonia (37%) and Poland 
(44%) had significantly lower shares of long-term un-
employment.  The  highest  levels  were  in  Bulgana 
(65%), Latvia (63%) and Slovakia (61%). In nearly all 
CEE countries. long-term unemployment was directly 
proportional to the level of education. though Roma-
nia and. to a lesser extent. Poland are exceptions as 
high levels of rural  employment have  prov1ded  the 
low-skllled with jobs. In Romania. those most affected 
were people with vocational and secondary educa-
tion rather than those with lower levels. 
11 
The  rise  in  employment which most CEE  countnes 
have experienced sine~ 1993 or 1994 has had some 
effect on the incidence of long-term unemployment 
Between 1995 and 1997, the proportion of the unem-
ployed out of work for a year or more fell  1n  all  the 
countries except Romania, where it was unchanged. 
and Estonia where it increased significantly. The fall 
in long-term unemployment was most marked 1n Bul-
garia and Poland. Nonetheless, in most countnes it 
remains higher than the EU rate, at between 50% and 
60%. Only in the Czech Republic (29%) and Poland 
· (38%) was the proportion significantly less than in the 
EU. This suggests that the problem of long-term un-
employment  may  not  be  resolved  simply  by  eco-
nomic growth. 
Regional Aspects 
There  are  significant  regional  disparities  in  unem-
ployment. These result from inherited regional imbal-
ances  as  well  as  from  new  regional  differences 
180 
caused by  varying conditions in the market economy. 
On the whole, capital city regions, large urban cen-
tres and Western regions tend to have lower unem-
ployment than the rest of the country. These generally 
benefit, as noted above, from favourable geograph-
ical positions, better infrastructure endowment and a 
higher growth of the private sector, particularly in ser-
vices. Conversely, many industrial regions have suf-
fered  a  large  rise  in  unemployment  as  they  have 
experienced difficulties in creating new employment 
opportunities and attracting new private business, as 
well  as  foreign investment.  In  rural areas,  develop-
ments are more diverse. Where agriculture has been 
restructured,  unemployment has  increased.  Where 
this is not the case, agriculture has, as noted above, 
become  an  employment  reserve  absorbing  those 
who would otherwise be unemployed. 
In Hungary, regional unemployment is lowest in Cen-
tral  Hungary (comprising Budapest) and highest in 
Northern Hungary and the Northern Great Plain.  In 
comparison, Czech regions all have relatively low un-
employment rates, but with some regional variation-
very low rates in Prague and Southern Bohemia but 
higher  rates  in  Northern  Bohemia  and  Moravia, 
largely due to the decline of coal mining and heavy in-
dustry.  In  general,  the  Eastern  regions  in  Hungary 
seem to  have been more  affected by rising  unem-
ployment than  Western  parts with  the  exception of 
Southern Transdanubia (Map 48). 
In  Poland.  regional  disparities  are  wider,  with  the 
highest rates in the North and West, where there has 
been  large-scale industrial decline,  and the  lowest 
rates in the South and parts of the East, where a high 
proportion of the work force is still employed in agri-
culture.  In  general, urban centres such as Warsaw. 
Poznan. and Katowice present the lowest unemploy-
ment levels. However, in some of them, significant re-
structuring still lies ahead. 
In  Romania,  unemployment is highest in  the  North-
East and lowest in the West.  Bucharest has experi-
enced the largest fall in employment, indicating that it 
is primarily the reduction in participation and the exo-
dus to  rural  areas which has  kept the  rate  low.  In 
Slovakia, the lowest rate of unemployment is also in 
the capital, though here the low rate in Bratislava pri-
marily reflects job growth rather than declining partic-
ipation. Unemployment is substantially higher in the 
Eastern region, which has been hit especially hard by 
the collapse in trade with the former Soviet Union. ,,,, 
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Trade 
Under the former (CMEA) trading system,  the CEE 
countries developed highly specialised and mutually 
complementary structures of production. Trade with 
the rest of the world was extremely limited, though 
over the 1970s and 1980s, it was expanded as a de-
liberate part of policy and largely to service growing 
foreign  debt.  Nevertheless,  in  1985,  under 20% of 
CEE exports went to present EU Member States. The 
low  figure  was  partly  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
reaching an agreement between the EU and the CEE 
countries to reduce restrictions on trade. The prefer-
ence in the EU was for an approach based on bilat-
eral  trade  agreements  with  each  of  the  countries 
concerned rather than with the CMEA as a group for 
fear of Soviet domination. In  1988, however, an EU-
CMEA joint declaration led to a first generation of bi-
lateral  agreements  between  the  two  sides,  giving 
'most-favoured nation' status to all countries in there-
gion, except Romania which already had a more far-
reaching trade agreement, and, as a result, there was 
some increase in trade. 
Since the transition began, the EU has concluded a 
new  generation  of  agreements with  the  candidate 
· CEE  countries,  the  Europe  Agreements  These  re-
move EU tariffs on industrial goods and progressively 
reduce quantitative restrictions (the agreements are 
asymmetrical. dismantling trade restrictions at the EU 
end first}. though some trade quotas remain on agri-
cultural products. As a result of this and the opening 
up of the CEE market, trade between the CEE coun-
tries and the EU has increased dramatically, Between 
1990  and  1996,  EU  exports  to  CEE  countries  in-
43  EU-CEEC trade balance, 1990-97 
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creased by 429% (over 5 times), while imports from 
them rose  by 263%,  so giving rise to a substantial 
trade surplus for EU Member States (Graph 43). By 
1996, some 59% of CEE exports went to the Union 
and around 58% of their imports came from the Un-
ion. Both figures were over 60% in the case of Poland, 
Estonia, Slovenia and Hungary, though only around 
35% in the case of Slovakia (for which trade with the 
Czech Republic is important) and Lithuania (for which 
trade with former Soviet Union countries remains sub-
stantial). 
For most countries in the region, therefore, the scale 
of trade with the Union in relative terms has, in a very 
short space of time, reached a similar level to that of 
trade between EU Member States. By contrast, trade 
between themselves has fallen to relatively low levels 
(12Wro of imports. 20% of exports). In  1996, EU ex-
ports to CEE countries amounted to around 10% of to-
tal Union exports to third countries. or only around 1% 
of Union GOP.  which may seem small but it is larger 
than Union exports to Japan and almost as much as 
those  to  East  Asia.  Moreover.  between  1990 and 
1996.  the growth of  exports to the region was only 
slightly smaller than the growth of those to the rapidly 
expand1ng East Asian market. 
EU exports to the reg1on.  however. go predominantly 
to three countr1es  In 1996. some 30% went to Poland. 
25%  to  the  Czech Republic  and  15%  to  Hungary. 
Equally. these three countries accounted for a similar 
proport1on of EU 1mports from CEE countries (Graphs 
45 and 46) 
During  the  Cold War.  the  EU  generally ran  a small 
trade def1c1t  w1th  the CEE countries est1mated at 0.9 
billion ECU  1n  1990.  By 1993. the pos1t1on had been 
firmly reversed w1th a trade surplus in favour of the EU 
of 5.5 billion ECU  Despite the asymmetncal nature of 
the trade agreements. the EU has continued to accu-
mulate a  substantial  trade  surplus with  CEE  coun-
tries. wh1ch m 1996 had risen to 16.5 billion ECU, well 
over 25% of  the  value of exports to  the  region.  By 
1997. the EU's trade surplus had further increased to 
over 20 b1ll1on ECU (Graph 43). 
In  1996. Latvia and Bulgaria were the only CEE coun-
tries with a trade surplus with the EU. In the case of Bul-
garia,  this  was  mainly  caused  by  a  substantial 
devaluation (Table 38). The trade deficit of CEE coun-
tries amounted in  aggregate to  7% of their total GOP 
but was substantially higher in some standing at 23% of GOP in Estonia, 15% in Latvia, 11% in Lithuania 12% in 
Slovakia  and  10%  in  the  Czech  Republic.  While  in 
many CEE countries, these deficits are financed by net 
capital inflows, all countries in the region had growing 
debts with the rest of the world, reflecting their relative 
lack of competitiveness as well as their expanding mar-
kets  and,  for  a  number  of  countries,  special 
programmes of repayment with the IMF. 
Trade with CEE countries has had a differential effect 
on EU Member States. In 1990, only Germany had a 
trade surplus with these countries.  In  1996,  all  EU 
Member States had trade surpluses. except Greece 
and Portugal which had very small deficits. Germany 
is by far the biggest exporter and importer, account-
ing for around 45% of EU exports to the region and al-
most 50% of Union imports from it (though the Nordic 
countries are more impqrtant trade partners for the 
Baltic States). This is a result partly of its geographical 
proximity.  partly of its  historical and cultural ties.  It 
also reflects, however, the extensive commercial re-
lations  and  sub-contracting  arrangements  which 
have been developed between Germany and anum-
ber of the CEE countries since the transition began. 
The next largest exporters and importers are Italy (ac-
counting for around 12% of both) and Austria (just un-
der 10%-implying that in relation to GOP, trade with 
-cEE countries is even larger than for Germany). 
Composition of trade 
In the early years of transition, exports of CEE coun-
tries were largely resource based and labour inten-
sive. while imports consisted to a much 
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ward investment, especially from EU Member States. 
In 1996, well over 70% of exports of goods from CEE 
countries consisted of manufactures and almost 80% 
of those to the EU. Moreover, whereas in 1990, machin-
ery, transport equipment and electrical and electronic 
goods accounted for only 15% of CEE exports to the 
ELJ,  by 1996, the figure had increased to 30%. 
Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the 
composition of exports between countries in the re-
gion. In Bulgaria and Romania, exports still consist to 
· a major extent of intermediate products and chemi-
cals and in Lithuania and Latvia, of raw materials and 
fuels, which is also true in Estonia, though here manu-
fac:::tures represent a growing share of total exports. 
Before transition,  imports from  the West had been 
dCiminated by capital and intermediate goods. With 
transition.  imports  have  shifted  massively towards 
cc»nsumer goods. Moreover, contrary perhaps to ex-
pectations. most CEE countries are net importers of 
food and agricultural products. Increasingly, a large 
proportion of both exports and imports of CEE coun-
tries  consists  of  manufactures,  particularly,  as  re-
gards their trade with the EU. This is a typical feature 
of trade between industrialised countries. which tend 
to  export and import the same kinds of product. re-
fle,cting consumer demand for choice as well as the 
growth of trade between subsidiaries of the same firm 
or between firms and their subcontractors. 
The present pattern of trade, however, may not be a 
good guide to the future division of labour between 
greater extent of more advanced prod-
ucts. The main exports comprised raw 
materials and highly standardised ba-
sic products. while imports were made 
up more of machinery, transport equip-
ment  and  high-tech  manufactures, 
which  partly  fed  into  the  production 
process but which were largely for final 
consumers.  deprived for  decades of 
the more sophisticated products which 
people in the EU take for granted. 
CEEC trade with the EU, 1894 and 189'7 
In  some  countries,  however  (primarily 
the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and 
Slovenia but also Poland and Slovakia). 
the  structure  of  exports  has  progres-
sively shifted towards more advanced 
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EU Member States and CEE countries. There is un-
doubtedly an element of pent-up demand behind the 
increase in imports of consumer goods resulting from 
the restrictions imposed before the reforms. The com-
position of trade may well continue to shift towards 
engineering and higher technology sectors as  new 
investment  takes  place.  reflecting  the  comparative 
advantage wh1ch stems from the existence of a highly 
qualified labour force in all CEE countries. 
FDI 
Despite  the  reduction  of  purchasing  power  in  the 
early transitiOn  years,  the  reforms in  CEE  countries 
have opened up a new market of over 100 million in-
habitants for EU producers with considerable growth 
potential. As generally happens. foreign investment 
in CEE countnes has increased as trade has grown. 
reflecting their attraction for companies in the EU as a 
result of their proximity, availability of skilled labour 
and access to EU markets through the Europe Agree-
ments. The inflow of investment has served to transfer 
technology, introduce new management techniques 
and add to jobs. 
The dismantling of barriers to foreign ownership led to a 
significant  increase  in  inward investment,  especially 
from  1991  onwards as  legal and other reforms gath-
ered pace. The cumulative stock of foreign investment 
over the period 1991  to  1996 amounted to some $30 
billion, the flows increasing from $2.1  billion in 1991  to 
$4.1  billion in 1993 and, after remaining unchanged in 
1994, to $9.5 billion in  1995, stimulated by economic 
recovery and the more firmly established transition pro-
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cess in most CEE countries. In 1996. FDI to the region 
fell  somewhat to $7.1  billion.  Nevertheless.  the  total 
stock of foreign capital in  the region remains modest 
and could increase markedly in the years to come. 
The countries vary considerably in their success in at-
tracting FDI. which seems to be related mainly to the 
perce1ved progress of transition. Those with more ad-
vanced  reform  programmes  - particularly  as  re-
gards the establishment of a suitable legal framework 
and property rights, market discipline and macroeco-
nomic  stability  - have  received  larger  1nflows 
Equally. however, geographical location. the 1mage 
projected by government and its perceived commit-
ment  to  economic reform  and,  perhaps.  the  pros-
pects for  early EU  membership seem also to have 
been factors. 
FDI.  in  pract1ce.  has been concentrated on a small 
number  of  countries.  specifically,  Hungary,  the 
Czech Republic and Poland, which together account 
for 85-87% of total inward FDI over the period 1991 to 
1996. Hungary is by far the biggest recipient. cumula-
tive inflows into the country over the period amounting 
to $12. 7 billion or some 42% of total FDI  to the CEE 
countries. a position partly explained by the fact that it 
was first country to begin economic deregulation and 
introduce  privatisation  (Graph  47).  Many  Western 
companies seeking to establish in  the CEE  market. 
therefore, chose Hungary as their regional base. 
The Czech Republic is the second largest recipient, 
cumulative inflows amounting to $7 billion over the 
period. In Poland, the third largest. they amounted to 
$5.4 billion. with significant increases in the later part of the period so that in  1996. Poland overtook Hun-
gary as the main destination of FDI in the region. In-
ward investment has been far lower in all the other 
countries in  region.  Romania ($1.1  billion) was the 
only one where the stock of FDI in 1996 exceeded $1 
billion, though it is worth noting that in  Estonia. it to-
talled $739 million, similar to that in Slovakia and more 
than in Bulgaria and, in relation to its GOP, on a par 
with the level in the Czech Republic. 
Indeed, in relation to population, Estonia is the third 
biggest recipient of FDI in the region. with cumulative 
inflows at $501  per head, after the Czech Republic 
($680) and Hungary ($1250). In these terms. Slovenia 
is  the fourth  largest recipient ($375  per head),  fol-
lowed by Latvia ($257). Despite the rise in  1995 and 
1996,  cumulative FDI  in  Poland was only $140 per 
head and it  was  much the same in  Slovakia.  This. 
however. was still much higher than in Bulgaria, Lithu-
ania and Romania where it was under $100 per head 
(only $50 in Romania). 
Regional a•pecta 
The regional distribution of FDI in the CEE countries is 
difficult to assess because of a lack of reliable data. It 
is evident. however. that the major part of inflows went 
to capital cities. large urban centres and Western re-
gions bordering the EU.  with.  in  most cases,  better 
transport links with EU markets and a more skilled la-
bour force.  In  Hungary, for example, Budapest and 
Western areas are estimated to account for 80-90% 
of total FDI. while in Bulgaria. 70% of inflows went to 
Sofia, Similarly, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
most of FDI went to Prague and Bratislava, though in 
FDI from the EU to Central and Eaatern 
Europe 
Cumulative  Cumulative 
InflOw  FDI/cap($) 
1991-92  1993-94  1995-96  1991-96  1991-96 
BG  42  160  182  384  46 
cz  1494  1541  3984  7019  680 
EE  58  372  309  739  501 
HU  2930  3436  6396  12762  1250 
LV  43  206  395  644  2S7 
LT  52  92  224  368  99 
PL  401  1122  3875  5398  140 
RO  77  441  614  1132  50 
SK  100  334  311  745  139 
Sl  154  243  350  747  375 
CEEC  3198  7947  16640  29938  284 
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Poland.  where there  are more large cities,  inflows 
were more evenly spread. (It should be noted, how-
ever. that these figures may overstate the extent of re-
gional  imbalance.  insofar  as  FDI  inflows  are 
commonly registered in  the place where investing 
company has its main office whereas the actual in-
vestment may well take place elsewhere.) 
The I!U u  a uurce of FDI 
EU Member States are by  far the largest source of FDI 
to CEE countries.  In  1995, EU  companies invested 
5.6 billion ECU in the region ($7.1  billion). their share 
of the total stock of FDI ranging from 45% in Poland to 
some 73-75% in Hungary and Slovenia.  In  line with 
FDI  as a whole, investment is concentrated in Hun-
gary, Poland and the Czech Republic, these coun- · 
tries accounting for 91% of total EU investment in the 
region in 1995. Among EU countries, Germany, Aus-
tria, France and Italy are the main sources of invest-
ment, though there are strong links between certain 
Member States and individual CEE countries. such as 
between the Nordic countries and the Baltic States, 
especially Estonia and Latvia. 
Over the period, 1992 to 1995, investment in the CEE 
countries amounted to some 13% of total EU FDI  to 
third countries, which represents a significant share 
of that going outside the  US (which accounted for 
40% of t1'1e total) and was more than to East Asia, in-
cluding China (10%). The other main investors in CEE 
countries are the US. Japan and East Asia, US com-
panies  being  important  in  Poland  (accounting  for 
32% total inflows over the period) and South Korean 
firms in Romania. 
47  FDI from the EU to Central and Eastern 
Europe, 1981-98 
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The potential effect of EU membership on  FDI  in the 
countries is difficult to predict. The accession of Portu-
gal and Spain coincided with a large rise in net inflows 
of investment from other Member States and they re-
main  among  the  largest recipients  in  terms  of  their 
GOP. Greece, on the other hand, has ,been much less 
successful in attracting inflows, suggesting that mem-
bership alone is not a sufficient condition and, for CEE 
countries, progress in implementing economic reforms 
is likely to be equally if not more important. 
4.4  Competitiveness 
The  lack of competitiveness of  CEE  economies re-
flects  the  long  period  before  transition  when  they 
were  protected from  market forces.  State  planning 
led to a distorted allocation of resources and insuffi-
cient investment in sectors with the highest return in 
the  long-term and  key  aspects of  competitiveness 
were often neglected. However, because of the lack 
of reliable data on the different aspects which deter-
mine overall trade performance. any analysis of com-
petitiveness can only be partial. The focus here is on 
research  and  technological  development.  physical 
infrastructure,  the  environment  and  human  re-
sources. Nevertheless. even in these areas. it is ques-
tionable whether  data are  comparable.  so  that  the 
results are purely indicative. 
Research and Technological 
Development 
Under the previous regime, research and technologi-
cal development (RTD) was accorded high political 
priority,  particularly  in  scientific  areas  and  certain 
special industrial sectors.  Consumer goods sectors 
and  social  sciences,  however.  were  generally  ne-
~lected.  Accordingly,  basic  research  in  science 
tends to be of high quality in CEE countries as does 
applied research  in  some  industries. and  RTD  was 
also well developed in military technology and other 
areas relating to national security (nuclear energy, for 
example). despite the restrictions imposed on tech-
nological transfers from the West. 
During transition.  RTD  in  CEE countries has  dimin-
ished  significantly  because  of  lower  State  funding 
and the exodus of researchers. In 1990, RTD expen-
diture  in  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland, 
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Slovakia  and  Slovenia  taken  together amounted  to 
1.8% of their combined GOP, slightly below the level 
in the EU (2.0%). By 1995, expenditure had fallen to 
0.9% of GOP, less than half the EU level (1.9%), with 
public spending accounting for around 50% of the to-
tal. 
Although the CEE countries often remain strong in ba-
sic  research,  their capacity for  applied research  is 
generally more limited, not least because of cuts in 
public funding,  but also because of the low level of 
private  sector  investment in  RTD,  except in  a few 
countries  such  as  the  Czech  Republic.  There  also 
tends to be a lack of interaction between business en-
terprises  and  the  research  base.  Moreover,  in  the 
early years of transition, there was a large-scale 'brain 
drain'  of  scientists  and  technicians  to  the  West 
(mainly to the  US),  though this  has  since declined. 
The main challenge facing CEE countries in this area 
now is an  'internal' brain drain. of scientists leaving 
RTD to work in private sector jobs where they do not 
apply their skills, and, because of the low salaries on 
offer,  few  new  science  and  technology  graduates 
choose to work in RTD. 12 
Physical Infrastructure 
The density of road and rail networks in CEE countries 
is  comparable  to.  and  sometimes  even  above,  the 
level in the EU. However, these networks were largely 
constructed  in  the  immediate  post-war  years  and 
were inadequately maintained in more recent times 
when new investment was limited. Accordingly, they 
are of poor quality. Moreover, the design of the trans-
port system  reflects the  pattern  of  trade  under the 
previous regime, the prime purpose being to convey 
goods between CEE countries and the former Soviet 
Union. The inadequacy of the system has become in-
creasingly evident during the transition period. 
Road networks 
The density of the road network in most of the region is 
similar to that in the EU. with Hungary and Poland hav-
ing the highest levels (1. 7 km  and 1.2 km per square 
km, respectively, in 1995), much the same as in Ger-
many, France or Austria and much higher than in the 
Cohesion countries, Ireland apart. In most other CEE 
countries, the density was comparable to that in the 
Cohesion countries (0. 7-Q.9 km per square km), with only Bulgaria, Estonia and the Slovakia having much 
lower levels (around 0.3 km per square km). 
However, the quality of the network is clearly inferior 
to that in the EU. A great many roads are single lane 
and  there  are  only  a  few  motorways  and  dual-
carriage ways. Motorways make up some 16% of the 
network in the EU but only 3% in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  Only in  Slovenia,  where  15% of roads are 
motorways, is the figure close to that in the EU, mainly 
due to its small size and the transit routes which go 
through  it.  In  Hungary,  the  Czech  Republic  and 
Slovakia, where motorways are more important than 
elsewhere in  the  region,  rnotorways  comprise only 
5-6% of the network. The position is  similar for dual 
carriage ways, which constitute 10% of the road net-
work in the EU but only 3% in CEE countries. the main 
exception being Latvia, where the figure is  13%. 
Problems of the road network also have a regional di-
mension. The best roads are typically in and around 
the large cities, while the more remote rural and, in 
some cases.  industrial areas are badly connected. 
Moreover, urban centres are seldom linked to each 
other but rather to the neighbouring hinterland and 
there is no effective international road network. 13 This 
is a problem which is compounded by 1nadequac1es 
at border crossings. which impedes trade between 
countries in  the  region as  well  as  w1th  the  EU.  and 
which urgently needs to be addressed. 
Rail transport 
The  railway  network in  CEE  countries  (5.6  km  per 
square km) is slightly denser than in the EU (5.2 km). 
Density is highest in the Czech Republic ( 10.7 km per 
square  km),  followed  by  Hungary  (8.3  km)  and 
Slovakia (6.9 km) and is lowest in Estonia (2.2 km) and 
Latvia (3.2 km). 
Like  roads.  however,  the network  IS  of  much lower 
quality than in the EU. Lines are in most cases single 
track, which causes delays and reduces efficiency. 
Only 26% of the CEE rail network is  double track as 
against 44% in the EU, though under 20% in Greece 
and Portugal (as well as Finland and Sweden). In Po-
land, the figure is the same as in the Union and in Lith-
uania,  37%.  while  in  Bulgaria  and  Romania.  by 
contrast. only 2 to 4  "'o of the network is double track. 
Moreover, only 23% of  the network is electrified as 
compared with 40% in the EU, though again the figure 
4  Enlargement 
is  well  above  that  in  Greece  and  Portugal. 
Electrification, like double track lines, is most preva-
lent in Poland (38%) and Lithuania (29%) as well as in 
Slovakia (29%), while in Bulgaria, Romania and Lat-
via, less than 10% of  the network is electrified. In addi-
tion, safety standards are low with tracks often warn 
out, rolling stock is outdated and the lack of servicing 
causes frequent breakdowns. As with  roads,  there 
are inadequate rail links between the main urban cen-
tres in the region as well as with the EU and border 
crossings can be lengthy. New investment is, there-
fore, required to improve the standard of the system. 
Environment 
All the CEE countries have suffered severe environ-
mental  degradation.  Their  development under the 
former regime took no account of the effect on the en-
vironment and there was no system of regulation. In-
dustries consumed  excessive  amounts  of energy, 
generated largely by cheap but dirty sources such as 
brown coal, and production processes were charac-
terised by obsolete technology with little or no effort to 
reduce the pollution caused. Mining and quarrying 
were intensive and mostly inefficient and have left 
many sites derelict and unusable. 
With transition, political awareness of environmental 
problems has increased significantly and measures 
have been taken in all countries to combat environ-
mental  problems.  Legislation  against  pollution  has 
been introduced progressively, partly driven by the 
need to conform to the EU acquis, modern technol-
ogy has altered methods of production and traditional 
heavy industry has declined, all serving to alleviate 
environmental problems in the region. 
Nevertheless.  considerable problems remain.  CEE 
countries need to go further in establishing regula-
tions and changing production techniques. Because 
of the cost involved, large sections of agriculture and 
industry do not apply effective environmental protec-
tion  measures.  Although  legislation  is  being  intro-
duced, the requirements it imposes are less than in 
the EU and there are problems with implementation. 
Moreover, as well as reducing present pollution, there 
is the legacy of the past to tackle, which means clean-
ing up sites made unusable by the dumping of waste 
or the extraction of minerals. The costs of doing so, 
however, are considerable and the CEE countries are 
unlikely to be able to bear them alone. 
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Air pollution 
Air pollution is a major threat to health. In GEE coun-
tries, the main cause is the heavy reliance on coal as 
a source of energy. Coal accounts for 75% of total en-
ergy produced in  Poland and 24%  in  Hungary,  as 
against an average of 19% in OECD countries
14 and 
the problem is compounded by the use of low quality 
coal producing a high level of emissions. 
Although motor vehicles are not yet a serious environ-
mental  problem,  except in  some  inner  city  areas. 
such as in Budapest, this is mainly because of low car 
ownership compared to the EU. However. car owner-
ship  has  risen  strongly  in  the  1990s  and  mobile 
sources of air pollution are likely to increase as real in-
come rises. 
During the transition, air pollution has diminished. In 
1996, emissions of carbon dioxide (C02- the main 
source  of  the  greenhouse  gases  responsible  for 
global warming) were some 20% lower than in  1990 
and those of sulphur dioxide (S02-a major cause of 
acid rain) over 30%  lower.  However.  in  most  GEE 
countries, oil and brown coal remain the main energy 
sources and  air pollution.  despite declining.  is  still 
high. 
Carbon dioxide emissions are over 10% higher than 
in the EU (9.2 tonnes per head of population per year 
as against 8.2) and in  Estonia (19 tonnes per head) 
and the Czech Republic (15 tonnes per head) much 
higher still. On the other hand, in Hungary, Slovenia 
and Romania (all around 6-7 tonnes per head), emis-
sions are below EU levels. 
Emissions of sulphur dioxide are generally far higher 
than in the EU, notably in the Czech Republic ( 125 kg 
per head), Estonia (96 kg) and Hungary (73 kg). (For 
comparison, the corresponding figure in Austria is 9 
kg.)  Emissions  of  nitrogen  oxide  (N02  - another 
cause of plant damage as well as of smog), however. 
are similar to, and in some cases below. EU levels. In 
Poland (29 kg per head). the level is much the same 
as in Austria and less than in Italy. while in the Czech 
Republic (36 kg), it is similar to that in  the Nether-
lands. 
Annual emission levels, on  the other hand. conceal 
substantial variations over the year.  In Katowice, for 
example, levels of black smoke in the Winter can be 
six times higher than in the  EU,  and regions where 
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heavy  industry  and  coal  mining  co-exist,  such  as 
Northern Bohemia, are also particularly affected. De-
spite the extent of air pollution, governments in GEE· 
countries have tended to give more emphasis to tack-
ling other environmental problems and its further re-
duction  will  probably  depend  on  shifting  to  less 
polluting energy sources. 
Waste disposal 
Environmental problems in the region also stem from 
large-scale, and often unsafe, disposal of waste. The 
extent of the problem, however, is difficult to assess, 
once again because of the lack of data. While domes-
tic  waste  has  clearly  increased  since  transition 
(though remaining below EU levels) and will continue 
to  rise  with  rising  real  income  levels,  especially in 
large  cities  like  Prague,  Budapest,  Warsaw  and 
Bratislava. the change in industrial waste is unknown, 
partly because of the probable dumping of some of 
the hazardous waste produced in  municipal landfill 
sites 15. The waste that has been disposed of at indus-
trial sites has led. in many cases. to  degradation of 
groundwater. and a particular problem is the dump-
ing  of  ash  from  thermal  power stat1ons  and military 
equipment wh1ch sometimes has high levels of radio-
activity. 
The  enwonmental damage caused  by  waste  is  in-
creased  by  tne  lack  of  appropriate  management 
programmes  In many countries. nearly 80% of waste 
is disposed of 1n landfill sites. much h1gher than in the 
EU. where the h1ghest figure is 60%. Hazardous and 
municipal waste are often disposed of  at  the  same 
site with no separation· and with only limited protec-
tion against seepage into groundwater  Landfill sites. 
moreover. are '" short supply and disposal costs are 
rising, so Increasing the amount of  illegal dumping. 
As a result. groundwater and soil pollution has risen 
and depos11s of other toxic wastes. such as mercury, 
and C02 from waste deposits. have increased. The 
need  is,  therefore.  for  improved  management  of 
waste disposal and more recycling. 
Water pollution 
Water supplies in the region are also affected by pol-
lution, notably rivers close to urban or industrial areas 
which are often contaminated by waste water from in-
dustry  and  households  as  well  as  by  agriculture. 
Again, the extent of the problem is difficult to assess, 
though estimates suggest that there is  significantly higher water abstraction in C~  countries in relation 
to availability than in the EU, reflecting more intensive 
use of water and resulting in a shortage of clean water 
in some regions.  In addition, a smaller proportion of 
the  population  is  connected to  public waste  water 
treatment facilities than  in  the  EU  and,  while  water 
supply and sewage collection is  generally satisfac-
tory, such facilities need to be extended. 16 
Moreover. there is a clear difference between urban 
and rural areas. In rural areas, a significantly smaller 
proportion of the population is connected to the pub-
lic water supply and wastewater disposal systems. 17 
These areas are also heavily affected by nitrate pollu-
tion,  caused  partly by the  fertilisers and  pesticides 
used in agriculture. In Hungary, estimates suggests 
that agriculture is the second biggest cause of water 
pollution, though overall, agriculture is a less impor-
tant source than in the EU. 18 
Human resources 
The labour force in CEE countries is generally highly 
qualified, but mainly in areas which reflect the priori-
ties of the education system under the former regime, 
such as in science and technology rather than in eco-
nomics. law or management, all areas which need to 
be strengthened in the new market environment. 
Overall participation in education and training among 
15 to 24 year olds is similar to that in the Union, with 
h1gher rates among both men and women than in the 
EU in Hungary and Poland, similar rates in the Czech 
Republic  and  Slovakia  and  lower ones  in  Romania 
and Bulgaria (though the data available relate to 1993 
and do not cover the Baltic States or Slovenia).,; The 
change in  participation rates.  however, has differed 
between the CEE countries. While participation in ed-
ucatiOn in the early transition years rose significantly 
in Hungary, it fell in Bulgaria and, to a lesser extent, in 
the Czech Republic, while in  Romania,  there was a 
marked increase among women. 
Primary  education  is  generally  of  high  standard, 
which  is  reflected  in  low  rates  of  illiteracy,  though 
compared  to  the  EU,  the  total  number of  hours  of 
teaching tends to be smaller. At secondary levels, a 
higher proportion of  students than  in  the  EU,  espe-
cially  of  men,  undertake  specialised  or  vocational 
training courses (except in Bulgaria). There are cur-
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rently  moves to prolong  secondary education  in  a 
number of the countries. 
Universities are generally of high standard, particu-
larly in  technical areas.  Nevertheless,  university at-
tendance  is  lower than  in  the  EU.  Whereas  in  the 
Union, university students accounted for  14o/o of all 
those at school or college in 1995, the proportion was 
smaller  throughout  the  region,  with  only  Bulgaria 
(13%) having a similar level. In Poland, Hungary, Ro-
mania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the figure 
was only 6 to 8%. While almost 25% of 20 year olds in 
the EU are enrolled in universities, only around 10% 
are in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania. Par-
ticipation, however, has increased during the transi-
tion,  partly because of  a lack of  job opportunities, 
though also because of the new demands of the la-
bour market. 
In most countries, there is a growing demand among 
students  to  study social  sciences,  especially eco-
nomics and law,  but teaching in these areas is less 
developed. There is a need for investment in better fa-
cilities, improved teaching material and the retraining 
of academic staff. 
Although vocational training systems are sometimes 
well developed, there is a need to improve the quality 
of general secondary vocational education. In partic-
ular, vocational courses tend to be narrowly special-
ised  and  do  not  provide  students  with  the  skills 
necessary in a market economy.  In some countries, 
there is also a need to improve general standards and 
to  increase flexibility,  so that students in  vocational 
training are able to go on to higher education. 
Education systems in CEE countries,  however, vary 
markedly  between  regions.  There  are  significantly 
fewer primary and secondary schools, and fewer fa-
cilities, in rural than in urban areas, while universities 
are predominantly located in the capital cities and re-
gional centres.  Moreover, with  transition,  there  has 
been an increasing concentration of students in the 
main university centres, often located in  the capital 
cities (except in Poland). 
The  above analysis has  indicated major shortcom-
ings in key aspects of competitiveness in CEE coun-
tries,  particularly in. transport and the  environment. 
Substantial investment in these areas is necessary to 
improve their prospects for long-term growth and to 
facilitate their full integration into the EU economy. 
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4.5  Administrative structure 
CEEC regional policies 
Before  the  transition.  imbalances between  regions 
were  addressed  through  the  ailocation  of  state-
controlled  investment.  This  sometimes meant that 
new industries were located in  regions which were 
not necessarily the best so far as their long-term de-
velopment was concerned. 
With  transition.  the role of the state in  the economy 
has been significantly reduced. In the face of high in-
flation and debt problems in the initial years, newly-
elected governments granted priority to macroeco-
nomic stability. and tighter fiscal and monetary poli-
cies reduced the scope for regional policy. Available 
financial resources were concentrated in growth cen-
tres and expanding sectors. M"oreover. the view was 
that market forces would help to achieve an accept-
able balance of economic activity between regions. 
Consequently, the re-organisation of administrations 
in  the  late  1980s  (Poland  and  Hungary),  the  early 
1990s (the Baltic States and Slovenia) and 1993 (the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia) gave only limited con-
sideration to regional policy. 
Most CEE countries.)lowever, have increasingly re-
cognised the importance of regional policy. As eco-
nomic  stability  has  been  achieved,  development 
policies. mainly at national but also at regional level. 
have been accorded higher priority and the need to 
address grow1ng  regional  disparities has  been ac-
knowledged.  There  has  also  been  some  decen-
talisation of government and a strengthening of the 
role of regional bodies, which has encouraged gov-
ernments m some degree to add a regional dimen-
sion  to  their  national  development  policies.  In 
addition, the prospect of EU membership and of eligi-
bility for  assistance from  the  Structural  Funds  is  a 
strong incentive for the countries to develop the insti-
tutional capacity needed in this regard. 
Accordingly, regional  development measures have 
begun to be implemented, though they are generally 
confined to one-off projects targeted on specific re-
gions or municipalities. and in most countries there is 
no comprehensive  regional  development strategy. 
Assistance to  regions is  provided through  sectoral 
policies, with little coordination and without clear de-
velopment objectives. Elements of a more compre-
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hensive regional poliCy, however. have been gradu-
ally introduced in some countries and there are plans 
in most to establish a specific regional development 
policy, but this has proved to be a lengthy process. At 
present, only Hungary, Romania and Latvia have a 
specific legal basis for regional  policy.  In  Slovenia 
and Bulgaria, a draft law is being discussed in Parlia-
ment, but elsewhere,legislation is still at a conceptual 
stage. 
The situation in each country is set out in more detail 
below. 
In Bulgaria, a regional policy is being established in 
line with its constitution stipulating the need to ensure 
balanced development between regions. At present, 
regional measures are formulated as part of national 
development policy and implemented on a sectoral 
basis. Regions with structural problems are targeted 
through  special  programmes  mainly  aimed  at  im-
proving infrastructure and the environment.  Munici-
palities with high unemployment can also be eligible 
for assistance. A draft Bill on Regional Development. 
which will form the legal basis for policy, setting out 
the  guidelines for  a comprehensive regional  policy 
targeting backward, industrial and rural areas.  is  in 
preparation. 
In  the  Czech Republic,  the Government has.  in  the 
past. given short-term assistance to regions with high 
unemployment. Recently, it has adopted a more ac-
tive approach to regional development. Following po-
litical debate.  the  Principles of Regional Economic 
Policy was Introduced defining the aims and proce-
dures concerning policy in this area. An act of parlia-
ment is being prepared on these lines and will form 
the legal basis for regional policy. In addition, a Minis-
try of  Regional  Development has recently been es-
tablished and is preparing the policy measures and 
instruments to be used. After accession, the Ministry 
will be responsible for coordinating structural support 
from the EU. 
In  Estonia.  regional development policy consists of 
measures formulated as part of national development 
policy·.  In  accordance  with  the .Government's  Re-
gional Policy Guidelines. regional development initia-
tives are  implemented on a sectoral basis and the 
Government considers that all regions outside Tallinn 
should be entitled to support. A Strategy for Regional 
Policy is currently under preparation which will deter-mine the main guidelines and priorities and which will 
be the basis for a national development programme. 
Hungary was the first CEE country to have a specific 
regional policy. This is based on the Act on Regional 
Development and Physical  Planning,  which  deter-
mines the guiding principles of policy, such as pro-
gramming and the regional allocation of resources. 
Following this, the National Concept on Regional De-
velopment has  been  adopted setting out the  aims 
and priorities of policy, and the authorities are pre par-
. ing a National Development Programme. Support is 
mainly targeted on less developed areas,  industrial 
and rural regions and those with high long-term un-
employment. 
In  Latvia,  the  government has  recently  adopted  a 
Concept tor Regional Policy which sets out the aims 
and priorities. The Law on Development Planning and 
the  Law on Assisted Areas form the legal basis, in the 
first  case,  for  spatial  planning  and  regional  policy 
and,  in  the  second,  for  state  support  to  less-
developed  regions.  While  regional  development 
measures have  so far  mainly been  designed on  a 
sectoral basis, more comprehensive regional devel-
opment programmes are under preparation targeting 
backward areas. The financial means of support will 
also be strengthened by the creation of a regional de-
velopment fund. 
Lithuania has no specific regional policy but Regional 
Policy Guidelines were introduced in July 1998, set-
ting out the main principles of policy and forming the 
basis for  prospective legislation. Regional develop-
ment initiatives are implemented at  a sectoral level 
and  the  increasing  number  of  development 
programmes  being  introduced  (such  as  the  draft 
programme  for  Eastern  Lithuania  and  coastal  re-
gions) are mainly sectoral in nature. 
In Poland, the Government has accepted the recom-
mendations of the Task Force for Structural Policy, in-
cluding the  proposal to establish a regional  policy, 
but as yet no specific policy exists.  Regional assis-
tance is provided on  the  basis of the  Principles  of 
State Regional Policy,  adopted in  1995. which sets 
out  the  guidelines  for  regional  development initia-
tives, which are primarily sectoral in nature. Regions 
targeted for assistance include old industrial areas 
and urban and rural areas threatened by the decline 
of agriculture or particular industries. The drafting of a 
strategy  for  regional  development  setting  out  the 
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aims and priorities has been initiated and this will form 
the basis of integrated programmes. 
In Romania, regional policy up until1998 was imple-
mented within a spatial planning framework targeting 
public investment on backward areas. A Law on Re-
gional Development was then introduced, based on 
the Green Book on Regional Development Policy and 
Analysis, which was produced with EU support. This 
is aimed at establishing a coherent legal and institu-
tional framework for regional programmes. It also en-
visages  the  creation  of  8  macro-regions and  of  a 
National Agency tor Regional Developmentwhich will 
be  responsible  for  managing  assistance  from  EU 
Structural Funds after accession. 
In  Slovakia,  regional  development  initiatives  have 
been implemented through sectoral policies on the 
basis of the Principles for Economic Policy. However, 
the Government has recently approved the Concept 
on State Regional Policy, setting out the general prin-
ciples  of  policy  and  the  format  of  regional 
programmes and, following this, plans to introduce a 
Regional Development Act.  Regional  assistance is 
mainly targeted at regions with high unemployment 
and takes the form of state subsidies and credit facili-
ties. though a regional development fund is planned. 
In Slovenia,  regional policy is primarily aimed at ar-
resting  population  decline  in  mountainous  areas. 
Support  for  rural  restructuring,  the  promotion  of 
SMEs, investment in infrastructure and integrated de-
velopment programmes comes from a Regional De-
velopment Fund, financed partly by the receipts from 
privatisation. A Law on Regional Development Pro-
motion is being finalised, under which assistance will 
be targeted on less developed areas, areas in indus-
trial decline and border regions.  A Strategy for Re-
gional Development Promotion is being prepared in 
parallel which will set out the guidelines for national 
development programmes and the  coordination of 
sectoral policies. 
l~stitutional structure of regional policy 
In most CEE countries, regional policy is the responsi-
bility of a Ministry with horizontal functions and limited 
operational capacity. These ministries are primarily 
concerned with the development of policy, though in 
some  cases,  they  have  a  coordinating  role.  Their 
main function is to prepare draft legislation and re-
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forms of existing policy. Although they are responsi-
ble for designing regional development initiatives in 
some countries, responsibility for implementation re-
sides mainly with the relevant sectoral Ministry or with 
government  representatives  in  the  regions  con-
cerned.  In  some countries,  the  Ministry or agency 
which will be responsible for managing support from 
the EU Structural Funds after accession has already 
been  nominated,  specifically in  Romania  (National 
Agency for Regional Development), the Czech Re-
public (Ministry of Regional Development) and Latvia 
(Ministry of Finance). 
Inter-Ministerial councils (the National Council for Re-
gional Policy in Hungary and the National Regional 
Policy Council in Estonia, for example) have been es-
tablished in most countries to coordinate sectoral pol-
icy,  usually  comprising  representatives  from  the 
relevant  Ministries.  In  some  countries,  these  also 
have a policy role in putting forward proposals tor re-
gional support schemes. However, sectoral policies 
tend to be only very loosely coordinated and regional 
development measures generally lack common ob-
jectives. 
The CEE countries retain a centralised administrative 
structure. Regional authorities are an integral part of 
the state administration. Local self-government, how-
ever,  which was  introduced with  the  reforms  is  al-
ready  well  established.  The  typical  situation, 
therefore, is one of a two-tier structure of government 
consisting of the centre and self-administered munic-
ipalities.  Regional  development  initiatives.  intro-
duced by sectoral Ministries, are  formulated  at the 
centre with  municipalities being responsible  in  the 
main for implementation. Hungary, Latvia and Roma-
nia are exceptions since regional bodies can formu-
late development plans. 
In many countries, a process of decentralisation has 
begun with the aim of strengthening the regional level 
of administration by establishing self-governing re-
gional bodies. This is the case in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, in particular, while 
in Poland, legislation on a new territorial structure has 
recently  been  adopted,  under  which  16  macro-
regions will  be created in  place of the  present 49 
voivodships, which will be responsible, among other 
things, for social and economic development in their 
area. Since delegation of powers to a regional tier of 
administration,  however,  is  always  a  politically-
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sensitive  issue,  decentralisation  in  CEE  countries 
may be a lengthy process. 
4.6  Conclusions 
The concern above has been to analyse the demo-
graphic and economic situation in CEE countries and 
regions, the changes which have occurred since the 
transition began and to assess the development of 
policies for regional cohesion, which will be a central 
issue at accession. Overall, the findings confirm the 
profound economic and social transformation which 
has taken  place over this period.  While  there have 
been adverse effects on standards of living and em-
ployment  as  well  as  some  net outward  migration, 
much  of  these  might  well  have  occurred  anyway 
given the pressures which were emerging under the 
former regimes. 
There are now clear signs that the position has stabi-
lised and that many of the elements have been put in 
place for sustained growth in the future. The evidence 
.  is that. in general, the countries that have done most 
to implement economic reforms have been more suc-
cessful in achieving macroeconomic stability and se-
curing  recovery,  whereas  in  those  where  reforms 
have been delayed, often in an attempt to mitigate the 
social costs, recovery has been slower. 
A major feature of the adjustment process has been a 
significant fall in output, the scale of which has varied 
across the  region,  the  largest falls occurring in  the 
Baltic States. Bulgaria and Romania with more mod-
est reductions in  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic and 
Slovenia.  As a result,  GOP  per head has  declined 
since the  start of  transition,  the  fall  being concen-
trated in the early years, and since 1993 or 1994, re-
covery  has  begun  in  most  countries  with  some 
catching up in relation to the EU. This is most clearly 
the case in  Estonia,  Poland,  Slovakia and Slovenia. 
Accordingly, it is no longer certain that all of the re-
gions will be eligible for Objective 1 status when the 
time comes tor them to join the EU. 
The  fall  in  production  has  had  adverse  conse-
quences on the labour market. Employment plum-
meted in most countries in the early 1990s and the 
composition has shifted towards services. Unem-
ployment has become a reality, though the rate var-
ies significantly between countries, from over 14% . 
- in 1997 in Bulgaria. Latvia and Lithuania to just over 
5% in  the Czech Republic and Romania. The de-
cline in job opportunities has particularly affected 
the young and the older members of the work force. 
On the whole. large urban cenrres, especially capi-
tal cities. as well as Western regions bordering the 
EU, which profit from better location and infrastruc-
ture. have lower rates of unemployment. 
Trade and direct investment developments confirm 
that there has been increasing economic integration 
between the EU and CEE countries. The EU is now the 
predominant trading partner for all countries in there-
gion except Lithuania and Slovakia. Exports to the EU 
have been stimulated by initially asymmetrical trade 
agreements. though the EU has a substantial surplus 
on trade with the region as a whole, partly reflecting 
the  considerable  demand  for  Western  consumer 
goods which were not previously available, as well as 
for capital goods for  the modernisation of industry. 
The opening of the CEE countries is also reflected in 
growing FDI,  most of this  coming from  the  EU  and 
Hungary being the main recipient, followed by (in re-
lation to population) the Czech Republic and Estonia. 
Despite  significant  structural  problems.  most  GEE 
countries have yet to develop coherent reg1ona/ poli-
cies. After reform. priority was g1ven to reducmg state 
intervention  and  securing  macroeconom1c  stability 
4.7  Cyprus 
Cyprus is different from the other candrdate countries 
in  a number of ways.  In  the  f1rst  place.  its  GOP  per 
head20 is significantly higher than the level in Central 
and Eastern European countries. and broadly com-
parable  to  Greece and Portugal  Although  harmo-
nised PPS figures do not exist yet. the GOP per head 
of Cyprus in these terms may be close or even above 
75% of the EU average, with potentialrmplications for 
eligibility tor Objective 1 at accessron. Secondly, the 
Cyprus economy is not in transitiOn.  the progress of 
which is the main preoccupatiOn in  the other candi-
date countries. By contrast. Cyprus is a market econ-
omy  dominated  by  services.  Finally,  the  de  facto 
partition following the events of 197  4 colour any anal-
ysis of the island's economy and a distinction should 
be drawn between the northern and southern parts of 
the island. Sometimes data are only available for the 
latter. 
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with  inevitable  constraints  on  public  budgets.  In-
creasingly,  however,  Governments are  adopting a 
more positive approach to regional policy in view of 
the need to address emerging spatial disparities as 
well as the structural development of the economy as 
a  whole.  Nevertheless.  the  decentralisation  of  re-
sponsibilities necessary for an effective regional pol-
icy is likely to be a lengthy process and the countries 
need to continue their efforts to establish the struc-
tures and procedures necessary for them to receive 
support from the EU Structural Funds. 
The economic impact of enlargement is likely to be 
generally positive.  So far,  there have been mutual 
benefits for both sides. For producers in regions in 
both CEE  countries and EU  Member States.  major 
new market opportunities have opened up and ac-
cession will intensify trade.  In  addition,  there have 
also been significant flows of direct investment into 
CEE countries. With accession, the regions of CEE 
countries can expect to benefit from the EU Structural 
Funds. aimed at promoting economic convergence 
and cohesion. Membership will imply full harmonisa-
tion with the EU acquis with consequences for social 
and environmental standards. In  the longer-term. a 
new division of labour is likely to emerge based on 
comparative advantage leading to general increases 
in  economic efficiency for the enlarged Union as a 
whole. 
Demography 
Analysis of demography is complicated by the exis-
tence of two categories of population: the official pop-
ulation comprises members of the two communities 
and legal immigrants, while the actual population in 
the northern part, also includes settlers from Turkey. 
These two have changed in different ways. Total ac-
tual population increased by just under 1  Y2% a year 
between 197  4 and 1996, largely because of a high 
natural growth, especially the population of the south-
ern part of the island, even though their fertility rate 
(2.1 ).  which is falling, is in fact close to that which is 
consistent with an unchanged population (Table 39). 
The population of the northern part of the island has 
been greatly affected by emigration which has led to 
a loss of 30,000 people since 1974. In addition, the 
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fertility rate is declining rapidly and has resulted in a 
fall in the legal population estimated by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Cyprus at just over 1% a year 
since 197  4. The actual population in the northern part 
of the island, however. is increasing rapidly (by an es-
timated 2~%  a year) because of settlement from Tur-
key. There has also been a net inflow of migrants into 
the southern part of the island, averaging just over 1% 
a year between 1974 and 1996. 
Labour market 
The Cypriot economy has been close to full employ-
ment for some time (no figures are available tor the 
northern part of the island). Between 1990 and 1993. 
except briefly in 1991 during the Gulf crisis. both la-
bour supply and demand increased significantly, ttie 
latter by more than the former. causing serious labour 
shortages. As a result, the Government introduced a 
policy of encouraging inflows of labour from abroad. 
In 1994, these constituted 6% of the total number em-
ployed. The labour supply has also been increased 
by the return of expatriates. 
In 1995, over 73% of the Cypriots of working age were 
economically active, which is well above the EU aver-
age and that in most GEE countries. Declining growth 
from 1996 might result in higher unemployment and. 
in turn. somewhat lower activity rates.  However. the 
decline in employment may not be very much. be-
cause activity in Cyprus is concentrated in services. 
particularly in those sectors such as tourism or finan-
cial services where labour demand is on a long-term 
upward trend. The growth of the labour force and the 
maintenance of near full employment suggest that the 
labour market is reasonably flexible. 
Economy 
Since 1974, economic developments in the two parts 
of the island have differed. After a significant down-
turn following the events of 197  4. GOP in the southern 
part of the island had increased by 1978 to the 1973 
level for the island as a whole. Since then. it has grown 
strongly, if at varying rates. and in the past few years. 
growth has exceeded that  in  the  EU.  though there 
was a slowdown in 1996 (to 2%)  (Table 40). 
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Despite several periods of high growth-such as be-
tween 1985 and 1990 when there was an influx of for-
eign direct investment - GOP in the northern part of 
the island has remained lower than in the  southern 
part of the island. Since 1991, following the Gulf war 
and the failure of the Polly Peck group, growth has 
been slow, averaging only just over }2% a year be-
tween 1990 and 1996. 
More generally, the northern economy has been ad-
versely affected by several problems. notably the use 
of the Turkish lira,  which has led to the import of high 
rates of inflation. and the weakness of investment (Ta-
ble 41 ). In addition, income from tourism has not com-
pensated  for  the  very  large  visible  trade  deficit 
(exports amounting to only 20% of imports) and, de-
spite large inward transfers. there was a substantial 
balance of payments deficit on current account (20% 
of GOP). 
GDP per head 
At  current  exchange rates.  GOP  per  head  in  the 
southern part of the island amounted to 60% of the EU 
average m 1997. However. adjusting for differences 
in purchasmg power. it may possibly be the case that 
the  level  exceeds  75%  of  the  EU  average,  which 
would mean the country not be1ng eligible for Objec-
tive  1  ass1stance.  though it  should  be  emphasised 
that no olf1C1al estimates are as yet available. 
Since 1974. GOP per head has diverged between the 
northern and southern parts of the island; at present 
GOP per head tn the former is only around 30% of that 
in the latter (3.240 ECU as against 10,900 ECU at cur-
rent exchange rates).This disparity is reflected in dif-
ferences 1n almost all parts of the economy, though a 
number of social indicators are similar in value (such 
as  the  number of people per hospital bed and the 
number of pupilS per teacher}. 
Employment 
Since 1990. employment has grown markedly in the 
southern  part of  the  island.  In  1995. the  number in 
work rose by some 3% and. though growth slowed in 
1996. new job opportunities are still being created. As 
a result. the employment rate remains high at around 
70% of working-age population, well above the  EU 
average. Accordingly, labour shortages have materi-
alised, especially in some activities demanding high (13) 
skills, an~  may constrain economic growth in the next 
few years. 
Growth of services is reflected in the sectoral compo-
sition of employment.  In  1995, jobs in  services ac-
counted  tor  over  63%  of  the  total  following  a 
significant shift out of agriculture and, to a lesser ex-
tent,  industry into tourism and other services. Tour-
ism, in particular, is estimated directly to employ 10% 
of those in work and to be responsible indirectly for 
20% of jobs in the economy. 
Unemployment 
Unemployment is significantly lower in the  southern 
part of the island than in the EU.  In  1995, it was only 
2.6% of the labour force and, though it rose in 1996 as 
a result of a downturn in economic activity, it was still 
only 3.1 %, close to the rate estimated to be equivalent 
to  full  employment.  Unemployment,  moreover,  re-
mains  low even among young  people and women 
and the only group for whom the rate is relatively high 
are those over 50. 
While  reliable  figures  are  not  available,  unemploy-
ment seems to be higher in the northern part of the is-
land. 
Trade 
Cyprus has strong trade links with the EU.  reflecting 
the close economic ties with the Union. Some 55% of 
exports of  goods go to the  EU  and over 50% of im-
ports originate from the Union. In addition, the EU ac-
counts for over 60% of income from tourism.21 
The composition of trade reflects the structure of eco-
nomic activity. The main products exported are cloth-
ing,  footwear,  potatoes  and  citrus  fn:its.  Services, 
however, account for almost 75% of total export earn-
ings and offshore activities for 7.5%. Accordingly, the 
economy is significantly exposed to  the volatility of 
tourism, and the  balance of payments tends to go 
into deficit when the number of visitors declines, as 
happened in  1995 and 1996. 
Competitiveness 
The Cypriot economy  is characterised by low levels 
of productivity. According to official estimates, GOP 
per person employed amounts to only some 55% of 
4  Enlargement 
the EU average. The difference is even wider in man-
ufacturing, where productivity is just 3Q-40% of the 
level in Spain, reflecting serious deficiencies in ad-
vanced technology. modern management systems 
and vocational training. As a result, unit labour costs 
are higher than in the EU. Government policy is aimed 
at raising productivity, which is projected to increase 
relative to the EU level in the coming years. 
Regional policy 
Because of its size.  a genuine regional policy has 
never been established in Cyprus. There are special-
ised government services for town and country plan-
ning as well as the supervision of municipalities. but 
no specific measures for tackling regional disparities. 
Preparations for the implementation of EU structural 
policies  are  being  made  by the  Planning  Bureau. 
which is responsible for the State investment budget. 
The possible unification of the island. with the major 
disparities which exist between the two parts, would 
result in significant internal pressure for the develop-
ment of a regional policy. 
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(1]  European CommiSSIOn. European Economy B. July 1997 
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have tower retirement ages and shorter working ages than 1n most EU Member States. which implies that official actiVIty rates- •e 
those calculated in terms of population below the official ret~rcment age and above school-leaving age - are h1gher than those 
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countnes themselves and also with the EU. In consequence. there 1s certa•n to be a divergence from official government l•gures. to 
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(4]  EBRD.  Transition Report.  1997. 
(5]  Ibid 
[6]  All ligures 1n purchasing power standards. 
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Strathclyde (1996).  The impact on cohesion of EU enlargement. unpublished study lor the European Commiss1on. 
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(11]  Ibid 
[ 12)  European Comm1ssion ( 1998), The Impact of  the enlargement of  the European Union towards the Associated Central and Eastern 
European Countries on RTD/innnovation and structural policies. 
(13)  RWI, EPRC (1996). op. cit. 
(14]  OECD (1996). Environmental indicators: a review of selected Central and Eastern European Countries. 
(15)  ibid. 
[16)  ibid. 
(17]  ibid. 
(18]  AWl. EPRC (1996), op. cit. 
(19]  Euridice (1997),  Compl~ment a  /'~tude sur les structures des systemes d'enseignement et de formation  initiale dans /'Union 
europeenne. 
(20]  At current prices. Eurostat and the Government of the Republic ol Cyprus are currenUy collabOrating to produce a PPS series. 
[21]  AWl, EPRC (1996). op. cit. 
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Time periods 
The baseline period used in the report is the latest de-
cade  available,  since  a  ten-year  period  is  long 
enough to minimise variations due to the business cy-
cle. For output and GDP data at the regional level, 
1996 is the latest year available, so the decade used 
is 1986-96. For labour market data. such as employ-
ment and unemployment. 1997 data are already pub-
fished, so the baseline period is 1987-97. As well as 
fitting statistical availability, there is some economic 
rationale for this, since changes in the labour market 
generally lag those in output by up to a year or more. 
For some indicators, the historical data series is rela-
tively short (eg Labour Force Survey data for urban 
and rural areas) and so only the latest data are given. 
Regions 
The  regional classification used in  the report is  the 
"Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics". com-
monly known  by its French acronym, NUTS.  This  is 
defined by Eurostat on the basis of existing institu-
tional arrangements in the Member State concerned 
and by agreement with the national authorities. Un-
less otherwise specified. 'regions· in this report refer 
to NUTS-2 regions, of which there are 206 in the Union 
as a whole. 
NUTS-2  is  the  smallest  level  of  geographical 
disaggregation  for  which  a full  range  of  statistical 
data are available. It is also the level at which eligibil-
ity for Objectives 1 and 6 is determined (for other re-
gional Objectives, the  smaller,  NUTS-3 regions are 
used).  Though  most  NUTS-2  regions  are  broadly 
comparable in  sizP-.  there are  some extreme varia-
tions, most notably lie de France and Lombardia at 
the  top end of the  scale with  populations of 9-1 0 
million and Corse, Burgenland and Highlands and Is-
lands at the bottom end with  populations of 2-300 
thousand, while Valle d'Aosta is even smaller. 
For more information, see Eurostat, Regions. nomen-
clature of territorial units for statistics, March 1995. 
Urban and rural areas 
The Eurostat classification of areas of dense. interme-
diate and sparse population is based on the following 
principles: 
•  densely populated areas are defined as groups 
of contiguous municipalities. each with a popula-
tion  density  greater  than  500  inhabitants  per 
square km, and a total population for the area of 
more than 50,000: 
•  intermediate areas are defined as groups of mu-
nicipalities,  each  with  a  population  density 
greater than 100 inhabitants per square km,  but 
not belonging to a densely populated area. The 
area's total population must be at least 50,000 or 
the area must be adjacent to a densely populated 
one. (A municipality or a contiguous group of mu-
nicipalities with an  area of less than  100 square 
kms,  not reaching the required density but fully 
contained in a dense or intermediate area, is con-
sidered to be part of that area. If contained by a 
mixture of dense and intermediate areas, it is con-
sidered intermediate.)  . 
•  All the remaining areas are classified as sparsely 
populated. 
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In this report, densely populated areas are identified 
as urban, while sparsely populated ones are gener-
ally considered rural. However, there is an alternative 
classification of rural areas, proposed by the OECD, 
which defines rural  regions as those with less than 
150 inhabitants per square km and this too is referred 
to in the text. 
PPS measures of GOP 
Throughout the report, comparisons between Mem-
ber States or regions are made in terms of PPS (pur-
chasing  power  standards).  These  adjust  for 
differences in  price levels between countries (there 
are no regional estimates of PPS) which are not nec-
essarily reflected in the prevailing exchange rate. 
Employment data 
There are two sources of regional employment data 
used in the report: 
•  data on numbers employed derived from the an-
nual Union Labour Force Survey, which relate to 
those resident in the region who are in  employ-
ment, wherever they work: 
•  data on employment based on regional (or na-
tional) accounts, which relate to those employed 
in the region, wherever they are resident. 
The  first  measure is used to estimate  employment 
rates and participation rates (the data on unemploy-
ment also relate to residence) where the denominator 
is working-age population resident in  the region (or 
country). The second measure is used in the estima-
tion of GOP per person employed, where the numera-
tor  is  also  based  on  the  regional  (or  national) 
accounts. 
The two measures will differ according to the scale of 
commuting, either in or out of a region. Although this 
is generally very small for most regions of the size of 
NUTS-2. there are a few regions where it is important 
- eg Luxembourg, where there is significant inward 
commuting, and Flevoland in the Netherlands. where 
there is equally large outward commuting. 
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Table 1  Growth of GOP In the Cohesion countries, 1986·99 
EL  E  IRL  p  EUR4  EUR11 1 "1  EUR151 "1 
Annual average %  1986-96  1.6  2.8  6.2  3.5  2.9  2.0  2.1 
change in GOP 
1986-91  2.2  4.3  5.3  5.1  4.1  2.8  3.0 
1991-96  1.0  1.3  7.1  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.5 
projections  1996-99  3.8  3.6  9.2  3.8  4.1  2.6  2.8 
Annual average %  1986-96  0.5  0.3  0.3  -0.1  0.3  0.4  0.4 
change in population 
1986-91  0.5  0.2  -0.1  -0.3  0.2  0.4  0.4 
1991-96  0.4  0.4  0.6  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.4 
projections  1996-99  05  0.1  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3 
GOP per head (PPS),  1986  59.2  69.8  60.8  55.1  65.2  107.7  100.0 
EUR15=100 
1987  57.4  71.5  62.5  56.7  66.3  107.4  100.0 
1988  58.3  72.5  63.8  59.2  67.6  107.1  100.0 
1989  59.1  73.,  66.3  59.4  68.3  106.9  100.0 
1990  57 4  74.1  71.1  58.5  68.8  106.8  100.0 
1991  601  78.7  74.7  63.8  73.1  105.5  -100.0 
1992  61.9  77.0  78.4  64.8  72.7  105.6  100.0 
1993  64.2  78.1  82.5  67.7  74.5  105.2  100.0 
1994  65.2  78.1  90.7  69.5  75.3  105.0  100.0 
1995  66.4  78.6  96.8  70.1  76.3  104.8  100.0 
1996  67.5  78.7  96.5  70.5  76.6  104.8  100.0 
projections  1997  69.2  17.8  96.4  70.7  76.3  104.8  100.0 
projections  1998  68.6  18.6  102.1  11.1  11.1  104.1  100.0 
projections  1999  69.3  79.6  105.1  71.8  78.2  104.5  100.0 
1 "JGrowth rates 86-96 and 86-91: excludmg new German Lander 
Source: Eurostst: DGXVI cslcula/tons 
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Table 2  GOP per head in richest and poorest regions in the Union, 1986 and 1996 
(GOP per head in PPS,  EUR15=100) 
1986  1996 
Regions_  GOP  Rank  Regions  GOP  Rank 
Hambura (0)  185  1  Hambura (0)  192  1 
Rea. Bruxelles-Cao./ Brussels Hfdst. Gew. (B)  163  2  Rea. Bruxelles-Cao./ Brussels Hfdst. Gew. IB\  173  2 
lie de France (F)  162  3  Darmstadt COl  171  3 
Darmstadt CD)  152  4  Luxemboura (Grand-Ouch~)  (L)  169  4 
Wien(A)  148  5  Wien CAl  167  5 
Greater London CUKl  148  6  ile de France (F)  160  6 
Bremen (D)  144  7  Oberbavern (0)  156  7 
Stuttaart COl  143  8  Bremen (0)  149  8 
Oberbavern CD\  141  9  Greater London (UK)  140  9 
Luxemboura (Grand-Duchel ILl  137  10  Antweroen CB\  137  10 
Highest 10  153  Highest 10  158 
Stockholm CS)  133·  11  Stuttaart COl  135  11 
Ahvenanmaa/Aland (FIN)  132  12  Grontnoen CNL\  134  12 
Lombardia (I)  132  13  Emilia-Romaana (I)  133  13 
Uusimaa (FIN)  129  14  Lombardta (I)  132  14 
Valle d'Aosta (I)  129  15  Valle d'Aosta (I l  131  15 
Berlin(Dl  128  16  Uusimaa (FIN)  129  16 
Emilia-Romaana (I)  125  17  Trentino-Aito Adtoe (I)  128  17 
Mittelfranken CD\  124  18  Gramotan CUK)  126  18 
Antweroen CBl  124  19  Friuli-Venezta Giulia (I)  126  19 
Karlsruhe (Dl  123  20  Karlsruhe CD\  126  20 
Dusseldorf COl  122  21  Veneto (I)  124  21 
Gramoian CUK\  122  22  Berkshire. Bucktnohamshire. Oxfordshtre (UKl  124  22 
Noord-Holland CNLl  117  23  Mittelfranken !Dl  123  23 
KOin(D)  117  24  Stockholm CS\  123  24 
Piemonte (I)  117  25  Salzbura CAl  121  25 
Highest 25  138  Highest 25  143 
Guvane (F)  37  1  Guaoelouoc CFI  40  1 
Guadelouoe (F)  37  2  toetros. <Ell  44  2 
Atenteto (P)  37  3  Reun1on (Fl  46  3 
Acores CPl  40  4  Guvane CFI  48  4 
Madetra (P)  4()  5  Acores cP1  50  5 
Reunion (F)  40  6  Vore1o Aloa•v !Ell  52  6 
Centro  42  7  Marlln10ue  CFi  54  7 
Voreio Aiaa10 (Ell  44  8  Made1ra (Pl  54  8 
Extromadura CE\  44  9  El(tromaaur a 1  E.l  55  9 
Alaarve (P\  44  10  Dessau cOl  55  10 
Lowest 10  41  Lowest 10  50 
loe1ros CELl  47  11  Anoa1uc1a tEl  57  11 
Martiniaue CF\  49  12  Dvt1k1 Ellada CELl  58  12 
Dvtikt Ellada CELl  49  13  Maadebura CD1  58  13 
NorteCPl  51  14  Perooonn1sos CEll  58  14 
lonta Nisia CELl  52  15  Calabna (ll  59  15 
Andalucla CE\  53  16  Alenteto cPl  60  16 
Castilla-La Mancha IE\  54  17  Centro  61  17 
Galicia CEl  55  18  Anatohkl Makcoon1a.  Thrak1 lEU  61  18 
Thessalia CELl  55  19  Thunnaen(O)  61  19 
Anatoliki Makedonia. Thrakt  CELl  56  20  Mecklenbura-Voroommern CD\  61  20 
Kriti (EL)  57  21  Dytikl MakeOon1a (ELl  62  21 
Dvtiki Makedonia CELl  58  22  lonta N1s1a CEll  62  22 
Kentriki Makedonia CELl  58  23  Norte(P)  62  23 
Calabna (I)  59  24  Thessaha CELl  63  24 
Pelooonnisos CELl  61  25  Gahc1a CEl  63  25 
Lowest 25  52  Lowest 25  59 
New German Lander, Gronmgen {NL): no data for  1986: France {OOM)  1996.  1994 data 
Source: Eurostat: DGXVf calculations 
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Table 3  Regional disparities In GOP per head and· unemployment by Member State, 
1987 and 1997 
GOP per head  Unemployment  Employment 
PPS (EUR15=100)  Regional disparity  % labour force  Regional disparity 
(average 
annual% 
(standard deviation)  (standard deviation)  change) 
.  1986  1996  1986  1996  1987  1997  1987  1997  1987-97 
B  102.8  112.1  25.0  26.0  11.0  8.9  3.0  3.7  0.3 
OK  112.1  119.3  - - 5.8  5.7  - - -0.1 
0  - 108.3  - 30.2  - 9.8  - 4.4  -
ogotcl  116.1  118.5  22.0  23.7  6.3  7.9  2.2  2.0  0.3 
EL  59.2  67.5  6.0  8.6  7.4  9.6  2.1  2.4  0.9 
E  69.8  78.7  13.7  16.8  20.8  21.1  5.7  5.6  1.2 
F  109.8  103.9  27.8  29.0  10.3  12.0  1.8  2.4  0.3 
IRL  60.8  96.5  - - 18.1  10.1  - - 2.3 
I  100.4  102.7  25.2  27.2  10.2  12.3  5.2  7.5  -0.3 
L  137.3  168.5  - - 2.5  2.5  - - 2.8 
NL'd'  101.8  106.8  12.2  12.3  9.9  5.2  1.4  0.8  1.3 
A  103.2  112.3  24.7  28.6  3.8'•'  4.4  1.0'•1  1.1  0.6 
P'"'  55.1  70.5  16.2  13.1  7.0  6.7  2.4  1.8  -0.4 
FIN  99.7  96.9  17.4  20.0  5.2  14.8  2.61 "1  2.7  -1.5 
s  111.5  101.2  10.7  11.1  2.5  10.4  1.0111  1.7  -0.9 
UK  98.6  99.8  19.6  18.5  11.0  7.1  3.6  2.3  0.4 
EUR15  100.0  100.0  27.1  26.9  10.s-
1  10.7  5.~  5.9  0.3 
'"Nat1onal data 
101EUR12 
'"'090. excluding new German Ltlnder 
10'GDP d1spanty 1986: excluding Gromngen 
1 '
1Employment growth: excluding A~ores  and Madeira 
Source: Eurostat; DGXVI calculations 
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Table 4  Densely-populated NUTS-2 regions, 1996/1997 
NUTS-2 region  Population  Population  Unemployment rates. 1997  GOP/head in 
('OOOs)  density  PPS 
(no./km2)  %  (EUR15=100) 
1996  1996  Total  Female  Youth  1996 
R~g. Bruxelles-Cap./ Brussels  949.4  5882  13.5  14.2  31.8  173 
Hfdst. Gew. (B) 
Greater London (UK)  7074.3  4483  9.7  8.7  16.6  140 
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  133.2  4297  26.4  36.2  58.4  72 
Berlin (D)  3465.1  3897  13.4  13.0  14.7  102 
Wien (A)  1595.4  3844  5.9  6.2  8.3  167 
West Midlands (County) (UK)  2642.5  2939  9.4  7.8  17.9  93 
Hamburg(O)  1707.9  2261  8.8  7.5  12.3  192 
Merseyside (UK)  1420.4  2169  12.1  9.1  24.7  73 
Greater Manchester (UK)  2575.5  2003  7.4  5.6  15.2  91 
Bremen (D)  678.8  1679  12.3  11.2  18.0  149 
West Yorkshire (UK)  2109.4  1037  7.4  5.7  15.3  93 
Dusseldorf (0)  5290.8  1000  9.6  9.0  12.5  119 
Zuid-Holland (NL)  3338.8  969  5.3  7.0  9.0  111 
lie de France  (F)  1  {044.3  919  10.7  11.2  18.7  160 
Atllki (EL)  3448.5  906  11.6  16.9  34.5  77 
South Yorkshrre (UK)  1304.7  837  10.0  7.6  19.6  74 
Utrecht (NL)  1075.0  750  4.1  5.4  6.8  120 
Comunrdad de Madrid (E)  5016.0  627  18.4  22.6  36.8  101 
·  Noord-Holland (NL)  2471.6  609  5.3  7.0  9.6  121 
Kbln (D)  4202.4  571  8.3  8.1  11.6  113 
Antwerpen (8)  1633.4  570  7.2  10.1  17.0  137 
Bedfordshrre, Hertfordshire (UK)  1564.6  544  4.1  3.6  7.6  102 
limburg (NL)  1134.9  514  5.4  7.2  7.5  98 
Total> 500 per kmz  65876.9  1029  9.8  10.1  17.6  122 
EUR15  373242.7  117  10.7  12.2  20.9  100 
Sourco. Eurostat 
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Table 5  Sparsely-populated NUTS-2 regions, 1996/1997 
NUTS-2 region  Population  Population  Unemployment rates, 1997  GOP/head in 
('OOOs)  density  PPS 
(no.Jkm2)  %  (EUR15=100) 
1996  1996  Total  Ee_m_a!e  'tq_uth  1996 
Guyana (F)  159.7  2  22.4  48 
Ovre Norrland (S)  525.4  3  13.3  10.3  32.2  97 
Pohjois-Suomi (FIN)  558.6  4  18.6  15.9  38.4  83 
Mellersta Norrland (S)  392.5  6  13.0  10.1  31.1  99 
Ita-Suomi (FIN)  703.2  8  18.7  15.7  38.4  74 
Highlands, Islands (UK)  280.4  9  8.4  7.4  13.4  80 
Norra Mellansverige (S)  859.8  13  12.3  11.0  28.1  97 
Vali-Suomi (FIN)  705.9  15  14.9  14.7  36.1  83 
Ahvenanmaa/Aiand (FIN)  25.2  16  4.6  4.1  15.8  119 
Alentejo (P)  521.5  19  10.4  15.9  22.5  60 
Castilla-La Mancha (E)  1694.0  21  19.1  28.1  37.8  66 
SmAiand Med Oarna (S)  792.9  24  8.6  9.1  17.6  99 
AragOn (E)  1180.2  25  14.4  24.4  30.0  89 
Extremadura (E)  1075.3  26  29.5  41.4  43.9  55 
Castilla y Le6n (E)  2509.8  27  19.9  30.3  43.8  76 
Corse (F)  261.3  30  15.2  19.7  30.6  82 
Etela-Suomi (FIN)  1796.9  31  15.1  14.4  32.4  92 
Dytiki Makedonia (EL)  301.9  32  13.8  22.6  45.7  62 
Valle d'Aosta (I)  119.2  37  4.1  5.3  11.2  131 
Ostra Mellansverige (S)  1499.6  39  10.2  9.7  22.8  92 
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (EL)  560.6  40  8.3  12.5  27.8  61 
lpeiros (EL)  368.2  40  10.5  17.6  43.4  44 
Limousin (F)  718.1  42  9.2  11.1  23.6  81 
Sterea Ellada (EL)  662.7  43  12.0  22.6  42.6  65 
Peloponnisos (EL)  671.4  43  7.5  13.2  27.9  58 
Voreio Aigaio (EL)  184.3  48  7.1  12.9  23.5  52 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra (E)  526.6  51  10.0  15.0  29.9  98 
Auvergne (F)  1314.9  51  11.0  14.0  33.8  84 
Notio Aigaio (EL)  267.9  51  4.3  7.2  15.5  75 
Bourgogne (F)  1625.1  51  11.0  13.5  27.9  90 
Ireland (IRL)  3626.1  52  10.1  10.1  15.8  97 
La Rioja (E)  260.5  52  11.8  17.6  26.5  89 
Tirol (0)  660.2  52  5.4  7.4  9.7  108 
Champagne-Ardenne (F)  1352.1  53  13.3  16.0  34.1  94 
Thessalia (EL)  741.8  53  7.5  12.8  27.1  63 
Luxembourg (B)  241.9  54  6.8  9.3  18.6  96 
Midi-Pyrenees (F)  2512.7  55  11.2  13.5  23.1  87 
Karnten (A)  562.8  59  5.8  8.4  10.2  90 
vastsverige (S)  1770.4  59  10.4  10.2  20.7  98 
Basilicata (I)  607.9  61  20.6  30.1  50.7  69 
Grampian (UK)  531.2  61  4.8  4.4  9.6  126 
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Table 5  Sparsely-populated NUT8-2 regions, 1996/1997 (continued) 
NUTS-2 region  Population  Population  Unemployment rates, 1997  GOP/head in 
('OOOs)  density  PPS 
(no.Jkm2)  %  (EUA15=100) 
1996  1996  Total  Female  Youth  1996 
Centre (F)  2437.5  62  10.9  13.4  26.3  92 
Poitou-Charentes (F)  1625.3  63  11.4  13.8  30.9  83 
Dytiki Ellada (EL)  733.0  65  7.9  11.6  28.5  58 
Clwyd, Dyfed, Gwynedd, Powys  1134.3  66  7.2  5.8  13.9  81 
(UK) 
Kriti (E)  559.3  67  4.3  6.9  19.8  72 
Trentino-Aito Adige (I)  918.7  68  3.8  5.7  10.0  128 
Franche-Comt~  (F)  1117.1  69  9.1  11.5  20.7  93 
Sardegna (I)  1663.0  69  20.5  29.3  51.0  73 
Algarve (P)  345.7  69  8.2  9.9  17.1  71 
Burgenland (A)  275.3  69  3.8  5.2  5.7  71 
Aquitaine (F)  2895.4  70  11.9  14.8  27.9  92 
Salzburg (A)  509.4  71  3.9  4.9  7.5  121 
Cumbria (UK)  490.6  72  6.9  5.5  13.7  101 
Centro (P)  1710.7  72  3.4  3.9  12.2  61 
Steiermark (A)  1207.2  74  4.8  6.6  7.6  90 
Molise (I)  330.7  75  17.2  23.7  49.9  79 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (D)  1820.1  79  18.8  22.4  10.9  61 
Niederbsterreich (A)  1524.3  80  3.4  4.4  5.0  96 
Basse-Normandie (F)  1418.9  81  13.2  15.1  32.8  89 
Andalucla (E)  7128.2  82  32.0  41.8  50.8  57 
Languedoc-Roussillon (F)  2254.5  82  17.8  20.8  32.0  78 
Ionia Nisia (EL)  199.4  86  6.2  7.6  23.4  62 
Brandenburg (D)  2548.2  86  17.2  21.1  11.6  67 
North Yorkshire (UK)  734.7  88  4.8  4.4  9.4  101 
Sydsverige (S)  1265.4  91  11.9  11.8  23.2  93 
Galicia (E)  2723.8  93  19.2  24.8  37.1  63 
Kentriki Makedonia (EL)  1776.9  94  9.2  14.5  28.2  67 
Regi6n de Murcia (E)  1084.4  96  18.3  26.9  28.6  67 
Picardie (F)  1866.4  96  14.2  16.9  37.9  85 
Umbria (I)  829.9  98  8.2  13.9  27.1  98 
Lorraine (F)  2311.5  98  11.3  13.6  29.3  89 
Pays de Ia Loire (F)  3166.5  99  11.0  13.6  25.4  91 
Cantabria (E)  526.6  99  21.1  28.9  45.1  77 
Bottom25  18944.3  16  14.8  17.5  33.2  79 
Bottom 50  48260.7  29  12.1  14.5  27.2  81 
Total < 100 lnhJKrnJ  88859.7  42  13.6  16.5  27.9  79 
EUR15  373242.7  117  10.7  12.2  20.9  100 
Source: Eurostat: DGXVI calculations 
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Table 6  Labour Force Survey data for areas of different population density, 1997 
Characteristic  Population density areas 
Dense  Intermediate  Sparse 
Share of EU population(%)  49.1  27.5  23.5 
Unemployment(% labour force)  11.5  9.1  11.3 
Youth unemployment(% labour force)  23.0  18.3  21.1 
Female unemployment(% labour force)  12.4  11.1  13.8 
Long-term unemployment (% unemployed)  52.2  48.0  40.8 
Lono-term unemJ>Iovment (%labour force)·  6.0  4.4  4.6 
Sectoral employment (% employed) 
Agriculture and fishing  1.1  5.1  12.9 
Manufacturing (incl. mining and electricity)  20.0  24.6  21.2 
Construction  6.6  8.4  9.6 
Transport and communication  6.7  5.4  4.9 
Finance and business services  14.0  9.6  6.4 
Trade, hotels, restaurants and other personal services  20.8  20.0  18.6 
Communal services  30.3  26.5  26.1 
Population by age group (%  total) 
<15  16.6  17.5  17.0 
15-64  68.4  67.4  65.5 
~65  15.0  15.0  17.4 
Employed part-time (o/o  employed)  17.1  17.5  15.9 
Part-time employed prefenng to work fullt1me ("'o  pari-timers)  19.0  15.7  26.2 
Self-employed(% employed)  12.7  15.5  19.1 
Family workers(% employed)  1.1  2.0  3.7 
Employed in more qualified occupations'·'' ("'o  employed)  39.5  33.1  26.7 
Temporary employees(% emplovees)  11.7  11.0  15.1 
Population aged 25-64 by educational/eve/ (% total) 
Low (lower secondary)  40.5  43.6  46.5 
Medium (upper secondary)  37.5  39.6  39.4 
High (tertiary level)  22.1  16.8  14.0 
1 ' 1Managers. professionals and techmc•ans 
Source: Eurostat.  LFS 
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Table 7  Regions with a high share of employment In services, 1996/1997 
NUT5-2 regions  Population  Employed in  Unemployment  GOP/head in PPS 
services  rate  (EUR15=100) 
('OOOs)  (%)  (%) 
1996  1997  1997  1996 
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  133.2  92.6  26.4  72 
Reg. Bruxelles-Cap./8russels  949.4  83.8  13.5  173 
Hfdst. Gew. (B) 
Greater London (UK)  7074.3  83.7  9.7  140 
Stockholm (S)  1735.0  82.9  7.9  123 
Brabant Wallon (B)  340.3  79.8  7.9  89 
lie de France (F)  11044.3  79.3  10.7  160 
Corse (F)  261.3  78.9  15.2  82 
Surrey, East+ West Sussex (UK)  2519.2  77.6  4.1  104 
Provence-Alpes-COte d'Azur (F)  4465.2  77.5  16.5  92 
Wien (A)  1595.4  77.4  5.9  167 
Namur (B)  436.6  76.7  11.4  86 
Uusimaa (FIN)  1334.8  76.7  11.4  129 
Vlaams Brabant (B)  1001.9  76.4  4.5  96 
Hamburg (D)  1707.9  76.4  8.8  192 
Berlin (D)  3465.1  75.9  13.4  102 
Lazto (I)  5217.2  75.6  13.3  114 
Utrecht (NL)  1075.0  75 6  4.1  120 
Noord-Holland (NL)  2471.6  74 6  5.3  121 
Zuid-Holland (NL)  3338.8  74.3  5.3  111 
Luxembourg (Grand-Duche) (L)  415.5  74  2  2.5  169 
Merseyside (UK)  1420.4  74.2  12.1  73 
Liguria (I)  1650.7  74.0  10.2  119 
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire.  2065.9  73.9  3.2  124 
Oxfordshire (UK) 
Cvre Norrland (S)  525.4  738  13.3  97 
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire (UK)  1564.6  73.8  4.1  102 
Top10  30117.5  80.3  10.3  137 
Top25  57809.0  n.a  9.5  127 
EUR15  373242.7  65.3  10.7  100 
Employment based on place of res1c1ence 
Source: Eurostat,  LFS 
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Table 8  Regions with a high share of Industrial employment, 1996/1997 
NUTS-2 regions  Population  Employed in  Unemployment  GOP/head in PPS 
industry  rate  (EUR15:o:100) 
('OOOs)  (%)  (%) 
1996  1997  1997  1996 
Stuttgart (D)  3872.1  43.8  6.1  135 
TObingen (D)  1730.8  42.9  5.7  114 
Detmold (D)  2019.8  42.5  8.3  105 
Oberfranken (D)  1112.0  41.8  7.4  107 
Veneto (I)  4452.8  41.1  4.8  124 
Lombardia (I)  8958.7  40.7  6.2  132 
Niederbayern (D)  1147.7  40.2  5.5  97 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra (E)  526.6  40.0  10.0  98 
Vorarlberg (A)  344.0  40.0  4.1  112 
Norte (P)  3537.8  39.9  6.9  62 
Piemonte (I)  4294.1  39.6  8.7  118 
Unterfranken (D)  1320.4  39.5  6.4  104 
Arnsberg (D)  3827.4  39.1  9.7  104 
La Rioja (E)  260.5  39.0  11.8  89 
Marche (J)  1447.6  38.7  7.1  106 
Karlsruhe (D)  2650.6  38.5  6.6  126 
Schwaben (D)  1725.7  38.4  5.8  110 
Cataluna (E)  6065.5  38.4  17.4  99 
Freiburg (D)  2093.4  38.3  6.2  109 
Limburg (B)  777.6  37.8  8.3  110 
Mittellranken (D)  1670.8  37.7  7.1  123 
Franche-Comte (F)  1117.1  37.4  9.1  93 
Oberpfalz (D)  1057.2  37.2  6.5  100 
Pais Vasco (E)  2069.2  36.9  18.8  92 
Sachsen (D)  4556.2  36.8  17.2  64 
Top 10  27702.4  41.4  6.2  116 
Top2S  62635.6  39.7  9.0  108 
EUR15  373242.7  29.4  10.7  100 
Employment based on place of res1dence 
Source: Eurostat. LFS 
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Table 9  Regions wlth·a high share of agricultural employment, 1996/1997 
NUT5-2 regions  Population  Employed in  Unemployment  GOP/head in PPS 
agriculture  rate  (EUR15=100) 
('OOOs)  (%)  (%) 
1996  1997  1997  1996 
Peloponnisos (EL)  671.4  43.4  7.5  58 
Dytiki Ellada (EL)  733.0  41.5  7.9  58 
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (EL)  560.6  40.0  8.3  61 
Thessalia (EL)  741.8  38.6  7.5  63 
Kriti (EL)  559.3  37.8  4.3  72 
Centro (P)  1710.7  31.9  3.4  61 
Sterea Ellada (EL)  662.7  31.8  12.0  65 
lpeiros (EL)  368.2  30.3  10.5  44  . 
Ionia Nisia (EL)  199.4  26.7  6.2  62 
Voreio Aigaio (EL)  184.3  24.2  7.1  52 
Dytiki Makedonia (EL)  301.9  23.4  13.8  62 
Galicia (E)  2723.8  22.2  19.2  63 
Ahvenanmaa/Aiand (FIN)  25.2  20.7  4.6  119 
Kentriki Makedonia (EL)  1776.9  19.5  9.2  67 
vali-Suomi (FIN)  705.9  16.4  14.9  83 
Extremadura (E)  1075.3  16.3  29.5  55 
Actores (P)  2421  16.0  5.4  50 
Mol1se (I)  330.7  15 5  17.2  79 
AlenteJO (P)  521.5  14.2  10.4  60 
Cast1lla y LeOn (E)  2509.8  14.0  19.9  76 
Bas1hcat~ (I)  607.9  13 7  20.6  69 
Calabna (l)  2074.2  13.1  24.9  59 
Ita-Suomi (FIN)  703.2  12.5  18.7  74 
Sardegna (I)  1663.0  12.5  20.5  73 
Madeira (P)  257.7  12.5  5.4  54 
Top 10  6391.4  35.4  6.3  61 
Top25  21910.5  22.7  14.7  65 
EUR15  373242.7  5.0  10.7  100 
Employment based on place of residence 
Source: Eurostat.  LFS 
208 Table 10  Imports by Membar State, 1997 
8/L  OK  D  EL  E  F  IAL 
Agriculture  6.584  2.497  17,628  1,097  6.751  9.004  767 
Mining and quarrying  1.092  27  1.725  67  591  1,743  161 
Petrol and gas  6.812  1,430  19,972  1.626  7,183  14,477  936 
extraction, refining 
Electricity, gas and  2.289  74  9.098  66  1.702  4,190  105 
water supply 
Basic metal products  8.542  1.995  22.411  1,322  5.909  13.671  929 
Mineral products  2,733  721  6.636  493  1,656  4,387  480 
Chemicals and  21.224  4.133  34.506  2.981  12.296  29.693  4.297 
pharmaceuticals 
Fabricated metal  4.069  1,447  11.557  658  2.805  6.690  827 
products 
Machinery and  9,366  3.593  23.297  1,931  8.272  21,159  2.035 
equipment 
Office machinery and  3.283  1,893  17,077  367  3.009  11.567  5.182 
computers 
Electrical and telecoms  10,592  4.656  41,905  1,712  9,609  27,396  4,541 
equipment 
Transport equipment  17,745  3,3)4  37,354  2,487  16.058  22,685  1,789 
Aviation and space  1,100  395  8,512  138  1,171  20,528  659 
Instrument engineering  2,184  759  8,070  475  2.158  5,541  722 
Food, drink and tobacco  9,357  3,148  21,005  2.505  6,576  16,779  2,153 
Clothing and textiles  9,014  3,342  34,077  2,243  5.529  18.198  1,758 
Wood  2.452  1,368  8.070  417  1,304  3.730  438 
Paper and printing  4,153  1,618  9.739  742  2.829  8,194  1,038 
Rubber and plastics  4.406  1,408  10,537  626  3.092  7,778  1,015 
Other  12,664  1,744  41,316  402  1,614  3,376  2,643 
Total  139.662  39.552  384,493  22,353  100.115  250.845  32.477 
Source: Eurostat 
~ 
I  NL  A  p 
10,375  8,444  1,842  2,371 
848  985  297  216 
12,939  10,163  1,907  1,919 
1,027  1,700  982  264 
16,900  9.202  3.552  1,450 
3.095  2.441  1,498  493 
25.711  17,579  6,135  3,131 
3.522  3,914  2,857  945 
12,975  7,882  6,490  2,308 
5,828  17,739  1,689  678 
17,474  16,353  6,963  3,149 
20,589  11,973  6,690  4,293 
1,682  1,362  932  196 
3,828  4,016  1,214  512 
13,331  9.465  2.647  1,969 
13,881  8,223  5,057  2.'iS7 
2,853  2.880  1,746  349 
4,775  4.509  2,187  793 
4,217  4.288  2,283  1,066 
7.2m  22,001  921  405 
183,050  165,800  57,890  29,505 
FIN  s 
1,178  2,131 
382  317 
1,759  3,523 
630  241 
2,155  3,593 
616  914 
3,180  5,647 
717  1,664 
2,925  6,413 
1,342  2.001 
4,459  9,248 
2,142  5.343 
710  812 
542  1,337 
1,161  2.481 
1,525  3.261 
303  877 
624  1,243 
785  1,886 
686  3,736 
27,818  57,471 
(million ECU) 
UK  EUR15 
10.554  81,283 
1,386  9,834 
7,386  92,031 
1,327  23,774 
13,684  105,314 
4,110  30,275 
26,070  196,583 
6,258  47,930 
20,739  129,388 
19,352  91,008 
34,935  192,992 
32,334  184,787 
3,651  41,849 
5,492  36,849 
16,841  109,418  I 
19,868  128,973 
4,875  31,663 
9,456  51,899 
7,<114  50,472 
24,659  123,967 
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0  Table 11  Exports by Member State, 1997  i. 
!!1 
(million ECU)  ~ 
BJL  OK  D  EL  E  F  IRL  I  NL  A  p  FIN  s  UK  EUR15 
Agriculture  4,038  2,827  3,925  1,621  8.288  13,113  499  5.692  9,562  482  472  448  592  2.689  54248  i 
Mining and quarrying  195  5  492  4  62  1,014  2  42  424  1  5  5  88  643  2,982 
Petrol and gas  3,724  1.359  2.775  879  2,162  2.832  153  3.388  7,3&)  286  412  779  1,472  13.846  41,418 
extraction, refining 
Electricity, gas and  391  267  668  21  119  3.226  5  72  4,397  317  26  48  541  975  11,074 
water supply 
Basic metal products  11,560  911  22.567  827  4,885  12.144  300  8.608  8,940  3,322  396  2,005  5,429  10,179  92.953 
Mineral products  3,405  622  7.028  528  3.559  4,967  364  8.174  1.690  1,631  845  527  725  4,087  38,151 
Chemicals and  25,851  4,116  48.855  582  7.468  32.848  12.468  16,244  23.767  3,370  997  2,193  4,884  28.800  212,443 
pharmaceuticals 
Fabricated metal  3.931  1,617  15,117  181  2.915  7,877  435  10.922  3,481  3.131  777  923  2,318  6.222  59,848 
products 
Machinery and  8.899  5.051  69.082  258  5.681  23.122  1.261  38.765  8.612  7,316  714  4,258  8,182  26,075  2!J7277 
equipment 
Office machinery and  2.360  782  10,115  29  1.102  8.649  10.753  3,226  16,198  598  73  1,023  830  18,446  74,183 
computers 
Electrical and telecoms  9,063  4,712  55,472  440  6.666  :x>.871  8,082  19.021  17,088  5,915  2,461  7,174  14,497  32,906  214,368 
equipment 
Transport equipment  2!J,988  1.590  71,428  117  21.903  31.946  187  18.525  8,216  6,242  3,149  1,937  8.594  24,341  219,163 
Aviation and space  824  282  9.381  :x>  867  25,692  294  1.845  823  598  82  156  1,075  4,566  46,515 
lnstn.ment engineering  1,594  857  10,008  23  748  4.547  1,380  3,413  5,035  799  149  390  1.351  4,966  35.260 
Food, drink and tobacco  12,701  8.689  18,741  1.235  6,438  21,841  5.496  8,486  22,094  2,101  1,095  915  1.565  13,996  125.392 
Clothing and textiles  10.586  2.389  18.522  1.862  6.084  13,059  896  35,317  6,116  3,710  6,075  716  1.318  10,4fKl  117,1:xl 
Wood  2,483  2.301  4,679  64  1.370  2,496  277  6,837  1,090  2,265  1.069  2.006  3,858  1,256  32,651 
Paper and printing  .3,668  812  12.564  381  2,413  6,653  289  4,596  3,880  3,086  978  8,499  7,fBJ  6,090  61,570 
Rubber and plastics  5,590  1,411  14.967  188  3,008  8.097  641  8,484  4,143  1,845  428  704  2.025  6,378  57,907 
Other  19,098  2.813  46.678  338  2.198  9,767  2.977  8,282  27,290  5,187  144  325  6.394  28,121  159,612 
Total  150.951  43,412  443.062  9,006  87,935  264,761  46,839  209,939  111),195  52,2!J3  2!J.349  36,431  73,400  245,062  1,864,145 
Source: Eurostat -
~ 
Table 12  Revealed comparative advantage by sector, 1997''' 
B/l  OK  D  EL  E  F  IRL 
Agriculture  -0.24  0.06  -0.64  0.19  0.10  0.18  -0.21 
Mining and quarrying  -0.70  -0.70  -0.56  .0.88  .()81  .()26  .0.97 
Petrol and gas  -029  .()03  .() 76  .030  .()54  .()67  .() 72 
extraction. refining 
Electricity, gas and  .() 71  057  .()86  .()52  .()87  .() 13  .()90 
water supply 
Basic metal products  015  .()37  000  .023  .()09  .()06  .() 42 
Mineral products  0 11  .()07  003  004  036  006  .() 14 
Chemicals and  0.10  00-1  017  .() 67  .()24  005  049 
pharmaceuticals 
Fabricated metal  -002  006  0.13  .()57  002  008  .()31 
producis 
Machinery and  .()_03  0.17  0.50  .() 76  .()  19  004  .()23 
equipment 
Office machinery and  -0.16  .() 42  .()26  .()85  .()46  .() 14  0.35 
computers 
Electrical and telecoms  -0.08  0.01  0.14  .()59  .().18  0.06  0.28 
equipment  . 
Transport equipment  0.08  -0.35  0.31  .0.91  0.15  0.17  .0.81 
Aviation and space  -0.14  .0.17  0.05  .0.65  .0.15  0.11  -0.38 
Instrument engineering  -0.16  0.06  0.11  -0.91  .0.49  -0.10  0.31 
Food, drink and tobacco  0.15  0.47  -0.06  .0.34  -0.01  0.13  0.44 
Clothing and textiles  0.08  .0. 17  -O.:xl  .0.09  0.05  -0.16  .0.32 
Wood  0.01  0.25  -027  .0.74  0.02  -0.20  -0.23 
Paper and printing  -0.06  -0.33  0.13  -0.32  -0.00  -0.10  -0.56 
Rubber and plastics  0.12  0.00  0.17  .0.54  -001  0.02  -0.23 
Other  0.20  0.23  0.06  -0.09  0.15  0.49  0.06 
Total  0.04  0.05  0.07  -0.40  -0.06  0.03  0.18 
,.  (X-M)tfX+M}. where X= expons, M = Imports 
Source: E...-ostat 
N  .... 
I  NL  A  p  FIN 
-0.29  0.06  -0.59  -0.67  -0.45 
-0.91  -0.40  -0.99  -0.95  .0.98 
-0.58  -0.16  -0.74  -0.65  -0.39 
.()87  0.42  -0.51  -0.82  .0.86 
.()33  -0.01  -0.03  -0.57  0.13 
045  -018  0.04  0.26  .008 
.()23  015  -0.29  -052  .().18 
0.51  -006  0.05  -0.10  0.13 
0.50  0.04  0.06  -0.53  0.19 
-0.29  -0.05  -0.48  -0.81  -0.14 
0.04  0.02  -0.08  -0.12  0.23 
-0.05  -0.19  -0.03  -0.15  -0.05 
0.05  -0.25  -0.22  -0.41  -0.64 
-0.06  0.11  -021  -0.55  -0.16 
-0.22  0.40  -0.11  -0.29  .0.12 
0.44  -0.15  .0.15  0.34  -0.36 
0.41  -0.45  0.13  0.51  0.79 
-0.02  -0.07  0.17  0.10  0.86 
0.34  -0.02  -0.11  -0.43  -0.05 
0.07  0.09  0.70  -0.48  -0.36 
0.07  0.04  -0.05  -0.18  0.13 
s  UK 
-0.57  -0.59 
-0.56  .0.37 
-0.41  O.:xl 
0.38  .0.15 
0.20  -0.15 
-0.12  0.00 
-0.07  0.05 
0.16  0.00 
0.12  0.11 
-0.54  .0.02 
0.22  .0.03 
0.23  -0.14 
0.14  0.11 
0.01  -0.05 
-0.23  -0.09 
-0.42  -0.31 
0.63  -0.59 
0.72  .0.22 
0.04  -0.05 
0.26  0.07 
0.12  -0.05 
(million ECU) 
EUR15  EU with 
RoW 
-0.20  -0.52 
-0.53  -0.78 
-0.38  -0.63 
-0.36  -0.79 
.0.06  -0.19 
0.12  0.24 
0.04  0.22 
0.11  0.23 
0.23  0.45 
-0.11  -0.40 
0.05  0.05 
0.09  0.32  I 
0.05  0.08 
-0.02  -0.08 
I 
0.07  0.21 
-0.05  -0.19 
0.02  -0.11 
0.09  024 
0.07  0.15 
0.13  0.14 
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Table 13  Unemployment rates In worst and least affected regions In the Union, 
1987 and 1997 
1987  1997 
Regions  Rate  Rank  Regions  Rate  Rank 
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  37.9  1  A6union (F)  36.8  1 
Andalucla (E)  31.1  2  Andalucla (E)  32.0  2 
Extr~dura  (E)  25.9  3  Extremadura (E)  29.5  3 
Canarias (E)  25.5  4  Guadeloupe (F)  29.3  4 
Pals Vasco (E)  23.2  5  Martinique (F)  27.2  5 
Cataluna (E)  21.8  6  Ceuta y Melilla (E)  26.4  6 
Campania (I)  21.5  7  Campania (I)  26.1  7 
RegiOn de Murcia (E)  21.4  8  Calabria (I)  24.9  8 
Comunidad Valenciana (E)  20.1  9  Sicilia (I)  24.0  9 
Principado de Asturias (E)  19.7  10  Guyana (F)  22.4  10 
Highest 10  23.9  Highest 10  28.1 
Cantabria (E)  18.8  ,  Dessau (D)  21.5  11 
Northern Ireland (UK)  18.6  12  Comunidad Valenciana (E)  21.4  12 
Merseyside (UK)  .  18.2  13  Princepado de Asturias (E)  21.2  13 
Ireland (IRL)  18.1  14  Cantabna (E)  21.1  14 
Calabria (I)  17.8  15  Canarias (E)  20.9  15 
Castilla y Le6n (E)  17.6  16  Magdeburg (D)  20.7  16 
Dumfries and Galloway, Strathclyde (UK)  16.8  17  Basil1cata (I)  20.6  17 
Hainaut (B)  16.4  18  Sardegna (I)  20.5  18 
Comunidad de Madrid (E)  16.3  19  Castilla y Leon (E)  19.9  19 
Sardegna (I)  16.2  20  Halle (D)  19.9  20 
Sicilia (I)  16.0  21  Galicea (E)  19.2  21 
Basilicata (I)  15.9  22  Castella-La Mancha (E)  19.1  22 
Northumberland, Tyne and Wear (UK)  15.7  23  Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (D)  18.8  23 
South Yorkshire (UK)  15.7  24  Pais Vasco (El  18.8  24 
Cleveland, Durham (UK)  153  25  lla-Suomo (FIN)  18.7  25 
Highest 25  20.1  Hljlhest 25  23.7 
Ahvenanmaa/Aiand (FIN)  10  1  Luxembourg (Grand-Duch6) (L)  2.5  1 
Stockholm (S)  13  2  Oberosterreocn (A)  3.0  2 
Uus1maa (FIN)  16  3  Berksnorc.  Buckongnamsh~re. Oxlordshore (UK)  3.2  3 
Vorarlberg (A)  17  4  Centro (Po  3.4  4 
Smilland Med Oarna (S)  22  5  Noederostcrrcoc!1 (A)  3.4  5 
vastsvenge (S)  24  6  Trentono-Ai:o Aaoge (I)  3.8  6 
Luxembourg (Grand-DucM) (L)  25  7  Burgenlan.:l (A)  3.8  7 
Krili (EI)  27  8  Salzburg (AI  3.9  8 
Ostra Mellansverige (S)  28  9  Surrey. Ea5t·West Sussex (UK)  4.1  9 
OberOsterreich (A)  28  10  Bedlord5rwe  HerUordsh!Te (UK)  4.1  10 
Lowest10  2.2  Lowest 10  3.6 
Stuttgart (D)  31  11  Utrecht (NLJ  4.1  11 
Sydsvenge (S)  31  12  Vorarlberg (AJ  4.1  12 
TObingen (D)  32  13  Valle d'Aosta (I)  41  13 
Tirol (A)  3.2  14  Knti (ELl  4.3  14 
Salzburg (A)  32  15  Notto A1gaoo (EL)  4.3  15 
Ionia Nisia (Ell  3.3  16  Vlaams Brabanl (B)  4.5  16 
NeederOsterreoch (A)  34  17  Noord-Braoant (NL)  4.6  17 
Mellersta Norrland (S)  3.5  18  Gelderland (NI)  4.6  18 
Ac;ores (P)  3.7  19  Herelord e.  Worcester. Warw1cksh1re (UK)  4.6  19 
Freiburg (D)  3.8  20  Zeeland (NL)  4.6  20 
Schwaben (D)  39  21  Ahvenanmaa/Aiand (FIN)  46  21 
Norra Mellansverige (S)  4.0  22  Hampsh~re. Isle ol Woght (UK)  4.7  22 
Oberbayern (D)  4.1  23  Oberbaycrn CD)  4.8  23 
Steiermark (A)  4.1  24  Veneto (I)  4.8  24 
Karnten (A)  4.1  25  Leecestcrsnore. Northamptonshire (UK)  4.8  25 
Lowest25  3.1  Lowest25  4.2 
Other regions (except extreme 20)  9.2  Other regions (except extreme 20)  10.0 
Other regions (except extreme 50)  8.8  Other regions (except extreme 50)  9.7 
. 1987: no data for new German LIJnder and DOM (F); nattonalfigures tor A.  S.  FIN 
Source: Eurostat: DGXVI calculations 
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Table 14  Regions with highest unemployment, 1997 
NUTS-2 regions  Unemployment rates(%)  Employment rates{%) 
Total  Female  Male  Youth  25+  Long- Total  Female  Male 
term 
Reunion (F)  36.8  41.0  33.7  57.8  33.1  - - - -
Andalucla (E)  32.0  41.8  26.0  50.8  27.5  47.3  39.5  25.2  54.3 
Extremadura (E)  29.5  41.4  23.1  43.9  26.6  41.9  41.8  24.9  58.2 
Guadeloupe (F)  29.3  33.4  25.7  54.1  26.4  - - - -
Martinique (F)  27.2  32.0  22.9  52.4  25.0  - - - -
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  26.4  36.2  20.5  58.4  19.7  71.6  42.2  26.7  58.7 
Campania (I)  26.1  34.1  21.9  64.9  19.2  79.3  38.8  23.5  54.3 
Calabria (I)  24.9  34.3  20.0  62.6  19.5  67.6  38.2  22.8  53.9 
Sicilia (I)  24.0  33.1  20.2  60.4  17.8  73.7  38.1  19.4  57.6 
Guyane (F)  22.4  26.5  19.7  36.5  20.5  - - - -
Dessau (D)  21.5  26.2  17.1  13.6  22.6  51.4  58.8  52.2  65.2 
Comunidad Vatenciana (E)  21.4  29.1  16.5  40.4  17.2  44.1  49.4  34.3  65.2 
Principado de Asturias (E)  21.2  27.5  17.3  50.3  17.1  65.6  43.2  29.8  57.4 
Cantabria (E)  21.1  28.9  16.1  45.1  17.0  64.3  45.9  32.0  60.0 
Canarias (E)  20.9  26.3  17.4  39.0  17.2  48.9  47.6  34.5  61.1 
Magdeburg (D)  20.7  24.3  17.5  12.6  21.9  52.2  59.3  54.6  63.8 
Basilicata (I)  20.6  30.1  15.2  50.7  16.2  62.5  42.1  26.6  57.7 
Sardegna (I)  20.5  29.3  15.9  51.0  15.3  68.4  43.1  26.0  60.5 
Castilla y Le6n (E)  19.9  30.3  14.1  43.8  16.3  52.5  47.7  30.1  65.0 
Halle (D)  19.9  23.1  17.0  13.9  20.8  50.0  60.5  55.7  65.2 
Galicia (E)  19.2  24.8  15.1  37.1  16.4  58.7  49.9  38.3  61.8 
Castilla-La Mancha (E)  19.1  28.1  14.6  37.8  15.1  40.9  47.8  28.7  66.9 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (D)  18.8  22.4  15.7  10.9  20.1  47.8  61.3  55.7  66.8 
Pais Vasco (E)  18.8  26.0  14.0  39.4  15.8  61.2  49.7  36.5  62.9 
Ita-suomi (FIN)  18.7  15.7  21.3  38.4  15.9  24.5  54.7  53.5  55.8 
Highest 10  ·28.1  37.2  23.1  56.5  22.7  56.4  39.0  23.1  55.3 
Highest 25  23.7  30.8  19.3  45.4  19.8  54.4  45.0  30.7  59.5 
EUR15  10.7  12.2  9.5  20.9  9.1  49.0  60.9  50.9  70.9 
Unemployment as"  labour force: employment as"  population 15-64 
F (DOM): 1996 
Source: Eurostat; DGXVI calculations 
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Table 15  Regions with lowest unemployment, 1997 
NUTS-2 regions  Unemployment rates (%)  Employment rates(%) 
Total  Female  Male  Youth  25+  Long- Total  Female  Male 
term 
Luxembourg  2.5  3.6  1.8  7.2  2.0  34.6  60.3  45.6  74.8 
(Grand-Due~)  (L) 
OberOsterreich (A)  3.0  4.0  2.3  5.0  2.7  24.9  69.8  60.8  78.7 
Berkshire. Buckinghamshire,  3.2  2.7  3.6  5.7  2.7  31.8  80.0  71.7  87.7 
Oxfordshire (UK) 
Centro (P)  3.4  3.9  2.9  12.2  2.2  46.6  81.4  73.5  90.0 
Niederosterreich (A)  3.4  4.4  2.7  5.0  3.1  36.0  69.6  61.1  77.8 
T  rentino-Aito Adige (I)  3.8  5.7  2.6  10.0  2.7  30.0  62.3  48.3  76.2 
Burgenland (A)  3.8  5.2  2.7  5.7  3.5  26.9  66.2  56.9  75.2 
Salzburg (A)  3.9  4.9  3.0  7.5  3.3  4.3  69.5  61.6  77.7 
Surrey, East+ West Sussex (UK)  4.1  3.5  4.6  7.1  3.6  38.4  77.3  71.0  83.8 
Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire (UK)  4.1  3.6  4.4  7.6  3.5  35.1  77.2  69.8  84.4 
Utrecht (NL)  4.1  5.4  3.1  6.8  3.7  29.2  72.2  61.2  83.4 
Vorarlberg (A)  4.1  5.7  3.0  6.7  3.6  16.6  68.9  56.4  81.1 
Valle d'Aosta (I)  4.1  5.3  3.3  11.2  3.2  37.0  61.9  51.5  71.9 
Kriti (EL)  4.3  6.9  2.5  19.8  2.4  48.8  70.1  55.3  85.6 
Norio A1gaio (EL)  4.3  7.2  2.7  15.5  2.5  43.0  61.7  41.3  82.8 
Vlaams Brabant (B)  4.5  5.8  3.5  11.9  3.9  50.1  63.5  55.4  71.6 
Noord-Brabant (NL)  4.6  6.1  3.5  7.4  4.0  49.7  68.3  56.0  80.0 
Gelderland (Nl)  4.6  6.1  3.5  7.4  4.1  44.1  68.0  55.8  80.0 
Hereford. Worcester, Warwickshire (UK)  4.6  4.2  4.9  9.4  3.8  31.0  78.1  69.2  86.4 
Zeeland (Nl)  4.6  6.1  3.5  6.2  4.3  53.0  67.1  54.2  79.7 
Ahvenanmaa/Aiand (FIN)  4.6  4.1  4.9  15.8  2.9  9.7  75.8  63.5  82.6 
Hampshire, Isle of Wight (UK)  4.7  3.9  5.4  8.6  4.0  36.4  74.7  67.0  82.5 
Oberbayern (D)  4.8  4.6  5.0  5.7  4.7  37.6  71.4  62.9  79.8 
Veneto (I)  4.8  7.4  3.1  10.9  3.7  37.7  59.7  46.1  73.4 
Leicestershire, Northamptonshire (UK)  4.8  4.1  5.4  9.5  4.0  33.5  76.3  68.7  83.7 
Lowest 10  3.6  3.8  3.4  7.3  3.0  34.4  74.3  65.8  82.7 
Lowest25  4.2  4.8  3.8  8.1  3.6  37.5  70.7  60.7  80.5 
EUR15  10.7  12.2  9.5  20.9  9.1  49.0  60.9  50.9  70.9 
Notes and source: see Table  14 
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Table 16  Unemployment rates In Member Statu, 1987-97 
(ranked by 1997 unemployment) 
E  FIN  I  F  EUR15  s  IRL  0  EL  B  UK  p  OK  NL  A  L 
1985  22.2  6.3  9.5  9.8  - 3.1  18.0  7.2  7.8  11.3  11.5  8.9  7.9  10.2  - 3.0 
1986  21.4  7.0  10.5  10.0  - 2.8  18.1  6.6  7.4  11.2  11.5  8.6  5.5  10.0  - 2.7 
1987  20.8  5.2  10.2  10.3  - 2.5  18.1  6.3  7.4  11.0  ' 11  7.0  5.8  9.9  - 2.5 
1988  20.1  4.8  11.0  9.6  - 1.9  16.3  6.3  7.7  10.1  8.9  6.0  6.1  9.2  - 2.0 
1989  17.4  3.8  10.0  9.3  - 1.9  14.9  5.7  6.7  7.2  7.4  4.8  7.6  8.5  - 1.7 
1990  16.4  3.7  9.0  8.7  - 1.4  13.1  4.9  6.3  6.3  7.0  4.1  7.8  7.3  - 1.6 
1991  16.0  7.0  8.7  9.0  8.2  2.7  14.6  5.3  6.9  6.1  8.6  3.6  8.5  5.7  3.8  1.5 
1992  17.8  12.2  8.7  10.0  9.2  4.8  15.3  6.4  7.8  6.7  9.8  3.8  9.2  5.6  3.3  2.1 
1993  22.3  17.9  10.3  11.2  10.5  8.6  15.7  7.6  8.8  8.1  10.5  5.3  10.9  6.3  4.0  2.3 
1994  24.4  19.4  11.2  12.2  11.2  9.2  14.7  8.7  8.9  9.7  9.8  8.7  8.7  7.0  4.0  3.4 
1995  23.1  16.9  11.9  11.3  10.7  8.7  12.2  8.2  9.1  9.4  8.7  7.3  7.4  7.0  3.9  2.8 
1996  22.5  15.5  12.1  12.0  10.8  9.5  11.8  8.8  9.7  9.6  8.2  7.4  7.4  6.2  4.5  3.1 
1997  21.1  14.8  12.3  12.0  10.7  10.4  10.1  9.8  9.6  8.9  7.1  6.7  5.7  5.2  4.4  2.5 
Source: Eurostat, harmonised regional unemployment rates; DGXVI calculations 
Table 17  Employment by sector, 1986 and 1996 
Share of employmen1  Million employees  Employment change 
(%)  (%) 
1996  1996  1986  1986-96 
Agriculture  5.3  7.6  10.8  ·3.3 
Manufacturing  27.8  39.6  43.6  ·3.9 
Market services  45.6  65.0  53.7  +1 1.4 
Non-market services  21.2  30.2.  28.9  +1.3 
Total  100.0  142.5  137.0  +5.5 
Source: Eurostat. National accounts 
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0)  Table 18  Demographic and labour force trends in the Union, 1985 to 2025 
2000-2005 
1985-90  1990-95  % point difference 
from baseline 
Baseline  Low  High 
Annual average 76 change in population 
Total  0.3  0.4  0.3  -0.3  0.3 
of which: 
aged 0-14  -1.2  -0.4  -0.2  -0.9  1.1 
aged 15-64  0.4  0.4  0.1  -0.1  0.1 
-~65+  1.7  1.5  1.3  -0.3  0.3 
Annual average % change in labour force 
Total  1.1  0.4  0.5  -1.0  0.8 
of which: 
men  0.5  -0.1  0.2  -1.1  0.6 
women  2.0  1.1  0.9  -0.9  0.9 
'BaseNne',  'Low' and 'High' relate to variant projections (see text. Part/.3) 
Source: Eurostat 
Table 19  Demographic and labour force trends In the Union, 1985 to 2025 
2000-2005 
1985-90  1990-95  Difference from baseline 
(millions) 
Baseline  low  High 
Change in population, millions 
Total  5.3  7.8  4.9  -4.9  5.9 
of which: 
natural increase  3.0  2.6  1.6  -3.6  4.4 
net inward migration  2.3  5.3  3.3  -1.3  1.5 
Change in labour force, millions 
Total  8.7  3.7  4.8  -8.5  7.5 
of which: 
· demographic change  5.2  4.5  0.9  -0.9  1.1 
change in  male activity  -1.4  -3.7  0.3  -4.6  2.7 
change in female activity  4.4  2.2  3.6  -3.4  4.1 
interaction effect  0.5  0.8  -0.1  0.3  -0.4 




















% point difference 
from baseline 
Low  High 
-0.3.  0.3 
-0.7  0.6 
-0.2  0.3 
-0.3  0.2 
-0.3  0.5 
-0.5  0.6 
-0.4  0.5 
2005-2025 
Difference from baseline 
(millions) 
LOIN  High 
-16.4  18.6 
-14.6  16.7 
-1.8  1.9 
-9.4  16.0 
-4.2  5.6 
-0.8  4.4 
-3.9  5.3 







~ 1\)  ...  ......,  Table 20  RTD Indicators for the European Union 
B  DK  D  El  E  F  IRL  I 
GDP per head, 1995 index  112  116  111  66  77  108  93  103 
Gross RTD expenditure as % 
GDP, 1995 1 •1  1.61  1.79  2.28  0.48  0.80  2.34  1.41  1.04 
EUR15=100  84  93  119  25  42  122  73  54 
Business RTD expenditure as o/o 
GDP,  1995 1b'  109  1.10  1.51  0 13  037  1.44  0.99  0.56 
EUR15=100  89  90  124  11  30  118  81  46 
BEAD as% GERD. 1995  67.7  61.5  "662  27.1  46.3  615  70.2  53.8 





Total RTD personnel as % labour 
force, 1995  1.23  1.71  1.52  0.83  0.73  1.58  1.14  0.86 
EUR15=100  98  136  121  66  58  125  90  68 
Private RTD personnel as % 
labour force 1995  0.65  0.92  0.82  0.09  0.21  0.80  0.53  0.33 
EUR15=100  108  153  137  15  35  133  88  55 
European patent applications  94  120  173  4  12  96  37  46 
per million people, 1995 
EUR15 excluding Luxemburg, EEA data for total and private RTD personnel 
taJ DK. EL, A 1993; NL  1994 
IWEL, A 1993 
(CI EL.  P,  EUR15 1993 
Source: Eurostat 
Nl  A  p  FIN  s 
107  108  67  96  101 
2.04  1.52  0.59  2.37  3.45 
106  79  31  123  180 
1.09  0.85  0.12  1.50  2.68 
89  70  10  123  220 
53.4  55.9  20.3  63.3  77.7 
2.65  2.52  1.76  2.87  3.15 
1.47  1.18  0.53  1.97  1.95 
117  94  42  156  155 
0.59  0.49  0.16  1.00  1.08 
98  82  27  167  180 














EUR15  EUR11  EUR4 
100  105  74 
1.92  2.05  0.82 
100  107  43 
1.22  1.30  0.35 
100  107  29 
63.5  64  45 
2.88  2.93  1.62  I 
I 
1.26  1.37  0.73 
100  109  58 
0.60  0.69  0.20 
100  115  33 









Table 21  RTD  basic Indicators - regional differences 
Germany
101  France ...  Italy  Spain  Portugal 
1993  1994  1994  1994  1995 
Obj1  Other  GERD<  GERD>  Obj1  Other  Obj1  Other  Rest  lisbon 
Basic data 
GERD (ECU million) 
per head ('OOOs ECU)  179  548  21  94  67  211  44  151  30  81 
as%GOP  1.78  2.46  1.25  3.49  0.64  1.20  0.50  1.18  0.46  0.81 
R&D personnel 
as % labour force  - - 0.65  2.16  0.49  0.97  0.54  1.20  0.38  0.80 
RTD in public sector 
GOVERD 
per head ('OOOs ECU)  52  78  3  15  12  46  7  34  3  31 
as%GDP  0.52  C.35  0.20  0.56  0.11  0.26  0.08  0.27  0.05  0.31 
HERD 
as%GDP  0.62  0.41  0.11  0.29  0.33  0.25  0.28  0.24  0.20  0.21 
R&D personnel in GOV and HES 
as% total  - - 31  30  83  57  86  6  67  12 
RTD in private sector 
BEAD (ECU million) 
as%GDP  0.64  1.70  0.93  2.60  0.19  0.69  0.13  0.66  0.10  0.14 
as% GERD  36  69  75  75  30  57  27  56  23  18 
R&D personnel in private sector 
as % labour force  - - 0.46  1.50  009  0.42  0.08  0.43  0.13  0.23 
as % total R&D personnel  - - 71  69  17  43  14"  36  33  28 
No. of European patent  ' 
23  176  65  172  7  61  5  20  1  2 
applications per million people 
Figlles in Italics are estimates  ECU: current exchange rates 
GERD- Gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
GOVERO- R&D expenditure in lhe GOY  GOV ·Government sector 
HERD - R&D expenditure in the HES  HES - Higher education sector 
BERD -R&D expenditure in thebusiness enterprise sector 
EUR11 excludes LuxembOurg for which data are not available 
,., Statistics for regional RTD expenditure and personnel in higher educalion are n<Jt available 
fDJ The first column shows the averages of  French regions where GERD as "  of GDP is less than the average for the country (2.38%) 
Sourcs: E!Xosrat 
-- --- --- ----
Greece  EUR11  EUR4 
1993  1995  1995 
Rest  Attiki 
26  57  384  83 
0.36  0.67  2.05  0.82 
0.63  0.96  1.37  0.73 
8  18  61  J 
0.12  0.21  0.33  0.161 
0.17  0.24  0.41  0.24 
88  81  49  73  I 
I 
0.07  0.22  1.30  o.35  1 
20  33  64  45  I 
I 
I 
0.07  0.18  0.69  0.20  I 
12  19  51  27 
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Table 22  FDI flows between the EU and other major economies, 1987·96 
Sum  Shares(%) 
1987-96  1987-91  1992-96  1987-96  1987-91  1992-96 
Outward flows 
ACP  -5336  -1607  -3729  1.8  1.1  2.4 
ex-Comecon  -21590  -1744  -19846  7.3  1.2  12.8 
EFTA?  -31336  -12071  -19265  10.5  8.4  12.5 
Japan  -4333  -2169  -2164  1.5  1.5  1.4 
OPEC  -9093  -3628  -5465  3.1  2.5  3.5 
USA  -152342  -86445  -65897  51.2  60.5  42.7 
Non-EU total  -297351  -142891  -154460  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Inward flows 
ACP  1304  321  983  0.5  0.3  0.7 
ex-Comecon  1781  592  1189  0.7  0.5  0.9 
EFTA?  67147  38860  28287  26.0  30.8  21.5 
Japan  23004  15598  7406  8.9  12.4  5.6 
OPEC  3680  1662  2018  1.4  1.3  1.5 
USA  103476  29323  74153  40.1  23.3  56.3 
Non-EU total  257827  126109  131718  100.0  100.0  100.0 
From 1992EUR15,  before 1992EUR12excludingA, FIN. S 
From 1994 EFTA 4 
ACP .. Afflcan. Caribbean and Pacific countries 
Data on flows with ex-Comecon are ava11aole only until 1991.  From  1992 onwards the value has been 
calculated from data for the CIS and the Central and Eastern European countries minus YuQoslavia 
and Croat1a.  The ligures contam data lor Slovema and Bosnia-Herzegovina which were not part of  Comecon. 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 23  Cumulative outward flows of foreign direct Investment to non-EU countries, 
1987·96 
ECU million  Shares(%) 
1987-96  1987-91  1992-96  1987-96  1987-91  1992-96 
8/L  13,558  5,074  8,484  4.3  3.2  5.4 
OK  6,050  2,163  3,887  1.9  1.4  2.5 
0  62,631  25,995  36,636  19.9  16.4  23.3 
E  11,959  3,043  8,916  3.8  1.9  5.7 
F  60,872  28,311  32,561  19.3  17.9  20.7 
EL  97  17  80  0.0  0.0  0.1 
IAL  9,431  2,538  6,893  3.0  1.6  4.4 
I  12,958  6.790  6,168  4.1  4.3  3.9 
NL  45.232  19,077  26,155  14.3  12.0  16.7 
A  5.863  2.700  3,163  1.9  1.7  2.0 
p  790  109  681  0.3  0.1  0.4 
FIN  6.974  5.188  1,786  2.2  3.3  1.1 
s  12.055  7,555  4.500  3.8  4.8  2.9 
UK  66,872  49.779  17,093  21.2  31.4  10.9 
EUR12115  315,342  158,339  157,003  100.0  100.0  100.0 
USA  94.373  31,107  63.266  - - -
Japan  179.463  116,462  63,001  - - -
Figures from  1984 to  1991 are for EUt2. 
Figures from  t992to 1996 are for EU15. 
Figures for all countries except Austria are me sum of equity and other cap1tal (excluding reinvested earnings). 
Figures for Austria are eqwty capital only. 
F1gures lor France include snort-term cred1ts from  1994. 
Figures tor Ireland and Greece are es11ma1es or based on partner-country dectaral!ons 
Source· Eurostar 
Table 24  Cumulative inward flows of foreign direct investment from non-EU countries, 
1987-96 
ECU million  Shares(%) 
1987-96  1987-91  1992-96  1987-96  1987-91  1992-96 
8/L  18,140  6,972  110168  7.4  6.0  8.6 
OK  5,324  2.417  2,907  2.2  2.1  2.2 
0  13.235  4,129  9,106  5.4  3.5  7.0 
E  18,521  10,359  8,162  7.5  8.9  6.3 
F  36.883  13,621  23,262  15.0  11.7  17.9 
EL  804  394  410  0.3  0.3  0.3 
IAL  4,908  3,217  1,691  2.0  2.8  1.3 
I  13,063  9,407  3.656  5.3  8.0  2.8 
NL  25,283  10,135  15,148  10.3  8.7  11.7 
A  1,752  416  1,336  0.7  0.4  1.0 
p  2,756  1,779  977  1.1  1.5  0.8 
FIN  1,321  788  533  0.5  0.7  0.4 
s  15,680  2,953  12,727  6.4  2.5  9.8 
UK  88,868  50.330  38,538  36.0  43.0  29.7 
EUR12115  246,538  116,917  129,621  100.0  100.0  100.0 
USA  205.387  114.913  90,474  - - -
Japan  2,306  263  2.043  - - -
Notes and source: see Table 23 
220 Table 25  Foreign direct investment, cumulative total, 1987-96 
lntra-EU  Extra-EU  NET 
(Ecu million)  (Ecu million) 
in  out  in  out  intra-EU  total 
BJL  52,601  37,588  18,140  13,558  15,013  19,595 
OK  8,430  10,696  5,324  6.050  -2,266  -2,992 
0  21,354  90,746  13,235  62,631  -69.392  -118,788 
E  46,143  9.284  18,521  11,959  36,859  43,421 
F  71,347  93,203  36.883  60.872  -21,856  -45,845 
EL  2,623  -25  804  97  2,646  3,355 
IRL  16,409  6,489  4,908  9,431  9,920  5,397 
I  19,337  29,398  13,063  12,958  -10,061  -9,956 
NL  30,661  60,549  25,283  45,232  -29.888  -49,837 
A  6,649  4,406  1,752  5,863  2,243  -1,868 
p  8,576  1,837  2,756  790  6,739  8,705 
FIN  3,120  11,093  1,321  6,974  -7,973  -13,626 
s  12,678  28,072  15,680  12,055  -15,394  -11,769 
UK  32,964  41,813  88,868  66,872  -8,849  13,147 
EUR12115  332,892  425,149  246,538  315,342  -92,257  ·161,061 
Pbpulation data used in calculation are for  1996; GOP data are averages for 1987 to  1996 inclusive. 
~  ...... 
lntra-EU as % GOP 
ECU per  in  out 
head 
1,850  3.0  2.1 
-569  0.8  1.0 
-1.450  0.2  0.6 
1,105  1.2  0.2 
-785  0.7  0.9 
319  0.4  0.0 
1,499  4.2  1.6 
-175  0.2  0.4 
-3,208  1.2  2.5 
-231  0.5  0.3 
876  1.4  0.3 
-2,660  0.3  1.2 
-1331  0.7  1.6 
223  0.4  0.5 
-432  0.6  0.8 
Extra-EU as % GOP 
in  out 
1.0  0.8 
0.5  0.6 
0.1  0.4 
0.5  0.3 
0.4  0.6 
0.1  0.0 
1.2  2.4 
0.2  0.2 
1.0  1.8 
0.1  0.4 
0.4  0.1 
0.1  0.8 
0.9  0.7 
1.1  0.8 
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Table 26  Cumulative outward flows of foreign direct Investment to EU countries, 
1987·96 
ECU million  Shares (%) 
1987-96  1987-91  1992-96  1987-96  1987-91  1992-96 
BIL  37,588  16,022  21,566  8.8  9.0  8.7 
OK  10,696  4,115  6,581  2.5  2.3  2.7 
0  90,746  34,360  56,386  21.3  19.4  22.8 
E  9,284  5,019  4,265  2.2  2.8  1.7 
F  93,203  44,250  48.953  21.9  24.9  19.8 
EL  -25  18  -43  0.0  0.0  0.0 
IRL  6,489  1,792  4,697  1.5  1.0  1.9 
I  29,398  11.668  17,730  6.9  6.6  7.2 
NL  60,549  21,147  39,402  14.2  11.9  15.9 
A  4,406  1,930  2,476  1.0  1.1  1.0 
p  1,837  529  1,308  0.4  0.3  0.5 
FIN  11,093  2,962  8,131  2.6  1.7  3.3 
s  28,072  21,901  6,171  6.6  12.3  2.5 
UK  41,813  11,825  29,988  9.8  6.7  12.1 
EUR12i15  425,149  177,538  247,611  100.0  100.0  100.0 
USA  100,309  24,894  75,415  - - -
Japan  43,034  31,956  11,078  - - -
Noles and source: see Table 23 
Table 27  Cumulative Inward flows of foreign direct Investment from EU countries, 
1987-96 
ECU million  Shares(%) 
1987-96  1987-91  1992-96  1987-96  1987-91  1992-96 
BIL  52,601  19,687  32,914  15.8  13.6  17.4 
OK  8,430  1,198  7,232  2.5  0.8  3.8 
0  21,354  6.913  14,441  6.4  4.8  7.7 
E  46,143  24,679  21,464  13.9  17.1  11.4 
F  71,347  21.229  50,118  21.4  14.7  26.6 
EL  2,623  928  1,695  0.8  0.6  0.9 
IRL  16,409  7,850  8,559  4.9  5.4  4.5 
I  19,337  9,000  10,337  5.8  6.2  5.5 
NL  30,661  12,354  18,307  9.2  8.6  9.7 
A  6,649  1,799  4,850  2.0  1.2  2.6 
p  8,576  4,650  3,926  2.6  3.2  2.1 
FIN  3,120  558  2,562  0.9  0.4  1.4 
s  12,678  5,939  6,739  3.8  4.1  3.6 
UK  32,964  27,455  5,509  9.9  19.0  2.9 
EUR12115  332,892  144,239  188,653  100.0  100.0  100.0 
USA  226,543  126,236  100,307  - - -
Japan  4,370  1,861  2,509  - - -
Nola lllld source: see Table 23 
222 Table 28  Economic indicators In assisted regions, 1988-97 
Regional group  Employment change (% pa)  Unemployment rate(%)'"' 
1988-93  1993-97  19881bl  1993  1997 
Objective 1 (89-99)  0.1  0.4  15.6  16.3  17.2 
Objective 1 (94-99)  - 0.3  - 14.9  16.2 
Objective 2 (94-99)  0.1  0.4  12.5  12.4  11.9 
Objective 5b (94-99)  05  -0.2  7.3  70  1.e 
Objective 6 (95-99)  - 0.7  - 19 9  18.4 
Others (94-99)  0.1  0 1  85  82  8 1 
EUR15 excl. new Lander  0.1  0.2  9.0  - -
EUR15  - 0.2  - 10.7  10.7 
1 ' 1 EUR15: Eurostat. harmonised unemployment rates 
lbl Figures by Objective are for EUR 12 
Source: Eurostal; DGXVI estimates 
~ 
GOP per head (PPS), EUR15=100 
1988  1993  1994  1995  1996 
63  68  69  69  69 
- 66  68  68  68 
94  96  96  97  96 
82  85  86  86  85 
87  77  77  81  77 
114  116  116  116  116 
100  - - - -
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Table 29  GDP per head (In PPS) In Objective 1 regions, 1988-96 
Region1•1  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Halnaut  77  76  76  76  78  82  84  82  81  81 
Obj. 1 lelglque-lelgll  .  .  .  .  .  .  84  12  81  81 
Berlln-011. Stadt  .  .  .  47  58  12  73  80  81  81 
·Brllldentug  .  .  .  39  48  57  59  66  66  67 
MICidentug.Vorponvnem  .  .  .  37  45  52  53  80  61  61 
Sachsan  .  .  .  36  44  53  54  61  63  64 
Sachsln-Anhalt  .  .  .  36  45  54  55  61  61  61 
ThOrlngen  .  .  .  32  43  52  53  80  eo  61 
Obj. 1 Dlutschl8nd  .  37  41  II  ..  13  64  15 
Analollkl Mak8donia. Thrakl  52  53  5I  53  55  56  57  59  eo  61 
Kenlrlkl Makedonla  58  58  57  58  61  63  84  65  66  67 
Dytikl Makedania  63  63  61  61  59  58  eo  eo  61  62 
Thessalia  54  57  54  56  56  57  58  eo  61  63 
lpeiro&  43  42  39  «<  41  42  43  43  43  44 
Ionia Nlsia  55  54  52  53  55  58  59  eo  61  62 
Dytikl Ellada  48  so  48  50  51  53  55  56  57  58 
Sterea Ellada  72  72  68  68  84  84  66  65  65  65 
PetoponniaoS  58  57  55  56  56  56  57  58  58  58 
Aniki  61  62  61  62  66  70  72  73  75  77 
Voreio Aigaio  44  41  41  43  45  47  48  49  so  52 
Notio Aigaio  68  67  65  66  68  71  73  74  75  75 
Krlti  57  84  61  62  64  67  68  71  72  72 
ObJ,1 EIIHI  58  5I  57  58  eo  13  64  15  16  ea 
Galicia  57  57  56  58  57  eo  62  61  63  63 
Principado de Aslurias  70  70  68  70  69  12  74  73  74  74 
Cantabria  72  74  73  74  74  75  76  76  77  77 
CutiHa y LeOn  67  66  65  67  66  72  74  73  75  76 
castiHa-La Mancna  eo  61  62  63  62  65  67  66  65  66 
Extremadura  49  48  48  so  50  55  56  56  54  55 
Comunidad Valenciana  72  73  75  77  76  75  76  75  74  74 
Andalucla  55  54  57  59  57  57  58  58  57  57 
Region de Murcia  66  67  70  71  69  68  70  69  68  67 
Ceuta y Melilla (E)  84  63  63  66  63  67  69  68  74  72 
Canarias  73  72  71  72  73  74  76  75  . 75  74 
Obj. 1 Espal\a  52  52  13  &5  &3  15  16  16  66  16 
Corse  78  76  76  76  76  82  84  82  84  82 
Guadeloupe  37  37  37  37  3'J  «<  41  «< 
Mart1n1QU8  51  so  so  52  52  53  54  54 
Guyana  49  51  53  54  52  50  51  48 
Reumon  43  43  45  4?  41!  46  47  46 
Obj. 1 Fr1nce  49  4t  4t  50  51  51  52  52  52  51 
lr~land  64  16  71  12  71  81  83  11  97  t7 
Abruzzo  87  81  89  89  00  87  87  89  00  00 
MOII&e  78  76  76  7ii  i"G  74  75  77  77  79 
Campania  68  68  69  68  68  66  68  67  66  66 
Pug11a  73  71  71  72  71  69  70  72  71  71 
Basilica Ia  84  62  63  63  ii4  64  66  67  68  69 
Calabna  57  59  56  59  !ltl  59  60  59  60  59 
SiCilia  66  64  67  69  69  68  69  67  66  66 
Sardegna  73  72  73  76  77  76  78  76  74  73 
Obj.1 111111  It  ea  It  70  70  ea  70  118  67  67 
Flevoland  73  75  76  74  i2  73  75  78  77  75 
Obj. 1 Nlclerllnd  75  78  77  75 
Burgenlanc:t  62  61  64  65  65  70  72  72  70  71 
ObJ. 1 01tamlch  .  n  n  70  71 
None  54  57  52  53  56  58  60  62  62  62 
Centro  45  45  48  49  52  54  55  58  60  61 
Liaboa e Vale do TejO  84  86  78  82  81  85  87  89  89  89 
AlenteJO  39  «<  54  51  so  53  54  56  58  eo 
Algarve  56  54  63  65  6:1  69  71  70  70  71 
~ores  43  45  43  44  46  48  49  so  so  so 
Madeira  43  45  41  45  47  49  51  52  55  54 
Obj. 1 Portugal  II  63  10  62  &3  16  68  70  70  70 
Merseys•de  80  77  74  70  71  74  75  74  71  73 
Highlands. l&landl  83  77  80  81  80  79  81  81  78  80 
Northern Ireland  76  75  74  75  76  78  80  80  79  81 
ObJ. 1 Unlttcl Kl~  71  75  74  75  71  78  10  ·78  76  78 
EUR15  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Total Objective 1 (IMI) "'  &3  64  64  65  65  87  ea  Ill  61  It 
Total Objective 1 (11M-II)"'  .  .  .  .  .  .  II  II  118  ea 
The period  is split into MO  subperiods to correspond with the MO  proramming periOds.  1989-93 and 1994 on. In eacn case. the year im· 
mediately before the programming periOd is shOWn as the basis for assess.ng changes over the period. The figures in italics are for re-
gions which did not hsve Objective 7 status during this period. These are excluded from the total for Objective 7 regions and from the 
country totals. For the first period. EUR15 excludes the new German Lilnder throughOut. 
'~ Only regions whOlly eligible for Objective 1 
iDI Only reg/oM with Objective  1  status thrOUQhout the period 
tel Regions with Objective 7 status during the second prOQrammtng period 
Source: Eurostst 
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Table 30  Unemployment rates in Objective 1 regions, 1988·97 
Region '"
1  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  Change  Change 
1988-93  1993-97 
Hainaut  15.4  11.9  10.9  10.7  11.8  14.0  15.5  15.9  15.8  15.4  ·1.4  1.4 
ObJ. 1 Belglque-Belgll  - - - - - 14.D  15.5  15.1  15.8  15.4  -1.4  1A 
Berlin-Oat. Stadt  .  .  .  9.7  14.0  10.9  11.1  9.4  11.2  12.7  1.8 
Brandenburg  - .  .  9.1  13.9  14.9  15.2  14.3  15.5  17.2  .  2.3 
Mecklanburg-Vorpommern  .  .  12.0  17.7  17.6  16.9  15.5  16.8  18.8  .  1.2 
Sachsen  .  .  .  8.6  13.9  14.8  15.8  14.1  15.3  17.2  .  2.4 
Sach&en-Anhalt  .  9.9  15.7  17.4  18.2  16.3  18.0  20.6  - 3.2 
ThOringan  .  .  .  9.9  15.4  15.9  16.0  15.1  16.0  17.6  .  1.7 
Obj. 1 Deutschland  - - - u  14.1  1$.4  15.1  14A  15.7  17.5  - 2.2 
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  9.0  6.7  5.1  4.8  6.9  6.6  7.4  9.2  9.6  8.3  -2.4  1.7 
Kentriki Makedonia  6.8  6.6  5.7  5.5  6.4  7.9  8.2  9.1  8.9  9.2  1.1  1.3 
Dytiki Makedonia  6.0  5.7  9.0  7.2  7.4  9.8  9.1  13.2  16.3  13.8  3.8  4.0 
Thessalia  6.9  6.5  7.0  6.2  7.3  7.2  6.9  7.6  7.6  7.5  0.3  0.3 
lpeiros  5.0  4.0  2.8  8.8  7.4  7.6  8.0  7.2  11.2  10.5  2.6  2.9 
Ionia Nisia  34  2.8  3.1  3.5  2.5  3.8  3.4  5.3  5.5  6.2  0.4  2.4 
Dytiki Ellada  7.2  7.2  6.9  7.8  8.6  9.4  10.5  8.2  8.6  7.9  2.2  -1.5 
Sterea Ellada  6.9  5.9  5.8  6.3  10.8  9.5  10.6  9.2  10.3  12.0  2.6  2.5 
Pelopomisos  5.8  4.8  5.2  5.0  7.3  5.8  6.3  6.0  64  7.5  0.0  1.7 
Altiki  10.0  8.5  7.9  8.9  9.7  11.1  11.1  11.0  11.9  11.6  1.1  0.5 
Voreio Atgaio  5.4  5.9  4.2  7.9  4.8  4.3  7.0  4.9  7.1  7.1  ·1.1  2.8 
Not10 Aigato  5.2  4.4  4.3  3.2  3.5  4.5  3.5  4.8  4.9  4.3  .0.7  .().2 
Kriti  3.5  2.4  2.2  3.6  3.3  3.5  3.8  4.1  3.4  4.3  0.0  0.8 
ObJ. 1 Ellada  7.7  &.7  5.3  6.1  7JJ  5.8  8.8  1.1  1.7  t.6  o.t  1.0 
Galicia  13.2  12.5  11.9  12.3  16.2  17.6  19.7  17.4  19.2  19.2  4.4  1.6 
Pnnctpado de Astunas  20.2  17.4  17.4  16.1  17.7  20.4  22.5  21.2  22.5  21.2  0.2  0.8 
Cantabrl8  21.8  17.6  16.9  15.4  16.3  19.9  24.4  21.7  24.8  21.1  -1.9  1.2 
Castilla y Leon  17.8  17.4  15.5  14.5  17.3  20.0  21.7  20.6  20.5  19.9  2.2  .0.1 
Castilla-La Mancha  16.6  14.8  13.3  13.6  15.3  19.5  20.7  20.7  20.2  19.1  2.9  .0.4 
Extremadura  27.1  26.8  25.4  24.2  26.3  :Jl.3  32.3  3).9  :Jl.5  29.5  3.2  .0.8 
Comunidad Valenciana  18.3  15.3  14.1  15.9  18.7  23.9  24.7  22.6  21.7  21.4  5.6  -2.5 
Andalucla  292  27.2  25.9  24.7  27.0  32.4  34.7  33.8  32.8  32.0  3.2  .()4 
RegiOn de Murc1a  17.6  16.2  15.8  16.5  19.4  24.5  25.1  22.6  24.5  18.3  6.9  -62 
Ceuta y Mehlla  35.4  31.7  29.8  29.7  25.5  22.9  27.9  33.5  27.3  26.4  -12.5  3.5 
Cananas  22.5  22.5  231  244  24.7  27.9  28.3  24.0  22.0  20.9  5.4  -7.0 
Obj. 1 Elpafta (198.13)  21.3  1U  18.7  18.7  21.1  25.2  2U  25.4  25.1  24.2  3.1  -1.0 
Obj. 1 Elpafta (1114-88)  .  .  .  .  .  25.1  2U  25.3  25.1  24.1  .  ·1.0 
Corse  10.6  94  9.7  11.3  108  11.9  12.5  11.0  14.7  15.2  1.3  33 
GuadelOupe  .  311  na  24.0  26.1  29.3  5.3 
Maruntque  321  .  na  26.2  26.0  27.2  .  10 
Guyana  240  .  na  18.2  23.0  22.4  .  42 
R$un10n  369  .  na  31.7  34.3  36.8  5.1 
Obj. 1 France (IXCI. DOMs)  10.6  9A  9.7  11.3  10JJ  11.1  12.5  11.0  14.7  15.2  1.3  3.3 
Obj 1 FRANCE .,  .  .  .  .  .  25.1  25.2  25.6  28.0  21.1  .  3.8 
Ireland  16.3  14.9  13.1  14.8  15.3  15.7  14.7  12.2  1U  10.1  -o.e  ·5.5 
Abruzzo  93  9.5  9.0  8.0  6.9  9.2  9.4  8.9  9.9  8.8  .0.1  .()4 
Mohse  124  121  10 7  12.8  7.0  13.3  17.2  17.3  17 8  17 2  0.9  3.9 
Campan1a  23.0  208  177  17.8  16.0  19.5  22.7  25.6.  25.5  26.1  ·3.5  6.6 
Pugh a  15.7  138  12.9  13.2  12.6  14.1  14.7  15.8  17.9  18.3  ·1.6  4.2 
Basil teat a  215  18.9  19.0  17.0  14.7  13.1  16.2  f  18.9  19.4  20.6  -8.4  7.5 
Catabna  22.6  232  20.1  18.6  16.8  21.2  21.8  23.7  25.0  24.9  -1.4  3.7 
S1C1ha  18.6  20.0  19.3  187  17.1  18.1  21.6  23.1  24.0  24.0  .().5  5.9 
Sardegna  18.4  17.6  16.8  157  15.2  19.6  20.0  20.6  21.8  20.5  1.2  0.9 
Obj. 1 ltalla  19.1  18A  16.7  •  16.3  14JJ  17.3  11.4  21.1  21.1  22.0  ·t.B  4.7 
Ftevoland  7.9  8.7  8.2  51  6.2  5.9  6.7  8.5  6.2  5.1  ·2.0  .0.8 
Obj. 1 Nederland  .  .  .  - .  5.R  &.7  8.5  5.2  5.1  .  .QJJ 
Burgerlland  3.1  24  2.8  2.8  2.8  37  3.8  .  1.0 
Obj. 1 Oaterrelch  .  .  .  .  .  2.8  2.8  2.8  3.7  3JJ  .  1.0 
None  3.6  29  26  2.7  3.1  4.5  5.8  6.5  7.0  6.9  0.9  2.4 
Centro  37  2.9  2.0  2.3  2.5  3.6  4.4  4.0  4.1  3.4  .0.1  .0.2 
LtsbOa e Vale do Teto  8.8  6.9  58  4.4  4.8  6.5  8.3  9.4  8.9  7.9  ·2.3  1.4 
AlenteJO  14.6  116  9.8  9.1  7.5  8.8  11.4  11.8  12.3  10.4  -5.8  1.6 
Algarve  5.5  31  38  3.9  2.8  5.1  6.8  6.6  9.1  8.2  .0.4  3.1 
A<;:OieS  22  25  3.0  3.7  3.4  5.3  6.6  8.1  7.2  5.4  3.1  0.1 
Made~ra  4.8  5.5  .  50  30  3.0  3.7  4.6  4.8  5.5  5.4  -1.1  1.7 
ObJ.  1 Portugal  6.0  4JJ  4.1  3.6  3JJ  5.3  &.7  7.3  7A  1.7  .0.7  1.4 
Merseyside  15.7  15.1  14.4  14.9  15.2  15.0  14.4  13.3  11.6  12.1  .().7  -2.9 
Htghlands. Islands  128  109  9.8  8.3  8.5  12.4  12.1  10.5  8.1  8.4  .().4  -4.0 
Northern Ireland  17  1  177  17.3  16.0  15.5  15.1  14.5  12.9  11.4  10.3  -2.0  -4.8 
ObJ.1 UK (198.83)  17.1  17.7  17.3  11.0  15.5  15.1  .  .  .  .  ·2.0  . 
Obj. 1 UK (1114-H)  .  .  .  .  .  14.8  14.2  12.8  11.2  10.1  .  -3.1 
EUR15, IXCI. new Linder  8.0  8.3  7.7  8.1  .  .  .  .  .  .  1.5  . 
EUR15  .  .  .  8.2  9.2  10.7  11.2  10.7  10JJ  10.7  .  0.0 
Total ObJ. 1 (1988-H)"'  15.6  14.5  13.5  13.3  13.1  11.3  17.8  17.5  17.7  17.2  0.7  o.t 
Total Obi. 1 (1114-H)"'  .  .  .  .  .  14.R  15.2  1U  11.3  11.2  .  1.4 
See Nole to Table 29. AbruZzo. in Italy, became no IOnQBr eligible for ObJective 1  status from  1997 on. II is included in the totlJI for Italy and the EU for this 
r:r!r for the sake of continuity. 
•  Only regions wholly eligible for Objective 1 
101 No data for DOMs in  1997: total for  1997 calculated on the basis of 1996 aats. 
rcJ Regions with 0b}8Ctive  1 status throughout/he period (except Abruzzo). 
I<IJ RegiOns with Objective  1 status auring the second programming periOd. 
Source: Eurostat: DGXVI estirr~&tes 
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Table 31  Employment rates In Objective 1 regions, 1988-97 
Aegion 181  Employment rate<"> CDl 
1988  1993  1997 
HainaiA  48.0  49.2  49.8 
Obj. 1 Belgique lelgll  .  41.2  41.8 
Berlin-Oil. Stadt  - - -
Brlndenburg  - 62.2  62.8 
Meckllnburg-Vorpommam  - 62.7  61.3 
Sacnlen  - 60.9  62.7 
Sachlen-Anhall  - 61.6  59.6 
ThOrlngen  - 61.6  63.0 
Obj. 1 Deu!RhiMcl  - 11.8  12.0 
Anatolikl MakedOnia. Thraki  62.8  64.9  62.2 
Kllnlrild Mak8donla  56.4  53.5  56.0 
Oytild Makedonla  57.6  54.3  53.6 
Thelaalia  59.1  57.9  60.6 
lpeiros  61.5  56.0  55.7 
Ionia Nisia  71.2  64.3  68.5 
Oytiki Ellada  65.9  56.9  59.9 
Sterea Ellada  59.2  54.9  55.6 
Peloponnisos  72.0  68.2  66.2 
Aniki  50.1  50.7  52.4 
VoreiO A~gaiO  55.2  52.5  52.5 
NotiO AigaiO  57.5  56.4  61.7 
Krili  70.9  67.9  70.1 
Obj.1 Ellada  57.1  55.2  11.7 
Galicia  56.8  51.9  49.9 
Prineopado de Asturias  47.0  44.5  <13.2 
Cantabna  45.4  46.9  45.9 
Csstllla y LeOn  47.7  47.0  47.7 
Caslilla·La Mancha  47.6  46.2  47.8 
Extrernadura  41.2  40.1  41.8 
Comunidad Valenciana  49.\J  46.9  49.4 
Andalucla  39.5  37.6  39.5 
RegiOn de Murcoa  47.8  45.8  48.6 
Csuta y Melllla  36.9  39.8  42.2 
Canan as  443  41.0  47.6 
ObJ. 1 Espalla  48.1  43.8  45.2 





ObJ. 1 Franca. axel. DOM  44.7  48.5  38.1 
Ira  land  51.5  52.7  Sl.1 
Abruzzo  56.0  537  52.3 
Mohse  593  528  49.6 
Campa"'a  45.0  422  38.8 
PU(lll:l  47 1  44 6  41.3 
Basollcala  48.8  456  42.1 
Calabloa  44 7  42.9  38.2 
Sicoloa  447  42.2  38.1 
Sardegna  463  443  43.1 
ObJ. 11talla  48A  43.9  40.5 
FleYOiand  593  664  SilO 
ObJ. 1 Nederland  .  61.4  18.0 
Burgenland  66.2 
ObJ. 1 011arralch  .  - 11.2 
Nor1e  701  676  66.7 
Cenlro  703  710  81.4 
LISboa e Vale dO TeJO  643  659  63.5 
AlenlejO  606  620  62.5 
Algarve  599  661  64.7 
Acores  601  596  58.5 
Madeora  71.3  67.7  63.3 
ObJ. 1 Portugal.  67.2  67.1  17.5 
MerHyslde  64.2  601  61.7 
Highlands. ISlands  6()1  665  73.9 
Nor1hern Ireland  58.3  600  64.2 
Obf. 1 UNITED KINGDOM  58.3  10.6  14.0 
EUR 15 (excluding naw Linder)  61.0  60.3  . 
EUR15  .  10.7  10.1 
Total Obj. 1 (1111-11)"'  51.4  49.7  41.8 
Total ObJ.1 (1114-11),.  .  51.1  112.1 
See /fie Note to Table 29. 
~~ Only regiOns wflolly eligible lor ObjeCtive  r 
101  TOIIII empiOyecJ/popu/stiOn aged 15-64 
t•l Figures for French DOMs on  1993 are for  1994 
101 RegiOI'IS with ObjeCtive  I status throughout the period (except Abruzzo). 
Source: Eurostat. LFS: DGXVIestimstes. BBcsuse the LFS regions/ data for the ysars before 1992 relate to population 
14-64,  the fiQures lor 15-64 have been estimBted on the basis of the data for the respective Member States. 
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Table 32  Employment change and·productlvlty In Objective 1 reglona, 1988-87 
Region 1"1  Employment change (% pa)  GOP/employed (EUR15•100) 
1988-93  1993-97  1988 1111  1993lbl  1883  1998 
HUllut  0.2  -0.4  108  113  115  112 
.  Ollj. 1 lelglq  ....  a.Jglt  0.2  -4A  .  .  111  112 
Ellrlln-Oit. Stadt  .  .0.2  .  .  71  78 
Brandenburg  .  -0.2  .  .  58  88 
Mecklenburg-Vorpornmern  .  -0.2  .  .  54  81 
S8ChMn  .  -0.2  .  .  54  82 
Slchlen-Anhall  .  -0.2  .  .  57  80 
ThOrtngen  .  -0.2  .  .  55  112 
Obi· 1 o.utactllencl  .  -41.2  .  .  17  14 
Anatolikl Makldonla, Thrlki  1.8  -0.8  53  52  S3  se 
Kenb'lkl Makedonia  1.0  .  2.8  85  811  70  •  DyllkiMMedcinia  2.8  0.2  81  88  ee  72 
Thellllla  -0.6  3.0  112  88  • 
88 
lpeirOI  ·2.2  0.2  52  80  6t  65 
Ionia Nllia  -0.5  t.t  54  6t  112  63 
Dyllkl Ellada  -3.0  2.3  54  70  72  73 
Sler•  Ellada  -0.8  -0.8  Sit  Sl4  05  . 101 
Petoponnilos  0.0  -0.3  64  67  ee  67 
Attild  2.5  1.6  72  72  74  74 
Voralo Aigaio  -3.5  0.4  53  64  65  63 
NoliO Algaio  4.4  -0.1  83  74  75  8t 
Krill  2.4  1.1  64  68  89  72 
Obj.1 Ellllcll  1.1  lA  17  • 
71  72 
Gllicia  ·1.2  0.1  81  86  88  71 
Principado de A&IU'Iaa  O.t  -0.6  89  88  68  91 
Canlabrla  0.6  -O.t  94  93  95  98 
Clllllla y LeOn  -0.5  0.5  83  87  811  Sit 
CUtlU.La Mancha  0.3  1.2  84  88  68  88 
ExtremadU'a  -0.3  0.3  78  80  82  8t 
Comunidad Valenc~~~na  0.6  2.3  89  Sit  93  87 
Andllucla  0.6  1.2  68  SID  Sl1  SID 
RegiOn de Murcia  0.5  0.9  88  90  92  SID 
eelft L  Melilla  0.2  2.2  92  Sl7  98  99 
Canari  13  34  tOS  103  tOS  97 
ObJ. 1 Eapafta  0.1  1.2  14  17  • 
17 
COrse  0.3  0.3  93  97  98  98 
Guadeloupe "'  .  .  .  .  52  49 
Martinique "'  .  .  .  67  61 
Guyane'''  .  .  88  58 
Riunion'''  .  .  75  88 
Obj. 1 France  0.3  0.3  13  '17  71  .. 
Ireland  1.2  4.1  83  • 
100  101 
Abruzzo  -11  -0.1  89  79  81  77 
Mollie  ·1.6  ·1.0  82  83  85  90 
Campania  -0.5  ·1.0  88  85  87  88 
Puglia  -01  -1.4  91  87  89  93 
Bas~icata  -1.7  -0.7  74  80  81  86 
Calabria  -0.2  ·1.5  74  76  77  79 
Sicilia  0.3  .().7  88  87  88  ae 
Sardegna  .()4  -0.5  87  92  94  88 
Obj.1 n.lll  -41.3  -41.1  •  • 
17  17 
FlevOiand  3.7  0.3  89  92  Sl4"  103 
Obj. 1 Nedlrland  3.7  0.3  • 
12  ..  103 
Burgenland  .  .  92  94  93 
ObJ. 1 Oaterralch  .  .  .  12  ..  13 
Norte  ·1.4  -0.9  46  52  53  5(1 
CENTRO  -0.8  .().9  40  48  49  57 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  0.3  -1.2  72  71  72  77 
AlentejO  -0.3  -1.1  44  57  58  66 
Algarve  5.1  -1.9  59  57  58  64 
~as  '  ·1.1  -1.1  46  51  52  57 
Madeira  -3.8  -0.5  37  50  51  57 
Obj. 1 Portugal  -41.5  ·1.0  14  • 
10  .. 
Mer~ey~ide  -0.7  1.0  87  81  83  77 
Higl'llands. Islands  0.6  1.0  76  71  72  70 
Northern Ireland  -0.3  1.0  80  85  86  87 
ObJ 1 UK  .OA  1.0  83  12  13  11 
EURUI, axel New Linder  0.1  0.2  100  100  100  tOO 
EURIS  .  0.2  .  .  100  100 
Total Obj. 1 (111•111'"'  0.1  OA  71  71  10  12 
Total ObJ. 1 (1114-11) 101  .  0.3  .  .  71  71 
See Nola to Table 29. 
tDJ RellltW. to EUR 15 BvtlfaQe excluding the new Under 
tel Figures for Frencll DOMs in  1993 are for  199-f 
ltli Regions with Objective t status Jhfoughout the psriocJ (except Abruzzo) 
t•l RegiOns with Objective 1 status during the second programming period 
Scurcs: EIJfOSiat: DGXV1 tnlimBtas 
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Table 33  Employment In Objective 1 regions, 1997 
Region,.,  Employment ('OOOs)  Employment(%) 
Agriculture  Industry  Services  Total  Agriculture  Industry  Services 
Hain8Ut  11  111  292  414  2.7  26.9  70.5 
Obi· 1 Belglqulolelgll  11  111  282  414  2.7  21.1  70.5 
Bertin-081. Stadt  3  143  459  IKl5  0.6  23.6  75.9 
Brandentug  58  375  670  1103  5.3  34.0  80.7 
MecklenbUrg-Vorpommern  50  235  482  767  6.5  30.7  62.8 
Sachlen  55  695  1137  1887  2.9  36.8  80.3 
Sachlen-Anhalt  48  372  673  10Q3  4.4  34.0  61.6 
ThOrlngen  42  383  642  1067  3.9  35.9  80.2 
Obj. 1 Deutletll8nel  2M  2203  4013  1522  3.1  33.8  82.3 
Anllolikl Makacloria, Thraki  92  41  97  230  40.0  17.9  42.1 
Kentrtld Mak8donla  136  178  381  694  19.5  25.6  54.8 
Dy\lki Makedonia  24  34  45  103  23.5  32.9  43.6 
Thellalia  106  48  120  274  38.6  17.4  44.0 
lpeir08  30  20  49  98  30.3  20.1  49.6 
Ionia Niaia  20  12  43  75  26.7  15.8  57.6 
Dytlki Ellada  97  41  95  233  41.5  17.6  40.9 
Sterea Ellada  51  44  66  161  31.7  27.5  40.7 
Petoponnisos  90  35  82  207  43.4  16.9  39.7 
Aniki  14  356  1038  1407  1.0  25.3  73.7 
Voreio AigaiO  13  11  31  55  24.2  19.6  56.1 
NoliO Aigaio  10  20  68  98  10.2  20.0  69.8 
Kr~i  83  27  109  219  37.8  12.5  49.8 
Obj. 1 Ellada  7U  -
2223  3153  11.8  22.5  57.7 
GaliCia  199  247  449  894  22.2  27.6  50.2 
Prineipado de Asturias  35  94  182  311  11.1  30.2  58.7 
cantabria  18  48  93  159  11.3  30.1  58.6 
Castilla y LeOn  108  220  447  775  14.0  28.4  57.6 
Gaslllla-La Manella  62  169  278  508  12.1  33.2  54.7 
Extrernadura  46  69  167  282  16.3  24.5  •  59.3 
Comunidad Valenciana  83  440  780  1303  6.4  338  59.8 
And& lucia  231  406  1232  1868  12.4  21.7  65.9 
RegiOn de Muroa  43  96  218  357  12.1  26.9  61.0 
Ceuta y Melilla  0  3  35  38  0.3  6.9  92.8 
Canarias  44  93  384  521  8.4  17.8  73.8 
ObJ. 1 Espalla  see  1883  4264  7014  12.4  2U  110.8 
Corse  4  8  42  53  6.6  14.5  78.9 
Guadeloupe  10  24  90  124  7.8  197  72.5 
Martinique  9  12  102  123  7.5  9.7  82.8 
Guyane  3  4  36  44  7.8  10.0  82.2 
Rtuoion  8  24  128  180  5.1  15.1  79.8 
Obj. 1 Fr1nce  34  73  397  504  1.7  14A  78.8 
Ireland  14!1  391  82t  1311  10.1  28.8  110.5 
Mollie  17  29  61  107  15.5  27.0  57.4 
Campania  153  335  1007  1496  10.3  224  67.3 
Puglia  132  284  715  1130  11.6  25.2  63.2 
Basil leal a  23  52  93  167  13.7  30.9  55.4 
Calabria  67  92  353  512  13.1  18.0  69.0 
Sicilia  154  257  867  1278  12.0  20.1  67.9 
Sardegna  62  114  322  498  12.5  228  64:7 
Obj. 11talia  807  11&2  3418  5188  11.7  22.4  15.1 
Flevoland  8  24  91  123  6.7  19.4  73.9 
Obj. 1 Naderland  8  24  91  123  1.7  11A  73.1 
Burgenland  10  41  69  120.  8.2  34.6  57.3 
Obj. 1 Oaterrelc:ll  10  41  6t  120  8.2  34.6  57.3 
Norte  183  630  765  1578  11.6  39.9  48.5 
Centro  288  268  348  904  31.9  29.7  38.5 
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo  57  378  1062  1496  3.8  25.2  71.0 
Alentejo  29  50  126  205  14.2  24.5  61.2 
Algarve  17  28  98  143  11.8  19.6  68.6 
Acores  15  19  57  91  16.0  21.2  62.8 
Madeira  13  30  64  107  12.5  27.7  59.8 
ObJ. 1 Portugal  1101  1403  2519  4523  13.3  31.0  11.7 
Meraeyslde  1  137  403  541  0.1  25.4  74.5 
Highlands. lalands  8  37  95  140  5.6  26.3  68.1 
Nonttern Ireland  35  181  448  664  5.2  27.3  67.5 
Obj.1 UK  43  355  Me  1344  3.2  21A  70A 
EUR15  7425  44036  17124  141311  5.0  21.5  IU 
Total ObJ.1  3352  8511  11111  311175  10.8  Z7.5  11.7 
101 only regions wholly eligible tor Objective 1 
Source: Eurostst, LFS; DGXVI estimates 
228 Table 34  Impact of the Structural Funds 
Comparison of simulation results obtained from macroeconomic models 
(growth effects as % difference from baseline) 
·PEREIRA  BEUTEL  HERMIN4 
1994-99  1989-93  1994-99  1994  1999 
yearly average  yearly average  yearly average  Total effects  Total effects 
(%)  (%)  (%)  (of which  (of which 
demand e.flects)  demand effects) 
Greece  0.410 0.6  0.8  1.0  1.2  9.4 
( 1. 1)  (4.8) 
Ireland  0.410 0.6  09  0.6  6.2  9.3 
(6.2)  (5.9) 
.  Portugal  0.610 0.9  09  1.1  7.0  9.2 
(7.0)  (8.1) 
Spain  .  0.3  0.5  1.9  4.3 
.  (1.9)  (2.9) 
Average EUR4  .  0.5  0.7  .  -
~2010 
Source: Pereira (1994}. Beutel (1996} Bradley eta/. (1995}. Chrislodoulakis and Kalvitys (1995}. Cordero (1996}. Roeger (1996} 
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Table 35 Demographic ~hanges  In Central and Eastern Europe, 1985·95 
ArnJal average %change 
1985-90  1990-95  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
CEEC  0.30  -0.13  0.00  -0.36  -0.13  -0.05  -0.06  -0.14 
Natural Growth  0.40  0.10  0.24  0.17  0.09  0.03  -0.01 
I  -0.10 
Net Mlaration  -0.10  -0.23  -0.24  -0.53  -0.22  -0.08  -0.05  -0.04 
Bulgaria  -0.40  -0.80  -1.12  -0.86  -1.28  -0.30  -0.38  -0.50 
Natural Growth  0.10  -0.30  -0.04  -0.16  -0.22  -0.30  -0.38  -0.50 
Net Mlaration  -0.50  -0.50  -1.08  -0.70  -1.06  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Czech Republic  0.05  -0.07  0.02  -0.50  0.12  0.08  0.00  -0.11 
Natural Growth  0.03  -0.04  0.02  0.05  0.01  0.03  -0.10  -0.20 
Net Migration  0.02  -0.03  0.00  -0.55  0.11  0.05  0.10  0.09 
Estonia  0.62  -1.10  -0.07  -0.52  -2.28  -1.28  -1.01  -1.03 
Natural Growth  0.42  -0.20  0.18  -0.02  -0.13  -0.40  -0.52  -0.50 
Net Migration  0.20  -0.90  -0.25  -0.50  -2.15  -0.88  -0.49  -0.53 
Hungary  -0.42  -0.31  -0.19  -0.17  -0.26  -0.32  -0.30  -0.30 
Natural Growth  -0.21  -0.31  -0.19  -0.17  -0.26  -0.32  -0.30  -0.30 
Net Miaration  -0.21  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Latvia  0.78  -1.20  -0.20  -0.40  -1.90  -1.55  -1.41  -1.09 
Natural Growth  0.34  -0.30  0.12  0.00  -0.14  -0.48  -0.68  -0.68 
Net Miaration  0.44  -0.90  -0.32  -0.40  -1.76  -1.07  -0.73  -0.41 
Lithuania  0.99  0.02  0.76  0.27  -0.28  -0.33  -0.17  -0.15 
Natural Growth  0.67  0.20  0.46  0.40  032  0.02  -0.10  -0.11 
Net migration  0.33  -0.18  0.30  -0.13  -060  -0.35  -0.07  -0.04 
Poland  0.52  0.29  0.38  0.33  0.28  0.23  0.20  0.07 
Natural Growth  0.71  0.34  0.41  0.38  0.31  0.27  0.25  0.12 
Net miaration  -0.19  -0.05  -0.03  -0.05  -0.03  -0.04  -0.05  -0.05 
Romania  0.45  -0.49  -0.08  -1.64  -0.15  -0.13  -0.15  -0.24 
Natural Growth  0.60  O.Ot  0~29  0.10  -0.02  -0.06  -0.08  -0.15  . 
Net miaration  ·0.15  -0.50  -0.37  ·1.74  -0.13  -0.07  -0.07  -0.09 
Slovak Republic  0.50  0.22  -0.73  0.45  0.35  0.41  0.37  0.21 
Natural Growth  0.70  0.43  0.48  0.45  0.40  0.38  0.28  0.16 
Net Miaration  -0.20  -0.21  -1.21  0.00  -0.05  0.03  0.09  0.05 
Slovenia  0.48  -0.07  0.17  -0.06  -0.24  -0.23  0.00  0.04 
Natural Growth  0.33  0.06  0.19  0.11  0.03  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Net migration  0.15  -0.13  -0.02  -0.17  -0.27  -0.22  0.00  0.04 
SOurce: Eurostat, National statistics 
230 Table 36  Total Population In Central and Eastern Europe, 1960-97 
1960  1970  1980  1985  1990  1991 
CEEC  86846  94465  101659  104404  106015  106010 
Bulgaria  7829  8464  8846  8971  8767  8669 
Czech Republic  9638  9790  10316  10334  10362  10364 
Estonia  1209  1352  1472  1524  1572  1570 
Hungary  9961  10322  10710  10599  10375  10355 
Latvia  2104  2352  2509  2570  2674  2668 
Lithuania  2756  3119  3404  3529  3708  3737 
Poland  29480  32671  35413  37063  38038  38183 
Romania  18319  20140  22133  22687  23211  23192 
Slovak Republic  3970  4537  4963  5179  5311  5272 
Slovenia  1581  1720  1893  1949  1996  2000 
Source: EUtOStat 
~-~  -- - -- ~--- ----
-· 
Table 37  Population growth In Central and Eastern Europe, 1960-97 
1960-70  1970-80  1980-85  "1985-90  1990-96  1991 
CEEC  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.0 
Bulgaria  0.8  0.4  0.3  -0.5  -0.7  -1.1 
Czech Republic  0.2  0.5  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Estonia  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.6  -1.0  -0.1 
Hungary  0.4  0.4  -0.2  -0.4  0.3  -0.2 
Latvia  1.1  0.7  0.4  0.8  -1.1  -0.2 
Lithuania  1.3  0.9  0.7  1.0  0.0  0.8 
Poland  1.0  0.8  0.9  0.5  0.3  0.4 
Romania  1.0  1.0  0.5  0.5  -0.4  -0.1 
Slovak Republic  1.3  0.9  0.9  0.5  0.2  -0.7 
Slovenia  0.9  1.0  0.6  0.5  -0.1  0.2 
tJ  Source: Eurostat  .... 
1992  1993 
105627  1~95 
8596  8485 
10313  10326 
1562  1527 
10337  10310 
2657  2606 
3747  3737 
38309  38418 
22811  22779 
5296  5314 
1999  1994 
--
1992  1993 
-0.4  -0.1 
-0.9  -1.3 
-0.5  0.1 
-0.5  -2.3 
-0.2  -0.3 
-0.4  -1.9 
0.3  -0.3 
0.3  0.3 
-1.6  -0.1 
0.5  0.4 
-0.1  -0.2 
1994  1995  1996 
105446  105385  105232 
8460  8428  8385 
10334  10333  10321 
1507  1492  1476 
10277  10246  10212 
2566  2530  2502 
3724  3718  3712 
38505  38581  38609 
22748  22712  22656 
5337  5356  5368 
1989  1990  1990 
- --·----- -----
AmJBI 
1994  1995  1996 
-0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
-0.3  -0.4  -0.5 
0.1  0.0  -0.1 
-1.3  -1.0  -1.0 
-0.3  -0.3  -0.3 
-1.6  -1.4  -1.1 
-0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
0.2  0.2  0.1 
-0.1  -0.2  -0.3 
0.4  0.4  0.2 

































I ~  Table 38  Balance of trade between CEECs and EU Member States, 1996 
EUR15  F  Bt\.  NL  D  I  UK  IRL  OK 
CEEC  16.456.4  1,637.4  945.1  3791  4,680.6  3.5744  9488  244.5  295.2 
Estonia  605.7  -0.8  -0.7  -710  76.8  42.5  -30.2  6.6  15.5 
Latvia  -15.2  -22.1  5.6  -2445  69.6  47.9  -72.4  -4.0  13.0 
Lithuania  364.7  96  -24.5  -1.5  181.1  61.5  -54.7  8.1  40.7 
Slovenia  1,105.8  132.4  96.7  64.7  -266.0  669.8  15.2  8.4  -2.7 
Poland  7,581.2  689.1  514.5  347.4  2.265.9  1,620.6  802.5  78.8  99.7 
Czech Rep  4,216.0  536.3  259.7  256.3  1,324.7  768.9  379.0  70.5  54.0 
Slovak Rep  5n.1  116.4  13.8  34.4  148.9  89.5  28.7  7.1  13.4 
Hungary  1.1111.5  94.6  67.2  25.9  3490  208.1  ·113.7  50.0  31.4 
Romania  849.8  67.6  24.6  -38.0  383.6  179.1  19.9  11.8  25.2 
Bulgaria  -9.3  14.3  -11.8  5.4  147.1  -113.5  ·254  7.2  4.8 
Source: Eurostat 
---·-- ----
EL  p  E  s 
-137.6  -0.7  444.6  .  745.2 
0.8  -0.7  62  -24.5 
3.3  -5.7  1.8  23.7 
1.7  -14.4  -6.8  58.5 
-11.1  -12.7  98.3  31.2 
-19.1  -2.6  279.5  376.6 
-45.5  -7.8  157.7  139.8 
-14.2  4.6  38.2  12.5 
-33.1  33.1  -31.1  85.0 
23.2  9.1  -10.9  19.3 
-43.7  -3.6  ..aa.s  23.1 
ECU million 
AN  A 
1,356.3  1,343.5 
578.7  6.6 
157.1  11.5 
972  8.1 
10.8  Zl0.7 
248.7  219.6 
116.5  3)6.0 
22.2  61.5 
87.6  326.4 
18.4  116.9 
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Table 39  Population In Cyprus, 1974·96 
1974 ('COOs) .  1996 ('COOs)  1974-96 (% pa) 
Southern part of the Island  506  652  1.2 
Northern part of the Island  116  198  2.5 
Source: Government of Cyprus, OemoQraphic Report. Figures for northern part sre estimates and include settlers 
Table 40  Changes In GOP In the southern part of Cyprus, 1990.96 
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
GOP growth (% pa)  - 0.7  9.4  0.7  5.8  5.5  2.0 
GOP  (billion ECU)  4.4  4.7  5.3  5.6  6.2  6.7  7.0 
GOP per head ('OOOs ECU)  7.5  7.7  8.6  8.9  9.8.  10.4  10.7 
Source: Eurostat; Government of Cyprus, National accounts 
Table41  Changes in output In the northern part of Cyprus, 1985-96  . 
Annual average % change 
GOP  Agriculture  Industry  Services 
1985-90  6.8  -4.4  15.0  5.9 
1990-96  0.8  5.0  0.5  0.6 
Source: Government of Cyprus, estimates based on other sources 
Table 42 GOP disparities In Cyprus, 1996 
Northern part  Southern part  North/South(%) 
GOP per head ('COOs ECU)  3.2  10.9  29.7 
GOP per person employed ('COOs ECU)  7.8  19.3  40.4 
Source: Government of Cyprus. Figures for the northern part are estimates based on other sources 
233 Statistical annex 
Table 43  Main regional Indicators 
Algicn  Eeoncmy  Labour miiUI 
GOPIIucl (PPS),  EmpiOyi'Nnl by MCIOr  u..-np~ormencr~~~ 
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~  123.1  137.3  137.8  1.7  30.0  68.3  118.5  10.2  7.2  !9.4  10.1  17.0 
l.i'ntug  QG.4  1011.5  110.4  3.0  37.8  5.2  41.1  118  8.3  80.3  13.3  16.1 
Ol»lllllnclnn  1111.5  104.4  104.8  2.8  32.7  14.4  18.1  8.8  6.5  58.5  8.7  15.0  ,.,.....,...  711.1  118.5  116.8  2.3  21.3  71.4  1!8.3  6.11  4.5  50.1  5.8  11.11 
Wllltolllllnclnn  102.7  117.3  118.0  5.1  33.1  81.8  70.2  7.5  5.1  52.6  7.5  10.5 
Ngian Wlllanre  14.5  Ill. I  1111.4  2.11  24.5  72.6  56.4  14.0  12.5  83.11  15.5  31.5 
.....  WIIon  75.6  Ill. I  111.0  1.7  16.5  711.8  203.7  8.8  7.9  51.4  9.8  23.0  ......  n.4  80.7  81.3  2.7  211.11  70.5  22.5  16.4  15.4  67.2  18.8  311.2 
LAgl  117.4  IIIlO  1111.4  2.5  26.6  70.8  511.7  13.6  12.2  617  15.5  31.3 
~(B)  8111  116.4  97.3  5.6  22.5  72.0  38.3  11.0  6.8  50.11  11.3  18.6 
IWI1ur  82.3  116.4  86.2  3.11  19.7  71.7  37.7  13.3  11.4  62.8  14.7  30.5 
a.-k  111.1  111.3  11U  3.7  11.1  ..  7  ,  ...  u  1.7  11.1  L7  u 
D•••iMI  11L1  1CIU  1DU  u  34.7  11.4  ,  ..  ,  u  u  4U  1CL8  tiLl 
~  125.2  124.0  125.8  2.8  41.2  58.0  303.4  3.5  6.2  45.8  6.1  8.1 
~  142.8  135.2  137.1  2.9  43.8  53.3  M.3  3.1  II. I  48.4  5.11  7.5 
l<lltwlll  123.5  125.7  1271  1.3  38.5  80.2  271.1  4.2  8.6  45.5  6.5  11.6 
l'twolug  108.0  1011.1  110.11  3.7  38.3  58.0  2112.11  3.8  6.2  44.6  6.2  9.0 
Tillqln  1011.5  114.4  116.2  37  42.9  53.4  252.0  3.2  5.7  41.5  5.7  6.8  --
115.9  1242  125.11  3.7  364  9.9  245.5  4.4  5.11  39.2  59  7.1 
~  140.9  1565  1584  3.0  31.5  115.4  3152.0  4.1  4.8  37.6  4.6  5.7 
NoeclltDIJWffi  68.11  1168  1186  6.8  40.2  53.0  102.1  4.9  5.5  29.1  !1.6  86 
ObllpiiiZ  110.4  911.6  101.0  5.5  37.2  57.3  157.0  8.0  6.5  41.3  8.9  71 
~  1182  1073  1086  36  41.8  547  136.4  4.6  7.4  402  7.9  110 
Mollllo•lloen  123.6  1232  1248  27  37.7  511.6  2na  4.6  7.1  43.0  7.3  8.5 
~  91U  1043  1059  24  395  581  206.0  43  6.4  42.5  6.9  8.5 
~  1066  1104  1120  43  38.4  57.3  11165  3.11  58  39.1  57  69 
lllr1on  128.1  1022  104 7  06  236  75.9  107.1  8.1  13.4  458  13.0  14.7 
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~lallllin  116.2  102.5  104 7  2.9  27.0  70.2  78.11  7.3  7.6  42.1  7.0  10.7 
61.2  60.4  3.11  35.9  80.2  32.4  .  17.8  45.8  21.0  12.3  ....  a2  .,  ..  IU  1U  :tl.l  '67.7  u  7A  ...  IU  14.1  31.D 
Ycnil Ellcll  57.2  14.8  83.7  27.5  23.1  411.4  6.4  lt.1  52.7  14.4  211.4 
ANdi,.....,'I"'WWU  56.1  61.1  51111  40.0  17.11  42.1  .  8.3  48.7  12.5  27.8 
IWdl  Mllleclllra  58.3  67.4  664  111.5  25.8  54.8  .  .  lt.2  48.8  14.5  28.2 
~  ........  ~.1  61.8  80.6  23.4  32.8  43.1  .  .  13.8  IIU  '22.8  45.7  n...  55.2  62.7  81.5  366  11.<1  44.0  .  8.5  7.5  83.8  12.8  27.1 
K8IWIIi o.ca.  57.7  58.2  57.7  37.1  111.6  43.3  .  8.8  61.5  '14.7  32.8  ....  47.4  43.8  43.4  30.3  Z.1  411.6  .  .  10.!  67.0  17.8  43.4 Statistical annex 
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J  I  I  I  ~  i 
~  ~  !  t  v  .. ..  10.1  S73IQ  117.0  17A  17.0  1U  41  40  ID  IUR11  ...  111.2  1U  311211  141.1  17A  17.1  1U  .  .  .  IUR1J 
17.S  4U  17A  10117  332.1  17.1  11.1  11.0  • 
M  27  ll'giiiJUI 111111 
53.0  41.0  80.2  iolll  5882.0  17.5  85.1  1H  31  27  35  Reg. ~.IIIMIIIaHidal.  Gew. 
80.1  48.1  70.8  511110  <1359  17.5  66.8  15.8  311  315  211  ""-"'~ 
58.5  41.5  70.2  1633  5611.7  17.7  66.3  16.0  41  33  28  ~ 
55.4  42.4  ea.o  778  321.0  18.5  6112  12.3  45  33  22  L.lniU'g 
11.4  51.2  71.4  1353  453.8  16.11  67.0  16.1  315  37  25  Ooll-..........., 
63.5  55.4  71.6  1002  475.7  17.3  66.9  15.8  34  315  31  \IUIIII!riiiMI 
81.0  411.6  72.0  1123  3584  17.7  65.6  16.6  31  37  24  w.t·lilllndlren 
53.3  43.2  63.4  3318  1117.0  18.7  85.0  111.3  40  33  27  Ngoan Wlllonne 
587  50.8  6&.8  340  312.0  19.8  661  14.1  211  211  45  lnlllnl  w.IDn 
411.8  402  !18.4  1285  3393  18.2  64.9  16.11  45  32  23  Hlinlul 
53.3  42.6  64.0  1014  262.6  18.2  651  16.7  311  315  27  ume 
567  47.2  au  242  545  20.6  63.8  15.11  4()  315  25  u..nt~~Ug 
58.4  45.5  67.2  437  1191  1113  849  15.11  31  33  28  NMv 
71.1  ...  12.3  1213  122.1  17.5  17.3  11.1  ID  ..  • 
~ 
14.2  11.7  72.1  11111  Z2U  18.2  11.3  IU  11  •  2S  Dulllhllllll 
68.0  !IQ4  71.4  10347  2894  169  682  14.9  22  56  24  a.c.n.w~ 
68.3  80.3  76.1  3872  3668  168  686  14.6  23  ~  24  Slulglll 
65.11  56.7  75.0  2651  3631  160  &116  154  20  57  23  K8rllnft 
68.2  80.11  n.3  20113  223 7  17 3  875  15.2  21  • 
23  FMIIurg 
68.2  801  712  1731  1941  182  676  14.2  22  54  24  Tlbnglfl 
611.6  80.6  714  120111  1703  165  680  155  22  • 
22  --
714  629  798  31185  2273  154  6116  150  20  52  27  ~ 
70.2  598  804  1148  111  1  17 4  67 3  153  23  !18  18  l\loldlllllyWm 
692  561  80.2  1~7  1091  17 4  67 4  152  24  57  19  OtlerPIIZ 
662  803  7511  1112  1538  1t) 4  668  16 7  23  SJ  18  Obllf.-
1183  805  758  1671  2306  lti1  681  158  20  58  23  MoUlt-
673  57.3  no  1320  1~  l  17 5  670  155  23  56  21  U'lllrl-
6111  804  n6  1726  1117  ll5  668  157  22  !18  111  SchMben 
621  57.7  66.5  3465  3897 3  ~!; 0  71  ~  137  15  52  33  Belton 
826  571  &113  2548  1164  lti9  69 7  '34  7  62  31  Br8nclenbulg 
5117  523  67.2  679  1679 3  139  68•  17 7  22  58  20  ar-n 
6311  5113  &114  1708  22613  IJ J  69o  170  20  56  24  IWnbutg 
648  561  733  8019  1850  155  687  158  20  56  24  - 6U  575  732  31!90  495(i  149  698  15 3  19  54  211  ~ 
637  536  737  1~  196o  165  678  156  19  Sl  22  Gilllln 
637  5311  732  1271  1533  16  1  ws  174  22  58  20  Kauel 
11.3  557  668  1820  786  177  698  124  9  82  211  Mldollntlulg-'/olpO'mllm 
634  5311  726  77'98  16J 7  1b.S  675  16  I  19  61  20  ~ 
610  514  704  1679  20/3  154  I  67 4  17 2  18  61  21  81-.g 
630  54.5  71.4  2143  2368  151  67 8  17 1  18  61  21  ....,_ 
6611  573  763  1809  1056  168  674  158  20  61  18  l.ii1IWg 
632  !>31  72.9  2367  1582  182  672  146  20  61  111  w.er.em. 
61.2  504  71.8  17'11120  !1260  163  678  159  20  SJ  20  Nardmell..wetll*n 
804  501  707  52i1  10004  155  &Ill  165  22  eo  18  DiiiMidorl 
61.5  50.0  729  4202  5706  160  689  151  21  54  25  KOin 
606  492  71  7  2580  3738  17 6  674  151  111  62  111  MOnlllf 
652  5411  75.4  2020  3099  174  662  163  18  63  111  o.tnald 
80.1  411.7  70.4  3827  478~  162  674  164  20  eo  111  Amlbelg 
63.8  53.2  7~.2  3989  2010  165  670  165  21  SJ  20  Atieliiii!O-Pielz 
84.0  !>3.3  74.7  1495  184  7  169  660  171  21  8)  111  I<OIIIIftz 
85.1  !>3.2  n4  507  1029  168  660  17.2  20  81  111  Titer 
13.3  !>3.1  731  1!188  2910  162  679  158  22  58  20  Allei~ri'IIIZ 
57.8  478  677  11:84  421 H  1~3  679  168  20  13  17  s.W1CI 
82.7  572  68.0  4556  241~  154  678  168  5  114  31  '*'-'  -
!18.6  544  64.6  2731  1336  160  686  154  8  65  27  ~ 
58.8  522  65.2  572  1336  15 7  686  157  7  67  25  o...u 
60.5  55.7  1111.2  a  2047  156  68.6  15.8  8  Ill  27  ...... 
!18.3  54.6  63.6  12!>3  1068  164  686  15.0  - 8  13  a  MlgllltMg 
11.5  57.2  75.7  2734  1738  15 7  683  16.0  111  81  20  Schill• ~ 
63.0  57.1  882  2497  154 4  162  667  15.1  8  13  30  1liQrlngeii 
11.7  40.1  74.1  111471  79.1  1U  17.1  1U  11  32  17  ... 
57.7  40.6  71.3  3381  599  168  68.1  15.1  57  28  18  \lolwle Elida 
822  483  '79.5  561  396  173  66.8  15.9  85  23  12  MIIQIIU ~  1'lniU 
!S.O  31.4  74.3  1n1  945  165  611.4  14.1  51  31  18  te.l*lll~ 
53.1  34.3  73.1  302  319  177  666  15.7  11  211  13  ~  ........ 
10.1  41.11  80.&  742  528  170  68.5  18.5  84  22  14  'TI1III* 
10.8  42.4  79.5  2635  489  162  662  17.1  Ill  24  11  1<81riiEid 
55.7  37.4  75.1  368  400  15.5  667  17.7  85  :l1  111  ..... 
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Table 43  Main regional Indicators 
Regoon  Econcmy  L.atlour market 
GOP/head (PPS).  Employment Dy aectOJ  Unemployment rate 
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lallaNtlla  51.9  61.9  61  I  26.7  15.8  576  6.2  46.5  7.6  23.4 
[)ytJki Eltada  489  57.7  56.9  415  17.6  409  7.9  65.6  11.6  28.5 
SterN Elladll  73.5  65.5  65.3  318  27.5  40.8  12.0  60.7  22.6  42.6 
F'etoponnolol  60.7  58.3  57.9  43.4  16.9  397  7.5  58.5  13.2  27.11 
Albki*  62.8  76.8  75.0  10  25.3  73 7  11.6  55.6  16.11  34.5 
NoN Aogaoau. Krill  56.2  69.5  68.5  28.5  15.5  560  4.7  48.4  77  19.0 
Voreoo AogaoO  44.0  51  7  50.3  242  19.6  56.1  7.1  544  12.9  23.5 
Notoo Aogaoo  65.1  75.3  74.6  102  20.0  699  4.3  43.0  72  15.5 
Knro  56.6  725  716  378  12.5  498  2.7  4.3  48.8  6.9  19.8 
E8pn  H.l  71.7  71.5  8.3  21.1  11.1  12..0  211.1  21.1  11.5  28.3  .. 
Noroule  603  673  66.8  184  28.5  531  3.11  15.4  19.9  61.1  25.9  40.9 
~  55.0  630  62.3  222  276  502  2.9  13.4  19.2  58.7  24.8  37.1 
ProncoPIIdOdeAsturoas  704  73.6  733  11.1  302  587  6.6  19.7  21.2  65.6  27.5  503 
Cantabna  67.0  76.9  76.7  113  301  586  3.6  18.8  211  643  28.9  45.1 
NOJ ..  ,.  84.5  918  918  6.1  36.7  57 2  14.6  18.5  16.0  549  23.7  34.5 
Pail Vasco  89.5  92.3  925  27  36.9  604  14.9  23.2  188  61.2  26.0  39.4 
Ccmunodad Forat de Navarra  84.8  981  974  89  40.0  510  27.8  15.1  100  42.0  150  29.9 
LaRqa  833  89.0  89.0  92  390  519  67  13.2  118  52.0  17.6  26.5 
AragOn  759  88.9  887  101  342  558  10.3  12.7  14 4  44.5  244  30.0 
Ccmunodad de Madrid  85.9  1006  996  12  265  723  218  16.3  184  575  226  36.8 
Cenuo  57 4  684  678  138  292  570  32  185  216  464  31.9  41.6 
CasMayLeon  650  75.9  74 6  14 0  284  57 6  4.2  17.6  199  52.5  30.3  43.8 
Castilla-La Manella  545  659  656  121  332  547  31  151  191  409  281  378 
Extremaoura  442  546  550  16 J  24 5  59 3  16  259  295  419  414  439 
Este  78 7  896  894  42  358  soc  216  207  18.5  513  24.9  355 
Catalulla  823  991  981  32  384  SO•  287  218  17 4  57 7  235  333 
Canunodad Valercoana  709  738  74  4  64  336  59"  13 7  201  214  44  1  291  404 
111as Baoeares  904  97C  98C  2~  244  •.l.'  51  13 4  122  394  15 7  265 
Sur  548  587  590  12'  223  6: t  JJ  298  300  476  396  481 
Andalucoa  528  57 2  574  12.  21  7  t~ •  32  311  320  47 J  418  508 
Regoon de Murcoa  67 J  67 2  660  12:  269  t.- 38  214  183  462  269  286 
Ceuta y Melolla  636  723  714  OJ  69  ),' '.  264  716  362  584 
Canatoas  693  74 J  74 8  84  17  ~  :-•.- 52  255  209  489  263  390 
FrMCe  109.8  103.11  105.1  4.6  26.6  61.7 
"  IU  10.3  12.0  41.5  1U  21.7 
ilede Frarce  1624  1589  163  1  04  203  l')]  204 5  86  10 7  412  112  18 7 
Sasson Parosoen  1014  927  941  6  I  310  6].;  640  109  126  426  150  319 
Ci13mQ"'Ine·Aidenne  104U  941  ~.,,  ,.~  2.'2  t...:.'  42 2  119  133  418  160  341 
Pocardoe  970  847  660  53  335  6' '  623  113  I  142  405  169  379 
Haute-Normandoe  1121  let> 9  107 B  33  335  b.l.'  635  12.7  136  47 7  160  347 
Cenl••  1033  919  935  65  308  o::·  799  100  t09  42 3  13 4  263 
Basse-Normandoe  916  889  904  73  296  oJ'  470  104  132  414  151  32.8 
Bourgogne  97 7  904  915  76  300  £.:10:  759  96  110  407  135  279 
NOfd • Pas·Oe-CalaoS  882  854  869  29  314  65 t  335  139  166  44 6  194  364 
Esl  1014  950  966  35  343  62~  820  93  96  363  116  230 
LOfratne  947  887  899  28  311  bb'  530  109  11  J  398  136  293 
Alsace  1142  1051  107 5  26  359  6'4  122  I  70  78  293  91  179 
Frarcl'oe.cantt  970  '427  938  59  37 4  !>6c  814  104  91  374  115  207 
Ouest  930  876  885  8 1  284  63•  444  108  10 7  41  7  131  263 
Pays deJa L.aote  951  910  922  63  326  61'  397  111  110  429  136  254 
ll!etagne  920  864  868  87  251  66'  47 4  104  99  395  121  250 
PooiOu-Char-1  906  833  84 4  109  262  629  481  109  114  429  138  309 
Sud-Ouest  956  888  896  84  232  684  508  104  114  419  138  254 
Aqu4ane  1026  921  929  80  21  7  7G2  407  117  119  43 1  148  279 
ModW'y!tnHs  906  872  879  84  245  67'  684  91  11.2  414  13 5  231 
Llll'IOUSIII  851  813  824  98  253  649  :.)6  97  92  367  Ill  236 
eenw•Eat  1054  97 3  989  46  299  6~ 4  142'  87  106  401  12.5  251 
RfiOne.AI!»S  1095  1004  1022  35  305  659  1628  84  105  395  122  237 
Auvatgne  1195  1137  1141  98  272  629  540  9.8  110  42.6  140  338 
~,..,.,  959  872  888  44  196  760  555  12.9  16.9  421  193  306 
Languedoc~  888  783  602  78  194  728  413  14.2  17.8  44.5  20.8  32.0 
Provence-Alpes-COte d'~  1004  920  936  27  198  77 5  654  12.3  16.5  412  185  298 
COfae  602  820  82.8  66  145  789  87  119  15.2  34.2  19.7  30.6 
~~  ci'Outre-Mer  413  465  465 
Guadetou!»  369  401  401 
Mannque  487  '  540  54.0 
Guy-.  36.9  480  480 
R6lnon  404  45.7  45 7 
lrRnd  111.1  •.s  M.l  10.1  21.5  10.4  33.3  1L1  10.1  51.0  10.1  15.1  ....  100.4  102.7  102.1  u  31.7  11.1  48.3  1D.2  12.3  61.2  1LI  33.1 
NOfdO\IIst  1163  118.2  117 3  46  34.8  607  70.0  7.9  9.0  62.2  13.0  28.9 
Poemonte  1168  117.5  1164  4.6  39.6  558  80.4  7.9  8.7  61.6  12.6  268 
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Empioymenl11118  "" populallOn agMI:  EeluCalialwl1118in1Nnt ol  25-6 
'"" PQDullliOn 15-64). 11197  I 
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68.5  &4.1  83.2  1119  86.4  16.4  64.1  111.5  87  24  10  loniaNiN 
511.11  43.5  7U  733  64.6  17.8  66.1  16.1  88  23  a  O)llilci Ellld8 
56.1  34.4  78.7  863  42.6  15.7  67.4  16.11  es  25  11  S..a.da 
85.2  47.5  8&.1  871  43.3  152  652  19.5  82  211  11  PelcpoMilaa 
82.4  37.2  118.3  3449  905.5  162  611.0  14.8  37  42  Zl  Alliki 
64.6  46.8  832  1011  57.9  182  64.!1  1CI.8  81  27  13  NiN  Aigliau. Knt1 
82.5  ·29.8  78.2  184  46.0  16.6  61.0  22.4  81  27  12  Vento~ 
61.7  41.3  82.8  2118  50.7  18.8  au  14.2  68  25  9  NaiiO AIQIIIO 
701  55.3  85.6  S5!l  67.1  18.5  65.3  1CI2  !8  28  14  Krli 
4U  33.7  13.1  31270  77.1  11.4  11.2  11.4  II  15  20  .... 
47.7  35.4  60.5  4322  95.4  14.0  67.8  18.2  Cl7  14  18  Naronll 
499  38.3  61.8  2724  92.5  14.4  67.5  18.1  70  13  17  G.licill 
43.2  29.8  57.4  1071  101.4  12.8  68.3  18.9  85  15  Zl  ~deAIIunal 
45.9  32.0  60.0  827  9!U  14.7  68.1  17.1  82  16  21  c.rutlna 
520  36.6  67.3  4037  57.4  13.7  89.4  16.9  57  17  28  Narw18 
49.7  36.5  62.9  2089  285.0  13.4  71.6  15.1  53  19  28  PeiiiiiiCO 
56.1  39.8  722  527  50.5  14.5  68.7  16.8  !Ill  15  26  Com.lnociMI Forll de~ 
54.0  37.4  70.3  261  51.7  14.3  67.4  182  84  13  Zl  LaAICja 
54.0  35.0  72.7  1180  24.8  13.8  66.3  19.9  Cll  16  23  lvrfPI 
494  35.5  63.8  5016  627.4  15.8  70.4  13.7  55  17  27  ~deMadnd 
466  28.6  64.2  5279  24.6  16.0  65.2  18.8  ee  13  18  c..o 
477  301  65.0  2510  26.6  14.0  66.1  20.0  63  15  21  CMIIill y LIOn 
478  287  66.9  16114  214  17.5  842  18.2  74  11  15  ~Manella 
41.8  249  56.2  1075  258  18.5  64.8  16.8  75  10  15  ~ 
!133  391  67.8  10706  177.7  15.7  687  15.6  S5  17  18  Elle 
553  41.6  tl80  11066  1900  14.9  69.0  16.0  63  17  19  CataVIa 
494  343  652  31113  1679  166  684  15.0  67  IS  17  Canunlclad llalercoana 
585  460  714  730  1455  176  675  150  69  16  14  lllaiBMares 
408  263  55.7  8346  64&  198  67.3  129  70  13  17  Sut 
395  252  543  7128  81  7  197  673  129  71  13  16  Andalucoa 
466  334  642  1064  958  197  672  131  66  15  Ill  RegiOn de Mutcoa 
422  267  587  133  42968  231  659  110  81  20  Ill  Cei.CayMel&lla 
476  345  611  1563  2159  190  703.  107  811  15  17  C.WIIS 
51.7  12.3  17.2  11375  107.3  11.4  15.4  11.2  37  43  tt  ,_ 
634  579  690  11()44  9194  202  684  114  34  38  2!1  Ill de France 
602  521  684  10483  720  200  645  155  42  43  15  BASSIN PllliMn 
582  492  675  1352  528  201  652  14 7  43  41  16  C~·ArcMnne 
583  505  662  1866  962  21  7  651  132  46  40  14  Pardoe 
603  520  685  1783  1448  21.4  650  13.5  42  42  16  Haule-Narmancloe 
619  !138  702  2438  623  190  641  16.9  42  ..  14  Cen!re 
593  525  683  1419  807  19.8  64.2  16.0  42  42  16  Ellale-Norrnlnd 
618  !136  703  1625  515  162  637  18.1  38  46  16  llautgagne 
495  398  5115  ~  3Zl6  223  64.5  13.2  46  41  13  Nord - Pel-<le-Calall 
606  527  684  5136  1069  19.9  680  14.1  38  45  17  Ell 
579  499  65!1  2311  98.2  199  657  144  40  ..  16  Lor,.,.. 
637  !162  71.1  1706  2063  199  67.0  13.1  34  48  18  AIMee 
811  529  tl83  1117  689  197  65.2  1!1.1  40  ..  18  Franctw-Cornlt 
615  su  68.6  7MO  900  18.9  642  17.0  36  48  16  0..11 
621  546  69.6  3167  987  198  645  156  38  47  14  Plyl de II  I..Oole 
610  540  680  21168  1064  187  642  17.1  33  48  19  IIIMaQN 
612  548  67.8  1625  630  174  634  193  38  47  15  Poolou-Ciw-s 
60.0  528  674  6126  591  167  644  18.9  32  49  19  SuOOunl 
583  502  667  21111!>  701  17 1  646  18.2  32  50  18  AQutWone 
617  55.3  682  2513  554  168  646  18.6  32  47  21 
~-·  614  55.5  677  718  424  148  627  225  35  so  15  Lomouson 
619  549  691  6!140  996  194  657  14.9  34  45  21  Cenlr•-Esr 
62.5  558  69.4  5625  128.7  201  659  14.0  34  45  22  Rrb.AIPia 
592  Sll.!i  67.9  1315  505  166  64.8  188  38  45  17  AIMrgrw 
!13.2  450  62.1  6981  1035  182  63.7  18.1  39  44  17  ~,.,. 
520  446  598  2254  82.4  179  63.4  18.7  40  42  18  1M1gwdlle.flouuilon 
&4.5  46.2  63.5  4465  142.2  184  63.8  17.8  38  4$  17  ~-ec..cr~ 
38.9  25.8  54.3  261  30.1  17.8  646  17.6  64  28  10  Corle 
1644  18.4  27.7  65.1  6.2  ~d'Our....., 
425  249.4  267  65.8  Cl.1  - - ~ 
380  345.7  24.2  65.9  7.4  t.llnnQul 
160  1.9  35.2  61.4  2.8  - Guy.-
670  2857  28.8  65.0  8.2  Nunoc1l 
17.7  41.2  70.2  3121  11.1  24.0  14.1  11.1  •  •  21  ....., 
11.3  31.1  11.2  17411  110.7  14.1  IU  1U  • 
Sl  •  .... 
55.Q  430  811.8  6064  1n.9  11.5  68.3  20.2  58  33  a  Nardo-t 
57.1  44.5  Cl96  4294  169.1  11.9  89.0  18.1  60  32  8  Pien'clnle 
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Table 43  Main regional Indicators 
Region  Economy  L.eour rnllrkal 
GOPihNc:l (PPS),  Em~IIV- Unemp~oymtnt  tale 
EUR1i!i•100  ,., cllolal). 11197 
hi 
,  .. , 
l!l  -
$  !J 
i  lif 
.....  .... 
i 
...  ....  if! 
!  ! 
t  f  I 
!!  !  f  J  I  I  t 
!I  J  J  I  ...  J,,!  ... 
118111td'Aalla  129.2  131.1  130.4  6.6  22.7  70.11  %7.0  5.0  4.1  37.0  u  11.2 
lJgWia  114.1  119.1  1167  4.4  21.6  74.0  41.2  1.2  10.2  64.5  14.9  39.0 
l..cmbwOa  131.8  132.5  131.5  2.7  40.7  58.6  102.0  5.6  u  56.2  g 1  18.8 
Nard Eat  112.4  125.1  123.3  s.a  37.9  56.3  12.7  6.4  i!i.O  3112  7.5  11.4 
T~Aage  115.2  1%7.11  126.6  11.7  %12  53.0  40.4  5.4  3.8  30.0  57  10.0· 
v.neto  111.7  124.4  122.3  5.2  41.1  53.7  52.7  u  4.8  37.7  74  10.11 
v.neto  111.7  124.4  122.3  5.2  41.1  53.7  62.7  6.2  4.8  37.7  7.4  10.9 
~  124.5  132.7  130.11  6.3  34.6  511.1  1111.8  6.4  6.7  33.9  111  167 
c-o  107.8  107.8  106.11  5.0  35.0  600  34.0  72  8.1  57.6  131  255 
TQICana  111.9  110.7  1011.8  3.11  34.3  81.8  37.0  7.4  8.5  57.11  13.4  28.11 
Uftlna  116.2  97.9  98.0  6.2  31.3  62.5  21.1  7.7  82  63.0  13.11  27.1 
MlrCne  1042  1064  104.9  68  311.7  545  34.0  6.5  7.1  53.4  121  210 
\.DO  112.1  113.8  113.3  4.6  IU  75.6  29.1  11.1  13.3  72.3  180  470 
Abruzlo.MoiiM  85.1  87.3  87.0  10.2  31.4  58.4  23.8  9.4  10.6  534  14.8  33.6 
Abtuuo  87.5  8&.6  89.5  u  32.5  587  29.1  8.6  8.8  62.7  12.3  28.7 
MoiiM  75.8  786  n.4  15.5  27.1  57.5  3.5  122  17.2  85.0  23.7  411.11 
c.np..a  66.9  65.9  66.3  103  224  57.3  5.11  21.5  26.1  711.3  34.1  64.11 
Sud  66.3  67.3  117.2  12.2  23.6  841  3.8  14.11  20.5  68.5  29.2  49.7 
PugU  70.8  71.1  71.2  11.6  25.2  53.2  4.5  13.2  18.3  70.0  211.4  44.5 
llalolcata  632  611.5  681  13.7  308  554  11.3  15.9  20.6  62.5  30.1  507 
Cllabna  586  5112  591  131  180  611.0  1.3  17.1  24.8  87.6  343  628 
S.C..  67.5  657  663  120  20.1  679  11.8  18.0  24.0  737  33.1  60A 
SaraeQna  738  72.5  740  125  228  647  72  16.2  205  684  29.3  510 
Lu~  (Cif8nd.OucH)  137.3  111.5  1'10.3  2.4  23.3  7U  ....  2.5  2.5  34.1  11  7.2 
Nldlrtlnll  101.1  101.1  101.1  3.5  21.1  -1  1311.1  ...  1.2  4U  u  1.5 
Noor~  1207  1033  1021  49  24'  646  68.6  6.8  588  91  108 
G<OIWIQI"  1789  1340  1296  4 1  24 4  641  684  8.3  536  110  14 7 
Frontand  626  873  875  51  24'  655  632  64  618  8~  107 
Orenme  984  874  880  58  233  641  689  56  633  74  59 
Clost·,._,.,.,  846  929  926  42  24 2  660  1Q50  48  479  64  8' 
~,...  881  936  91,  33  267  639  1022  5'  483  6A  g;, 
GetOeflancl  845  951  945  44  236  6ci5  113.4  46  441  61  ,. 
Ftevatanc!  665  74 9  766  63  184  701  566  51  688  68  au 
We\1~  1090  1150  1140  28  17 2  74  1  969  51  446  67  8; 
Ulreclll  994  1200  1187  18  159  756  911.9  41  292  54  6ti 
Noord.-.c:l  1172  1206  1190  24  169  746  816  53  454  70  9< 
ZUOCI-Hal.lnO  1068  1106  1009  30  171  74 3  I 11  7  5.3  47 2  70  ~G 
Z--.cl  1010  1024  1035  65  254  027  568  46  530  6 I  62 
Zuocl~  92.8  1041  1027  37  272  633  2104  4.8  501  6•  7J 
Noord-Br.a.nt  !147  107  I  1054  39  269  636  259.3  4.6  497  61  74 
Lf'flllurgflli'.t  892  978  97 2  33  280  62a  1120  54  506  7?  7 ~. 
~  10U  112.3  111.3  u  a.a  13.5  ....  .  u  33.0  u  u 
Osalerrec~  1273  1260  60  268  67 2  86.6  46  463  53  64 
BurgetiiWIO  641  715  71  3  82  346  !>7 3  197  3.8  269  5~  57 
""'-Oitetrec~  889  964  948  115  303  582  842  3•  360  44  50 
w.n  1485  1666  165  I  o•  222  774  tOO•  59  539  62  83 
~·-=~  902  892  94  312  594  62,4  51  334  7 1  84 
Karnlen  833  898  897  80  288  632  7111  58  217  84  102 
s-m- 815  904  890  ·too  323  576  872  4.8  396  66  76 
~recn  108  1  1075  65  321  61  4  1157  38  13 7  51  66 
Otlerollerrecn  988  102.2  1009  82  354  564  1144  30  249  40  50 
Salmurg  1132  1213  1214  56  254  690  81.9  3.9  43  49  75 
TrOI  103 I  1078  108 I  55  260  685  95.11  54  ••  14  97 
\lcnflllerg  1088  1125  Ill 9  30  400  570  20111  4.1  166  57  67  .._....  55.1  70.5  70.1  13.3  31.0  55.7  1.7  7JJ  1.7  52.1  7.6  1".5  c- 580  714  710  132  313  554  7.2  6.7  52.3  76  144 
~  51  1  624.  621  116  399  485  4.11  6.9  5411  68  117 
Cnro  41  7  609  598  319  297  385  5.5  3.4  46.6  39  122 
LlltiOe e v•  do Te,o  79.2  885  885  38  252  710  11.7  7.11  !137  115  176 
Alll-.,o  37 I  Sl7  580  ,.2  245  612  11.11  10.4  38.11  159  225 
~  444  70.8  702  118  1116  686  8.2  53.5  99  171 
Al;orel  38.11  500  499  160  21.2  629  3.7  5.4  61.4  10.1  165 
Mldlra  40.2  545  538  125  276  588  4.5  5.4  54.3  52  14 3 
.........  tel  W.7  ....  ....  7.7  %7.3  ....  ,  ...  .  14.1  27.5  13.3  :au 
Mnlll&cm  56  968  1147  7.7  2U  646  1743  14.11  27.6  13.3  32.9 
u..rnu  1211.3  1289  12311  1.4  21.4  767  3071  11.4  31.7  11.6  261 
Ellll&cm  1143  1117  900  76  34.1  579  164.2  .  15.1  28.7  14 .•  32.4 
lta-Suam  53.5  741  74.0  12.5  23.5  638  55.1  18.7  2  ...  5  157  384 
V»&cm  88.5  83.1  817  16•  29.5  54.0  73.0  .  14.11  25.5  14.7  36.1 
~  au  82.7  83.0  9.8  23.8  66.4  17U  .  1U  23.5  159  38.4 
~-mal~  131.9  118.6  119.5  207  15.5  63.8  .  4.6  11.7  4.1  15.8 
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Demography  ecu:- lleglan 
~,..  .,  J)OCIUiaiiCin  aQ.c~:  Eellabanalallllnnwnt  al 25-58 
"populalion 15-64). 18117  I 
~~ 
year OICia "  llllal). 18117 
~ 
Ji 
J  I  I  j  Cl  i  t 
~  •  !  v  ~  IS 
81.11  51.5  71.11  119  36.5  12.6  811.8  17.7  10  33  7  Yallaei'Acllla 
52.2  38.4  81.4  1651  304.7  10.2  81.5  ZJ.3  ..  311  10  lJQIN 
58.3  45.2  71.3  eaee  375.3  13.0  70.7  16.3  57  34  9  Lanbania 
!18.8  48.4  72.11  116M  184.7  13.2  811.4  17.4  !18  33  a·  NorCIEII 
82.3  48.3  78.2  IIIII  67.5  15.8  68.2  18.0  53  311  7  TIW1Iifii.MI Adige 
58.7  48.1  73.4  4453  :M2.5  13.3  811.11  18.8  58  311  II  "-
511.7  48.1  73.4  4453  242.5  13.3  811.11  16.8  81  32  7  "-
83.2  51.2  75.2  31138  178.0  10.8  87.11  21.3  55  311  10  ~II 
58.8  42.11  70.8  5802  141.0  12.1  87.1  20.8  • 
33  II  c.r.o 
58.4  43.0  70.2  31125  153.3  11.6  67.4  21.0  10  32  II  ~  r-.. 
55.0  41.1  811.2  830  98.1  12.6  88.3  21.0  52  311  6  Urlltlna 
56.0  43.9  72.4  1448  1411.3  13.1  68.7  3).2  56  33  II  Marclll 
50.1  34.6  68.4  5217  :1)2.8  14.4  811.7  15.8  50  38  12  LUio 
51.8  38.5  67.4  1601  105.3  15.5  68.0  18.5  58  36  II  Atlruz»Maala 
52.3  38.11  68.1  1274  118.0  15.4  68.2  18.4  58  36  II  Abruuo 
411.6  35.1  64.5  331  74.5  16.0  65.1  111.0  58  34  II  Malila 
38.8  23.5  54.3  5786  425.5  20.4  87.2  12.4  11  3)  II  c.n..na 
40.4  23.5  56.0  11770  152.4  18.6  57.1  14.3  113  a  II  Sucl 
<11.3  23.4  60.1  4088  211.2  18.5  677  13.8  15  27  8  ~ 
42.1  211.6  57.7  8QI  60.8  17.8  68.1  16.1  113  a  7  ~ 
38.2  22.8  53.11  3l74  137.5  19.2  66.0  14.8  10  31  10  CelaiN 
381  19.4  57.6  5101  1984  19.0  66.2  14.8  84  a  a  SicN 
431  26.0  60.5  11163  690  16.1  70.0  13.8  • 
25  7  ~ 
10.3  4U  74.8  411  1110.1  1U  117.4  14.1  • 
Z7  Ill  (GIIIIcWiuciiW) 
111.0  IU  71.7  11131  374.0  1L4  1&.3  1U  34  42  M  Nldlltand 
634  51.9  74.5  1631  1432  181  67.5  14.4  38  45  111  ~ 
612  50.2  71  7  558  188,  16 7  689  14.5  35  44  22  Gronongen 
634  51.0  75.3  614  1069  192  66.7  14,  38  45  17  FNI!and 
66.2  552  770  459  1712  184  670  14.7  35  47  16  Or..-
6711  557  711.8  3214  2929  194  677  129  35  43  21  Call~ 
117~  58.2  782  1058  3088  193  574  13.3  35  411  19'  o..r.t• 
680  558  800  1881  365 7  18 7  68•  132  35  42  Zl  Glldl<1and 
690  531  849  277  1149  24!1  665  g 1  37  45  18  Flelleland 
691  59.1  79.0  7253  6110  18,  682  136  32  41  27  w.t~ 
722  61.2  834  1075  749.5  188  688  12.4  26  38  34  UhChl 
699  61.7  78.1  2472  8QI9  174  691  135  30  42  a  ~ 
677  570  781  3339  9689  18 4  677  13.8  34  41  25  Zuoo--.cl 
671  542  7117  368  1255  185  65.5  161  37  47  16  z.llncl 
676  558  78.9  3432  470.7  180  69.5  12.5  36  42  22  ZUICI Nlellfiii1CI 
683  sao  80.0  2297  452.1  184  696  12.0  34  42  24  NoarO-IIre.nt 
1162  55.2  787  1135  513 7  172  692  136  40  41  111  _l.lnl:lutg{N) 
17.a  11.1  7U  -
11.1  17.5  17.3  15.2  21  •  • 
~ 
664  609  759  3395  1441  162  673  16.5  24  65  11  OllolllriKh 
662  589  75.2  275  694  162  664  17.4  35  58  6  Burgrollnd 
69.6  61.1  77.8  1524  795  17.5  664  18.1  25  ee  7  NolcllrOIWIIIC~ 
67.7  81.3  742  1595  38443  15.0  664  111.6  22  113  15  W.n 
65.0  54.8  75.2  1770  663  174  66.8  15.8  Zl  71  6  SUciOIIIn'tocll 
634  529  74.1  563  590  17.9  665  15.6  20  75  6  KIINn 
65.7  558  75.7  1207  73 7  17 1  689  15.11  24  70  6  Slltlmwk 
689  595  78.3  2894  842  191  676  13.4  27  66  7  ~ 
6118  10.8  78.7  1381  1153  189  670  141  28  65  7  Otleo011111a0C11 
69.5  616  17.7  sal  712  18 7  68.2  13.1  Zl  87  10  Salzlug 
1168  58.8  716  660  522  1112  679  12.8  25  87  7  Torol 
589  584  811  344  1323  201  683  11.8  32  111  7  ~ 
17A  ....  77JJ  1127  1CILO  17.1  17.7  14.7  71  12  12  ........ 
678  59.1  771  114a  106.2  17.3  67.9  14.8  78  12  12  eonw-
1167  5611  75.1  3538  1663  194  683  12.3  80  10  10  Nolle 
at•  73.5  110.0  1711  723  166  657  17.7  81  9  10  Cenlro 
63.5  545  732  3312  2776  159  68.4  14.7  68  17  18  UIIXIU Y.  dO T.,o 
625  48.3  77.3  522  194  15.2  83.9  3)11  82  9  8  .-., 
64.7  52.9  762  346  69.3  16.4  654  18.1  113  11  5  AlgiM 
56.5  40.5  77.1  242  103.9  23.9  113.11  12..2  84  II  6  Al;cral 
63.3  54.7  73.2  258  3309  2U  667  12.0  15  10  5  Mallin 
12.2  11.2  IL2  1121  15.2  11.0  IL7  14.3  37  43  11  .............. 
82.2  59.2  65.2  !01111  15.1  19.0  66.7  14.3  27  51  21  Mliww.suam 
87.8  85.3  70.5  1335  128.3  111.0  69.5  11.5  25  48  27  ~ 
625  58.1  88.8  1797  309  17.11  116.3  15.11  211  51  20  EIINuamo 
54.7  53.5  55.8  703  8.3  18.8  65.4  15.8  a  54  18  lll&cmi 
61.0  57.8  64.2  706  15.1  19.8  845  15.7  211  53  18  VIIi-Suomi 
57.3  54.5  60.1  558  4.1  22.0  65.8  12.3  Zl  57  20  ~ 
75.8  63.5  82.6  2S  16.2  19.0  85.5  18.3  32  54  t!l  ~-.a 
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Region  Econamy  L8llour ,.,.... 
GCP"'-1 (PPS).  Empioynwnl by MCiar  ~,.  .. 








!  i 
..  ...  ill 
! 
f  I  J 
!  I 
J  1  I  ~ 
!I  !  j  J  ~ 
w  .....  111.1  101.2  1110.3  1.1  ...  70.1  triA  .  tOA  AI  1.7  21.1 
Slcx:kllclm  132.6  123.1  122.1  o.6  16.4  82.9  311.6  7.11  31.8  7.2  1S.2 
0..  MIIIIII'Mgl  IOU  92.4  91.0  3.8  28.6  87.4  18U  .  10.2  30.8  11.7  22.8 
Smlllnd Mid'*'- 108.6  98.8  117.4  5.7  34.0  803  IIU  8.8  33.8  11.1  17.6 
~  104.3  92.11  112.5  4.0  2S.9  70.2  197.1  .  11.9  38.2  11.8  23.2 
VllliVIngl  111.3  97.6  98.8  3.1  28.0  68.8  183.4  10.4  311.1  10.2  20.7 
Narrll MIIII•  ..  QI  103.0  97.0  Q&.l  3.7  30.4  eu  1S4.4  .  12.3  27.7  11.0  31.1 
MIIIIIIINorMncl  110.8  99:3  88.4  5.1  28.0  6U  2).2  13.0  32.2  10.1  31.1 
Oft  NorMncl  109.2  911.!1  97.5  2.4  23.5  73.8  148.5  .  13.3  34.3  10.3  32.2 
Unllld ICingclom  ....  ...  -.o  1.1  ...  71.1  7U  11.0  7.1  a2  u  t:U 
Narll  87.6  87.2  86.2  1.7  31.3  86.7  .  14.5  11.3  40.4  6.8  18.0 
~.Ourtwn  83.5  82.7  81.8  1.0  32.8  65.9  15.3  9.8  39.7  7.0  18.7 
~  101.0  101.3  101.5  8.3  31.5  81.9  .  1.1  u  35.4  S5  13.7 
NcllrunbeltMd. Trn-lftd  W...  86.6  88.1  84.8  0.5  30.1  81.2  .  1S.7  u  42.3  7.1  11.0 
YOiklln lftd  IUnbnicll  112.3  811.4  86.3  1.S  30.0  &8.4  .  12.3  7.1  35.6  6.3  16.2 
Hll'nDit1ldl  92.6  94.8  112.7  1.11  34.4  83.4  .  13.5  8.7  32.0  7.2  18.4 
Narll YOiklln  102.7  100.5  99.3  4.5  24.1  71.5  .  1.0  4.8  30.5  4.4  1.4 
Sol.ch Ycrlllhft  84.8  74.4  73.7  0.4  32.0  67.5  .  15.7  10.0  38.8  7.8  11.8 
Wwl Ycrlllhft  113.8  112.5  91.8  0.7  :5.3  81.7  11.2  7.4  36.1  5.7  15.3 
EMIMoclnll  911.2  94.1  113.7  1.8  33.5  648  1.11  6.0  35.11  4.1  12.1 
Oerbyslice, Notlingl•ull.,.  92.7  89.7  88.7  I. I  34.4  84.3  .  11.2  7.1  38.5  5.1  14.2 
~.  Nartwnplcnlln  101.6  1017  102.1  1.3  34.9  83.7  .  7.11  4.8  33.5  4.1  11.5 
LincC*llhn  88.4  8118  811.2  5.6  26.5  67.7  10.5  5.7  30.2  5.1  11.3 
Ea!Angtoa  98.9  Sl9.5  98.3  35  27.7  884  .  8.0  S.5  32.5  4.9  10.4 
SaoAII EM! (UK)  116.1  1178  114.7  1.1  21.1  777  8.1  u  40.11  58  11.6 
a.dlcrCIII'IIte. HelllotOIIwe  103.3  102.2  5197  0.9  249  738  6.1  4.1  35.1  36  7.6 
Elelkllwe. Buclunglwnllwe. Oxfords/we  1059  1237  1202  19  241  73.9  4.11  3.2  318  2.7  5.7 
Surrey. Eat-Well~  1134  1045  5193  16  206  n6  5.3  4.1  384  3.5  7.1 
Essex  849  872  848  15  270  714  7.4  5.7  378  50  105 
Gt-LondOn (UK)  1475  1404  1384  03  157  837  108  97  445  87  166 
~  •. l  ...  oiWglll  1016  1035  972  16  259  72.4  7.6  47  384  39  86 
Kent  864  918  902  18  255  727  8.3  63  354  5.3  121 
SaoAII Wesl (Ukl  930  946  933  32  254  712  8.6  5.7  34.4  49  11.0 
Avan. ~.  Wlltshtre  1037  IQI8  1059  Ill  263  71.6  7.7  5.0  347  4.3  92 
eor.-.o.van  818  !Kit  79.9  5.0  24 I  10.1  10.8  7.3  341  8.3  15.0 
Oorllel. Sometlel  888  878  880  35  25.3  109  7.5  51  34.6  43  9.2 
Will Modlandl  897  934  917  19  343  637  t2.3  70  311.1  59  140 
Hetetord & WOrCIItlf. WIIWICklhora  83.1  1000  961  2.8  298  67.2  8.!1  4.8  31.0  4.2  9.4 
Slvopllwe.~  841  881  84.7  3.1  35.0  618  10.0  4.!1  291  4.2  10.2 
Wilt Mocllftdll (Ccully)  9118  1134  937  05  363  62.9  15.0  11.4  442  78  1711 
Narll Well (Uk)  91.9  89.8  88.4  0.8  29.0  101  13.3  7.7  357  5.!1  16.0 
Chnhre  102.1  1133  1106  1.2  300  &87  .  10.8  .5.4  29.2  ..  11.5 
~I.Wic,..,  9!.0  91.3  89.8  0.4  29.1  104  12.8  7.4  338  5.6  15.2 
~  864  878  86.4  1.7  310  671  11.1  5.7  26.0  43  11.8 
MlrMysade  858  731  725  0.1  253  74.2  18.2  121  44.9  91  24.7 
W8ln  829  83.0  82.0  3.4  28.7  676  12.8  7.5  35.5  5.8  148 
Clwyd, [)yted, Gwynedd, Powyl  IK).t  1Kl7  79.4  7.4  267  655  12.5  7.2  36.3  5.8  139 
co-.t Mod-Scai!MV.II GIM>arQBn  848  844  837  0.8  300  88.9  12.11  7.8  34.1  5.7  15.3 
ScciW1d  !124  983  98.8  2.7  26.8  104  14.8  8.0  32.6  6.2  15.2 
Sardft.Cinltll.fole-Lollloln-Tllyllde  94.6  1037  100.11  2.7  257  714  13.1  7.3  314  57  14.4 
Dllnlnea And a.ttow..y, S~llftelyde  118.0  902  89.5  13  2611  718  16.8  11.3  34.5  69  17.2 
HogNands. llllndl  862  !Kit  79.7  56  263  88.1  13.8  8.4  31.2  7.4  13.4 
~  1216  1260  124.8  6.t·  30.3  631  10.0  4.8  24.5  44  9.6 
Narllllm  lretrod  768  811  1Kl.2  52  27.0  6U  18.8  10.3  58.7  76  166 
,., average GDPihHd 1994·95·96 •  74.96 
F (DOM): GOP  1SIB6 ana 1994 figures: PfJP(JiatiOfl by age class  1992; unemployment  t996 
FIN: ~tent  applicatiOns:  t995 
Source: Ecxostst, REGIO: DGXVI calculatiOflS 
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Demography  Edue.lbon  Regoon 
EmplOyment rate  % populiltoon agad:  Educ8toonal attainment ol  25-59 
(% I)OOUiation 15-64), 1997  ~ 
year oldt ('!1. total).  11197 
f~ 
~  ·- 'C 
~i 
1  j  §i 
i  a  I 
a..  l  t  "'  '!! 
+  !  ...  :I  v  :a 
V.7  15.0  70.3  1141  21.5  18.8  13.7  17.1  Zl  • 
21  ...... 
68.1  66.8  69.4  1735  2673  18.6  66.3  15.0  17  45  38  Slad<llolm 
67.6  &1.5  70.5  1500  39.0  19.1  63.6  17.3  24  50  26  Oan~nga 
71.2  68.9  75.4  793  242  19.3  61.8  18.9  30  47  23  Srnillnd Med o.ma 
66.0  62.1  69.8  1265  906  18.4  63.5  18.1  25  48  27  ~ 
68.8  65.1  72.3  1770  592  19.3  633  17.5  24  49  26  Vlati..,IQB 
65.0  61.8  67.9  860  13 4  18.4  62.0  19.5  24  55  21  Norra Mlll-.-.ge 
69.0  699  68.2  393  55  18.0  62.2  19.8  24  ~  23  Melletllll Narr1and 
&1.6  642  64.9  525  34  192  64.1  167  20  55  26  0\IRE Narr1and 
70.7  13.1  77.1  51801  243.2  11.3  14.1  15.7  45  32  Zl  Unlllcl Kingdom 
651  :.g.2  70.9  3091  2005  192  646  16.2  47  34  19  Narll 
65.6  594  71.9  1166  3853  200  648  15.3  47  34  19  o-land. Ourn.n 
703  633  77.1  491  719  182  641  17.7  4()  41  19  Cl.mlnl 
62.9  577  66.0  143.5  2578  1119  64.7  164  50  31  19  Narthurnllerland, Tyne and We81 
1182  619  74.4  5036  3268  195  646  15.9  46  33  21  Yari<IIW W  H161'108<11de 
658  57.5  73.8  887  2528  196  64.1  16.3  47  33  20  l-kl'nberlldl 
75.8  676  &1.0  735  884  180  64.2  17.9  4()  34  26  Narll Yorklhore 
615  56.5  66.2  1305  8369  191  649  16.0  50  32  19  Sou1ll Yorklhore 
707  649  765  2109  10370  202  64.9  14.9  46  33  21  Welt Yorklhore 
734  668  79.8  4141  2650  192  650  15.8  47  32  21  Easl Miclandl 
711  647  77.3  1994  4163  189  65 I  15.9  46  32  22  Oerbylhore, Noltlnglllmahtre 
763  687  837  1532  311  5  200  65 5  146  46  32  20  L-111We,l\lol1lllmplonl 
732  686  779  616  1040  180  633  18 7  50  33  18  L.inCalnlhore 
736  660  811  2142  1'04  186  642  17 2  45  34  21  EutAnglta 
733  658  8J6  18120  6656  192  659  149  «  29  27  Saulh East (UK) 
772  698  &14  1565  544 2  200  659  14  1  39  34  27  lledlordtrwe. Helllardshtre 
8JO  71  7  877  2066  3598  199  67 3  129  39  31  30  Belkshore. ~.  Oxtordshtre 
773  710  838  2519  461  4  178  631  191  4()  32  28  Surrey, Eaat·West Suuex 
72 7  638  812  1586  431  6  169  o4 3  163  52  32  17  Essex 
690  621  759  7074  4403'  ~9  ~  673  133  45  24  31  Greaaer t..ondon (UK) 
74 7  670  825  1753  42: 5  '3G  650  160  43  34  23  Hampa/11'8, ISle ol Wight 
725  637  814  1557  41.. CJ  192  642  165  46  33  21  Kent 
760  69 I  829  4842  ;103 2  '8'  633  186  41  35  24  Saulh West (UK) 
765  71  8  849  2134  2&'  188  65G  163  4()  33  27  Avon. Gleueeltershwe. WlltiiWe 
722  654  791  1543  150 3  17 8  622  200  42  37  21  eom...n. Devon 
764  691  838  1165  1908  1  ~ 5  6t6  ZIO  40  36  24  Dorset, Somerset 
706  621  789  5317  400 A  1'.!~  64 6  15 5  50  30  21  WHIModandl  -
78  1  692  864  1197  2028  18 6  65  I  16 3  0  28  29  Hereford & Worce1111r. WiiiWICI<anore 
724  637  81  1  1477  2:Jd  '  19  I  656  15 3  47  34  19  snrop.twe. StaltofdShtle 
660  579  740  2642  293;1 3  207  639  154  54  29  17  WEST Mtdl8ndl (County) 
676  613  738  6401  8716  ;100  644  156  47  32  22  North Welt (UK) 
71  I  637  785  980  42\)4  194  &54  1~2  42  32  26  Chnllu• 
67 2  607  735  2576  ;zoo;!,  7  20~  646  148  48  31  21  are-!Mnct'telltlr 
716  652  n8  1425  41;·1  '  136  637  166  45  34  21  t.rca~~We 
61  7  57 I  66~  1420  21686  ;.>OC  639  161  50  31  20  Me<leysld8 
663  602  723  2921  140'  195  632  17 3  49  30  20  WeiH 
680  612  '746  1134  662  186  625  189  47  32  22  Clwyd, Oyted. GwyNdd, Powys 
652  597  709  1767  4')1 z  201  6:16  163  51  29  20  G-.~  Mld·Souti>-Welt Gl8norgan 
680  621  740  5128  665  188  660  152  38  J8  25  Scclla.tc! 
704  640  n1  1891  10!> 9  18 3  662  156  37  37  26  Bordeti-Gentrai-F1W~Tayi!Oe 
634  588  681  2425  1219  191  658  151  4()  38  22  Oumtnea and Geltoway, Strathelyde 
739  685  791  280  92  19&  647  15 5  34  39  28  ~.IslandS 
77  1  67 5  858  531  610  190  670  140  35  36  29  Gr.nPan 
642  570  71.~  1663  1234  234  634  12 7  44  36  20  Norlllllrn Ireland 
UK {Wales): popu/attOn by age class  1995 
Eaucat1onat al/ainrnent.  1997 labour torco survey 
(accordmg to ISCED ctassrfrcattOn  lOw  = loss man ISCED 3.  med1um =  ISCED 3; h1gh ,. /SCED 5, 6 and 7) 
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